India in the 17th Century
(Social, Economic and Political)
Memoirs of François Martin
(1670-1694)
Crest of the French East India Company, 1664
—Courtesy Musée de la Marine, Paris
To

R., R. and M.
NOTE

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Introduction

François Martin was an employee of the French East India Company. He arrived at Surat on 10 March 1669 and died at Pondicherry on 30 October 1706. Unfortunately, very few personal details about him are known. A manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (Nouvelles Acquisitions, 9352, 3-5) offers some biographical information.

François Martin was the natural son of Gilles Martin, being born of Peronne Gosselin in 1634. His paternal family members seem to have been associated with eastern trade from an early period. The child’s grandfather, also called François, had an abundant knowledge about eastern products while Gilles Martin owned a spice shop at Les Halles, in Paris. Gilles Martin was not an indifferent parent and took considerable interest in ensuring that his son, François, received adequate training for a business career. Gilles Martin died in 1650. Three years after his death, in September 1653, François Martin was issued formal papers of legitimisation.

The death of Gilles Martin forced François Martin to earn his own livelihood and he took service with a grocer. At the age of twenty-eight or twenty-nine, he married Marie Couperly. He had three daughters by her, Marguerite, Marie and Agnes. Financial stringency compelled him to take service with the “Compagnie des Indes Orientales” which had come into being as a result of a Royal Charter on 1 September 1664. Joining with the rank of under-merchant, he rose in 1667 to that of merchant. His subsequent career may be traced without any difficulty in the text of the Memoirs.

François Martin left France on 1 March 1665 having embarked on the “Aigle Blanc” at Brest for Madagascar. After a
sojourn of four years at Madagascar he took his departure for Surat. The Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb, had issued a firman to the French East India Company on 4 September 1666 by which the Company was to be allowed to establish a counter at Suvali. In 1668, this counter was shifted from Suvali to Surat and it was to this establishment that Martin was now being despatched. With the exception of a short period from 17 April to 21 November 1669 when François Martin was to engage on a voyage to the Red Sea region, and the period September 1693 to February 1694 which he spent in captivity as a Dutch prisoner of war, François Martin lived out the remaining portion of his life in India. François Martin died at Pondicherry on 30 October 1706. He was buried at this settlement which he had done so much to develop. A tomb was erected over his grave but, unfortunately, no trace of it remains today. According to Madame Y.R. Gaebélé, it was blown to smithereens during one of the recurrent outbreaks of hostility between the French and the English in India.

The personality revealed through the Diary is that of a man wholly preoccupied by his duties with little taste for ostentation, luxury or glory. One has to bear with certain of his prejudices such as his conscious sense of superiority over the peoples of India by virtue of being a European and a Frenchmen, his disdain of Hindu polytheism while according a slightly higher position to Islam, added to his intense pride in the pre-eminence of the Roman Catholic religion. Being wholly activated by the profit motive, his castigations with regard to the indigenous mercantile community, the workers and more particularly, members of the Brahmin caste, can be accepted only with a degree of reservation. Having taken all this into consideration one cannot but be overwhelmed by the scope of his Diary, touching as it does on many aspects of the social, economic and political life of the time.

For thirty years, starting from the period of his departure from France, François Martin maintained a day-to-day record in which he chronicled events with meticulous care. His work, was, however, essentially a private record rather than an official memorandum and Martin offers no clarification as to why he was compiling these Memoirs. He may have intended to publish
his Diary after retirement from service. The Company, however, was extremely reluctant to release him and he died in harness at Pondicherry. His failure to return to France may have prevented him from taking the steps necessary to secure the publication of his manuscript.

François Martin revised his text on several occasions—in 1676, 1684-1685 and 1696 respectively. The last revision was executed, at best, in an imperfect manner. While some entries were redrafted and brought up to date, others were allowed to remain in their original form. Despite this drawback, the narrative of François Martin can still be rated as highly reliable for the Diarist takes considerable care to attest to the veracity of his sources. When Martin uses material obtained at second-hand, he takes great pains to append the date when the material was obtained, the source, and the degree of authenticity that may be ascribed to it. The document in its final form was entitled “Mémoires sur l'établissement des colonies françaises aux Indes Orientales”, covering the period 1664-1694. The only material for the period 1694-1706 is fragmentary in form. Martin wrote two documents entitled “Journal du 21 Février 1701 au 15 Février 1702” and “Journal du 18 Février 1702 au 31 Janvier 1703” dealing with the occurrences of the period. These unpublished manuscripts (Colonies, c2 66. f. 15-49,154-171) are to be found at the Archives Nationales, Paris.

The text of the Memoirs is housed at the Archives Nationales, Paris (T 1169, 631 folios). Although these Memoirs are not penned by Martin himself, he took care to ensure textual accuracy, inserting marginal notes in his own hand. This text was published at Pondicherry by A. Martineau in a three-volume work entitled Mémoires de François Martin, printed in 1931, 1932 and 1934 respectively. The only changes introduced in the text by A. Martineau were the transformation of the seventeenth century language into a more contemporary idiom, the division of the material into chapters and the introduction of sub-headings to facilitate the task of reference.

A copy of the Mémoires at the Archives Nationales was made by A. Margry and kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. This work has not yet been published. Martineau makes it quite clear that he has followed the original Mémoires rather
than the Margry copy. The importance of making the *Mémoires* available as source material to scholars has been realised from an early date. S.N. Sen, in his work entitled, *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji* (The Book Company, Calcutta, 1927, pp. 261-354), translated the portion dealing with the invasion of the Carnatic by Shivaji. Jadunath Sarkar worked in the same field and elaborated further on the period spent by Raja Ram at Gingee on the basis of the same source. (Jadunath Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, M.C. Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 3rd edition 1955, pp. 193-4, 234-49.) These translations, however, constitute a very small portion of the work as a whole.

The present work has been sponsored by the University Grants Commission and the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi. An annotated translation in English of the first portion of the *Mémoires* covering the period 1664-1670 is to be published by Dr. Anirudha Ray, University of Calcutta. The present work covers the text of the Diary extending from 1670 to 1694 as published by A. Martineau which has been annotated and translated into English. Editing has been avoided as the work is intended as primary source material. In the format which has been adopted for the present work, page numbers inserted on the right hand margin alongside the text denote pagination of the original publication by A. Martineau. With regard to sequence of chapters, the first chapter in the present work corresponds to the fifth chapter of the document as published by A. Martineau, but any other textual change has been assiduously avoided. Where alterations in nomenclature have been introduced for greater textual clarity, these have been duly brought to the notice of the reader. The introduction, along with the illustrations and maps do not form part of the *Mémoires* as published by A. Martineau.

The years 1670 to 1681 are covered in the first volume. The second volume carries the narrative down to the year 1694. The first volume corresponds to chapters V to XI, and XII to XVIII of A. Martineau, *Mémoires de François Martin*, Volumes I, II, respectively. The period which saw the establishment of the Company at Surat marked its expansion into other areas also. A counter was established at Rajapur on the Konkan coast in 1668. On 9 December 1669 Abdullah Qutb Shah issued a firman
according the Company the right to establish a counter at Masulipatam. In the same year, a counter was also established at Mirjan on the Malabar coast, but in 1670, business operations were shifted from Mirjan to Tellicherry.

Martin describes the men into whose hands the nascent fortunes of the French Company in India had been entrusted. Three figures emerge clearly—Caron, de la Haye and Baron.

Caron, who remained at the helm from 1668 to 1672 was greatly trusted by the Directors at Paris. He had originally been in the service of the Dutch Company, but having been passed over in the choice of the office of Director-General at Batavia, he had joined the French Company. He had grandiose ambitions and hoped to utilize the experience he had gained in Dutch service to slice away a substantial portion of the trade of his erstwhile masters. It was with this end in view that he personally engaged in a voyage to Bantam and advocated the Ceylon adventure to de la Haye. Caron failed to achieve his objective but Martin’s castigations belittle the real achievement of Caron in registering the French presence over an area stretching from Gombroon or Bandar Abbas in the west to Bantam in the east.

The character of Baron emerges with a quiet sense of authority, but this quality alone was insufficient to galvanise the Company and provide it with the necessary impetus to enable it to surmount the obstacles in its path. The exigencies of the European war which all but severed the umbilical cord binding the Company in India to the administration at Paris, provides only a partial answer to his lack of success. Despite Baron’s undisputed business acumen, he lacked the vision and the drive to enable the Company in India to do more than just survive the innumerable difficulties with which it was beset.

The information given by Martin with regard to the expedition of de la Haye is quite invaluable. The Diarist shows himself remarkably free of rancour despite the shabby treatment to which he was subjected by the Admiral. The military ability of de la Haye and his undoubted qualities of leadership are stressed but Martin is quite forthright in criticising the poor sense of judgement shown by the Admiral. The failure of the expedition could, in fact, be largely attributed to the many ill-considered decisions of de la Haye.
Apart from the difficulties which the French had to face in attempting to establish themselves in a new market, a reading of the Memoirs also reveals the other pressures and constraints under which the Company had to operate. A permanent feature of European trade in India during this period was the attempt made by each Company to corner the market for itself. In the event of the emergence of any dichotomy between overseas mercantile interests and European diplomatic alignments the logic of the former proved a far more compulsive factor than that of the latter. This was clearly demonstrated in the stance adopted by the English at the time of the presence of de la Haye at San Thome, as also at a later date during the war of the League of Augsburg.

Participation in Indian trade during the seventeenth century necessarily involved engagement in the commerce of what may be loosely termed as that of the Indian Ocean. Western India had trade links with the entire East African coastline starting from the Cape and stretching beyond Africa into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. As far as Persia was concerned, the French had a special interest in maintaining a foothold here because of the importance of this kingdom in commanding the land route to Europe. To the south of India lay the East Indies and Ceylon, both areas coming under the increasing domination of the Dutch. The East Indies was also linked both to the trade of the region around the Bay of Bengal from the Coromandel to Tenasserim as also to that of China and Japan. Westward of this lay yet another tentacle linking the Philippines to the Spanish Main by means of the treasure ship despatched each year from Acapulco to Manila. The references found scattered in the Memoirs throw into sudden relief various aspects of this vast network of trade. Inevitably, the different systems of mensuration and numismatics prevailing in these regions are given incidental notice. References to the African sector are relatively few. This is understandable as François Martin was more concerned with the Dutch and English presence than with Portuguese activities.

Apart from the insights provided by Martin into European involvement in the trade of the Orient, considerable details are also provided with regard to local political conditions. During
this period political boundaries in the Deccan underwent considerable change. The Mughal thrust into the Deccan dramatised by Akbar's absorption of Khandesh and spoliation of Ahmednagar had been continued and carried further by Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Having wiped Ahmednagar out of existence in 1633, Shah Jahan gave priority to consolidation rather than further expansion. He wished to stabilise imperial frontiers in the Deccan rather than hazard renewed confrontation with Bijapur, Golconda, or the Marathas who had come to the fore as champions of the defunct Nizamshahi dynasty. With this in mind, Shah Jahan fostered a three-cornered set of agreements between the Emperor and Bijapur, the Emperor and Golconda, and the Adil Shah and Qutbshah. As a result of the Tripartite Treaty which thus emerged, it was agreed that the existing boundaries between the three kingdoms would be mutually respected.

Although this treaty acted as a stabilising factor in the northern portion of the Deccan, it was to have the very obverse effect in the south. With the decline of the Vijayanagar Empire, particularly after the battle of Talikota in 1565, conditions became increasingly unsettled in the south. Sometime between the years 1399 to 1420, Yadu Raja, who had secured the title of Wodiyar, founded a principality based at Mysore. In the early years, Mysore was included within the Vijayanagar Empire, the overlord of the Wodiyar chieftains being the Viceroy of Vijayanagar at Srirangapatnam. In 1610, Raja Wodiyar captured Srirangapatnam and included it within his own dominions around Mysore. In 1612, the Vijayanagar Emperor, Venkatapati Raya, a member of the Aravidu dynasty ruling over a considerably attenuated empire accorded formal recognition to the conquest of Raja Wodiyar. Although the authority of Vijayanagar was formally recognised until as late as 1668, the de facto independence of Mysore is to be traced to the year 1610.

With regard to other possessions of the Aravidu dynasty, it may be asserted that although units such as Gingee, Madura and Tanjore never asserted their independence, they existed as virtually autonomous units within the empire, the interests of the Emperor never being allowed to act as an undue constraint on the ambitions of the local Governor or Nayak. The Vijayanagar
Empire was, therefore, crumbling from within, when Golconda and Bijapur, having accepted a durable northern boundary, turned southwards in an attempt to satiate their urge for expansion.

Bijapur and Golconda engaged in a series of invasions as a result of which the possessions of Vijayanagar in the Carnatic were in effect divided between the two powers. The territory of Golconda extended down the Gingelly coast up to the river Pallar, and included Pulicat, Madras and San Thomé. The territories acquired by Bijapur covered a much vaster area, the southernmost limit being reached in Madura. Madura and Tanjore were allowed to enjoy virtual autonomy while the remaining portion was directly annexed. Sher Khan and Nasir Muhammad were appointed to administer the Adilshahi coastal possessions from their respective capitals at Valikondapuram and Gingee. Had the Nayaks of Gingee, Tanjore and Madura co-operated with the Vijayanagar King, Sri Ranga Raya, or had the king himself possessed a greater degree of vision, the advance of the two Deccani sultanates could have been stalled if not checked. The Hindu potentates were, however, unable to present a united front. With the death of Sri Ranga Raya in about 1677, the Aravidu dynasty came to an unlamented end. The only regions in the southern part of the Deccan which remained untouched by the southward expansion of Bijapur and Golconda were Mysore, the Malabar coast and the Travancore region.

With regard to Mysore, it is of interest to note that the Bangalore region absorbed by Bijapur from the Vijayanagar empire was entrusted by the Adilshahi General, Randaullah Khan, to his staunch lieutenant, Shahji, a Maratha. Despite his protracted absence in the south, Shahji did not neglect his ancestral domains making sure that his son Shivaji developed strong links in the Poona-Chakan region. He kept his second son, Ekkoji with him and it was on this son that the property of Shahji in the Carnatic was to devolve.

Martin was unaware of this multiplicity of factors which moulded the political situation in the south and was quite pragmatic in his approach. For this reason, perhaps, his responses have a freshness which may have been lacking had he possessed
a more comprehensive knowledge of the balance of forces on which the foreigners had to base their trade. His narrative makes it quite clear that although the Adilshahi and the Qutb-shahi administrations may have left much to be desired, there was no cleavage between the central structure and the Carnatic possessions of these potentates despite the increasing chaos in the central machinery. This is to be contrasted with the Diarist’s impressions of the Mughal machinery of administration, for Martin is led to remark that during the latter portion of the reign of Aurangzeb, provincial Governors showed an inordinate interest in laying the basis of future autonomy.

The information given by Martin with regard to the invasion of the Carnatic by Shivaji is of great interest. The demands made by the new administration on the French inevitably coloured Martin’s impressions and this bias has to be borne in mind in sifting the material to be found relating to this episode in the Memoirs. The personality of Shivaji is etched very lightly but even the shadowy figure which emerges puts all other figures in the drama, including that of his chief adversary, Sher Khan, into the shade.

An interesting feature of the Memoirs is that the Diarist never makes use of generic terms which, in the Indian context, could be taken to convey a sense of national, regional or ethnic unity in a broader sense. The term maratha for instance is used very sparingly. People are classified, more often than not, in accordance with the allegiance owed to a particular potentate, rather than because of any other consideration. This aspect of catholicity in state employment, particularly in the field of trade, was a notable feature of the modalities of social life in pre-European India.

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General Affairs:
October 1670-January 1672

Results of the Marcara Episode in India

October 1670

I will now return to my narrative. Repercussions followed in the wake of the Marcara affair. A Persian "chassemoulla" now came forward claiming that he had presented Marcara with a horse in the hope of obtaining something in return but had been disappointed in this expectation. He now wished the horse to be restored to him. The officials who had involved themselves in this episode also expected some gift. We rejected the claim made by the chassemoulla, and asked the others to wait until our ships had arrived. The only problem with which we had to deal, and which caused us considerable trouble, was the bill for 900 pagodas. After the expiry of the four months, they were pressing us for payment. We evaded the issue as long as possible, hoping to receive some directive from Caron, but Caron was quite unconcerned and did not write anything to us. At last, three months after the expiry date, knowing that the King had issued orders to force us to pay, we discharged the debt. We were also cognizant of the fact that there was some justice in this demand.

November 1670

Between 5 and 6 November, a severe storm occurred. Of the four

1Chassemoulla may be identified with chabuk-suwar, a horse breaker.
ships anchored at the Masulipatam roads, three were grounded. A single cable retained the fourth at its moorings but its destruction was virtually certain.

Since we had received no orders and were totally bereft of money, we stayed idle in the counter while the English and Dutch busied themselves with their commercial affairs which brought them such rich returns.

The Company Upholds the Authority of the Director, Caron

On 21 November we received letters from Surat which brought us very important news.

As far as the Company was Concerned, the most important item was that three ships had arrived from Fort Dauphin. Of these, one was the “Saint Paul”, which, according to the packets received in Surat in April, had left France during the current year. This ship brought out the King’s envoy, M. Dépréaux Mercey, who was carrying the Decree of the Council of State by which the action taken by the Council of Fort Dauphin against Caron was nullified. Dépréaux had left a copy of the Decree at Fort Dauphin after which he had continued on his way to Surat. The packet addressed to M. Caron was handed over to him here and the Director found that he had received every vindication he could have desired. They were so firmly convinced in France that only Caron could establish the Company on a proper footing and guide it to prosperity in India, that they were even willing to go so far, if I may be so bold so as to say so, as to support him in his wicked ways. His position was further fortified by this Decree in his favour. He began to act in an even more arbitrary manner, and no one in Surat dared oppose him.

The two ships sent by the Company with the “Saint Paul” were hookers. Two days later the “Saint François”, which as I have already mentioned, had been left behind at Batavia,

\*The Council of State was the most important of the Councils organised by Louis XIV.

\*The word given in the text is houcre which could be taken to correspond with hourgre.
View of Surat roads and fort
-Courtesy Surat Municipal Corporation
arrived, while another vessel, the "Vautour", also put in. The two ships brought in a considerable amount of capital and had these funds been placed at the disposal of a better man than Caron a very profitable cargo could have been sent back to France. With the arrival of these ships the Director gained sufficient funds to enable him to give adequate support to the counters on the Malabar coast and at Manulipatam. However, he refused to do so and persisted in his earlier plan which, as I have said before, he had drawn up with the advice of the courtier. The intention of the two men was to restrict all Company enterprise to Surat so that all matters would be channelized through their hands.

A ship which had been sent to Moka returned to Surat with only marginal profits. This was not surprising, as the merchandise which had been sent out on behalf of the Company had been 25 per cent to 30 per cent above the market price. There were still a few people at the Surat counter who had belonged to the anti-Caron faction. This vindictive man knew very well how to make these people rue what they had done against him in the past and was not sparing in his harsh treatment of them.

The "Marie" and the "Force" which had been sent from Surat at the beginning of the year had arrived at Fort Dauphin. Mondevergue had boarded the "Marie" to return to France. The two ships had then set sail, but at the Cape of Good Hope they had encountered a violent storm. Mondevergue took fright and on his own authority, in disregard of the advice tendered by the Captain and the officers, had ordered the ship to turn back, and the "Marie" had reanchored at Fort Dauphin. The "Force" had continued and had been able to return to France along with the "Sommaque", which was

The Dutch records mention a third ship, the "St. François" which was associated with this voyage. In May 1670 the "St. François" had anchored at the Cape having sailed in from Surat via Madagascar. It had left Madagascar along with the "Force" and the "Marie" on 15 April 1670. The "St. François" had obviously got separated from its two companion ships and after awaiting their arrival at the Cape, it finally sailed back to France without them. Dagh Register Gehoudeen int Casteel Batavia, Batavia (henceforth cited as D.R.), 19, p. 183; cf. P. Kaeppelin, La Compagnie des Indes Orientales at François Martin, Paris, 1908, p. 654.
Sack of Surat by the Marathas

Now I will give news of a more general nature. The famous Raja Shivaji had sent 4000 to 5000 men to attack Surat—the majority of them being poorly armed. It would have been easy for the Mughal officers to oppose these ill-accoutered troops, but they retired into the city with all their men. The enemy entered the city and during the three or four days that they spent there, collected considerable booty of gold, silver precious stones and merchandise. Before retiring, they set fire to several parts of the city. Our lodge was spared from any attack. Caron had tried to preclude this possibility by sending an envoy with a present to the General commanding the troops of Shivaji. This in itself would have proved ineffective but fortunately for us, a few days prior to the attack, some of our ships had arrived and Caron had been able to position well-armed men drawn from these vessels for the defense of the lodge. It was the presence of these men which made Shivaji’s soldiers desist from the attack. Despite this, we lost three Frenchmen who were unintentionally killed by random shots. The English lodge was attacked, but it was well defended and the thieves could do little here. The Dutch counter was at some distance from the richer section of the town. The enemy did not proceed that far and the Dutch were saved from any depredation. The majority of the inhabitants, who had fled on the approach of Shivaji’s

This was a very small ship even by the standard of the times. Kaeppelin (op. cit. p. 654), makes a reference to a 30 ton ship, the “Saumacque”. The average size for a ship belonging to the Company was between 250 and 300 tons. The average tonnage for Asiatic shipping was as follows: 600 tons for a Chinese junk, 500 for a Siamese ship, vessels from Tonking, Annam and Cambodia were approximately 400 tons, Indonesian junks 100 tons while Indian shipping was about 200 tons. J.C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, Haag-Bandung, 1955, p. 212.

Surat was considered to be the richest emporium of the Mughal Empire and was at this time serving a very rich hinterland. In 1594, the Surat sarkar contributed 4 per cent of the total revenues of the suka of Ahmedabad. By 1720 this had increased to 14 per cent. J. Sarkar, India of Aurangzeb, Calcutta, 1901, (henceforth cited as India of Aur.), p. xiv. In 1670 the revenues should also have been quite substantial.
men returned after their departure. They tried to settle themselves as best as they could, but found that almost everything they had left behind had been taken away.\(^7\)

**SHER KHAN LODI OFFERS US AN ESTABLISHMENT AT VALIKONDAPURAM\(^8\)**

Shortly after our arrival at Masulipatam, Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri Governor of the province of Valikondapuram, got in touch with us. Valikondapuram stretched from the sea into the land for forty leagues between 10 and 11° latitude. Sher Khan invited us to his territory which is the centre for the production of good quality cloth. He offered us advantageous

\(^7\)The account which was received by Martin at Masulipatam differed in many respects from the contemporary eye-witness account given by the English. Martin does not seem aware of the fact that Shivaji led this expedition in person. The Maratha Chief had a force consisting of 15,000 horses and foot rather than the 4000-5000 men mentioned by the Diarist.

Shivaji's intentions were quite clear—he was interested in pillage rather than heroics. On both counts he would wish to avoid foreigners, for not only were the latter the less affluent members of the mercantile community at Surat, but they could also be counted on to defend themselves more vigorously if pushed hard.

As early as the second week of September, the English were aware of Shivaji's hostile intentions on Surat and hence the charge of negligence levelled by the French against the military commander seems justified. The soldiers must have retired into the castle rather than the city as is stated by Martin.

During the sack of Surat, the English were very critical of the French whom they accused of colluding with the Marathas but the English were also forced to send a present to Shivaji. Shivaji had left the English alone after Streynsham Master had demonstrated the English capacity to fight back. The Dutch were spared on their agreeing to remain strictly passive throughout the action.


\(^8\)Circan Loudy and Valgondapouram in the text.
India in the 17th Century
terms if we agreed to come and trade there. Sieur Goujon decided, after acquainting himself a little about these territories, to send an Armenian from the retinue of Marcara to this region to acquire more information. On his return, while still at a short distance from Masulipatam, this Armenian learnt of the fate which had befallen his master. He became afraid and let the courtier know of his return. When this was reported to me, I sent for the Armenian, assuring him that he had nothing to fear. The Armenian came to the lodge accompanied by one of Sher Khan Lodi’s men who had brought me a letter from his master. In this letter, Sher Khan confirmed all that he had conveyed to us earlier. The Armenian described everything that he had seen—the bounty of the countryside and the abundance of weaving operations. Since we could do nothing without the permission of Caron, I replied that in anticipation of a favourable response from Surat, we were prepared to accept Sher Khan’s offer, but the latter would receive a more definitive statement with regard to the settlement he was prepared to offer us within the next two or three months. I wrote to Surat on this subject but received no reply. Despite this, I continued to correspond with Sher Khan Lodi on this matter. There will be sufficient opportunity for me later to expand on this topic and also to refer to the important settlement we built up in this region.

End of 1670
January 1671

The rest of the year passed by quite uneventfully for us. Towards the end of December, several ships anchored at Masulipatam. These belonged to the English, the Dutch and the local businessmen and had come in from different places.

STAGNATION AT MASULIPATAM

We were invited to participate in several ventures towards the beginning of the year. Some of the merchants at Masulipatam were prepared to either allow us to charter their ships wholly or share the capacity of the ships with us. There was every chance of success, for trade was flourishing at this time. However, as
we had neither the provisions nor the money we could not take advantage of these opportune circumstances. The credit available to us was not very large and we survived by taking loans at a monthly interest of 2 per cent. I have already described how, under similar circumstances, the late Sieur Goujon had been forced to pay a monthly interest of 3 per cent. There was, in fact, no shortage of funds at Surat at this time, but the neglect of the other counters arose from the fact that Caron wished to concentrate all the activities of the Company at Surat alone. It was a part of his malicious policy to prove that all subsidiary counters were unprofitable despite the expenditure involved in their upkeep. He hoped in this way to convince the General Assembly and obtain support for his scheme to abandon all the outlying counters and concentrate the activities of the Company at Surat. Caron hoped that the true cause for the failure of the subsidiary counters, namely, his refusal to provide the persons in charge of these with means which could have been profitably used, would not be realized. His whole attitude, therefore, was to make life for us as difficult as possible. Last year, in the month of July, our serious financial difficulties had forced the late Sieur Goujon to issue a promissory note for the sum of Rs 6,000 which he had obtained locally. We received a letter from Golconda which informed us that the Surat administration had refused to honour the bill, despite the fact that it was to have been paid within forty days of sight. Although this policy was directed against us as individuals, it was the Company which suffered. Not only did the Company have to pay the interest on these loans, but there was a further backlash in as much as the very credit worthiness of the Company received a set back.  

January-May 1671

We did not get involved in any commercial operations during the months of January, February, March, April and May. While all the Europeans and the city merchants were busy despatching their vessels and carrying on a profitable trade with

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9The way in which promissory bills called hundies were found to work in India is described in Appendix II.
various places, we remained idle awaiting both instructions from Surat and the means to engage in business enterprise.

With regard to news items of general interest, the state of extreme confusion in the management of the English counter has to be reported. Acting on the orders of the home administration, the new Governor of Madras sent out by the Company, and the new Chief of the counter at Masulipatam, wished the previous Chief to render an account to them. The latter, however, was an extremely intractable man, and when he saw that his position was being threatened, he collected some men and fortified himself inside his house. The two groups often verged on an open clash. However, after a little while the conflict simmered down. It was finally agreed that both parties should go to Madras to try and settle their differences there and both groups accordingly left for that place.10

10The sequence given by Martin appears somewhat confusing. Between 1665 and 1668 there had been considerable upheaval in the affairs of the English. In 1665 the Governor of Fort St. George, Edward Winter, was relieved of his office and superseded by a new Governor, George Foxcroft. Edward Winter, however, rebelled and on 16 September 1665 he imprisoned Foxcroft and assumed charge once again. Winter’s usurpation was brought to an end on 21 August 1668 when Foxcroft was released and reinstated in office. During the period 1665-1668, William Jearsey, the English factor at Masulipatam, had tried on several occasions to secure the release of Foxcroft.

The affairs of William Winter demanded an investigation and the Company appointed Sir William Langhorn to this task. Langhorn was also deputed to succeed Foxcroft when the latter completed his tenure of office.

Foxcroft left India on 18 January, 1672 while Langhorn arrived in 1671. Langhorn spent the intermediary period in conducting his investigations at Masulipatam and Madras. During his visits to Madras he sat at the Council in the position of Second. In Masulipatam, however, fresh problems awaited him.

Despite the support given by Jearsey to Foxcroft the former had placed himself under a cloud of suspicion. The reason for this was the private trade in which Jearsey engaged to the detriment of the Company interests.

In 1669, Jearsey had been dismissed from office and ordered to produce his accounts. However, as he enjoyed considerable support in India he was able to defy the Company directives. As a result of these proceedings initiated against Jearsey, the English were without a Chief at Masulipatam. It was then decided that when Langhorn visited Masulipatam he was to act as the provisional head of the English counter there. H.D. Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, I, London, 1913, pp. 219-271; J. Bruce, Annals of the Honourable East-India Company, II, London, 1810, p. 289; T. Bowry, A Geographical Account of the Countries Around the Bay of Bengal, Cambridge, 1903, p. 251.
Bhagnagar was in a state of great disorder and people were looting with impunity. This was a result of the poor administration there and the inordinate power enjoyed by the officials, several of whom were directly supporting these villagers. The King, shutting himself up in the fortress at Golconda, had left the entire administration in the hands of his ministers. The Dutch in Bhagnagar were attacked. They required some local reinforcements and prepared to defend themselves inside their lodge within which they had shut themselves.

Towards the end of May, we received letters from Surat and the remittance for a letter of change for Rs. 5,000. This sum did not cover all the commitments of the lodge and we still had our living expenses to consider. We were ordered to prune the number of servitors at the lodge. Compared to the retinue maintained by the other Europeans and taking into consideration the customary practices among the natives, our numbers were small indeed. Despite this, we obeyed the order.

**Caron at Bantam**

The same letters also brought us the news that Caron had left for Bantam with three ships. It was speculated that the purpose of this trip was political. Knowing the hatred borne by the King of Bantam against the Dutch, Caron was to try and form an alliance with this monarch. Whether in fact, any such treaty was signed I do not know. There is reason to believe that the voyage was undertaken because Caron wished to establish a counter at Bantam, or to be more precise, because of the personal interests of Caron, for it was not necessary for him to undertake this journey himself. A merchant could have set up the establishment at Bantam as effectively as the Director and at much less cost. Two of the three ships could then have been sent back to France laden with merchandise which would have yielded much higher profits to the company. As it was, the

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11 There was much unrest in Golconda as the question of succession had come to the forefront in the last years of the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. There were two contenders in the field, Sayyid Ahmad and Abul Hasan (vide *infra*, Chap. II, pp. 331-332), both married to the daughters of Abdullah Qutb Shah. A.M. Siddiqui, *History of Golconda*, Hyderabad, 1956, pp. 224-225. It should be noted that pagination of text referred in the notes relates to page numbers given on the right hand margin of the text.
task undertaken by Caron only led to additional expenditure. It was also believed, that hating the Dutch as he did, it gave Caron particular pleasure to appear at the very portals of the capital city of the Dutch in the Indies. We learnt of his decision to leave the management of affairs at Bantam in the hands of three merchants only after Caron's return to Surat. This arrangement led to disorder and utter confusion at the Bantam counter.12

11 The Dagh Registres throw considerable light on the activities of Caron at Bantam. The Dutch were apprehensive lest the French form an anti-Dutch alliance with the King of Bantam and the Dutch agent at Bantam, William Caeef, was asked to keep a close watch on Caron.

Caron had sailed on 20 March 1671 from Surat for Bantam, taking three vessels with him. He arrived at Bantam in the second week of July 1671 where he was not only welcomed by the Shahbundar but also provided with accommodation by the same official.

When he appeared for an audience before the King, Caron requested that the French Company be allowed to establish a counter at Bantam and that the privileges in trade enjoyed by the other European Companies should also be extended to the French.

The French were given permission to establish a counter near the Dutch lodge for which a rent of 1,000 crowns would be paid. No import or export dues would be charged but in lieu thereof each French ship putting in for trade would have to pay a levy of 1,000 crowns. The French would be given the same treatment as the English and be allowed to trade freely throughout the kingdom.

Caron had two audiences with the King during which he gave presents collectively worth 5,000 Rix dollars (15,000 Florins) and also offered the services of 100 sailors after the arrival of the squadron expected to put in from France.

Despite Carré's assertion that Caron's visit had proved very advantageous for the Company, the arrangements made by Caron broke down as soon as he departed for Surat. The three merchants who had been given equal status and placed at the helm at Bantam found it impossible to work together and paucity of funds forced the work on the construction of the French counter there to a stop. D.R., 19, pp. 357, 373, 382-83, 389, 435, 437, 439; Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 65; Lady Fawcett and Charles Fawcett trans., The Travels of the Abbé Carré in India and the Near East, II, London, 1947 (henceforth cited as Carré), p. 301; K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, The Hague, 1958, p. 50.

Despite the criticism of Martin the administration at Paris also desired the establishment of a counter at Bantam. The priority given to this project is shown in the objectives set for the expedition of de la Haye by the Company (vide infra, Chap. I, pp. 303-304).
General Affairs

May 1671

The courtier at our lodge at Masulipatam claimed to have received Rs. 5,000 from Caron with orders to start work on a consignment of local chintz material. This conduct would have surprised us had we not already known of Caron’s desire to prevent Frenchmen from gaining knowledge of local commercial practices for the reasons which I have already mentioned. All his actions after his assumption of sole control have confirmed the truth of this assessment of Caron.

Our Commerce in Persia

We also learnt that the ships which had been sent the previous year to the Persian Gulf had returned. As I have already stated, since the prices charged for merchandise had been 25 per cent to 30 per cent above the current market rates, it was only to be expected that the margin of profits would be low. The merchant, Sieur Frotter, had died in Basra. He was a man of integrity and had always tried to serve the Company zealously. The merchant, Sieur Lebel, and the undermerchant, Sieur Niceron, were in an extremely serious condition at the time of their return. Despite this, no assistance was given to them at the lodge and when charitable people, moved by compassion, came forward to help, they were turned back. The two men thus died within a few days of their arrival.

The Arrival of the Director-General Baron at Surat

The ‘Aigle d’ Or’ had been sent to France laden with merchandise which had been bought, as usual, through the courtier Samson. Mariage who was to depute as Chief of the Surat counter in the absence of Caron, was now functioning as the President. The months of June and July were uneventful except for the news which we received of the arrival of the Director-General Baron at Surat. Baron informed us of his arrival himself and I replied to his missive. The captain of a Dutch ship who had navigated his vessel round the Cape of Good Hope also informed me that some of the ships belonging to the Royal Squadron commanded by de la Haye had anchored at Saldanha Bay.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) Saldaigne in the text.
THE AUTHORITIES AT MASULIPATAM

June-July 1671

During these two months, the English had been having a lot of trouble with the Deputy of the Governor of Masulipatam and with the other officials—and all over a trivial affair which did not merit any importance. The English had hired some men to resurface their lodge. The workers had not done their job and the English had placed them under arrest. During this incident some of the artisans were manhandled. The local officials showed their displeasure at this action by arresting the indigenous men who had taken service with the Company. The English went fully armed to the house of the Kotwal—a functionary similar to the Provost—who had been responsible for the recent action. They broke into his house and the Kotwal was forced to flee for refuge in his bedclothes to his neighbours. The Englishmen then forced an entry into the customs shed from which they recovered the cannon and powder which had been taken away from them. This was all taken back to the lodge. The affair would have escalated much further but for the fact that the principal merchants now intervened and brought about an accommodation. Although I have reserved a description of the city of Masulipatam for the latter portion of my narrative, I must interject here, in order to give added coherence to my report, that in no other city in India do Europeans enjoy so much liberty and autonomy as they do here.\footnote{The Golconda court was anxious to attract European commerce by offering various concessions in the hope that in the long run all of these would be recovered. T. Raychaudhuri, \textit{Jan Company in Coromandel}, The Hague, 1962, p. 16.}

The only noteworthy event which occurred during the months of August and September was a change in the government of Masulipatam. Masulipatam was placed in the charge of one of...
the most prominent nobles at court, Zafer Beg,\footnote{Jabarbek} who sent one of his cousins to the city to serve as his deputy. The official arrived on 12 August 1671.

We greeted him at a distance of one league from the city and the other foreigners did the same. On 14 August, he paid a visit to the Customs House. From the way in which he conducted his conversations with the officials who were with him, we could tell that he would create trouble for us.

Several ships from diverse places have arrived—English ships from Europe and other places, Dutch ships from Batavia, and ships belonging to local merchants. The English ships brought us news that war was imminent in Europe.\footnote{The Dutch war (1672-1678) during which France allied herself with England against Holland.} The Dutch ships brought us information that Caron had arrived at Bantam and had set up a counter for the Company there.

Nothing very noteworthy occurred during the month of October except for the news which we received from Surat that the Company ship, the 'Dauphin Couronné' had arrived there. This ship had sailed from France eighteen months ago and had put in at Brazil prior to its arrival at Surat. This delay was believed to have been intentionally caused. The merchant placed on this ship was suspected of lapse of duty at Surat. He was dismissed and later send back to France.\footnote{Carre makes no mention of the “Dauphin” having proceeded to Brazil but merely states that it had stopped at Mozambique for six months. He does, however, state that the two royal ships, the “Triomphe” and the “Sultane” had spent one month in Brazil prior to their junction with de la Haye’s fleet at Madagascar. Carré, II, p. 387.}

\footnote{Jabarbek in the text. Tavernier refers to Abdul Jabbar Beg, an important General in the army of Abdullah Qutb Shah. V. Ball tr., revised by W. Crooke, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, I, London, 1925 (henceforth cited as Travnerier), p. 138. Raychaudhuri, however, refers to the same person as Zafar Beg. Zafar Beg had earlier served as Governor of Masulipatam in 1669 but had been dismissed because of his extortionate policy towards the Dutch. The date given by Martin refers to that of the reappointment of Zafar Beg. Vide Raychaudhuri, op. cit., p. 60.}
THE DUTCH, SUSPICIOUS OF OUR DESIGNS ON SAN THOME',
SEND AN EMBASSY TO THE KING OF GOLCONDA—
ARRIVAL OF THE SQUADRON OF DE LA HAYE

Although the Dutch Company was quite well established in India and its trading operations were extremely prosperous, it was always seeking additional expansion. This was done despite the fact that many of its possessions involved in it useless expenditure. Notwithstanding the poor returns, the Dutch held on to such possessions only to prevent other European nations from obtaining a foothold. The officials maintain a constant vigil not only over Dutch interests, but also on the potential commercial interests of other European nations so that the latter can be circumvented. When it was learnt at Batavia that a squadron was being equipped for India in France, the Dutch, in order to preclude us, were quick to advance into areas which they believed would be interest to us. They despatched orders to their Governors and military commanders in Ceylon and on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts to maintain guard. I do not know how we aroused the Dutch suspicion that we had some designs on the city of San Thomé. I must admit, however, that this place was mentioned in the memorandum which was drawn up for the General Assembly in Paris. Caron was in the habit of having his correspondence with the Dutch translated into French. For this purpose he would either use Dutchmen, or persons associated with the latter. While at Surat we had seen for ourselves that some of these men were frequent visitors at the Dutch lodge. Apart from this, since Caron confided each one of his plans to the courtier it is not surprising that all the other Europeans should also have become aware of our projects. The matter had become so open that at the time of our arrival at Masulipatam in August 1670, Sieur William Langhorn, the English gentleman sent as Governor of Madras by the Directors at London, privately asked me during one of his visits if we intended to embark on our projected expedition on Ceylon fairly soon. This project had also been under discussion at Surat. I replied that I knew nothing about it but it appeared unlikely that the French Company would undertake a project on territory owned by the Dutch. Langhorn had responded by attesting to the authenticity of his source. It was evident
that our plans were well known.¹⁸

November 1671

The Governor of Pulicat¹⁹ was instructed by the Batavia Council to send an embassy with expensive presents to the Golconda court. The aim of the mission was that of asking for the cession of either the city of San Thomé or the islands of Divi, close to Masulipatam. If these islands were ceded to a powerful nation like the Dutch, the latter would have no trouble in dominating the commercial activities of this city. The Second at Pulicat was chosen to head this embassy. He arrived at Masulipatam towards the end of November accompanied by a large train, which was to be further augmented by others who were to join from the lodge. It was estimated that presents worth Rs 1,50,000 were being taken for the King of Golconda, apart from other expensive gifts intended for the ministers.

Towards the end of November, from letters written at Golconda, we learnt that the squadron commanded by Monsieur de la Haye had arrived at Surat. Towards the beginning of the month of December the Chief of the English Company affirmed to me that the royal squadron had arrived at Surat.

December 1671

The Dutch ambassador left for Golconda towards the beginning of the same month. He was accompanied by three merchants, ten European guards, and two hundred natives who all formed a part of his suite. These numbers were to be further augmented on his arrival at Golconda.

January 1672

CONCENTRATION OF DUTCH SHIPPING AT PULICAT

On 8 January 1672, five Dutch ships put in at the roads at Masulipatam. Three of the ships were armed while two of the others had come from Japan with consignments of gold, copper and curiosities belonging to that kingdom. Every year the Dutch

¹⁸Dutch records do not corroborate this statement of Martin for when de la Haye appeared on the Indian seas, although the Dutch took steps to protect their interests, they had no idea where the French intended to strike. D.R., 20, pp. 114-15.
¹⁹Pallacate in the text.
at Masulipatam receive ships from Japan which bring them a part of the funds necessary for their commercial activities but never before had these vessels been escorted by warships. We learnt later that the warships had been sent from Batavia to escort the merchant ships because of the Dutch fear that the squadron commanded by de la Haye would proceed directly to these coasts. The official explanation was, however, that the warships had been sent out to reinforce the authority of the embassy which had been sent to Golconda, the implication being that the Dutch would be prepared to use force if they were not given satisfaction. On the following day, 9 January, another large Dutch ship put in at the port. Contrary to their usual practice, the Dutch opened private trade while the ships remained at harbour. The Company was aware that with the arrival of our royal squadron it was essential to win over the men. It was hoped that by making this exception and allowing complete freedom of trade the men would be sufficiently conciliated.\(^5\)

The men were so unrestrained about the amount of merchandise which they were loading on to the ships that the Treasurer at the lodge imposed a duty of one pagoda per bale—a pagoda being worth two crowns at the time. This led to some heated altercations between the Treasurer and the Captains. The Captains refused to make any payment in the beginning but were ultimately forced to comply. For some time, Japanese gold coins and curiosities were much in evidence at Masulipatam. Dutch commerce in Japan had been extremely profitable the previous year and profits had percolated to even the common sailors. The warships stayed in harbour for a few days and then sailed for Pulicat.

\(^5\)In conformity with the usages current among the other European Companies trading in India, the Dutch allowed their servants a certain degree of liberty in the field of private trade. The exception to which the Diarist is alluding arose from the fact that there was a strict injunction that such trade could only be practised at the ultimate destination to which the ship was being sent for the commercial enterprises of the Company and not at any intermediary points along the route. \textit{Selections from Records of the Madras Government, Dutch in Malabar} (cited henceforth as \textit{Dutch in Malabar}), p. 30; \textit{Carré}, I, p. 163.
On 10 January an express messenger from Surat brought us news that the royal squadron had arrived there. The Director-General Blot had come out on board the "Saint Jean Baptiste", a Company ship. We were also apprised of the return of Caron from Bantam.

**INCIDENTS RELATING TO THE VOYAGE OF DE LA HAYE—EMBARKATION AND DEATH OF MONDEVERGUE—DE LA HAYE TAKES POSSESSION OF FORT DAUPHIN IN THE NAME OF THE KING—ON HIS DEPARTURE HE IS REPLACED BY CHAMPMARGOU—SOJOURN AT ISLAND OF BOURBON**

Several details will have to be reported here to improve the cogency of my narrative. In narrating what I know I shall try to be as sincere as possible.

It was the firm belief of the court and the Company that Caron was the only person who could establish French commerce in India. After his arrival in India, Caron had asked for additional numbers of men and ships of war for the implementation of his plans. The home administration had continued to repose the same confidence in him. I have not read the letters and am quite ignorant about all the details. I am only repeating what I heard Caron himself say when he described his plans. He had been quite certain about their success, provided he possessed sufficient forces. This had led the King to order that a squadron should be equipped for the Indies. The squadron consisting of seven ships of large and small size, set out from La Rochelle in March 1670 under the command of the Lieutenant-General de la Haye, a gifted man who had made himself well-known in France for his fine deeds and his knowledge of warfare and fortifications. The Brigadier-General was Sieur la Grateloup, also a man of recognized merit. Officers had been appointed.

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31 Carré (Carré II, p. 383), is more sympathetic towards Caron than François Martin, and points out that the Company had encouraged Caron because his initial commercial undertakings in India had been reasonably successful.

32 At the time of its departure, the squadron had comprised nine ships. After barely fifteen days at sea, three vessels had to be sent to Lisbon for repairs—the "Sultane", the "Triomphe" and the "Indienne". The squadron, now reduced to six ships sailed on. Carré, II, pp. 383-84.
There were many volunteers and four companies of soldiers had been organized under experienced captains. With regard to the naval personnel, M. de Turel, who possessed a distinguished record in the navy, was appointed to command the squadron and other officers were also drawn from the same source. The squadron was replete with brave men and had been amply provided to withstand the strain of a long voyage. With these advantages, it was hoped that something substantial would be achieved.

Soon after the departure of the squadron from La Rochelle in March 1670, some of the ships had become separated. The greater part of the squadron, including the ship on which de la Haye was sailing, anchored at Madiera Island. From here the squadron had sailed to Cape Verde and then to the Cape of Good Hope. A thorough survey was conducted of the Cape region particularly of Saldanha Bay, St. Martin’s Point and other bays and rivers to find out if there was any suitable site for the establishment of a base like the fortified one built by the Dutch on Table Bay. De la Haye, active by nature, wished to examine the terrain himself and took part in all the expeditions. There were a few tussles with the Dutch, but these were devoid of any further repercussions. The ships continued on their way and anchored at Fort Dauphin. Soon after, the squadron at Fort Dauphin was joined by the other ships which had separated during the voyage.

The disunion among the principal officers which has caused so many of our important enterprises to fail was evident in this

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29 The “Sultane” had been the first to leave the fleet. Shortly after this, the “Indienne” was detached to tow the “Triomphe” to Lisbon where the defects of the latter were to be remedied. Ibid., p. 384.

29 The French fleet stayed at Saldanha Bay for seven weeks during which period the local Dutch residents were treated so badly that they retired to Table Bay. De la Haye went to the extent of pulling down the Dutch flag and replacing it with the French one. The French, however, encountered great difficulty in obtaining water and provisions as the Hottentots refused to help them. D.R., 19, pp. 219-20, 230-31.

30 These consisted of two ships of the Company, the “Dauphin” and the “Phénix”, and the three royal ships, the “Triomphe” the “Sultane” and the “Indienne”. Carré, II, p. 387.
expedition also. Examples of such disunity abound both within France and without.

The naval officers as a body showed little respect for the authority of de la Haye. They were now joined by the officers of the army who resented the manner of the commander and, indeed, it is very difficult for any commander to endear himself equally to all sections. Under these circumstances, de la Haye managed affairs with commendable prudence. During the period when the squadron remained at Fort Dauphin, the malcontented party went to the extent of convening a meeting which was attended by the principal officers. A decision was now taken, on extremely illconceived grounds, to arrest de la Haye and send him back to France. It is said that Sieur Grateloup had the presence of mind to mingle with the malcontented group in order to get wind of the plans being contemplated by the more extreme members. Grateloup, by his tact, prevailed on these officers to return to their duties. He pointed out to them that their actions could never meet with approval in France and he made them realize the consequences that would have to be borne by them. Despite this, resentment, like an ulcer, continued to fester below the surface. It would surely erupt at the proper time.

At Madagascar, de la Haye met de Mondevergue, who as I have earlier said, had returned to the island. De la Haye had been ordered to send the ex-Governor back to France in case the latter was to be found at Fort Dauphin. De Mondevergue embarked on one of the ships belonging to the Company anchored at the road which subsequently set sail for France. Several people who had been anxious to return to France, and included in this number were some of the members of the squadron, also embarked on the two boats. Among the latter was the captain of the ship which had proceeded to Brazil. De la Haye had deprived him of his command on the suspicion that the captain had wilfully contrived this detour for his own selfish ends.

The subsequent fate of de Mondevergue is quite well-known. He was arrested at Port-Louis by royal order and taken to

*Carré makes no mention of de Mondevergue but states that the discontented officers returned to France on board the "Aigle d'Or" which was returning to France from Surat. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
Saumur castle. Here he was interrogated several times on the charges brought against him. It was said that he was on the point of being absolved and freed but died a few days prior to this. I have related the conduct of this Lieutenant-General elsewhere. With regard to the charge of peculation preferred against him, I must admit that it would be difficult to find a person less interested in graft than he. As for the other counts of malversation, the extent of pressure brought to bear on those involved in the process to decry de Mondevergue speaks for itself. According to public reports, the factor which had harmed de Mondevergue the most had been his open recrimination of a person who enjoyed high standing at court. This person, for his part, had not spared his efforts to ruin de Mondevergue.

De la Haye found the Company ship, the "Phénix" at Fort Dauphin. This ship had left France seventeen to eighteen months ago and was now in very bad shape. The Bishop of Heliopolis, the great prelate of the Overseas Missions, had embarked along with several missionaries on this boat. I will have occasion to dwell at greater length on this Mission later in my narrative.

In accordance with his order, de la Haye had taken possession of Fort Dauphin in the name of the King on his arrival there. He had placed officers in the service of the King at the garrison. The Company had now no further part to play and was absolved of the responsibility of retaining and conserving this fort.

The squadron had remained at Fort Dauphin until August 1671. During this period, many men including a large number of officers died. De la Haye, taking some soldiers with him, led an expedition six leagues into the interior against a village chief who had refused to come and see him. The utility of this action was doubted. It is true that the village was captured but the purpose of the expedition was foiled since the village chief escaped. It would have been easy to capture the village chief if

27The "Phénix" had arrived in an extremely battered condition at the Cape on 8 October 1670. Here, it had been joined by the "Indienne", in good condition, and the two ships had sailed together for Madagascar on 2 January 1671. D.R., 19, pp. 231, 283-84; vide supra, n. 24.

28According to Carré, this totally unnecessary campaign against Ramouset, the village Chief, cost the French 1,000 lives. Carré II, pp. 386-87.
General Affairs

dele Haye had made less noise and had taken the advice of the old residents who knew the country well. The Lieutenant-General had next proceeded to the Isle of Mascareigne where he had replaced the administrators of the Company by Crown officials, after which he had come back to Fort Dauphin.

A whole year, which could have been used to much better advantage, passed by, while the squadron remained in Madagascar and de la Haye involved himself in the expedition to Mascareigne. This delay was all the more regrettable because, as I have already pointed out, so many men were lost during this period. At last, with the onset of the season to Surat, de la Haye handed over the government of the Fort to Sieur Champmargou, about when I have already spoken, and set sail with all the ships at the roads. He arrived at Surat in October 1671.

THE DIRECTORS-GENERAL GUESTON AND BLOT—CARON RETURNS FROM BANTAM

With the news of the death of the Director-General, de Faye, the General Assembly also received reports of the disorders which had arisen at the counter at Surat. Two persons were chosen from among the Company employees, MM. Gueston and Blot. They were appointed Directors-General and were sent to India to restore order at the Surat counter. These two gentlemen set out on two large ships while five smaller vessels accompanied them. Shortly after they had set sail from Port-Louis they encountered a tempest. The ship on which Gueston was sailing struggled against the wind for a few days after which the mast was broken. Gueston was forced to return to La Rochelle while the other ships got scattered. The ship in which Blot was travelling withstood the tempest. He was able to continue the voyage. After revictualling at Table Bay, the ship

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According to the Dutch records (D.R., 28, p. 29), fifteen ships arrived at Suvali. Eight were Company and seven were royal ships. The French were said to possess 250 men on these ships of whom 80-90 were crew members. They had lost a large number of men through illness. According to Bruce (op. cit., II, p. 302) the French fleet consisted of twelve ships. W. Milburn (Oriental Commerce, I, London, 1825, p. 382) gives the same number.
passed by Mozambique and put in at Suvali Bay during the
month of November.\textsuperscript{30}
A few days later, Caron returned from Bantam with the news
that a counter had been established there.\textsuperscript{31} I have already
referred to this. In the interests of an orderly narrative I will
return to this subject later when I have more material at my
disposal.

\section*{Questions of Ceremonial at the Court of}
\textbf{Golconda—Aims of the Dutch Embassy}

The only item of interest during the month of January was the
news transmitted to me from the Golconda court. Sayyid
Muzaffar,\textsuperscript{32} an important minister at the court who had extend-
ed his protection to the Dutch, had invited the Dutch ambassa-
dor to a meal. The ambassador was very upset when he found
that two or three Persian officers had been given precedence
over him at table. He had protested loudly, at which Sayyid
Muzaffar had replied that the ambassador had already been
provided with a seat much more exalted than that to which his
rank entitled him. The ambassador took offence at this reply
and retired with his suite even before the meal had been served.
This precipitate and illconceived action was to cause a lot of
harm subsequently to the Dutch. The reception given to the
Mughal envoy by the King of Golconda also pricked the vanity
of the Dutch. The King of Golconda showed his respect and
fear of the Mughal Emperor by sending the most high-ranking
among his nobles to greet the envoy. The Dutch complained
that such an honour had not been accorded to them. The reply
given to them was that there was a great deal of difference
between the ambassador of the Mughal Emperor and the envoy
of their commercial Company. I am reporting what was written
to me by well-informed persons who witnessed these events.

\textsuperscript{30}Kaeppelin (op. cit., p. 80), states that M. Blot arrived in the month of
October.
\textsuperscript{31}Caron had sailed from Bantam on board the "Vautour" in August 1671.
\textsuperscript{32}Sidi Musafer in the text.
Portrait of Sayyid Muzaffar
-Courtesy Salar Jung Museum, Hyderabad
In the month of February, an Englishman who was at Bhagnagar wrote to the Chief of his Company at Masulipatam that the Dutch had apprised Sayyid Muzaffar of their requirements which they had been enjoined to petition of the King. Four demands were made. The first was for permission to build a stone house at a place half a league distant from Masulipatam called "Roque de Barre" where they could store their merchandise and other effects during the swelteringly hot season. The second was that the fort of Pulicat which belonged to the Dutch should be exchanged for San Thomé, which belonged to the King. The reason given was that the latter place could be defended by the ships in harbour as it was within cannon range. The third demand was that the island of Divi, close to Masulipatam, should be ceded to them and they should be allowed to fortify themselves on it. The only justification for this demand was that the Dutch considered it to be necessary for their welfare. The fourth demand was that in conformity with the treatment given to the English and the French, the Dutch should be exempted from payment of a sum of 3,000 old pagodas which they had to make each year in lieu of customs duties on imports and exports.

The ambassador was carrying expensive gifts for the King and the ministers, but he had been directed to distribute these only if it appeared likely that the four points would be conceded. Sayyid Muzaffar showed his surprise at the temerity of the Dutch in advancing such demands. His response to the first three demands was that these made it appear as if the Dutch wished to secure their control over the most important positions

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33 Bagnagar in the text.
34 Divi in the text.
35 The French had appeared later than the Dutch on the scene but had yet managed to secure better terms from the Golconda court. In September 1612, the Dutch had secured a firman by which the tolls which had been fixed at 4 per cent were to be commuted on payment of an annual sum of 3,000 pagodas. Against this, when Marcara had negotiated the terms for the French in 1669 the Golconda court had waived all duties. Raychaudhuri, op. cit., p. 25; E. Gaudart, Les Privilèges du Commerce Français dans l’Inde, Pondicherry, 1935, p. 2; H. de Closets d’Errey, Précis Chronologique de l’Histoire de l’Inde Française, Pondicherry, 1934, p. 2.
of the kingdom along with the coast. He was amazed at this and considered the Dutch very audacious to come forward with such a plan. As for the exemption from the payment of 3,000 old pagodas, all that he could say about it was that he would be able to procure this concession provided presents were sent to court from time to time. This reply showed that Sayyid Muzaffar was no longer inclined to favour them. The Dutch, therefore, now turned their attentions to the other ministers.

March 1672

DEATH OF THE KING OF GOLCONDA

There were rumours throughout the month of March of the reported death of the King of Golconda. There were many Rajputs within the kingdom at this time. They had taken service as soldiers and the majority of them had acquitted themselves with distinction. These men were by birth Mughal subjects and as the high pretentions of the Emperor to the kingdom of Golconda were well known, it was feared that these Rajputs might band themselves together and form a party in favour of the Emperor. The Havildar of Masulipatam received orders from court to issue a proclamation ordering all Rajputs to leave the city. The same official also asked the English and the Dutch to dismiss all Rajputs from their lodges. The two European nations paid no attention to these demands, and, on the whole, the terms of the proclamation were disregarded by others also.

THE GOVERNOR OF MASULIPATAM WISHES TO TAKE BACK A PORTION OF THE LODGE FROM US

The Havildar or Governor, proud of the support he received from the overbearing Zafar Beg, one of the foremost nobles at

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In this context it may be noted that Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajputs deteriorated only after 1679. Bernier (A Constable, trans. Travels in the Mogul Empire A.D. 1656—1668 by François Bernier Oxford, 1916 (henceforth cited as Bernier) p. 195, states that the administration in Golconda had deteriorated so much as a result of the total lack of interest of Abdullah Qutb Shah, that the people would have welcomed the more equitable government of the Mughal Emperor. Tavernier (pp. 138-39), however, does not support the effete portrait of Abdullah Qutb Shah as is sketched by Bernier. According to the former, the King had strengthened his position by accumulating sufficient resources to enable him to be less complaint to the Emperor.
court, went out of his way to make life for the Europeans difficult. He picked first on us and the resultant episode dragged on for several days. The subject of dispute was as follows. Between the building to the front of the lodge, and the rear building which had direct access to the river, there was a large open square which was freely used by outsiders. The factor of the King of Siam who had a lodge very close to ours, often used the field to work on the riggings of his ships. When this Siamese official heard that I intended to enclose the square, he came to an understanding with the proprietor of our lodge by which the owner was to lease the small area in the rear building used as a storeroom by us to the Siamese factor. This was done even though we had rented the entire building. This would enable the factor to prevent us from shutting off the square in which he carried on his work.

In order to improve his chances of success, the factor had involved the Governor to whom he had given a fine present. The proprietor also received a gift. The latter had asked us on more than one occasion to release the storeroom, but finding us adamant in our refusal he persuaded the Governor to take action. The Governor approached us several times, but our response did not change. Finally, taking advantage of our absence from the lodge the Governor sent out soldiers and masons to the counter. The soldiers were to offer protection while the masons built up a wall separating the storeroom from the rest of the building. I learnt about this on my return and ordered that the wall should be demolished without delay. The Governor took offence at my action and sent orders that I should have the wall restored. This was followed by threats. Finding that these had no effect, he posted some soldiers to prevent our courtier from moving out of his house, while others were stationed at different parts of the town. Strict injunctions were issued not to allow anything—neither water, wood nor provisions—to enter our lodge. Matters now came to a head.

On 13 March 1672, the Governor left his mansion situated at the distance of a little less than a league from the metropolis. He brought with him 50 cavalry, 400 to 500 infantry, and camels loaded with field pieces and another kind of gun used
by them in their wars. He made his way thus to the city. As soon as he had started out on his way, the Governor had sent a messenger asking us to hand over the desired property. This demand was repeated three times during the course of his march. We repeated our earlier reply, viz. that the property in question was an appendage of the lodge and we were not prepared to give up our rights to it. We stood on guard, our weapons loaded and ready, with a stock of grenades which we had made by attaching fuses to large bottles of thick glass which we had filled with gunpowder. The Dutch, aware of the inimical attitude of the Governor against them, enquired if we would join them in putting up a common defence. We politely declined this offer. While this was going on, the Governor advanced within two hundred feet of the lodge, after which he stopped in an irresolute manner. He passed by our lodge, subsequent to which he sent one of his men to us with betelnut, a mark of reconciliation, and a message to the effect that he wished to be our friend. He then proceeded towards the customs shed, his usual seat of justice, and it was on this note that the incident drew to a close.

Disputes between the Governor of Masulipatam and the English and the Dutch

The dispute between the Governor and the English assumed a more serious dimension than ours. There were many English merchants at Masulipatam. Several among them had settled here with their families and had engaged themselves in a flourishing private trade. A few among them had amassed considerable wealth and commanded substantial credit. Their trading operations extended from the coasting trade to trade with the Indies. This made the officials of the English Company at Masulipatam, who covered the same area in their private trade, extremely jealous. They felt that their own ventures would

37 This may have been the harquebus on fork which had been introduced into Indian warfare by Akbar. The gun was made to rest on a hook fixed to a frame which in turn was placed on the back of an elephant or camel. J. Sarkar, Military History of India, Calcutta, 1960 (henceforth cited as Military History), p. 55.
prosper more if these private traders could be excluded. Since the English Company permitted private individuals to carry on such trade, the Company merchants could do nothing openly but their envy prompted them to take some action. One of these officials was extremely upset when private merchants, who were preparing a ship for a trip to Johore, refused to allow him to participate in the venture. To avenge himself, this man represented to the Governor that exemption from customs duties obtained by firmans from Golconda was applicable only to the English Company, and not to private English traders. The Muhammadans who are always on the look-out for ways to harass Europeans, were overjoyed at this piece of advice. The Governor exploited the situation skillfully. He immediately impounded all the belongings of the English merchants in the customs shed. When the owners complained, the Governor replied that they would have to pay duty. The merchants then appealed to the Chief of the English Company, but, receiving a rebuff from this quarter, it dawned on them as to who had originated their troubles. To avenge themselves they represented to the Governor that since the firmans only covered the trade of the Company, the Company officials could not claim exemption when they traded in their private capacity. This advice was well received and the Company merchants were now treated on par with private merchants.

This unfortunate incident created by the malicious behaviour of the two parties, was finally resorted by both the sides giving presents to the Governor and the other officials. The Company officials had the advantage that they could always find a pretext to charge these expenses to the Company, but the private merchants had to pay themselves. I have no interest in following the activities of the other European Companies but I cannot prevent myself from pointing out that the welfare of the English Company was adversely affected by the selfish activities of several of its servants. Those who have studied the transactions of the Company over the past twenty years know that all the troubles which have occurred between the Company and the local Governors and customs officials in Bengal, Masulipatam

\*Jor in the text.
India in the 17th Century

and Surat can be traced to the fact that some of these officials have preferred to sacrifice Company interests and honour to protect their own private interests. These incidents are well known and I would explain them in greater detail if this were necessary.

The differences between the Dutch and the Governor sprang from other causes and the dispute proved to be a more protracted one. It was said that Zafar Beg, who enjoyed overall authority in Masulipatam and the entire province, disliked the Dutch because they had refused to give him a loan when he had approached them for one. There may have been other reasons but these were not revealed and the Havildar made use of this pretext to put pressure on the Dutch. The Havildar claimed that the Dutch had not been equitable in the payment they had made to the previous Governor, Mohammed Beg, and demanded that the sum of 8,000 new pagodas should be made over to Zafar Beg who had replaced the previous incumbent. Out of this sum of 8,000 pagodas, 6,000 pagodas was the sum owed by the Dutch for the annual exemption from import and export duties, while the remaining 2,000 pagodas was owed for the aldea of Palakollu, near Narasapur, which the Dutch had farmed out from the King. Added to this demand was a further claim. It was stated that with the connivance of the Dutch Chief, with whom an understanding had been achieved,

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*Mamoudebek* in the text.

The claim against the Dutch was probably based on differences with regard to the rate of exchange between the old pagoda and the new one. The Dutch had secured exemption against payment of 3,000 old pagodas (supra, Chap. I, p. 308), whereas the present claim was computed on the basis of new pagodas. *Tavernier* (II, p. 71), refers to the old pagoda which according to him "were coined by different Princes who reigned in India before the Musulmans". As the supply of old pagodas was fixed, its value in terms of 'new pagodas' would tend to rise. It was perhaps this factor which influenced the Qutb Shah to retain the old pagoda in the monetary transactions of the realm. *Vide* W.H. Moreland, *Relations of Golconda in the Early Seventeenth Century*, London, 1931 (henceforth cited as *Relations*), p. 92-3.

*Alde* in the text. The word aldea, having the general connotation of a village, was introduced into Anglo-Indian parlance by the Portuguese. *Vide* Hobson-Jobson, q.v.

*Palcocote* and *Narsapour* respectively in the text.
many Company servants and even some strangers, were carrying on private trade under the name of the Company. Since the import and export duties which had been evaded were computed at the rate of 2½ per cent, the arrears which were claimed amounted to a large sum.

The Dutch were well-apprised of the Havildar’s intentions and had taken their precautions. They had reinforced the guards for the defence of their lodge in advance and had laid by provisions of food and munitions. The first step which is always taken by Muhammadans when they wish to insult Europeans at Masulipatam is that they post guards on all the streets leading to the lodge so that no water may be taken inside. In the case of the Dutch, however, their lodge was well stocked with both these commodities. Even under normal circumstances, the Dutch kept three to four hundred country jars filled with water. The water was changed from time to time, each jar being replenished whenever water was taken out. As the Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, have different customs from Europeans, and as even among Hindus there are further differences based on caste or community, each community was provided with its own water. These jars were locked, the key being in the possession of the community concerned to prevent any outsider from drinking their water. The water jars reserved for the Dutch were kept aside.⁴³

As a result of all their precautions the Dutch were able to resist the Governor, who, despite his much publicized threats and his warlike stance, would never dare to directly attack the Dutch counter.

Hostilities were, therefore, carried on from a distance. According to the orders of the Havildar, if any of the men engaged by the Dutch were to be found in the city they were to be arrested. Some of these men were treated very badly. The barks used by the Dutch for the embarkation and disembarkation of their merchandise were seized and sunk and every effort

⁴³R. Ovington (H.G. Rawlinson, ed., *A Voyage to Surat in the Year 1689* by J. Ovington, London, 1929, henceforth cited as Ovington, p. 174), described how Hindus when travelling carried their own drinking water in Kousers (water containers) for they would not drink any water which had been touched by members of another community.
was made to prevent any provisions from being taken inside the lodge. The families of those who were serving at the lodge took refuge in a district three leagues away from the city which was outside the jurisdiction of the Havildar.

The Dutch, for their part, were not inactive. The Rajputs in their service came out of the lodge and captured as many peons as possible. Some of these prisoners were treated badly. The other officials of the city and the leading merchants did not approve of the violence of the Havildar and tried to effect an accommodation. However, as the latter insisted that the dues should be paid and the Dutch refused to do so, no agreement could be reached. The situation became more explosive and it seemed as though an open struggle would ensue. The Dutch also appeared to have reached the same conclusion for one of their hookers, moored at the roads, was brought into the port. On this were embarked the women, children and all those whose presence was considered superfluous at the counter. All the valuables were also taken out of the lodge and sent on board. The Havildar's men did not dare to oppose these operations despite their numbers and proximity. This enraged the Havildar who appeared to have decided to act. He went to the customs shed and ordered that the cannon should be made ready so that a battery could be set up to destroy the lodge. Having given these orders, the Havildar retired taking some of the men with him, intending to launch the attack later. Fifteen to twenty Dutchmen, accompanied by fifty to sixty peons, now advanced against the customs shed and put to flight all the Governor's men who did not attempt to put up the least resistance. The Dutch spiked all the cannon the Havildar had intended to use against them. They looted the sacks of sugar and utterly disarranged all the preparations which had been made for the celebration of the feast of Hasan and Husain, observed annually by Muhammadans of the sect of Ali. They even brought back some of the cannon with them to the lodge without facing the least opposition on the way. Meanwhile, the crew of the Dutch hooker prevented any country craft from entering or leaving the harbour. These mutual attacks could not but exacerbate the relations between the two antagonists.

When the resolution of both parties to fight it out became
evident, all the residents began to send their valued possessions outside Masulipatam fearing that the Dutch would set fire to the city. It was at this juncture, that the news of the death of the King of Golconda was received.

May 1672

This news was brought to the city of Masulipatam on 6 May on which the Havildar desisted from further action. It also became known that the Dutch ambassador at the court had reached an accommodation. This had been achieved at a price, but the Dutch had no other alternative as this is the only way in which such incidents can be terminated. The Dutch were restored their liberty and the women and children returned to the lodge. The city was once again tranquil. The Havildar bestowed several courtesies on the Dutch and offered his services to them. Six weeks later he left for Golconda. I have related the whole affair in a continuous narrative to spare myself the trouble of having to refer to it every now and again. While these dissensions between the Dutch and the Havildar had been in progress, Zafar Beg who was behind all these troubles, sent presents on behalf of the King of Golconda to the English and ourselves. These consisted of jackets, turbans, waist bands and a horse. Zafar Beg had sent these gifts partly to humiliate the Dutch, but his main reason was his desire to prevent us from joining the Dutch for the imbroglio between the Governor and the Dutch was fraught with implications for all of us three European nations. We had not taken any open stand but both the English and ourselves had sent messengers remonstrating to the Governor that his actions were undesirable.

Discord at Surat between de la Haye and Blot—
De la Haye and Caron leave Surat 29 January 1672

Towards the end of March I received letters from Surat which informed me about the state of our affairs on the west coast. With the arrival of de la Haye, Blot and Caron whose Company

**Abdullah Qutb Shah died in the first week of April 1672. Journal of Indian History (henceforth J.I.H.) XLV (1), 1967, p. 156.**
was to be further enlarged by the addition of Baron, it seemed as though Company affairs would prosper as a result of the steps which would now be taken.

January 1672

Unfortunately, these gentlemen began to quarrel among themselves. It was not known if Blot was carrying out orders given to him privately but a break occurred at his very first interview with Caron. In the beginning, Blot treated all the officials at the lodge in an extremely cavalier manner. Mariage was dismissed from the office of President and made to leave the lodge with his wife. When Fort Dauphin had been taken over by the Crown, senior Company officials, having nothing further to do in Madagascar, had come to Surat. Blot treated these officials very badly. They were sent out of the lodge and housed in a private residence where they were given a subsistence allowance of six livres a day. This procedure appeared extremely harsh, particularly as Blot was acting only on hearsay evidence of reports circulating in France with regard to the lapses imputed to these officials. It would have been more equitable if Blot had given these men a chance to clear themselves before taking such extreme measures for no man deserves to be condemned without a formal indictment. Matters did not stop here. Having broken with Caron, Blot also quarrelled with de la Haye when the latter demanded Company help in the form of money and ships for the implementation of the projects with which he had been entrusted. It was being said that the General Assembly had issued orders to the effect that no help, or the least possible help, should be extended to the expedition led by de la Haye. I admit it must have been very difficult to frame a policy which could harmonize such contradictory directives. Since the King,

4\textsuperscript{45} Carré admired the efficiency of Blot. According to him, the difficulties at the lodge arose from the fact that Caron, the older and more experienced of the two, aspired to pre-eminence which Blot refused to concede to him. \textit{Carré}, I, pp. 142-3.

4\textsuperscript{46} Kaeppelin (\textit{op. cit.} pp. 81-2), points out that Blot was partly activated by his conviction that in view of the poor profits made by the Company in India, any policy of expansion leading to deeper involvement of the Company in India was to be eschewed.
in his bounty, had sent out a squadron to help the Company establish itself on strong foundations, it would seem only fair that the Company should reciprocate by making every effort to secure the success of the enterprise by which the Company had so much to gain. However, a policy of the strictest restraint was followed as though the outcome of the expedition was of no interest to the Company. It is said that the reason why Blot fell out with Caron was because the latter had refused to tell Blot what exactly had been in his mind when he had written to court urging the despatch of a squadron, in the absence of which, plans which would bring so much glory to the French name, could not be implemented. So great was the esteem in which Caron was held at court that de la Haye had not only been instructed to seek the advice of Caron before taking any action, but had been further told to give greater weightage to the wishes of Caron than even to resolutions passed by the entire Council. As will become apparent later, these directives were to have important repercussions.

In view of his responsibilities, Blot had demanded that he should be informed how the effects of the Company which were being requisitioned were going to be utilized. This seemed a reasonable request and should not have been denied. Several meetings were held at which the more conciliatory men tried to restore harmony. Blot, a forthright man, refused to soften his stand. He spoke in an unrestrained manner to de la Haye, overstepping the boundaries perhaps, which led the Lieutenant-General to think in terms of arresting Blot. I have it on good authority that it was Caron who turned de la Haye from taking such a step. On bearing of this, Blot, an impetuous man, tried to protect himself, although not very successfully, against the threat to his freedom which was being planned. The atmosphere improved a little largely as a result of the efforts of Baron. It was decided that the squadron would be reinforced with two of the Company ships, the “Phénix”, and the “Saint Jean Baptiste”. The two ships were accordingly armed and well provisioned. Caron was also supplied with a large sum of money for which he agreed to furnish accounts. The squadron was now ready to sail.

While the squadron was still at the Surat roads, Caron
received the order of Saint Michel which had been conferred on him by the King. De la Haye presided over the ceremony. The religious function was performed by Father Ambrose as the Bishop of Heliopolis refused to assist at the ceremony. The Bishop absented himself on the excuse that the performance of such offices lay outside the scope of his ministerial duties. M. Blot was also absent despite the fact that an invitation had been extended to him. The date had even been postponed to suit the convenience of Blot but on the day of the ceremony he pleaded an indisposition. His absence was criticized and was attributed to two reasons. The first was his jealousy at the honour being conferred on Caron and the second arose from the fact that there had been little improvement in the embittered relations between the two men. The King had sent a gold chain of the same order for the late la Faye also. Caron would have conferred it on him had the latter been alive. All the officers of the squadron were present at the ceremony which was performed to the sound of a constant cannonade kept up from the ships. This was followed by a grand feast given by the new Chevalier to the members of the Company.

During the period spent by the fleet at the Surat roads and in Suvali Bay, a dispute is said to have broken out with the English over the question of salute. The matter was settled without recourse to violence.

The French had contended that since their squadron was sailing under Royal rather than Company colours, the ships belonging to the English East India Company at Suvali should pay their fleet the honour of the flag.
Portrait of Neknam Khan
—Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
The Governor conveyed his compliments to de la Haye who followed up this courtesy by sending an envoy to the Governor. The local officials wished to impose a duty on the silver being landed for the purchase of provisions. A strong representation was made to the Governor who desisted from imposing this being afraid that we might engage on some enterprise against the fort. After this, relations eased a great deal, our officers were allowed to move freely in and out of the city and the customs officials did not attempt to place any impediment on loading and unloading operations of our men.\(^1\)

There was no change in the acrimonious attitude of the men. The naval and infantry officers still complained at de la Haye’s treatment of them. This was a continuation of the episode which had started at the time of the departure of the squadron from France. In fairness to the Lieutenant-General it must be stated that some of the officers were guided more by passion than reason. The captain of the “Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne” was given permission to return to France by the overland route. He had been instructed to allow his vessel to run aground so that the depth of Suvali basin could be gauged. He had clashed with de la Haye on this as he had refused to undertake such an operation without the express orders of the General which were refused to him. Upon this, the captain had requested to be relieved of his charge which was acceded. Despite the death of several officers which had taken place, when the squadron was ready to set sail from Surat, it was still sufficiently strong to undertake significant exploits for the greater glory of France.

Towards the beginning of January 1672, the Directors despatched the “Dauphin Couronné” to France. The captain, apparently acting on secret orders, set sail without waiting for the packets to be sent out by de la Haye. A ship from the squadron was

\(^1\)Both Thevenot and Carré bear out the fact that the appearance of the French fleet at Surat aroused a great deal of suspicion among the local people. Thevenot refers to the rumour enjoying local currency according to which it was believed that the French fleet had been sent out to conduct piratical expeditions. Carré is more explicit and says that it was the Dutch, who, being afraid of French intentions, had started this malicious rumour to turn the country powers against the French. Father Ambrose succeeded in convincing the Mughal Governor of Surat that these rumours were quite false. Carré, II, pp. 389-91; Rawlinson, Thevenot, p. 5.
India in the 17th Century

despatched after it and the "Dauphin Couronné" was brought back. The captain could not offer any reasonable explanation for his conduct, and his vessel was allowed to proceed only after it had been charged with letters for the King and the ministers. Several persons no longer considered useful were also sent back to France by this ship.

Everything was now ready for the departure of the squadron. De la Haye instructed some of the ships to precede him and Caron embarked on the "Saint-Jean-Baptiste". The admiral set sail with the rest of the squadron on 20 January. I will take up this narrative again later.

The Capuchin friars, established in Madras since the past forty years, sent me word that they had received letters addressed to them by Caron from the Malabar Coast brought to them by express messengers. Caron had requested that one of the Fathers should make his way by any means possible to Trincomallee Bay on the island of Ceylon where the squadron was to proceed. This plan had been discussed at Surat and it was said that the Reverend Fathers had themselves given an assurance that one of them would proceed to the island. Much had been anticipated from these negotiations which were to be initiated with the King of Kandy through the agency of the priest. The Capuchin fathers wrote to me saying that such a journey could not be undertaken now because of the prevailing scarcity of provisions and the contrary winds and currents.

April 1672

At the same time during the month of April we received the news of the death of Neknam Khan, the Commander-in-Chief

Niknan Khan in the text. Neknam Khan's original name was Riza Quli Beg. His father, Bahman, was in the service of Shah Abbas Safawi. Bahman incurred the Shah's displeasure and was executed in 1594-1595. Riza Quli made his way secretly to India where he took service under Mahabat Khan. Upon the death of Mahabat Khan, he took service under Mir Jumla in Hyderabad. He was associated with Mir Jumla in the conquest of the Carnatic until the latter defected to the Mughals in 1656. When the Carnatic began to slip away from Qutb Shahi domination, Abdullah Qutb Shah appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the Carnatic where he was successful in reasserting Qutb Shahi authority. The King thereupon bestowed upon him the title of Neknam Khan. He died on 19 March, 1672, three weeks before Abdullah Qutb Shah himself died. J.I.H., Vol. XLV (1) 1967, Sherwani, p. 153 n., p. 156.
of the Golconda army. An eunuch, he was a spirited man, and had a reputation for being well-versed in war. The Dutch negotiations at court proceeded very slowly. This was attributed partly to the policy adopted by the late King during his lifetime and to the hiatus caused by his death. The main reason was, however, the haughty manner affected by the ambassador which had offended all the ministers.

On 28 April, I received letters from Madras. These had been written by Sieur Boisseau, a clerk in the Company service who had arrived there. When de la Haye had anchored his squadron at Trincomallee Bay, he had sent Boisseau by hooker to Madras to fetch one of the Capuchin priests for the purpose which I have already mentioned. It was in this way that I learnt about the adventures which had befallen the squadron.

**Vide supra Chap. I, p. 319.**
Voyage of the Squadron of de la Haye from Surat to Trincomallee (29 January-21 March 1672)

I will now return to my narrative. After its departure from Surat, the squadron stopped at Daman where some of the ships anchored. The Portuguese Governor here sent his compliments to de la Haye along with a gift of refreshments. A few priests came to visit the ship and Mariage, who had taken up his residence here after his expulsion from service by Blot, also came to pay his respects. Mariage had resolved to return to France via Persia to lay his complaints before the General Assembly. Being aware of these intentions, both Caron and de la Haye handed over their packets to Mariage.

The squadron set sail again, keeping close to the coast and making a survey of the ports, bays, coves and the estuaries of rivers. Often de la Haye participated himself in these investigations sometimes by long boat, sometimes by launch. It was with great care that de la Haye participated in these investigations and he maintained a meticulous record of his observations. The fleet put in at Versova and passed by Danda-Rajapur,
Wherever it was possible to engage in taking soundings without giving rise to conflict this was done and almost the entire area was covered in this manner. Along the way, the squadron encountered the Company ship, the “Saint François” which was returning from Bantam laden with pepper. De la Haye made the “Flamand” precede the other ships of the squadron and sail ahead to Goa. The officers on board this vessel were to disembark at Goa where they were to greet the Viceroy and ask the latter for permission to procure refreshments. As the squadron neared the road which was at the entrance to the river at Goa, one of the officers who had been sent by de la Haye with his compliments to the Viceroy, returned to the Admiral’s boat and told him that the Viceroy had extended his welcome and had given his permission to the French to buy whatever they needed in the city. The same officer also brought the news that the “Breton” which had left France the previous year to join the squadron, had arrived at Goa, having anchored at the roads on 25 January. The next day, an aide-de-camp came to de la Haye with the compliments of the Governor who had just arrived at Aguada Fort situated to the north of the entrance to the river. The aide repeated the earlier assurance that the French could buy whatever they needed in Goa. De la Haye declared that he

1Verseva, Danda, Caranja, Ceytapour, Coropatam respectively in the text. Danda-Rajapur was situated to the South of Chaul. According to the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (henceforth Gaz. Bom. Pres.), Vol. X, pp. 342-343, the port of Kharepatan lay twenty-five miles up the river Vijaydurg. During the seventeenth century, the town of Kharepatan was sometimes confused with Vijaydurg. The utility of Kharepatan as a port was, however, much reduced subsequently as a result of the silting of the river.

2The “Saint François” was one of the three ships which Caron had taken with him from Surat on 1 April 1671 for his trip to Bantam. Marcara, who was now a prisoner, had been embarked on this vessel. When Caron had taken his departure from Bantam to return to Surat, the “Saint François” had been left behind as its cargo of pepper had not been fully loaded. The “Saint François” had left Bantam on 1 November 1671 and it had arrived at Suvali on 13 February 1672. Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Français (henceforth B.N., F.Fr.), 8972.

3Curé (Carré, II, pp. 396-97), mentions that the “Breton” was in good condition being well equipped and well provisioned.

4In the text, the term used is Maitre de camps.
would be very happy to meet the Viceroy but would prefer to do this incognito to avoid all ceremony. The aide promised to communicate this to his master who gave his approval. De la Haye was duly informed, and accompanied only by Caron, he descended at night and went to meet the Governor who was awaiting them at his portals. I do not know what transpired during the conversations between these two high-ranking persons. It was speculated that several important enterprises had been discussed, but there were no concrete results. It was also believed that this was only a ruse practised by de la Haye to arouse the jealousy of the Dutch. Food and refreshments were loaded onto the ships during this stop-over. The principal officials of the city, and priests belonging to various orders came on board several times to greet de la Haye. The French certainly did not try to save any powder when they fired their cannon to accompany the toasts and the Portuguese were no less unreserved. There were two Portuguese ships which were about to sail for Lisbon. The Governor had promised de la Haye that the French packets would be collected and sent out by these vessels, but the ships set sail without de la Haye receiving any prior intimation. At a distance of two leagues from the roads, however, the ships found themselves becalmed. This gave time to the Secretary to carry out the mail by launch and bring back a receipt from the captain.

The "Barbet" which had sailed with the "Breton" from France but which had separated from it along the way, joined the squadron at the Goa roads. This ship had been forced to put in at the Colombo roads for water and wood. The Governor-General of the Dutch establishments on the island, Rijkloff Van

4Carré points out that the Portuguese Viceroy, who was arming a squadron against the Arabs, exploited the situation to his own advantage. The French visit proved to be the occasion of much ostentation and the members of the squadron were encouraged to spend as much money as possible. Not only were high prices charged for the provisions which were supplied but several Frenchmen fell into the hands of creditors and were unable to return to their ships. The Viceroy formed these men into a contingent which was then added to the Portuguese forces. Bibliothèque, Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions (henceforth B.N., N.A.), 9352 (77); Carré, II, pp. 397-400.
Squadron of de la Haye in the Indian Ocean

Goens⁶ would not allow a single Frenchman to land. He ordered that all the water, wood and other French requirements should first be transported to a ship belonging to the Dutch Company currently anchored at the roads, from where the commodities were to be conveyed by launch to the French hooker. Another hooker belonging to the Company had left France the previous year and had joined the squadron at the Goa roads. Its cargo consisted only of iron.

February 1672

Several Frenchmen, including a few officers, deserted the squadron at Goa. The Viceroy was approached to secure their return. This official ordered a search to be made but it was reported that no Frenchmen could be found.⁷

⁶To prevent confusion between Rijklof Van Goens the Elder and the Younger, a brief biographical note becomes necessary here. Rijklof Van Goens, the Elder, was one of the most distinguished servants of the Dutch Company. He had been employed in the Dutch Indies since his youth. He had played a significant role in the destruction of Portuguese power by the Dutch in India during the years 1653, 1654 and 1656.

In 1654, he was appointed extraordinary member of the Supreme Council of the Indies. In 1655, he was placed in charge of the expedition which destroyed the Portuguese hold on Ceylon. This task had been accomplished by June 1658, by which date the Portuguese expulsion from Ceylon was complete. In 1663, he finished his first term as Commissary and Superintendent of the Dutch possessions in Ceylon.

During this period, his second son, also called by the same name, had established himself in the Company service. Van Goens, the Younger, had travelled to the East in 1657. In 1670, he was appointed Governor-Designate of Ceylon and formally took over from his father in 1672.

Van Goens, the Elder, however, remained in Ceylon until 1675 where he served as Superintendent. He used this opportunity to train his son to continue the policies which he had initiated. In 1675, Van Goens, the Elder, finally took his departure from Ceylon having been appointed Director-General of the Company at Batavia. Van Goens, the Younger, remained at his post until 1679 when he was succeeded by Laurens Pyl.

Despite the presence of both father and son in Ceylon, it was only with Van Goens, the Elder, that de la Haye came into direct contact. Selections from Records of the Madras Government, Dutch Records No. 13 (henceforth cited as Dutch Records), p. 8; S. Arasaratnam, Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1658-1686, Amsterdam, 1958, pp. 4, 16-17, 51 n., 77, 82.

⁷Vide supra, n. 5.
Having finished his business at Goa, de la Haye set out in advance of the rest of the squadron on the "Phénix", intending to put in at Tellicherry where the Company possessed a counter. The remaining ships followed him on 1 February keeping close to the coastline. The number of ships in the squadron had increased with the arrival of the "Breton" and the two hookers. The "Breton" was a fine ship, well-equipped and with reinforcements on board. This ship had brought letters from the court for de la Haye.

On 10 February, the squadron anchored before Tellicherry where M. de Flacourt, the Company Chief here, boarded the Admiral's ship. He informed de la Haye that the Zamorin, or the Emperor in Calicut, along with other princes related to the royal family wished to form an alliance with us against the Dutch who had insulted the Zamorin on several occasions. The Emperor was at that time at Ponnani ten to twelve leagues to the south, where he was engaged in the celebration of a feast which was performed here each year.

The squadron lifted anchor and arrived at Ponnani on 12 February. The Zamorin was informed about the arrival of the fleet and the next day, two of the highest ranking princes, the heirs apparent to the throne, boarded the Admiral's boat. Preparations had been made to give them a befitting welcome. The visitors were regaled well and they, for their part, were not chary in their use of fine phrases in which Asiatics are so prodigal. Several years ago the Zamorin had granted the French the territory of Ayakotta situated at a distance of two leagues

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*Piniany in the text.

The Magha festival was celebrated each year sometime between 12 February and 11 March at Ponnani in Valluvanad. Every twelve years, festivities took place on a grand scale when this feast was called the Mamanga or Mahamagha festival. The Zamorin must have been performing the annual rites in this reference by Martin, Dutch Records, p. 65 n.; K.V.K. Ayyar, A History of Kerala, Palghat, 1965, pp. 214-17.

**Dual monarchy as an institution did not exist in Cochin, but below the Zamorin were four other princes of rank. At the time of the succession of the new Zamorin, a formal investiture was held not only for the new ruler but also for the four princes. K.V.K. Ayyar, op. cit., pp. 336-38.

^Allcote in the text—Ayakotta may have been a European corruption of Irinjalakuda.
from the Dutch possession of Cranganore. The Dutch were now in occupation of this territory. Caron disembarked and secured the ratification of this grant from the Zamorin after which he returned to the ship. The squadron set sail and anchored between Cranganore and Ayakotta. De la Haye wrote a letter to Van Rheede, the Dutch Governor of Cranganore, protesting at the Dutch occupation of Ayakotta. Ayakotta had been granted to the French and de la Haye was in possession of the deed. He therefore demanded Dutch withdrawal so that the French could enter into possession. The only reply vouchsafed by Van Rheede to the officers who brought him the letter was that his orders were not to listen to any proposal brought forward by de la Haye nor allow any Frenchmen to set foot on any part of his territory. Van Rheede forced our officers to return to their ships without delay. When de la Haye heard of the haughty behaviour of Van Rheede, he conveyed his orders to the other officers of the squadron. Troops were embarked on long boats and launches and set ashore near Ayakotta. A contingent consisting of thirty cadets, led by an officer and supported by a larger body of men now proceeded to march towards this post. The Dutch who were inside retreated with their flag when they saw our men. Our men were able to enter into occupation without any resistance and found that the Dutch position consisted only of a straw house surrounded by a stone palisade. De la Haye ordered the demolition of the palisade. He did this to emphasize that it was not his intention to build a fortified base here but to secure its possession for the Company so that it could carry on its trade from here. While this was going on, a fire broke out on the roof and the whole building was reduced to cinders. This was believed to have been caused by lighted matches inserted by the Dutch prior to their departure. De la Haye now sent back the two Brahmins whom the Zamorin had asked to accompany the squadron and watch this action.

Van Rée in the text. Adriaan Van Rheede had been appointed Commander of Malabar in 1669. The rank of Commander stood below that of Governor in the Dutch colonial hierarchy. Van Rheede was responsible for the administration of all Dutch factories on the Malabar Coast. Dutch Records, p. 4; S. Arasatharam, op. cit., p. 99, n. 45.
After he had issued instructions to Flacourt, de la Haye retired with his troops.

On 18 February, two Dutchmen visited the Admiral's ship with a letter from Van Rheede in which apparently there was a reference to the Ayakotta incident. The squadron set sail on 19 February and continued on its route.

The Ayakotta expedition and all the other projects aimed at establishing French influence on the Malabar coast came to naught. The Dutch who enjoyed a strong position along these coasts holding several place of strategic value, found it easy to restore the previous balance. The officials of the French Company here were perhaps somewhat ingenuous in placing too much trust in the plans they formed with several of the leading local dignitaries. The latter wished the Company to help them to win back their property which had been expropriated from them by the Dutch. De la Haye had been drawn into these projects but the other designs to which the squadron was pledged received top priority. These schemes on the Malabar coast were, therefore, shelved for the time being.

On 20 February, a Dutch squadron consisting of twelve ships was seen sailing close to the coast. The fleet had been equipped in Ceylon and sent to the Malabar coast to keep a watch on

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13 Flacourt, although centred at Tellicherry was obviously expected to tend to Company interests along the entire region. Vide infra, Chap. VI, p. 604.

14 The French seem to have been extremely successful in preserving the strictest secrecy about their plans, for despite this contact with the Dutch on the Malabar Coast, the Batavia Council appeared to be totally in the dark with regard to French intentions. D.R. 20, pp. 114, 116, 118. Langhorn's knowledge of French plans (supra, Chap. I, p. 301), may have stemmed from the liaison which existed between England and France at the time. The author of the Mémoire sur Compagnie des Indes (henceforth cited as Mem. Cle. des Indes) (B.N., N.A., 9375), however, supports the stricture passed by Martin (supra, Chap. I, p. 301), on the lack of discretion shown by Caron. It is stated that Caron had two Dutch interpreters or secretaries at Surat who passed on all information to their compatriots.

15 The Zamorin made a further attempt in 1674 when he tried to secure the intercession of Sher Khan, known to be a friend of the French. The Zamorin wished Sher Khan to suggest to the French that de la Haye should cooperate with the Zamorin in chasing the Dutch out of Cochin. The Zamoria was willing to supply 300,000 men for this purpose. B.N., N.A., 9352 100.
A council was immediately held on board the flagship to decide what was to be done. De la Haye and all the naval and military officers on board were unanimously of the view that our squadron should engage the Dutch vessels in action. It is true war had not yet been declared but a pretext for a quarrel could be easily found by demanding a salute from the Dutch. The Dutch would be certain to refuse as the Batavia Council had prescribed this specifically. This non-compliance could serve as the excuse for the opening of hostilities. Caron was the only person to dissent from this. He agreed that it would be easy for the French to engage the Dutch squadron in battle and cripple it. However, it had to be remembered that this would not put an end to Dutch activity. The Dutch power was like a hydra which gathers new strength each time it is destroyed and even if we decimated this fleet, the Batavia Council would send out others which would be even stronger. Another and more convincing argument brought forward by Caron was that we could scarcely expect to get involved in such an action without sustaining some losses ourselves. Irrespective of the scale of these—whether major or minor—the squadron would certainly get delayed. The implementation of the broader objectives would therefore receive a set back.¹⁷

These arguments, coupled with the positive injunctions which I have mentioned according to which de la Haye was to do nothing against the wishes of Caron,¹⁸ led to the adoption of

¹⁴According to the Mem Cle. des Indes (B.N., N.A., 9375) the Dutch fleet consisted of 14 vessels. It was commanded by Rijkloff Van Goens, the Elder. Kaepelin, op. cit., p. 90. Carré (Carré, II. pp. 400-1), records that when the Dutch fleet sighted the French squadron it was gripped by panic as it found itself hedged in-between the French vessels and the coast.

¹⁷Carré specified that the objective of the fleet was not to engage in hostilities with the Dutch in the Orient but to establish French contacts for trade with the richest countries of the east. Ibid, p. 401. On his return voyage de la Haye was instructed to impress the local powers by making a show of the presence of the fleet in all the countries on his path stretching from Cape Comorin to Arabia. Revue des Questions Historiques (cited henceforth as R.Q.H.) 1897, p. 186 n.

¹⁸The instructions to de la Haye were very clear on this point, viz., “even if you know that the Directors of the Company are working against the
the resolution that the squadron was to continue on its route giving a wide berth to the Dutch fleet. De la Haye and the other officers were extremely vexed by this decision. Some of them were so overcome by their emotions that they could not prevent themselves from decrying the Director heatedly for impeding an action which appeared to have every chance of success and which would have brought a great deal of honour to the nation.

To give an honest and unprejudiced opinion, the destruction of this fleet would not have dealt an irretrievable blow to the Dutch Company in India. However, it must be borne in mind that the strength of the Dutch forces at this time was not very great either because they had been negligent about asking for their despatch from Europe in sufficient numbers, or because they had been confident that they had nothing to fear.

I still have at hand a record of the number of troops possessed by the Dutch at Batavia and those maintained by them in their establishments and fortresses in India. It would have been extremely difficult for the Dutch, unless they were prepared to strip their establishments bare, to equip a second squadron which would be sufficiently strong to harm our royal one. The defeat of the first Dutch squadron would certainly have weakened them a great deal, and, in this context it should be remembered that many successful revolutions can be traced to far humbler beginnings.

I cannot prevent myself from reporting a lapse which was committed at Surat, one which was made all the more serious because of its irretrievable consequences. A few days after the departure of the fleet from Surat, packets addressed to de la Haye from court were received. In these de la Haye was informed about the prospect of war between France and Holland, in the contingency of which, instructions were issued to him to take advantage of every opportunity to harm the Dutch. These packets were placed on board a hoy belonging to the Company. This small vessel was then despatched to Goa in the expectation

interests (of the Company) it is the desire of his Majesty that you should punctiliously fulfil their directions after having presented them with your views." *Annales de l'école des Sciences Politiques (A.S.P.)* 1894, Fleury, p. 293.
that it would find the French squadron there. When Blot had been making these arrangements, it had been pointed out to him that in the event of an attack by the Malabar pirates no resistance would be possible as only two or three Europeans had been placed on board. The pirates would seize the boat and the packets would be lost. There was no scarcity of Frenchmen at the lodge and to ensure the safety of the letters ten or twelve of them should have been placed on the hoy. Blot ignored this advice and sent the boat as he had first planned. The boat was accosted and seized by Malabari vessels. Our crew was unable to put up any resistance and escaped to the shore by launch. The first error in sending out such an ill-equipped vessel was now compounded by a second one. This lay in the fact that the captain of the hoy was kept in total ignorance that the bale which he had been asked to deliver also contained a packet for de la Haye. If these letters had been given to the captain, he would have been able to carry them away with him. It is true that the letters were recovered subsequently, but it was by then too late. The harm caused by this negligence can be judged from the fact that if de la Haye had received the letters he would have known about the preparations afoot in France for the outbreak of hostilities, and of the fact that war would be declared by the beginning of the year 1672.\footnote{This letter gave de la Haye explicit instructions to take every opportunity to attack the Dutch. \textit{B.N., N.A.}, 9375.}

Knowing this he would not have been so restrained towards the Dutch but would have used every opportunity to harm them. He may have even attacked the squadron as a result of these orders, and subsequently in Trincomallee, as will be reported later in my narrative, when de la Haye was to check himself in the face of Dutch insults, he may well have been less circumspect.

\textbf{March 1672}

Further, as we shall see, he would have avoided detaching the ships from the squadron which were to fall into the hands of the Dutch. He would also have avoided leaving behind the ships and troops at Trincomallee and thus have prevented their capture. The strength of the squadron would thus have been
fully conserved. These subjects will be dealt with more fully at the proper time when further information becomes available.

After the decision to avoid the Dutch had been taken, our squadron left the Dutch vessels well at large and sailed towards Ceylon. On 7 March 1672, the squadron had reached Galle Point and by 20 March it was in Batticaloa Bay. The squadron anchored here while launches were sent out to procure water and refreshments. A cannon-ball was fired from a newly built fort and, shortly after, a canoe bearing a white flag and carrying two Dutchmen appeared. These men requested us not to proceed any further inside the bay and showed our men a place where water was available. They also agreed to send us provisions. Our men respected these wishes and proceeded no further. Several launchloads of water were carried from a pond at the spot which had been shown to us. As the provisions which had been promised had not still been brought, the entire squadron set sail on 21 March arriving before Trincomalilee Bay on the same day.

**De la Haye at Trincomalilee**—Embassy to the King of Kandy—Scarcity of Provisions in the French Squadron

De la Haye, who was always anxious to supervise surveys, embarked on a long boat himself and, accompanied by several

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*Batticaloar*. Batticaloa, a flourishing centre for the country trade of Ceylon, was situated in territory which was rich in paddy, timber, wax, honey and elephants. It had been conquered from the King of Ceylon by Commander Roothas in 1668. Roothas was also responsible for fortifying this new acquisition. Arasaratnam, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 41.

*The original name was Tirukonthamalai, Mountain of Kotha (a Hindu deity). Ceylon Today, 1958, p. 24. De la Haye had been instructed to establish a French counter at Trincomalilee, assessed by Caron to be the most favourable spot for the establishment of French presence in Ceylon. The squadron was then to proceed towards the Moluccas. R.Q.H., 1897, p. 187. In making these plans, it had been assumed that this part of Ceylon was free of Dutch interference. This proved to be a costly mistake as Du Pon had already conquered Trincomalilee in 1665. Arasaratnam, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Moreover, it was very unlikely that the Dutch would allow any other European power a foothold in the cinnamon trade of Ceylon which was a Dutch monopoly.*
well-armed launches, he entered the bay to see things for himself before mooring the squadron here. A small Dutch fort and a few other works were to be found here, but these were all of a minor order. After the bay had been reconnoitred, a signal was given for the ships to enter. The squadron anchored before a Dutch park—the same given to a country fortification enclosed by stones. The squadron fired a nine gun salute which was returned by a hundred gun one. Several Singhalese people—as the natives of this island are called—came on board the Admiral's boat offering refreshments and every kind of assistance on behalf of the King of Kandy. The King controls the interior but the entire coastline is under Dutch occupation. The Singhalese men wished to convince de la Haye that the news of the arrival of the squadron had already been conveyed to the King who had sent them to the General with his greetings. They asked for letters which they could carry back to their monarch. The envoys were treated very well. They were given presents and when they left the ship de la Haye gave them a letter for their King. They seemed to take extraordinary pains about their return trip and they contradicted the statement which they had earlier made. This aroused suspicions that they may have been sent by the Dutch. They were all brought back to the ship by an officer but as nothing could be found against them, they were released after a few days.

Upon the appearance of a launch with a Dutch flag in the bay, a French boat was sent out to encounter it. The launch contained eight men who either feigned not to understand French or were really ignorant of this language. Since our men did not know theirs, no clarifications could be obtained and both groups retired without engaging in any communication. After examining the whole bay, de la Haye stopped at an island which he named Sun Island. It was decided that a fort would

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329 Cingalas in the text.


24 The Dutch name for this island was "Divers in de Wegh" (The Obstacle).
be erected here. This followed from the plan projected a long
time ago that an alliance would be made with the King of
Kandy and the French would join the latter in hostilities
against the Dutch. The exact site of the fort was chosen, the
alignments were traced and work was started. The time had
come to gather information about the King of Kandy and to
start negotiations with him. De la Haye decided to send an
envoy. The choice fell on Sieur Boisfontaine, corporal of the
guards, who took his departure. A detachment of thirty men
escorted Boisfontaine eighteen to twenty leagues into the interior
and then returned declaring that they had been treated extremely
well in all the villages through which they had passed.

When the squadron had arrived at the bay, there had already
been many sick men on board the ships. Their numbers were
further augmented as a result of the lack of food and refresh¬
ment experienced by the squadron at the bay. Each day, the
Singhalese promised to bring supplies, but nothing appeared.
The crew and the soldiers began to feel the pangs of hunger, and
even some of the principal officers now fell ill. The greatest loss,
deeply felt by the entire squadron was, however, the death of
de Grateloup, who expired on 30 March 1672 after an illness

The Dutch had helped the King of Kandy to expel the Portuguese but
relations had subsequently deteriorated when the King saw that they wished
to step into the position of the Portuguese. The Dutch, who had occupied
much of the coastal area, tried to maintain friendly relations with the King
by sending numerous envoys with presents. The King oscillated between
periods of warmth, when he granted audience to the envoys, and those of
hostility towards the Dutch. R. Knox, A Historical Relation of Ceylon,
1671, Bysterveld was sent by the Dutch to the court of Rajasimha but in
1672 hostilities broke out once again between the Dutch and the Singhalese
King. Arasaratnam, op. cit., p. 68; P.E. Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders,
1658-1796, Ceylon, 1918 pp. 17-19. At the time of the appearance of the
French fleet, the relations between Rajasimha and the Dutch were very
strained but Rajasimha found it impossible to provide effective assistance
to the French. B.N., N.A., 9375.

Three envoys were in fact sent by de la Haye to King Rajasimha II.
Knox, op. cit., p. 295. The name of the second envoy was mentioned as
d'Orgeray de Harmes. A Portuguese interpreter also accompanied the
French envoys. Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon Branch, N.S.
of three or four months. He was a gentleman of merit, possess-
ing many good qualities, who had served with distinction in France. He had been deputed by the King to succeed de la Haye in case of death. De Grateloup was buried with full military honours on the island where the fort was being erected.

April 1972

On 2 April, a Dutch launch approached the Admiral’s boat and a Dutch officer brought a letter for de la Haye written by Rijkloff Van Goens, the Dutch Governor of Ceylon. The latter protested at the French action in constructing a fort as he claimed that the entire bay was a possession of the Dutch. In the French reply, it was stated that since the territory belonged to the King of Kandy whose permission had been obtained for the construction of the fort, no other authority had the right to press for its demolition. The Dutch officer returned with this letter.

Attempts were being made to find a solution to end the food crisis afflicting the squadron. The Coromandal coast had every¬thing in abundance and the best means appeared to that of despatching a few vessels to this region. The “Phénix”, the “Europe”, a flute and a hooker belonging to the Company were chosen to undertake this mission. Sieur de la Mélinière, the commander of the “Phénix” was ordered to go to Tranquebar, the captain of the “Europe” was to go to Porto Novo, and the hooker was to proceed to Madras, from where this tiny vessel was also to bring back one of the Capuchin fathers. Sieur Boisseau, a clerk in the service of the Company, was further charged with the handing over to the Reverend Fathers of a packet for despatch to Surat. This contained letters addressed to the court and the General Assembly, while a separate packet was enclosed for the Directors at Surat. A company of infantry under Sieur Darmes was embarked on the “Phénix” while the
crew of the “Europe” was fortified by the addition of a few men.

I do not wish to question the judgement of de la Haye in deciding to despatch these ships, but it does seem a strange lapse on his part not to have given any explicit instructions to de la Mélinière, either oral or written, as to what should be done in case of a Dutch attack. And yet, in view of the strong protests lodged by the latter, such a possibility did not appear in the least remote. Many commanders would have refused to undertake such a voyage without specific instructions to serve as a guideline but as de la Haye had promoted de la Mélinière by giving him this command, the latter feared that he would be stripped of his new rank if he offered any opposition. There was no such explanation for the complaisance of the captains of the “Europe” and the hooker. The three ships set sail on 8 April following their respective routes. It was only after the arrival of Boisseau at Madras that I was informed about the adventures of the fleet.

The acute scarcity to which the squadron found itself reduced at Trincomallee Bay was indeed mystifying. Several men among the ranks had died of starvation and even the officers had not been spared. Only three months had elapsed since the squadron had left Surat where it would have been easy to provision the fleet for as long a period as desired. Later, during a conversation with de la Haye, when I took the liberty of mentioning this to him, he had said that he had been deceived by those who had advised him that everything which he required would be available in plenty at Trincomallee. This had made him refrain from taking on any extra stores from Surat. Although the island of Ceylon is rich in cinnamon and certain other products, it is well known that there is deficiency of food along the

There is a discrepancy here between the statements made by Martin and those available in the records. Blot wrote in a letter dated 6 January 1672 that Caron had initially asked for 10,000 crowns in cash, an equivalent amount in merchandise and food sufficient for ten months for the squadron. Blot had compiled but Caron had then increased his demand and had been supplied with food for eighteen months. B.N., N.A., 9352 (51). Carré confirms the figures given by Blot in his letter dated 24 January 1674. Ibid., p. 86.
coastline and in a few pockets in the interior. The Portuguese in previous times, and the Dutch in present times, drew their necessities for the sustenance of their garrisons from the coasts of Malabar and the Coromandel, and from the Kingdom of Bengal. I will describe the subsequent activities of the squadron at the proper time and in order to preserve the continuity of my narrative I will now return to affairs at Masulipatam.

May 1672

**Succession to the Throne of Golconda**

The packet brought by Boisseau for the Surat counter was sent on to me and I immediately despatched it by express messenger to the Directors at Surat. I have already stated that on 6 May 1672, the news of the death of the King of Golconda had become known at Masulipatam. This Prince had possessed three daughters—the eldest was married to Muhammad Sultan the eldest son of Aurangzeb (Orengzeb), the third son of Shah Jahan (Chagehan), the reigning Mughal Emperor. The second was married to an Arab prince, Bara Mirza, meaning “great Prince Mamour” in the text. This marriage had taken place in 1656 following which the Qutb Shahi’s bride had been taken to the north. According to the treaty signed at the time of the marriage, Muhammad Sultan was to have succeeded Abdullah Qutb Shah to the throne of Golconda. However, Prince Muhammad Sultan had also contracted a marriage alliance with his cousin, the daughter of Shah Shuja. When Aurangzeb engaged on the war of succession to win the throne of Delhi, Muhammad Sultan espoused the cause of his father-in-law rather than that of his own father. For this misdemeanour, Aurangzeb sentenced him to life imprisonment at the fort of Gwalior. Muhammad Sultan died in prison in 1677. Siddiqui, *op. cit.*, pp. 206, 215; J. Sarkar, trans., *Maasir-i-Alamgiri of Saqi Must‘ad Khan*, Calcutta. 1947 (henceforth cited as *Maasir*), p. 98.

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31 Both Knox and Baldeus describe the agricultural wealth of Ceylon. The reports which de la Haye had received may well have been quite true. The major miscalculation made by the French lay in their overlooking the fact that whereas the fertile interior was under the command of the King of Kandy, the Dutch controlled the coastline, as a result of which they could easily prevent the supplies sent from the interior from reaching the French. Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 386; Ceylon Historical Journal, VIII, 1958-59; P. Brohier, trans. *A True and Exact Description of the Great Island of Ceylon*, by Phillipus Baldeus (henceforth cited as Brohier, *op. cit.*), pp. 3-4.

32 *Prince Mamour* in the text. This marriage had taken place in 1656 following which the Qutb Shahi’s bride had been taken to the north. According to the treaty signed at the time of the marriage, Muhammad Sultan was to have succeeded Abdullah Qutb Shah to the throne of Golconda. However, Prince Muhammad Sultan had also contracted a marriage alliance with his cousin, the daughter of Shah Shuja. When Aurangzeb engaged on the war of succession to win the throne of Delhi, Muhammad Sultan espoused the cause of his father-in-law rather than that of his own father. For this misdemeanour, Aurangzeb sentenced him to life imprisonment at the fort of Gwalior. Muhammad Sultan died in prison in 1677. Siddiqui, *op. cit.*, pp. 206, 215; J. Sarkar, trans., *Maasir-i-Alamgiri of Saqi Must‘ad Khan*, Calcutta. 1947 (henceforth cited as *Maasir*), p. 98.
noble”, who resided at the court. The third was given to a scion of the ancient royal house of Golconda. This young man had long been a wandering knight but had been induced to lead a more regulated life by a Muslim dervish respected for his sanctity by the Europeans. The dervish had assured the young man that he was destined to a share in sovereignty upon which the latter returned to court. The ability of this sage to foretell the future was well known. The late King had made his ministers promise that on his death they would elevate his third son-in-law to the throne. Abdullah Qutb Shah had even designated this son-in-law as his successor in the testament which he had drawn up. Bara Mirza and his wife, who appear-

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**Footnotes:**

33 Tavernier calls him “a Prince of Arabia” and “a relative of the grand Shaikh of Mecca”, Azad Bilgrami alleges that he was the offspring of a runaway marriage between Sayyid Masum and a sister of Shah Abbas II, and that his full name was Sayyid Nizam-ud-din Ahmad of Najaf. J. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, IV Calcutta, 1940 (henceforth cited as *Aur.*) p. 398 n.


36 Siddiqui, *op. cit.*, p. 219, n. 3, makes a reference to a prophecy of Shah Raju that the third daughter of Abdullah Qutb Shah was to marry Abul Hasan but does not say anything further.

37 It was almost by a quirk of fate that Abul Hasan contracted this royal alliance. Abdullah Qutb Shah, had, in fact wished to marry his third daughter to an Arab adventurer by the name of Sayyid Sultan Najafi who won the Sultan’s favour, and even the date of the marriage had been fixed. A quarrel, however, occurred between Sayyid Ahmad and the prospective groom as a result of which the engagement was abruptly broken off and a new groom hastily found in the person of Abul Hasan. Siddiqui’s *op. cit.*, pp. 220-22.

38 The English records quoted by Bendre, *Q.S.*, pp. 4-5, 14-15, corroborates the information given by Martin. Abdullah Qutb Shah had little love for Sayyid Ahmad or his wife whereas he doted on his youngest daughter. After the marriage, Abul Hasan not only secured a firm hold on the
ed to have stronger rights to succession, opposed these last wishes. The ministers and leading nobles of the kingdom had, however, been won over and the testament of the late King was executed. The third son-in-law who belonged to the ancient line of kings was raised to the throne and he assumed the name of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (Houssein Koutoub Shah).

The ministers who contributed the most to this elevation were Musa Khan and Sayyid Muzaffar, the former being the Commander-in-Chief and the latter the Chancellor. All the means by which Bara Mirza could have asserted his rights were then taken away from him.

ARRIVAL OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL GUESTON AT SURAT

I received letters from Surat on 8 May in which I was informed that the Director-General, Gueston had arrived. I have already described how, within a few days of his departure from France, the ship on which he had been sailing had been forced to return to la Rochelle as a result of a tempest. Another ship was now prepared and the Director set out once again. Gueston spent the next nine months on the ship without stopping at any place. Now that all three Directors had arrived, it was hoped that the affections of the King, but also gathered a strong party around himself by projecting a far more amenable temperament than did his arrogant brother-in-law. Whereas the testament, to which Martin refers, is confirmed by Bendre, Sherwani, *J.I.H.*, 1968, pp. 317-18, is quite explicit that Abdullah Qutb Shah did not formally designate any successor. His preference for Abul Hasan was, however, quite obvious.

*Abdalla Ouchem Koutoubscha* in the text.

*Sidi Muscan and Sidi Musafer* respectively in the text. Both enjoyed prominent positions during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah, Sayyid Muzaffar playing an important role in arranging the marriage between Badshah Bibi and Abul Hasan. Bendre, *Q.G.*, pp. 5-6, 8-11. Siddiqui *op. cit.*, p. 225, states that Sayyid Muzaffar was an important general in the army of the late King. Sarkar *Aur.*, IV, pp. 398-99, asserts that Musa Khan enjoyed the position of Mahaldar during this period. Wilson defines Mahaldar as the principal officer of a district enjoying revenue and police functions. The ranks given to them by Martin in the text, were not those enjoyed by them at the time of the death of Abdullah Qutb Shah but were conferred on them by Abul Hasan on his accession to the throne as a reward for their support. Bendre, *Q.G.*, p. 16.

41This was the "St. Esprit" *Carré*, I.P. 143.
affairs of the Company would be placed on a better footing but as we shall see, the effect was quite contrary to what had been expected.

Several ships were sent from Surat to Persia, Basra, Bantam and the African coast. A cargo was loaded for Bantam. Caron had left three Frenchmen with equal powers there. A merchant who was to enjoy authority over the other members of the establishment was now sent out from Surat to Bantam. No other event of particular significance occurred during the month of May.

June-July 1672

There were many rumours during the month of June of several encounters having taken place between our ships and those of the Dutch at Trincomalley Bay. The news was brought to me by a ship which belonged to some Bengal merchants. This vessel had entered the bay and the train of events recounted appeared entirely probable. The ship was making stops at Madras and Masulipatam on its return voyage. Our ships in Trincomalley Bay were blockaded by a Dutch squadron consisting of fifteen to sixteen ships which had positioned itself at the entrance to the bay. These ships had stopped and seized a French vessel returning from the Coromandel coast laden with provisions. Although I did not believe everything recounted by these officers, it was necessary to keep Messieurs, the Directors informed. I took the unusual step on the same day of engaging two express messengers who promised to reach Surat within seventeen days.

On 26 June, the new Havildar, a replacement for the previous official who had retired, arrived at Masulipatam. Following the usual custom, we went to meet him at the distance of a

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43 The ship sent to Bantam was the "Vautour" which was to proceed from Bantam to France. Carré states that Pilavoine, who had been installed at the Bantam counter by Caron, was being replaced by this merchant who was being sent out by Gueston. Ibid., II, p. 394

44 In his letter to Baron, Martin had stated that there were 18 Dutch ships at the Bay. B.N., N.A., 9332 (50).

45 This was the "Phénix" vide infra, Chap. II, pp. 346-347.
league from the city. The English and the Dutch also acquitted themselves of the same duty.

During the month of July, four English ships from Europe anchored at Madras. Their next stop was at Masulipatam from where they proceeded to Bengal. From the European news brought to us, it appeared almost certain that the English would join us in a war against the Dutch.

**August 1672**

On 13 July, I received letters from Boisseau written at Madras. He related that when he had been on his way to rejoin our fleet inside Trincomallee Bay he had found a Dutch squadron at the entrance from which three ships were detached and sent towards him. He had already learnt that the Dutch had captured one of the ships which had been sent to the Coromandel and feared the same fate would befall him. This had made him return to Madras where he had subsequently anchored. I continued to keep the Directors informed and sent on this news by express messengers to Surat.

Two days later, a runner from Surat arrived at Masulipatam with letters for de la Haye and Caron. I send him on to Madras to Boisseau. The Directors ordered us to start collecting a cargo for France. We received an advance sum of Rs. 2,000 by letters of credit. We were promised that further sums to a limit of 200,000 livres would be remitted to us in due course.

**Squadron of de la Haye at San Thome’—Withdrawal of the French from the City of Masulipatam**

On 31 July, we received advice that our squadron had anchored before the village of San Thomé, just about a league south of Madras. At first, the Governor had refused to provide any food on which the squadron had fired a few shots at the city. Subsequently, however, an understanding was reached.

On 2 and 4 August, we received further confirmation of the presence of our fleet before San Thomé, first by the

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"In French the distinction between a city and a town is not always very clear as the word "ville" covers both these terms. In this translation the word "ville" has generally been taken to mean a city."
letters written by the Capuchin priests at Madras, and later by those written by de la Haye. The Lieutenant-General informed us that as the Governor of San Thomé had persisted in his refusal to allow us to purchase supplies from the shore, the squadron had attacked and captured the town. The time had also arrived, stated de la Haye, when the King of Golconda had to be made to pay for the insults offered to the Company at Masulipatam. He had been influenced by this factor in arriving at his decision to effect the capture of this place. Caron wrote to us in the same strain and both Caron and de la Haye urged us to take precautions against the orders of arrest which the King of Golconda would certainly issue against us. Upon receipt of these letters I convened a meeting of the principal members of the lodge to discuss the measures we would have to take. Our initial reaction was to raise additional reinforcements of men, furnish ourselves well with food and other necessary articles, and then await the shock. On more mature reflection, we realized that we were not really strong enough to resist the orders of arrest which the King would issue against us. We decided to make our way to the roads where several ships belonging to various merchants in the city lay at anchor. We would seize one of these and await whatever instructions they wished to deliver to us on board this vessel. The resolution was passed and minuted. We removed all the valuable effects of the Company such as emeralds, French brocades and other costly materials for storage at the house of a private French trader,

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\[46\]This explanation offered to Martin appears to have been formed to justify the action after it had been taken rather than explain why the decision had been taken. Carré, II, p. 440, illustrates the folly of this conquest very well. The capture of San Thomé from the King of Golconda would alienate this powerful potentate and French mercantile interests at Masulipatam would surely suffer. Martin, infra, Chap. II, pp. 354-355, and Froidevaux, R.Q.H., 1897, p. 187 make it quite plain that the decision to capture San Thomé was essentially an ad-hoc one evolved by purely local factors rather than forming a part of a preconceived plan. The immediate reaction of the Dutch was to take advantage of the situation created by the French and step in on the side of the King of Golconda, refurnishing thereby their image of altruistic well-wishers of this monarch. Their troubled relations with King Rajasimha II of Ceylon, however, did not permit them to take immediate action. D.R., 20, p. 325; *ibid*, 21, p. 208.
Sieur Junet, who was at that time residing at Masulipatam. The Company property that was left behind at the lodge was not worth very much. I had the records and other papers placed in a chest intending to take these with us. Having taken all these precautions we prepared to leave.

As soon as the Dutch received information of the arrival of our squadron on the coast, they transferred all their belongings from the lodge to a garden they possessed outside the city, fearing that our boats would sack Masulipatam.

CONDITIONS AT THE CITY OF SAN THOMÉ

Before describing what befell us at the Masulipatam roads, I will relate the adventures of the squadron up to the time of the capture of San Thomé. It would help the continuity of my narrative if I describe conditions within the town in advance so that later events can be understood better. The origins of the city can be traced to the efforts of several Armenians who had settled here to undertake trade. The city also developed as a result of the cult centred around the saint after whom it was named. When the Portuguese established their domination in the Indies, they settled everywhere. Some took up residence at San Thomé allying themselves with the Armenians who were already there. They built houses and the city developed and

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47 M.J. Seth, *History of Armenians in India*, Calcutta, 1895, pp. 18, 140, does not distinguish between Madras and Mylapore (San Thomé). He states that unlike the European trading nations who flocked to India during the seventeenth century the Armenians did not channelise their trade through counters. They preferred to mingle with the local people and carry on their trade through individual initiative rather than organised endeavour. Armenian permanent settlement in Madras is traced to the year 1666, although individual Armenian traders undoubtedly had connections with the settlement long before this date. According to legend, the apostle, St. Thomas, who established the Orthodox Syrian Church in India, was martyred at the mount which was subsequently named after him.

48 The Armenians were interested in the St. Thomas legend, as, according to their own traditions, this apostle was buried in an Armenian monastery near Tabriz. They were already aware of the Indian story of the martyrdom of St. Thomas at the mount in Mylapore. The Portuguese, in their missionary zeal, also showed considerable curiosity in the institutions and practices of the Syrian Christian community said to have been converted
later became an extremely flourishing one as a result of the trade which was carried on from here with the one and the other India. It is said that in previous times, some of the families which resided here possessed riches worth several millions and the wealth generated by trade during the early days could surely have been likened to a varitable gold mine. When our royal troops captured the city, the fortifications on the landward side were virtually in the same condition as they had been when the Portuguese had first constructed these. On the seaward side, the only defence was a small weak unflanked wall, eight to ten feet in height. Their affluence had made the inhabitants so vainglorious and insolent that for a long time they had refused to accept the superior authority of the Viceroy at Goa. Many long before their arrival in India. In 1517, the Portuguese were brought to San Thomé by an Armenian merchant so that they could see for themselves the Christian community here. According to Love, the first Portuguese monastic institution was established at San Thomé in 1522 and served as nucleus around which a Portuguese establishment developed. It was constituted into a Bishopric in the year 1607. M. Faria Sousa, J. Stevens, trans. The Portuguese Asia, I, London, 1971, pp. 269, 271-72; ibid., III, pp. 419; Love, op. cit I, p. 291.

49 India proper as opposed to the surrounding regions towards the east.

50 This is incorrect as according to Dutch records the seaward side of the town was strongly fortified. Dutch Records on the East Indies, unpublished typescript of Bombay University Library, henceforth cited as Dutch Rec. on E. Indies, p. 141. In view of Martin's statement infra, Chap. II, p. 337, his description in the text, here appears to be that of San Thomé as it existed under the Portuguese prior to its conquest by Neknam Khan.

51 Quoting from a Portuguese source dated approximately 1635, Love states that no revenue accrued to the King of Portugal from San Thomé as all sources of revenue belonged to the “Lord of the Soil”. As a result, the Portuguese did not establish any administrative machinery at San Thomé. Only two officials received a pay of 2000 cruzadoes annually from Goa—the Captain and the Bishop. In former times the “Lord of the Soil” (San Thomé formed a part of the Vijayanagar empire) used to pay the Captain a gold pagoda per day. But the current arrangement, which was far less profitable, was that of the payment of half the revenues received from the sea-customs dues. Love, op. cit., I, pp. 297-9. Martin, therefore, does not represent all the facts when he talks of the refractory nature of the Portuguese settlers at San Thomé. Sousa, however, states that the Captain obtained a revenue of 120,00 ducats from Malapore, Sousa, op. cit., III, p. 418. This may have been the revenue from the customs which may not have been forwarded to Goa which would perhaps explain the attitude of the Viceroy as delineated by Martin.
Governors deputed by the Viceroy had been made to return, and those who proved acceptable never enjoyed the least degree of authority. Murder, assassination, poisoning and other crimes of a similar nature seemed to be the natural order of the day in this city. Many horrifying stories are told. I know several of the older residents of the town who had themselves avowed that the misfortunes which had overtaken them was a just vengeance inflicted on them by the heavens. The governance of the city was in a state of anarchy. For the past seven to eight years, two of the principal families had been in a mutual state of bitter enmity and had involved all the local residents in their conflict. Partisans of the rival groups posted themselves along the roads and inside the gardens. Nobody could go from one place to another without running the risk of being wounded or killed. Matters came to such a pass that even priests could not venture out to administer the sacraments without securing permission from the two feuding groups.

Such a government could not survive for long as the Portuguese power in India had entered into a period of decadence. The inhabitants could offer no resistance when the King of Golconda conquered a portion of the Carnatic. This potentate took advantage of the war between the Portuguese and the Dutch to start the siege of San Thomé. The inhabitants did not receive help from any quarter including that of Goa. Indeed, a letter was sent from Goa by which the inhabitants were inform-

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52 The reasons for the hostility between Portugal and Holland in the East had its roots in the manner in which Holland came into being as an independent nation. Protestant Holland had initially been under the domination of Catholic Spain. Catholic Portugal was a constituent unit of the Spanish Empire. In 1581, when Holland broke away from Spain, her relations with Portugal could not but be acrimonious. This European friction was transferred to other quarters when both powers began to expand overseas. When Portugal became independent in 1641, the situation in the Indies did not change radically for the basic issue of trade rivalry remained the same. A truce of ten years duration was arranged in 1641. Hostilities recommenced in 1653 and continued until 1663 in the East. In Europe, Portugal and Holland signed a peace treaty in 1661. Although both powers had ratified this treaty by December 1662, the news of cessation of hostilities reached India only in 1663. F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, II, London, 1966, pp. 300, 304, 329.
ed that as they had always refused to obey the orders of the Viceroy's sent by the King, they could not be recognized as Portuguese subjects. The city was finally captured. Several of the inhabitants were allowed to live on the outskirts of the town where they were permitted to retain their property and houses. San Thomé was handed over to the Commander-in-Chief, Neknam Khan, to whom I have already referred. This noble man decided to fortify the city and one explanation for this decision was that he had taken this precaution lest he should be forced to seek protection in the city during one of the court revolutions which take place so frequently in India. On the seaward side, walls flanked by four bastions were ordered. Those who have a knowledge of fortifications and other experienced persons have said that this wall was as sound and strong as any other in the world. Neknam Khan also built a mud gate here which was afterwards called the "Royal Gate". The fortifications thus started were duly completed, the material having been obtained from several large temples which had been demolished.

There was no civilian population within the city. Only the members of the garrison numbering between 200 and 300 men were allowed to reside within it. This was the state in which our

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43Sherwani J.I.H., 1967, p. 154, states that the Portuguese garrison at San Thomé surrendered to Neknam Khan in May 1662. Manucci, op. cit., III, p. 276, infers that when Neknam Khan started his campaign in the Carnatic he had not initially intended to take over San Thomé. It was only when the Portuguese refused to lend him two pieces of cannon for which he had asked, that he attacked the garrison. After the capture of San Thomé, according to a Persian source quoted by the French, the headquarters for the Qutb Shahi administration of the region was established at Arcot. B.N., N.A., 9352 (45).

44The Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de San Vicente (1666-68) started negotiations with the Golconda court to try and regain possession of San Thomé but died before any definitive treaty could be signed. Subsequent to this, the Portuguese position at San Thomé appeared to be an amorphous one. They were, in theory, allowed to fly their flag for which privilege they paid the sum of 2000 patacas or ducats. In fact, since the Portuguese residents were also Qutb Shahi citizens, they were rarely able to exercise this right. Manucci, op. cit., III, pp. 277-78; B.N., N.A., 9352 (45).

45Vide supra, Chap. I, p. 320.
squadron found San Thomé. I will now describe the events which befell the squadron at Trincomallee Bay.

April 1672

A retrospective account of the sojourn of the squadron at Trincomallee Bay—Fortification of Sun Island—Relations with the King of Kandy—Problem of revictuallement impels de la Haye to leave the Bay

After the “Phénix”, the “Europe” and the Company hooker had left for the Coromandel coast M. de la Haye landed, accompanied by several officers and one hundred soldiers. He went to the village of Tambelagam,\(^\text{56}\) inhabited by the local people, where several Singhalese had assembled. Here the price for rice, cattle and other refreshments which the latter promised to supply was fixed. De la Haye gave them a few presents and asked them to carry back a letter for Sieur de Boisfontaine, one of the envoys sent to the King of Kandy.

Although the natives had promised to supply us with food and refreshments nothing appeared and they kept postponing the dates of delivery. All that had been obtained in fifteen to twenty days time were five or six buffalos, coconuts, bananas, and milk—quite inadequate to serve the needs of the squadron which began to suffer from lack of food.\(^\text{57}\) Many men fell ill and Sieur de...,* captain of the “Jule”, died on 21 April. On 23 April, de Turel, commanding officer of the naval personnel, expired. These deaths were followed by those of several officers. From this, the condition of the soldiers and the crew can be easily inferred and each day five or six among them were laid to rest. This did not hamper the work of fortifying Sun Island which de la Haye pursued with his customary vigour. He also tried very hard to find some means feeding the men but met with little success in this field.

\(^{56}\text{Tambelagam in the text.}\)

\(^{57}\text{Rijklof Van Goens prevented supplies from reaching the French by posting his men along all the roads which could have been used by the Singhalese for bringing in provisions. Carr\textsuperscript{4}, II, pp. 407-08.}\)

\(^*\text{Lacunae such as these are to be found in the original text of the Memoirs.}\)
Some French soldiers who had taken service under the Dutch left their masters and joined de la Haye. There were, however, many more both among the naval and military personnel who deserted the squadron and threw in their lot with the Dutch. These renegades loudly proclaimed the conditions of acute scarcity currently being experienced by the squadron, and in order to justify their reprehensible behaviour, described de la Haye as being a very severe and implacable person who would never forgive any misdemeanour. Many Frenchmen, other foreigners, and even a few of their own men who were miserable in Dutch service, had decided to join us but were held back by these statements.

I think it is relevant here to report a conversation I had with an official of the Dutch Company in Masulipatam during the period when our squadron was present at Trincomallee Bay. After several conversations with him on subjects of a general nature, he avowed to me that his compatriots had been thoroughly consternated by the arrival of our squadron. It was well known that even though a good number of men in Dutch service had served well beyond the periods of their contract they were not being allowed to retire. Apart from the fact that these men were more useful as they had a better knowledge of local conditions, they were being retained because it was not always easy to obtain fresh recruits from Holland. The Dutch authorities feared, and with some justification, that with arrival of our squadron their position on the island would be greatly weakened as a result of large-scale desertion. However, they were reassured when they heard of the way in which de la Haye had welcomed some of the men who had wished to desert. The French commander had assumed these men to be spies and had threatened to hang them. This had made the others contemplating desertion withhold from flight as they feared that a worse fate might be awaiting them.

The fear of the principal officers of the Dutch Company that many of their men would desert was well-founded. If the fullest advantage of the situation had been taken after the arrival of the squadron at Trincomallee, it is certain that a goodly number could have been enticed to desert. Missives in various languages should have been distributed all over the island carrying the
Portrait of King Rajasimha II of Ceylon
assurance that all soldiers and sailors who left Dutch service to join ours would be treated well. They would be favoured and our officers would be instructed to absorb them in the jobs which they had relinquished to come to us. A few could even expect rewards. Such a policy would have deprived the Dutch Company of a portion of its armed forces. We have seen that the majority of the Dutch soldiers looked on the arrival of our squadron as the only means by which they could hope to end their bondage. I do not know why a completely different policy was adopted.

It is quite true that the suspicious nature of de la Haye had made him threaten to hang some of those who had tried to seek refuge with us having accused them of being spies. The would-be deserters were arrested and confined on the ship for several days. The turn-coats from our side, to whom I have referred, carried this news with them to the Dutch. We thus lost a fine opportunity of weakening our enemy. I have come to the end of my digression and will resume the main thread of my narrative.

On 27 April, the frigate the "Diligente" which de la Haye had placed to guard the entrance, discovered that a small Dutch vessel had entered the bay. The captain of the French ship lifted anchor to reconnoitre the Dutch ship and force it to give a salute. The Dutch ship tried to evade ours by sailing off the wind. Our frigate followed and the Dutch ship found itself grounded. No further steps were taken and our frigate returned to its anchorage.

May 1672

On 2 May 1672, Sieur d'Orgeret one of the envoys sent to the King of Kandy, returned. He informed de la Haye of the fine reception which had been accorded to them by the King of Kandy and showed the presents they had received. These consisted of gold chains and other articles which were collectively worth 70 to 80 louis. He also let de la Haye know that three royal envoys were in the country waiting to be conducted into the presence of de la Haye when they would present him with their salutations. The flag of the Council was hoisted. Some of the

The fine welcome accorded by the King of the Kandy to French envoys
officers were sent to escort the envoys while the remaining officers gathered together on board the Admiral's boat. Upon their arrival, the envoys were greeted by cannon fire and were treated with all the civility customary on such occasions. Only subjects of a general nature were covered during these talks. The envoys spent the night on the ship and were sent back the following day. Each of them received a present of 100 ells of white cloth, and some other fabrics. Their interpreter was given 50 ells. Before leaving, they said they would write to the King of Kandy and inform him of all that they had seen.

On 6 May some more envoys of the King of Kandy were received on board. Caron and de la Haye spent as much time conferring with them as they had done with the three previous envoys. A few days later consultations were held again. Measures to harm the Dutch position were thought out and devised and the envoys informed their King about these steps.

The work on the fortifications of the Sun Island continued and the envoys sent some Singhalese to help the Frenchmen. A group of sentries had been posted on the land close to the ships. On 9 May, a party of Dutch soldiers trying to overpower these men was seen from the ships. Thirty soldiers were immediately sent by launch to the aid of our sentries. Upon arrival, these men seized thirteen Dutchmen and four blacks. They were brought to the "Flamand" where de la Haye personally interrogated them as to why they had tried to insult our guard post. They replied they were following orders and had been sent to search out four of their men who had deserted. These men were kept back on the ships.

On 14 May, de la Haye descended, taking care to present a smart appearance. To the sound of trumpets, oboes and other
instruments, he visited the envoys of the King of Kandy who were very gratified at the honour thus shown to them. Discussions of a general nature again took place after which de la Haye requested that provisions for the squadron should be supplied and refreshment should be sent for the invalids. The envoys promised to send everything in abundance and yet nothing appeared. These promises were executed in no better a way than the first ones, and the squadron continued to suffer. De la Haye returned to the ships on the same night.

On 15 May, a Dutch squadron consisting of fifteen ships anchored at the entrance to the bay. The ships sported the flags of the Admiral, Vice-Admiral and the Rear-Admiral. De la Haye sent his captain of the guard by launch to the Admiral’s boat with a message. Just as we had respected Dutch wishes when they had asked us not to enter inside bays which belonged to them nor anchor near their forts, de la Haye was now requesting the Dutch in a similar manner not to enter inside the bay which the King of Kandy had granted to us. To this Sieur Rijklof Van Goens, the commander of the expedition replied that it was to them that the bay belonged. We had no right to circumscribe their movements and they would enter and leave the bay as they pleased. They received the captain of the guards without bothering to salute him and sent him back with this reply to de la Haye. Three ships of the squadron anchored at the entrance to the bay and the others took up supporting positions.

The next day, a Dutch launch appeared at Point Breton.

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60 Upon the appearance of the French fleet, Van Goens asked for reinforcements from Batavia. The Batavia Council sent out four companies of militia and instructed Van Geons not to attack the French but to prevent any further accretion to the strength of the French squadron. If, however, Van Goens considered it necessary for the protection of Dutch interests, he was given the freedom to assume the offensive. D.R., 20, pp. 171-79, 185, 187.

61 Carré mentioned two islands—a large island which was called “Isle of the Sun”, and a second one which was smaller and situated close to a promontory called Point Breton. This smaller island was called “The Sun”. Later both these islands came to be known as Sober Islands. The term, Point Breton, was given to the region later known as Ostenberg Point because it had been fortified by the crew of the “Breton”. Although the French had initially decided to fortify both these islands, they later concentrated on the smaller of the two. Carré, II, pp. 404-05, n. 1.
where we had posted some guards. Our guards stopped the launch and informed de la Haye who sent for the captain and ensign. When these officers were brought before him, they handed over a letter from Rijkloff Van Goens. It was a note protesting our actions in the bay. De la Haye promptly drafted his reply. In receiving these officers de la Haye reciprocated the behaviour of Van Goens towards the captain of our guards and did not so much as to raise his hands towards his hat. The frigate, the "Diligente" was then sent to patrol the entrance to the bay. The same day, Rijkloff Van Goens made a show of reviewing his men at the beach close to the fortress. He seemed to have about 600 men with him.

On 17 May 1672, the envoys of the King of Kandy sent sixty soldiers under three captains to serve under de la Haye. The captain of the guard who had been sent by de la Haye on the previous day to visit the envoys returned on board bringing with him the deed of the donation of Trincomallee Bay, Kottiar, and its dependencies to the French.

The Dutch, numbering almost 500 men, advanced in battle formation along the sea shore towards Point Breton where we had established a guard. The launches of all the ships were immediately armed. De la Haye embarked along with the officers and the troops and the launches could be seen sailing along the coast ready to help our men in case of attack. In the evening, there was a very heavy downpour which made our men withdraw. The launches were brought back to the ships.

On 18 May, de la Haye descended to visit the envoys. They talked for more than three hours on the current situation. The envoys offered to call in a general of the King of Kandy who was at present near Batticoloa with 3,000 men. De la Haye agreed, after which he returned to the squadron.

The next day, the purser was sent to the envoys to ask for men to help in the construction work and also for the despatch of food and refreshments. They promised, but as usual nothing appeared. The purser was told that a group of Dutch helped by a few Singhalese subjects were present at a distance of two leagues with the intention of attacking their fort. The envoys

*Collary in the text.*
asked for fifty men so that they could set up an ambush in the jungle. De la Haye excused himself pleading that his country had not yet declared war on the Dutch.

On 20 May, de la Haye went by ketch to Point Breton where our launches were maintaining vigil. There was a Dutch launch here with one of the principal members of the Council on board. This person handed over a letter from Rijkloff Van Goens. The incidents which had taken place were discussed. De la Haye complained at the injuries the Dutch were continually trying to inflict on us on territory which was rightfully ours by royal donation. De la Haye pointed out that he had never intended to insult the Dutch and was willing to go out of his way to live in amity with them. To prove this, he was even willing, if Rijkloff so desired, to restore the thirteen Dutch soldiers who had been seized during their attack on our sentinels and guard. Subjects of a general nature were next touched upon after which the purser retired.

The envoys of the King of Kandy were pressed for food supplies and for the despatch of some workers, but again nothing happened. Work on the fortifications on Sun Island continued as also at Point Breton.

During the days which followed, the Dutch made several movements. Six vessels of their squadron moved to anchor closer to the entrance of the bay while a Dutch group proceeded towards Point Breton. Sieur de Rebray, commander of a company, who was on duty, drew up before them and said that it was not customary for an armed group to approach so close to a mounted guard unless they wished to offer provocation. He warned them that if they came any closer he would ask his men to charge. The Dutch commanding officer declared that his men had been sent out to cut wood. After this he withdrew. The Dutch stance convinced us that they were only seeking to aggravate their relations with us. De la Haye avoided an open rupture as far as he could, and, in order to show his cordial intentions, he sent back the thirteen Dutch soldiers who had been taken prisoner while they had been attempting to overpower our sentinels and guards. The men were sent back to Sieur Rijkloff escorted by the captain of the guards. De la Haye also wrote a polite letter to Van Goens who appreciated this gesture.
very much. The Dutch Admiral drank to the health of de la Haye amidst the sound of cannon shot and sent back a letter of thanks through the captain.

On 24 May, de la Haye was warned that the Dutch were threatening our guards on Point Breton. He started out by ketch taking six guards with him. He ordered the soldiers to follow him. Upon his arrival, de la Haye was informed that during the night the Dutch had removed a sentinel and that their natives were hovering around our guards. They had also established an outpost close to ours. When de la Haye advanced, he saw ten to twelve Dutch soldiers in a body. As he came near they drew out their spontoons with which they were armed. De la Haye seized one of them by the shoulder strap and shaking him up rather badly, demanded to speak to an officer. A Dutchman replied that an officer would be summoned. In the meantime, ten or twelve of our men came up and joined de la Haye. When the Dutchmen saw this, they fell back to their position at which about one hundred coloured and European soldiers were to be found. De la Haye followed in their rear. An officer appeared and asked de la Haye what he wanted. De la Haye replied that he wished to speak to the commanding officer. The Dutchman retorted that the commanding officer was not there, and pointed his gun at de la Haye. Calling out to him by name, he asked de la Haye to go back. Our men began to take aim and the situation began to veer towards an open conflict when one of their superior officers appeared and restored calm. De la Haye complained at the harassment of our guards and declared that if the Dutch appeared near our position again our men would be instructed to shoot. The captain replied that the men were only carrying out the orders of the Admiral. The Admiral was in fact present close by and if de la Haye could wait a little Van Goens would speak with him. While all this was going on, reinforcements were being landed by launch. De la Haye stayed for some time waiting for Rijkloff to appear. Both sides maintained strict guard. The Admiral, however, did not come and both sides retreated to their respective positions in an atmosphere of mutual animosity.

On 25 May, two Dutch ships entered the outer bay. After discharging several broadsides they anchored near Kottiar. De
la Haye ordered the captain of the “Diligente” to anchor near these ships. The captain was ordered to defend himself if attacked. He was to go down fighting rather than allow himself to be shifted from his position. On the same day, de la Haye received the news that the Dutch had cut a path through the woods through which twenty men could march abreast so that they could launch an attack on Point Breton.

On the morning of 26 May, three more Dutch ships entered the outer bay. The “Diligente” sailed before them keeping her head as much as possible before the wind. The captain sent a launch with an officer to one of these ships protesting at the Dutch violation of the bay which had been granted to us by the King of Kandy. The launch was stopped next to one of the Dutch ships and the officer was sent to the Admiral. The three Dutch ships dropped anchor close to the two which had arrived the previous day. De la Haye sent a second order to the captain of the “Diligente” to return to his post and follow his orders. In the evening, Rijklof entered the bay with twelve ships and anchored in line close to the other ships. The “Diligente” was positioned at the distance of a musket shot.

On 27 May, a Portuguese who claimed to have served as an officer with the Dutch crossed over to us bringing his valet with him. He informed de la Haye, to whom he had been taken, that the ultimate aim of the Dutch who had anchored in the outer bay, was to press inward until they had reached the port where we were anchored. The Dutch squadron was provided with fireships. Many men from the Dutch garrisons in Ceylon had been embarked on these boats. The garrisons had thus become depleted and the Dutch had tried to fill in the gap by forcing civilians to man these posts. The Dutch were aware of the fact that our squadron was suffering from lack of food and that de la Haye had despatched three ships to the Coromandel coast to procure provisions. They had sent out three of their own ships to patrol the sea and intercept our vessels. They were planning to sweep away our guards at Point Breton and prevent us from obtaining any supplies from the mainland. After hearing all these statements, de la Haye replied that he did not believe that Rijklof would be so foolhardy as to cause a rupture between the two nations but if he chose to do so we were quite prepared.
to face him. There appeared to be reason to suspect that the Portuguese was a spy. He was detained on board and the officers were ordered to keep him under surveillance. Orders were then sent to all the officers to remain on guard.

On 28 May, the Dutch ships made several tacks in the outer bay and appeared to be preparing for an attack on us. However, they reanchored at their old positions.

The officer of the frigate, the “Diligente”, who had been sent to the Dutch ships on 28 May returned by launch bringing back the men who had gone with him. He reported that he had been taken to the Admiral who had at first taken him to be a spy and had even used threats against him. During the two days which he had spent on board the Dutch ship, he had spoken to several Dutch officers. The latter had all railed at our entry into the bay and had pledged that they would expel us from it. Our officer had been treated in a very cavalier fashion and sent back without any reply.

The envoys of the King of Kandy came on board to meet de la Haye. More promises which were as ineffectual as the previous ones were made. The only thing which was done was that a few buffalos were despatched from time to time, but these were quite inadequate to meet the food requirements of the entire crew. With the arrival of the Dutch fleet, they found a new excuse and completely stopped their supplies. They claimed that the presence of the Dutch had caused all the people to withdraw into the interior from the coast. Even if the natives had been in league with our enemies they could not have devised a better method to weaken us. The numbers of those who were ill went up alarmingly.

On 29 May, a group of Dutchmen followed by several blacks made a sudden descent on Point Breton. They captured an advance post where nine men and a commanding officer had been stationed. Our men did not offer any resistance as they had no instructions to shoot.

On 30 May, a Dutch contingent appeared near Point Breton, intending to capture our position there. Our sentinel saw them and called out to them to retreat. His warning went unheeded and he fired. The Dutch responded by firing twelve to fourteen musket shots after which they advanced no further and retraced their steps.
On 31 May, three envoys of the King of Kandy who had arrived from court the previous evening were received on board. They delivered a letter from Boisfontaine to de la Haye in which the writer gave his assurance that the King had ordered his officers to furnish the French with whatever they wanted by way of workmen, food and refreshments. These envoys also made generous promises but did nothing.

On the same day, de la Haye was informed that four Dutch ships were giving chase to a French vessel. A launch was sent to the entrance of the bay to find out more about the incident. The officer on the launch returned and said that that ship in question was the “Phénix” which appeared to be heavily laden. The “Phénix” had only fired one cannon shot after which it had been boarded by the Dutch ships. After its capture, the “Phénix” had been brought in and anchored amidst the Dutch squadron. We later received further assurances that this ship had, in fact, been the “Phénix” on its way back from Tranquebar to rejoin the squadron with supplies of food and refreshments. As soon as the “Phénix” had tried to approach the entrance to the bay four Dutch ships had appeared before her. The skipper had not been given any instructions as to how he was to react to his present predicament. A captain...it was Sieur Darmes...the commanding officer of an infantry group placed on board, made all his men assume position and asked for orders. The commanding officer was at an utter loss and could only reply he had not received any specific instructions. But surely if one is attacked, one does not wait for orders to defend oneself. The captain took no steps to stave off the attack as boat-loads of men sent by the Dutch neared his vessel. A sergeant was enraged at this cowardly behaviour, so uncharacteristic of the French nation, and when the Dutch got ready to board the ship he drew his halberd and attempted to hinder them. He was ordered to fall back. This upset him so much that he lost control over himself and broke his weapon on the deck. His example was followed by several others who were good soldiers. The Dutch boarded the ship and without firing a single shot they seized and anchored it amidst their vessels within view of our
On 1 June, de la Haye wrote a note to Rijkloff about the seizure of our men at the advance post at Point Breton and at the capture of the “Phénix”. He protested at these actions and threatened to retaliate. The officer sent with this letter was given a very cold reception by the Dutch. They dismissed him saying that they would send their answer within one or two days.

On 4 June, de la Haye received the answer to the letter which he had written. Rijkloff had replied that the capture of the “Phénix” and the seizure of our advance guard had been affected to punish us for attempting to establish ourselves on territory which was rightfully theirs.

On 5 June, two Dutch vessels were sighted in pursuit of a French one. It turned out to be the “Europe” returning from Porto Novo charged with food. It was captured with the same ease as the “Phénix” and then brought and anchored amidst their squadron. All this took place in full view of our squadron.

During the morning watch of 9 June, several discharges of musket fire could be heard proceeding from Point Breton. De la Haye left by launch taking with him his personal attendants and such of the men and officers as had managed to get ready. An officer who had been keeping guard by launch close by had attempted to land on hearing the noise but he had been prevented from doing so by a group of Dutch soldiers on the shore who fired at him and at his men. As the day dawned, several enemy detachments on land came to view both from the ships as well as from Sun Island. When the French opened fire

*Carré (*Carri*, II, p. 334), states that as the Dutch were unaware of the outbreak of hostilities against France in Europe, the Frenchmen who were distributed among the Dutch ships were treated well and allowed to retain their possessions. All the belongings of the French Company found on the “Phénix” was handed over to the captain of this ship, de la Mélinière. B.N., *N.A.*, 9352 (54).

**Further details about the capture of these two ships may be found in Carré (*Carri*, II, pp. 333-34, 408-11).
these Dutchmen withdrew into the woods. Despite the presence of the enemy, de la Haye landed with the men. He sent a sergeant with four soldiers to find out what had happened to the guards whom we had posted. The sergeant sent back one of his soldiers with the message that he had not found anybody there. De la Haye began to investigate the territory taking care to ensure that he had a good following with him. The bodies of a sergeant and two cadets were found. A Dutchman, who had been seized in fight, was interrogated. He said that our advance guard had been attacked by a group consisting of 600 Dutch soldiers and sailors, and 400-500 natives. Our guards, taken by surprise, had been assulted by the enemy. The Dutch had considered it unnecessary to establish a guard here and had retired. A few days later the French returned to this spot. The palisade which had surrounded the post was dismantled. The stakes were brought back to the island so that they could be used in the fortifications which were being erected.

On 13 June, it was found that the Dutch ships had engaged in the pursuit of a vessel on the high seas. It was assumed to be the Company hooker. The hooker changed its course as a result of this action and anchored before Madras as I have earlier stated.\(^{65}\)

On 14 June, two new envoys of the King of Kandy arrived bringing with them presents of fruit which the King had sent from his own garden for de la Haye. The King had sent a message that he would join the French with a powerful army within a few days and would help them in obtaining satisfaction from the Dutch for the insults offered by the latter.

De la Haye was told that the envoys had brought between 12 and 15,000 men with them. He descended on 15 June to inspect these men but found only 1200-1500 men who were poorly

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\(^{65}\) *Carré (Carré, II, pp. 411-12)*, gives further details about the way in which the "St. Louis" managed to evade capture. During this incident, a Dutch vessel which had been sent out to capture the "St. Louis" was damaged by the French ship, the "Triomphe" which was giving chase on the orders of de la Haye. The Dutch thereupon declared this to be an act of open hostility and proclaimed their intention of treating all captured Frenchmen, henceforth, as prisoners of war rather than as hostages. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*
armed and who appeared to have very little experience. It was necessary, however, to accept these reinforcements with good grace and affect satisfaction at the assurances which were given that a much larger group could be expected soon.

On 19 June, a standard with a copper plaque was planted on Sun Island. On it was inscribed the formal take-over by the French of Trincomal Lee Bay and Kottiar along with their dependencies in conformity with the donation which had been made by the King of Kandy.

The envoys of the King of Kandy informed de la Haye that a consignment of 50,000 pounds of rice had arrived. When the French came ashore to take delivery of this, they found only 5,200 pounds. The word of these men can obviously never be trusted.

On 25 June, three Frenchmen from the "Phénix" made their way to the Admiral's boat. At the risk of their lives, they had escaped during the night and had managed to reach the boat by clinging to the end of a mast. They handed over letters which their captain had written to de la Haye. The capture of the "Phénix" was described, the details tallying with these already given by me, and the seizure of the flute, the "Europe", was confirmed.

The French fleet was facing conditions of acute scarcity at Trincomal Lee Bay. The livestock supplied by the envoys of the King of Kandy consisted only of a few buffaloes, the meat of which was not only deficient in quantity but also in quality and did more harm than good to the crew. Several officers including some high ranking ones had died and both the crew and the Company personnel had been reduced by as much as a third. It was obvious that we could no longer place any reliance on the promises made by the King of Kandy and his envoys and the fleet could not continue any longer in its present plight. The Council was convened to deliberate on this point. The predicament of the squadron was discussed in detail and it was decided that the most important factor was to try and obtain food from some other source. The fate of the "Phénix" and the "Europe" showed the futility of sending out single ships in quest of food. It was decided that the whole squadron should
sail so that the Dutch, who were now our declared enemy, could be resisted. The departure of our fleet would free the Dutch of all restraint and they would certainly attack Sun Island. Even though it was known that our fortifications here were not yet sufficiently strong to withstand Dutch attack, it was decided not to abandon this position but to maintain a garrison there.

Sieur de Lesboris, captain of an infantry division, was appointed Governor of the fort. His jurisdiction was quite extensive covering the whole of Trincom Alle Bay, including Kottiar along with its dependencies. The Franciscan friar, Father Maurice, a man of action more suited to the sword than the breviary, was placed in charge of the commissariat of the fort, a position for which he was well suited. One hundred men were left in the garrison but the majority were ill and could not be expected to do very much. All the munitions and provisions which could be spared were left behind. The number of deaths which had taken place had made serious inroads in the strength of the equipage. It was decided that the “Saint Jean-Baptiste” would be moored close to the fort while the flute, the “Indienne”, by now thoroughly unseaworthy, would be beached. The crew of these two ships would then be redistributed among the remaining ships of the squadron.

It is true that the “Indienne” had sprung leaks all over and could not have kept up with the other boats, but the “Saint Jean-Baptiste” was well-armed and in a good condition. If it

**It is unfortunate that the Diarist gives no details about the route which de la Haye now intended to follow. During his visit to Bantam, Caron had promised the King that he would return after the arrival of the French fleet. The King had hoped to use the French to counteract the growing influence of the Dutch. By virtue of the nominal control which he exercised over the Sultan of Ternate, the King had promised Caron that the French would be granted the island of Bachan in the Moluccas. On hearing of the arrival of de la Haye, the King had even prepared to receive the French. Carré was extremely critical of the Admiral’s decision to go to San Thomé, with the Governor of which place the French had not established any relations. The Abbé declared it would have been far more judicious for the squadron to have touched at Bantam where such a valuable foothold in the spice trade had already been promised to them. B.N., N.A., 9352, 77-78, 80, W. Foster, *Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton*, p. 26; B.H.M. Vielke, *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia*, The Hague and Banduny, 1959, p. 53.**
was essential to leave behind one boat, de la Haye should have taken this ship and left behind some other one such as the "Triomphe" or the "Jule". The "Triomphe" had already been condemned and the "Jule" was in a very feeble state. De la Haye made his decision knowing these facts full well.

Sieur de la Nérolle, a lieutenant commander and a man of merit, was appointed Resident at the court of the King of Kandy. He was to take some Frenchmen with him who on arrival, were to join the others who had earlier been sent to Kandy with de Boisfontaine. This would bring up the total number of Frenchmen at court to ten or twelve. De la Haye promised to return to the bay within three months, and, indeed he thought he would be in a position to do so. This plan was to be contravened by subsequent events which I will describe later. Our envoys remained at the court of Kandy and they received no notice after this. When I was writing about this incident in 1676 a Dutchman told me that our men were in irons and in a state of abject misery in Kandy. We learnt from other sources, however, that these men were well and at liberty. The flute, "Barbaud", was prepared for despatch to France and de la Haye sent letters to court by this ship. After making all these arrangements, the squadron was ready to leave for the Coromandel coast.

I have perhaps allowed myself to go into too much detail with regard to our relations with the envoys sent by the King of Kandy at Trincomallee Bay, and our altercations with the Dutch. As far as the first is concerned, I have done so only to reveal the futility of relying on the promises of these island people and the same criticism may be made of the natives of...

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68 It was the policy of the King to detain embassies and gradually break down the will of the envoys until they were ready to serve his interests. The account given by Knox reconciles these conflicting accounts which reached the French. De la Nérolle had been sent to court in June 1672. As a result of his arrogant behaviour, the King of Kandy had ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the entire mission soon after the arrival of de la Nérolle at Kandy. The followers of de la Nérolle were set at liberty shortly after as they disclaimed all allegiance to him. De la Nérolle languished in chains for six months after which he was also pardoned. *Ibid.*, pp. 290, 295-98.
India also. In emphasizing this, it is my hope that such pitfalls may be avoided in the future. As for the Dutch, it was my intention to throw into relief their obstructive attitude towards us. The same attitude is to be expected whenever our Company attempts to establish itself in areas which are likely to arouse Dutch suspicion. I cannot, however, prevent myself from saying that adequate precautions were not taken against them. We had received several insults from them, and yet, for all the measures which we took, it appeared as though we were at profound peace with them. It was surely worth running some risk to prevent the capture of the “Phénix” and the “Europe” which were bringing the provisions of which the squadron stood so much in need. De la Haye did not wish to assume the offensive and he was right in not doing this, but surely, when his ships were captured before his very eyes, and he was in a position to prevent this, he should have acted. These unfortunate incidents can be attributed in part to the capture of the hoy by the Malabar pirates and the loss thereby of the packet from court.

July 1672

The squadron at this time consisted of the “Navarre”, the “Breton”, the “Flamand”, the “Triomphe”, the “Jule”, the frigate, “Diligente”, the flute “Sultane”, a Company hooker, and a long boat. The signal for departure was given on 9 July and a favourable breeze helped the progress of the fleet. The Dutch squadron consisting of fourteen ships was anchored close to their fort in a straight line, beam to beam, anchored at the stern. The ships belonging to the two squadrons passed each other without any incident. The French ships were directed into the open sea for a while to escape from the sight of the Dutch squadron. Instructions were then given to the captain of the flute “Barbaude”, which set its course for France. The squadron then made for the Coromandel coast and on 12 July it anchored at the Tranquebar roads belonging to the King of Denmark.
De la Haye sent an officer ashore to greet the Governor and ask for revictualling facilities. The officer was received well and the health of de la Haye was toasted to the sound of cannon fire. The officer was then sent back with all possible civility. The Governor did not stop there. He got into a launch intending to visit the French boats himself, but the heavy sea and contrary winds forced him to return and prevented him from showing this extraordinary manifestation of good will. De la Haye had been told about these intentions of the Governor and on 13 July, he went ashore accompanied by Caron, the officers of the ships and his guard. Half-way to the shore, they were met by the Governor who had come by launch. They descended together and when they entered the fort all the guns inside were fired in salutation. There was a splendid banquet at which several toasts were quaffed to the sound of artillery fire. When de la Haye returned to the ships in the evening, he was accompanied by the Governor and several other officials. They dined on board the Admiral's boat amidst much ostentation. When the Danes returned ashore, they were escorted by some French officers as a mark of civility.

On 15 July, de la Haye sent his secretary with a present of unusual arms to thank the Governor for the banquet and all the politeness which he had shown. De la Haye wished to give money to the Governor with the request that the latter should ask some of his men to buy provisions which would be collected by the squadron when it returned. The Governor was very happy to do this and declared his willingness to render any other service requested of him by de la Haye. During the three or four days spent by the squadron at Tranquebar, food

**Tranquebar** was the Europeanized enunciation of the Tamil name Tharangambadi—the wave-washed village. In 1681, Roland Crappe obtained on behalf of the Danish East India Company a strip of land in Tranquebar village measuring 15 sq. miles from Raghunatha Nayak of Tanjore (1600-1630). The fort of Dansborg was built here in 1620 by another Company servant, Ove Gjedde. In 1624, the Company ceded the fort to the Danish King, Christian IV (1588-1648), in lieu of payment of a debt owed by the Company to the Crown. It remained in the possession of the Danish Crown until its cession to the English in 1845. *Tanjore District Handbook*, p. 405.
and refreshments, which were to be of substantial help, were taken to the vessels. On 16 July, the ships set sail and on 17 July the fleet anchored at Porto Novo. As usual de la Haye wished to reconnoitre the terrain himself. He went ashore incognito and mingled with the other officers whom he had sent. He examined the lie of the land and during the two days which were spent here, all the food which could be bought was loaded onto the ships. It was considered unnecessary to spend a longer time at this anchorage. The squadron set out again on 19 July and moored before San Thomé.

CAPTURE OF SAN THOMÉ

De la Haye and the officers of the squadron were surprised by the appearance of the city. As I have already stated, they had not expected to find such strong walls on the seaward side. While the Council was being assembled to decide on the course of action to be followed, Boisseau who had put into port on the hooker which had returned to Madras, came by launch to the Admiral’s boat. He let de la Haye know about all that had happened to himself and included the information of the capture of the news packet from the hoy. Fortunately, it had been possible to recover the letters by giving a present to the Malabaris. The missives had been sent to Madras and were now in the hands of the Capuchin priest, Father Ephraim.70 De la Haye promptly

70 Father Ephraim, a priest of the Capuchin order, was a native of Auxerre. He was the brother of M. de Chateau des Bois, a Counsellor of the Parliament at Paris. He was a mathematician and a linguist. He was reputed to have achieved mastery over the English, Portuguese and Dutch languages and to have been conversant with Persian, Turkish and Arabic. The order had originally intended him to serve at Pegu and he had arrived at Surat in 1641. From Surat he travelled to Golconda intending to make his way from there to Masulipatam from where he hoped to find a ship to take him to Pegu. Despite the solicitations of Shaikh Ahmad, the eldest son-in-law of Abdullah Qutb Shah, that he remain in Golconda, Father Ephraim continued his journey but was unable to find any ship which would take him to Pegu. The English now encouraged him to come to Madras. They had their own reasons for doing so. San Thomé was a serious commercial rival of Madras and the English hoped to lessen its importance by attracting Portuguese settlers from there to take up residence in Madras. The Portuguese refused to migrate unless they were provided with adequate facilities for the practice
sent an officer with salutations to the Governor of Madras who was thanked for his offer to protect the hooker if the Dutch attempted to attack it while it was in the English roads. The French officer was also to bring back the packet in the possession of Father Ephraim. The next day, 21 July, two officers were sent ashore to ask the Governor of San Thomé for permission to take in water, wood and refreshments. The Governor, a proud and insolent man, gave a point-blank refusal and caused our officers to re-embark without any delay. The latter made their report on their return. The incivility of the Governor aroused the French, and, while the Council was being convened to deliberate on the pressing problem as to how the squadron was to be revictualled, the hooker which had anchored at the Madras roads came and moored itself close to our squadron.

A major of the fort at Madras came to greet de la Haye on behalf of the Governor. He offered every assistance and handed over a packet which had been sent from court. This missive had been sent through some ships newly arrived from Europe which were still in harbour. A light meal was served during which several toasts were drunk to the sound of cannon fire. The fire was returned from the fort at Madras and the English ships in harbour. After the meal the major retired extremely satisfied. The packets were immediately opened and the most important news was the probability of a joint declaration of war by England and France on Holland.71

of their religion. In June 1642, Father Ephraim agreed to take up permanent residence in Madras. This explains the presence of a Catholic Mission in a Protestant settlement. Barring a few absences, Father Ephraim remained in Madras from 1642 until his death in 1694. His devotion to the English caused Abbé Carré to make several adverse comments about him during the siege of San Thomé. Tavernier, I, pp. 132, 176-77; Carré, II, pp. 550 n., 553, 624 n.; Manucci, op. cit., III, pp. 428, 464; Sarkar, Aur., IV, p. 395.

71This is a reference to the Dutch war waged by Louis XIV on Holland from 1672 to 1678. Louis XIV had succeeded in winning the support of England by paying a subsidy to Charles II. Charles II, in difficulties with his own Parliament, was happy to accept French gold as it assured him an income which would enable him to free himself of Parliamentary interference. With the leaking out of the clauses of the secret Treaty of Dover, however, Charles II was forced by an irate Parliament in 1674 to renounce the French alliance and come out openly in support of the Dutch. These events were to have their repercussions in India.
A Chelinque or Masuri
- Courtesy India Office Library
On 22 July, de la Haye sent the captain of the “Flamand” to congratulate the Governor of Madras and ask for permission to secure revictualling facilities for the squadron. The French captain was then directed to proceed to the English ships and greet the commander. He was to find out the possibility of buying ropes of thin quality, tar and other gear which were needed by the ships of our squadron. This officer returned in the evening highly gratified by the reception he had been accorded both on land and on board the English vessels. He brought assurances from the Governor and the Deputy Admiral that all our requirements would be met.

On the same day, two attempts were made to secure provision by sending men ashore. On the second occasion, one of the leading officers of the squadron had been sent, but the British Governor was even more insolent than before. He punished a local man who had brought a Frenchman to his home and forbade any further sale of commodities to us. He threatened our men and then sent them back.

On 23 July, the meeting of the Council took place. De la Haye represented that the toleration of such humiliating treatment was an insult to French arms. Apart from this, the Moors also need to be taught a lesson for their insult to the Company at Masulipatam. A better opportunity than the present one could not be hoped for and it was important to take advantage of it. All the officers were of the same mind. It was decided, however, to make one last attempt without force. If this failed, San Thomé would be shelled and every advantage would be taken of the ensuing circumstances. The ships were ranged broadside to broadside and were in readiness to open a brisk fire as soon as the signal was given.

De la Haye, who always took the lead in any perilous situation, did not wish to be absent on this important occasion. Four launches manned by one hundred musketeers were put into a state of combat. De la Haye embarked on one of these accompanied by his guards and a few volunteers and advanced

*Goldron in the text. This has been taken as goudron.

*It must be remembered that both Masulipatam and San Thomé were constituent units of Qutb Shahi kingdom.
towards the breakers. Descent is made difficult all along the Coromandel coast by the sea which is almost always rough here. If an attempt is made to board by launch, there is every danger not only of losing the boat but also of losing one's life. Small barks called chelingues\textsuperscript{74} or masuris\textsuperscript{75} are also used for landing. These are flat-bottomed boats made of several planks joined by rope yarn. These light crafts are very responsive to the billowing waves which cast them ashore without the least damage. After the mooring of the four launches had been assured by letting down their grapnels, two officers were sent ashore by catamaran.\textsuperscript{76} Depending upon their size, the catamaran is made of five or six pieces of wood which are bound and fastened together. These are commonly used in some parts of India, particularly by fisherfolk.

Scarcely had the two officers set foot ashore when they were forced to retire. The landing had been filled by soldiers who had been sent by the Governor. At this fresh insult de la Haye signalled to the ships which started a continuous cannonade. All the people on the shore disappeared as soon as the firing started. Two officers and ten sailors threw themselves into the sea to seize a mussoola on the shore close by. They intended to bring it to the launches to facilitate disembarkation, and having seized it, got ready to set themselves afloat. Upon this, the enemy advanced to stop our men. This action had been started with so much fanfare that it was important to push it through. De la Haye managed to overcome all difficulties. H. ordered his launch to advance and when it was lost amidst the breakwaters he was the first to throw himself into the sea which was waist-high. The officers, the volunteers and the soldiers followed his example. This vigorous action caused the Moors to retreat. The successful landing of our men and the continuous cannonade which was kept up caused the inmates of the city to hoist a white flag.

\textsuperscript{74} A chelingue was a 36-oar long boat made of planks nailed together. It had a flat bottom and high sides. Kaeppelin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 664; vide also \textit{Hobson-Jobson}, q.v.

\textsuperscript{75} The masuris mentioned by Martin must have been the same kind of vessel as the \textit{mussoola} in \textit{Hobson-Jobson}. This word may perhaps have been derived from Arabic مَوْسَل \textit{Mausul} (joined).

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Catamaron} in the text.
As soon as the signal was given, the firing ceased. De la Haye, followed by some officers inspected the territory reconnoitering the points which were open to attack. At the same time, he ordered that two mussoolas to be found close by were to be seized and set afloat. On approaching the large gateway, he found it to be open and observed a number of people trying to get inside. He went towards them and had he been followed by troops and been able to attack, the city would surely have fallen at that moment. During the brief period when de la Haye paused trying to decide as to what he was to do, the gate was shut. He completed his round of the city after which he went back to his troops. Two envoys sent by the Governor came to meet him here. The Governor asked to be excused for the events which had taken place and swore that in future he would supply us with whatever we required.\(^7\) De la Haye re-embarked and returned to the squadron bringing back some of the troops with him. A Jesuit priest and some Portuguese residents followed him. They described the internal conditions at San Thomé and also talked about the beauty and the bounty of the countryside. Some sailors were then set ashore. Some had axes with which they were to cut wood while others were to procure water. The Moors had recovered from their first panic, and feeling that they had no further cause for alarm, they reverted to their previous behaviour. They even got ready to insult our men. When this news reached the squadron, the Council was convened. Arguments were marshalled for the conquest of this place reputed to be the best and strongest along the Coromandel coast. The fine manufactures of the surrounding countryside contributed to the wealth of San Thomé. The city was, therefore, well suited for development into an important centre for the Company. The means by which the retention of San Thomé subsequent to its capture could be secured were then outlined. It was pointed out that a garrison at San Thomé could only be maintained by withdrawing the soldiers from the ships. If this was done, the

\(^7\)Carré (Carré, II, pp. 436-39), gives a somewhat different sequence, According to Carré de la Haye demanded payment of 100,000 crowns. If the French were not given satisfaction within three days San Thomé would be captured by the French.
squadron would be unable to achieve anything further. The question of how provisions were to be secured after the conquest was also discussed. It appeared certain that if we took San Thomé, the Moors would make it very difficult for us to provision the place by preventing any supplies from the countryside from reaching us. All these aspects were discussed with considerable emotion as a result of which no decision could be taken. The captain of the “Trioniphe” now declared that his ship was leaking so badly that it would not be possible to keep it afloat much longer. If the vessel was beached, and there was no alternative to this, the crew and the soldiers could form a part of the garrison, while the cannon could be used for the bastions. De la Haye had already made up his mind to attack and had only convened the Council to gauge the attitudes of the officers. Nevertheless, the meeting ended without any common decision having been taken.

The Council met again on the morning of 24 July and it was resolved that every effort would be made to capture the city. The men were set to work at making ladders which were to be used for the surprise attack. Four small pieces of cannon were brought to the shore where de la Haye landed with the troops and munitions. The Moors looked on at all this activity without bestirring themselves as they believed that they were well protected by the enceinte of their walls. It took a whole day to complete the preparations for attack. The stock of powder was insufficient and the rough seas made it very difficult to land additional supplies. During the night, our men were deployed to the best advantage. The most vulnerable part of the fort was considered to be a point in the northern section where a shanty town was to be found below the bastion. De Rebrey, an infantry captain, was asked to quietly install himself here with one hundred men. The bastion was to be subsequently named after him. The night passed by quite peaceably. The Moors fired a few musket shots but these were devoid of any ill-effects.

At dawn on 25 July, a bark and a mussoola appeared on the shore with the necessary supplies of munitions. De la Haye

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78These consisted of 300 well-armed men. Ibid., p. 440.
79This part of the wall did not have any parapet. Ibid. p. 441.
wished to make one last effort with the Moors before resorting to violence. He ordered a Portuguese, preceded by a drummer, to go to the Governor and ask him for his friendship. The Governor was to supply us with our requirements for which we would make payment. If the Governor refused, he was to be warned that we intended to attack. The Moors did not give us time to make this declaration. They pointed their cannon at the bark which they saw approaching the shore. One of the shots reached the “Navarre” and cut through some of the rigging.

The signal was now given for a general attack by sea and land. Our ships kept up a copious fire from their cannon. Of the four small pieces which had been landed the previous day, two were directed against a postern on the southern side, and two against the flank of an advance post which protected the postern. The Moors had been firing heavily at our men from this position. Our firing was more intense than theirs, as a result of which they were forced to retreat. Two of our men were wounded in this incident. One of them died a few days later. The other, a grenadier lost an arm which was blown off by a grenade which had exploded in his hand as he was about to throw it. Caron was always at the side of de la Haye. The latter realized the importance of hastening the attack so that the city could be taken before the Moors could receive any reinforcements.

He made the men axe the gate and make an opening in it. When this was done, an earthwork which had been put up the previous day came into view. Our men were about to push further when they heard that de Rebrey had already entered the place. This gentleman had kept himself under cover along with his men at the post to which he had been sent when he noticed that in the heat of battle the enemy had abandoned the positions on his side. He had emerged with his men and with the help of a ladder, the only one which they had been able to make on the ships, he had climbed with his men on to one of the bastions

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80 The signal was that of hoisting up a red flag. Ibid., loc. cit.
81 These were the troops under Mondal Nayak at Poonamallee. Ibid., pp. 438-39.
82 Carré (Carré, p. 441), states that the attack on the southern gate was intended to divert the Moors who would concentrate their forces here thus leaving the northern point exposed.
without encountering any resistance. They had then spread themselves out over the city attacking all those who wished to oppose them. The garrison, upon seeing our men inside had fled after putting up a feeble resistance. De la Haye advanced towards the door with his troops in proper formation, ordering his men not to pursue any of the retreating enemy he entered the city and joined de Rebrey. One hundred and ten Moors who had been unable to run away were taken prisoners and sent to the ships. Thirty to forty men had been killed. The city was then given over to plunder, but our men were not much enriched by it. It was only at the Governor's house that there was anything worth taking, and this was divided among two or three officers who had been the first to enter here. Twenty-two pieces of cannon were found on the walls and a search of the magazines yielded twenty-five thousand cannon-balls, sulphur, saltpetre, one hundred ingots of lead, and about 10,000 pounds of musket shot.

I will stop here now and resume the thread of my narrative as to how we came away from Masulipatam. We decided to take this step when we heard of the capture of San Thomé.

August 1672

ON THE PROSPECT OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM MASULIPATAM

While we were walking towards our bark and launch, intending to embark on them, we learnt that the Kotwal was advancing with 200-300 men and had reached within 300 feet of our lodge. The Kotwal had been ordered to arrest us by the Governor to whom these instructions had been issued by the King of Golconda. We hastened our embarkation and were in the open sea by the time the Kotwal was ready to take action against us. We arrived at the roads on the morning of 6 August. We boarded a ship which belonged to a man named Mir Abdullah Baqir, one of the principal Moorish merchants at Masulipatam. There were seven to eight sailors on board. These men became alarmed when they saw that we were armed but we set their fears at rest. Before embarking, I had asked our courtier to go and find Mir

Abdullah Baqir and assure him that in boarding his ship we were only seeking refuge from the insults which we knew to be in store for us. He was not to worry as we would not damage his vessel in any way.

Our departure from Masulipatam caused a stir in the city. The leading merchants began to fear that their commercial transactions would be affected and noticing that the Dutch were continuing to send their valuable property outside the city, they also did the same. The Governor came to the customs shed where the other officials came to meet him. The feature to be noted was that while the Governor feigned ignorance as to the reasons for our withdrawal, he blamed the Kotwal for not having opposed our embarkation. The Kotwal replied that he had come too late to stop us. The merchant Mir Abdullah Baqir, who was present in the assembly now spoke and said that we had good reason to withdraw as it had been widely proclaimed in the city since the past few days that we were going to be evicted from our lodge. The other merchants now joined in and said that something had to be done to solve our affair as the commerce of the city would suffer if we did not return. The Governor ordered the merchants to write about the matter to us. While proceeding from the customs shed to inspect a place where a battery of three cannon was to be subsequently erected, the Governor passed by our lodge. When the peons whom we had left behind to guard the lodge saw the Governor coming towards them they wished to shut the gate. The Governor asked them not to do this as they had nothing to fear. One Frenchman had been imprudent enough to stay behind at the lodge. When the Governor learnt of his presence he asked him not to stir out of the lodge, but to remain inside and look after all the property.

Several merchants of the city sent us food. I accepted these gifts at the first instance, but on learning that the donors were not entirely disinterested I thanked them and asked them to desist from sending us any more as we did not wish to put ourselves under obligation to anyone.

Throughout the remaining part of the month of August, there were rumours that the King of Golconda was going to send us a firman asking us to return to Masulipatam. The most reliable information which we received was that Sayyid Muzaffar was
on the point of being disgraced on suspicion that he was in league with the Mughals.  

A few of the ships which had arrived at Madras from Europe put in at Masulipatam. The captains of these ships came to visit us on our craft. They offered us their services for which we thanked them without committing ourselves in any way.

I had written to Caron asking him if it would be possible to send a ship from the squadron to Masulipatam so that we could sail to San Thomé on it. On 24 August, we received letters from him in which he stated that this would not be possible. He advised us to fall back on our own resources as best as we could.

The officials and other inmates of the city pressed us very hard to come to the headland close to the entry of the harbour near the bar. They assured us that we would be completely safe here and offered us every guarantee. I replied that we would not come near the city unless we obtained a firman from the King. They knew that we were trying to find some way to withdraw from San Thomé. They said that they would write to court and earnestly requested us not to leave. Mir Abdullah Baqir informed us that he had intended to sent the boat on which we had taken refuge to Tennasserim. He would suffer if we detained this ship any longer. He requested us to release it and offered us another small boat to which we could move. I approached Mir Abdullah Baqir but finding that he was unable to help us, I requested Sieur Junet, about whom I have already spoken, to write to Narasapur. I wished the latter to try and buy for us a thirty-five to forty ton ketch which I knew was available there. The Dutch obstructed us quite openly while the English,

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84 There were various factors which would conceivably improve the French position at Masulipatam irrespective of what took place at San Thomé. There was first the rivalry between Sayyid Muzaffar and Musa Khan, the Governor of Qutb Shahi Carnatic who was the overlord of San Thomé. The feeling between the two men was so bitter that Sayyid Muzaffar was willing to go to the extent of helping the French. Secondly, Zafar Beg, the Governor of the Masulipatam region, was known to have little love for the Dutch. The French agent, Marcara was known to have played a part in turning the Governor against the latter. *B.N., N.A.*, 9352 (54); *B.N., F. Fr.*, 8972.

85 *Tannasserim* in the text.
acting in an underhand way, rendered us many a grievous
disservice.\footnote{This lends little support to Fawcett's statement, \textit{Carri}, II, p. 482 n., that this vessel had been bought from an Englishman at Madapollam by Junet.}

September 1672

I will not interrupt myself either to relate the news which we received during this month, or to narrate the sequence of events at San Thomé. I would prefer to finish what I have been describing without any digressions.

On 2 September, I received the news that two Frenchmen, of whom one was a pilot, had come to the lodge. These two men had been deputed to guard a bark loaded with rice which had been seized before San Thomé. The cable had given way. Propelled by the wind and the currents, the bark had reached the island of Divi where it had foundered. The two Frenchmen had managed to escape and had taken the opportunity to come to Masulipatam in a small boat which was bringing in wood from Divi. They were stopped at the customs shed but the Shahbundar had them released and sent to the lodge. I had brought them to our boat. I have written down what they told me. The affairs of the Dutch embassy at the court at Golconda were in the same state of impasse.

The merchant Mir Abdullah Baqir continued to press us to vacate his ship. We made many attempts to buy a vessel. Finally, Junet obtained the ketch which I have mentioned for Rs 15,000. I sent some men to Narasapur to bring in this ship. It arrived on 12 September and anchored close to us. I transferred our things to this vessel during the days which followed and on 15 September we moved onto the ketch. Mir Abdullah Baqir recovered his ship.

I had written to the Directors at Surat informing them about what I had learnt about the condition of our squadron which had found itself enclosed by the Dutch fleet inside Trincomallee bay. Towards the beginning of September I received answers from them. I was ordered to send two Frenchmen to Europe on a ship which the Directors believed would be setting sail for London towards the end of September. These two men were to
ask the French ambassador at the English court to write to Colbert informing the latter about all that I had been able to gather with regard to the adventures of our squadron. Since events took a happier turn, the implementation of these orders proved unnecessary. The packet which I received contained letters for de la Haye, Caron and those for transmission to France. I sent all of these to San Thomé.

On 10 September, we were informed that an English vessel had put in at the Madras roads. This ship had been specially sent with the news of the joint declaration of war on Holland by France and England. During the month of September, the Dutch circulated the rumour that they had captured the fort which we had built at Trincomallee Bay. Several well-laden ships left during this month for Bengal, Pegu, Tenasserim and Atjeh.

Since the time for the breaking of the northern monsoon was at hand, and in view of the orders which had been issued to us by Caron and de la Haye directing us to come to San Thomé, I sent Sieur Deltor to the mainland to settle the affairs of the counter and pay off the debts of the Company. We thus began to take steps to prepare for our departure.

On 27 September, a new Governor arrived at Masulipatam. He was related to Sayyid Muzaffar and had been appointed by the King of Golconda to the government of this province. He was a eunuch of poor physique but of high mettle. Following local usage, the English and the Dutch came outside the city to receive him and pay him the customary compliments. He sent a messenger to our lodge to find out why we had not also come before him. We replied that our absence could be attributed to the circumstances in which we found ourselves.

The captain of a Danish ship which had arrived two days before from Tranquebar called on me. He confirmed the fact that the Dutch had reached an understanding with our men after which they had taken over the fort built by us at Trincomallee Bay. He informed me that Caron was to leave for France on a ship belonging to the squadron which was being prepared for him. He corroborated the fact that the French and English had jointly declared war in Europe against Holland and was quite emphatic that the Golconda troops had arrived before San
Thome and had started the siege.

On perceiving that we were quite determined to leave for San Thome, the Governor of Masulipatam, the other officials and the principal merchants were extremely upset. They feared that if we left Masulipatam our ships would range up the coast and destroy all their commerce. The Governor and the officials approached Deltor several times while he was winding up our affairs at the lodge. Deltor was asked to write to me asking us not to withdraw was all the guarantees for which we had asked would be given to us. We should give due consideration to the fact that our continued sojourn at Masulipatam could contribute a great deal to the restoration of peace between the two nations. I was to write to de la Haye to elicit his reactions. The Governor, for his part, would write to Sayyid Muzaffar who would bring the court round to the view of accepting the necessity for initiating an accommodation with us. These arguments were very well founded despite the fact that the merchants who were the loudest in their demand that we should stay were activated by purely personal motives. However, as we had received specific orders to retreat to San Thome I called together the principal members of lodge. I placed before them the repeated solicitations of the Governor and the weighty reasons which could serve to justify our continued presence at Masulipatam. The only factor which counter-balanced all these considerations were the orders we had received to withdraw to San Thome. We came to the conclusion that we could achieve much more by staying behind provided there was an awareness as to how best our services could be utilized. We decided to anchor our ketch at the place called the Point.\(^{36}\) close to the entrance to the port of Masulipatam near the bar. We believed we would be safe here even if the Moors failed to keep their word. We could erect tents here to provide shelter for some of our men and then write to de la Haye and the Directors at Surat explaining why we had decided to stay on while asking for further orders. I informed Deltor about our resolution but made it quite clear that it was entirely

\(^{36}\)The Point was at the distance of a cannon shot from the city and from here it was very easy to sail into the open sea. \textit{B.N., N.A.,} 9352 (54).
conditional on the Governor sending us the firman which he claimed to have received from the Chief Minister by which we were guaranteed complete surety at Masulipatam irrespective of what happened at San Thomé. Deltor immediately informed the Governor who confirmed his promise to give us all the security which we had demanded.

October 1672

The leading merchants in the city were very happy that we had decided to stay. They went to the Governor in a body and requested him to keep his promises to us. The Governor pledged to abide by his word and as testimony of his good faith he entrusted the firman of the King and the letter of Sayyid Muzaffar to one of the merchants asking the latter to convey these to us. In his letter, Sayyid Muzaffar stated he had every confidence in whatever the Governor was to say to us. All these events took place on 3 October. The merchant entrusted with the firman decided to deliver them to us on the following day. The same day, two Dutch ships which had sailed in from the south anchored at the roads.

The royal firman and the letter of Sayyid Muzaffar were handed over to us on 4 October. The merchant who brought these documents confirmed that the Governor would stand by the sureties which he had given. The rumours of court reaction to our capture of San Thomé had been exaggerated. The annual revenue of San Thomé was seven to eight thousand pagodas. The cost of repairing the fort and maintaining a garrison there involved an expenditure of between twenty and twenty-five thousand pagodas. He was certain that a few overtures backed by some gifts from us would ensure that we were granted a firman giving us possession of San Thomé. Sayyid Muzaffar had committed himself to serving our interests in this affair and we could rely on him. The merchant then told me that on the following day all the important people in the city would come to greet us at the Point. I told the merchant that I would lift anchor and moor at this spot. After the departure of the merchant, I wrote of all that was happening to de la Haye and to the Directors at Surat.
On the same day, I received a letter from Sieur Duquesne, a lieutenant serving in His Majesty's squadron. The letter had been written aboard one of the two Dutch ships which had arrived the previous day. Duquesne had been captured on board the "Phénix". He had been transferred from this ship to a Dutch vessel which was to take him to Batavia. There were other officers on board the two ships and still more were to come on other ships. I also received confirmation about the Dutch capture of the fort which we had created at Trincomallee Bay. I will write later of the events which had taken place in the bay after the departure of the squadron.

We lifted anchor and moored ourselves close to the Point at the distance of a gun-shot from the shore. On the morning of 5 October, three of the highest ranking officials at Masulipatam, the Chief of the Customs, the Secretary to the King, and another dignitary, accompanied by six of the most important merchants came to meet me at the Point. They received me when I set afoot ashore and we proceeded to the tents which had been erected. These officials reiterated the assurances on behalf of the Governor. They talked to me about our return to the lodge but when I told them I could do nothing without the orders of my superiors they did not press me any further. I tried to make them realise how much we had staked by deciding to stay on despite the fact that we had been called on to retire. We were doing this only out of a sense of consideration for the honour being extended to us by the Chief Minister in soliciting us to stay. We would, therefore, put all our faith in the assurances

**In a letter written on 31 December 1672, Martin states that the Dutch had sent five vessels from their squadron at Trincomallee both to collect merchandise from Masulipatam and to prevent the French from sending out any of their consignments from this port. **Ibid., loc. cit.

**In his letter dated 31 August 1672 Martin makes these events a little clearer. The ketch had already been anchored near the Point. The French crossed the bar on the night of 4-5 October and anchored a little closer to Masulipatam as a precautionary measure against the storms which lashed the coast between October and December. **Ibid., loc. cit.

**The identity of this functionary appears somewhat obscure. The term Secretary suggests that he may have been one of the letter-writers of the King.**
given to us by the Governor which had now been confirmed. The Chief of the Customs told me in private that Sayyid Muzaffar would be only too glad to help us. He had every inclination to do so even if it meant incurring displeasure of the Dutch who now ranked very low in his favour. The current circumstances were very favourable to us and our General at San Thome was advised to take advantage of them.

After several discussions on the same subject, the officials returned to the mainland. I sent two of the most important members of the lodge to accompany them.

Two more Dutch ships arrived carrying on board officers who had been captured from our squadron and those who had been taken at Trincomalley bay. De Lesboris, who had been left behind as Governor of the fort, wrote to me, as did the others also. They requested me to send them food as the amount which was being provided for them was inadequate in quantity. There were at this time six Dutch ships at the roads.

I sent one of our men to seek the permission of the Chief of the Dutch counter to allow us to visit the officers of the French squadron on board the Dutch ships and to take refreshments to them. This concession was granted. I sent two merchants by launch from the lodge to the Dutch boats with refreshments for the officers of the squadron and the agents of the Company who had been seized by the Dutch on the “Phénix”, the “Europe” at Trincomalley Bay. On their return, these men were able to give me a detailed account of the capture of the fort. This is how they described the event.

July 1672

**Details of the French Surrender of their Fort at Trincomalley Bay to the Dutch—French Prisoners Brought to Masulipatam**

After the departure of our squadron for the Coromandal coast, the Dutch ships entered the large bay on 11 July and anchored close to the entrance of the island on which we had erected our fort. A large number of cannon shots were fired at the Dutch from the fort. The Dutch returned this fire.
On 16 July, the Dutch landed between 1000 and 1200 men on the island of Caron\textsuperscript{91} which is close to the one on which we had our fort. They unloaded four cannons\textsuperscript{92} which they placed in a battery. Our men were much put out by the fire as they had scarcely any cover. On an extremely dark night on 18 July, the “Saint Jean” was boarded by twenty launch-loads of Dutchmen.\textsuperscript{93} There were only fourteen men on board this ship.\textsuperscript{94} They attempted to put up some defense by firing a few rounds of cannon and musket shot. The contest was too unequal. The “Saint Jean” was boarded and captured.

On 19 July, Admiral Rijkloff boarded the prize, at which time it was systematically plundered. The Admiral took as his share the ornaments from the chapel. When he laid hands on the chalice he remarked, with an impiety for which he deserves to be roasted in hell, that it would serve him well as a toasting vessel. All the things were taken away from the men who were then sent to a Dutch ship where they were put into chains. The enemy persisted in their cannonade of the fort and tried to establish a base in closer proximity so that they could continue the attack. De Lesboris, the commanding officer, knew that it would be impossible to resist. If the Dutch launched a sudden offensive and there was every likelihood of this, the fort would fall. He assembled all his officers and the decision was taken to start negotiations. The signal was given upon which the enemy ceased their fire.\textsuperscript{95} Father Maurice, dressed in riding costume, was sent to draw up the articles for the surrender of the fort. The articles along with the Dutch rejoinders are given below:

1—First article—Request—that within eight days all our ships which had been captured by the Dutch in the Indian Ocean should be returned along with their equipage consisting of

\textsuperscript{91} Vide supra, n. 61.
\textsuperscript{92} The Dutch also landed between one thousand and one thousand two hundred men. B.N., N.A., 9352 (54).
\textsuperscript{93} A total of 450 men had been sent to board the “St. Jean”. Ibid., loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{94} When de la Haye had left Trincomallee twenty men had been left on the “St. Jean” but all of them were ill. B.N., N.A., 9352 (77).
\textsuperscript{95} Sun Island was under Dutch blockade for 8 days prior to its surrender by the French. D.R., 20, p. 272.
crew members and armed forces, and a rendition was also to be made of all the arms, ammunition and comestibles found on board.

Reply—The decision will be left to our superiors, either to the sovereign authority in Holland or to the Governor-General in Council at Batavia.

*It was at the encouragement of the Grand Pensionary, Jan Oldenbarn-еveldt, that the Dutch East India Company had been founded in the year 1602. The Company was also known as the Jan Company or the V.O.C.—Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Chambers were organized at the different ports from which ships sailed to the east, the most important being the Chamber at Amsterdam which was also called the Grand Chamber. Just as the Netherlands was a loose confederation of States, the Company was also organized on federal lines the constituent units comprising the Chambers of Amsterdam, Middleburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. Each Chamber fitted out its own ships and kept its own accounts. Directors were appointed from among the different Chambers, the maximum number being sixty. A committee of seventeen members, drawn from the constituent units, acted as the governing body. The Seventeen, as they were called, sat for six years at Amsterdam and two at Middleburg. As a rule, there were three annual meetings of the Seventeen but sub-committees were appointed to prepare the drafts for correspondence with India or for any other purpose. These drafts were circulated among the Chambers. Individual Chambers could then inform their representative on the Seventeen as to their views on the subject concerned. The accounts of the Company were submitted to the shareholders once in ten years. Dutch Records, p. 29: R. Picard, Les Compagnies Des Indes, Arthaud, France, 1966, p. 63. Because of the distance involved, decision-making tended to gravitate towards Batavia.

*When the Governor General and his Council had first been instituted at Batavia for the government of Dutch possessions in the east, it had been intended that the Governor-General should function only as a presiding officer. In fact, he soon assumed the preponderating influence. By the Instructions drawn up in 1617 it was stated that the Council was to consist of nine members excluding the Governor-General. The first member was to be a commercial expert, the second and the third members should possess competence to command the navy and the army respectively, the fourth, a jurist, was to function as the Advocate-General, and the fifth member was to be the Director-General of the out-factories. The remaining four were non-resident members as they were the Governors of the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda and the Coromandel. The Governor-General had the casting vote and distributed the offices among the members of his Council. In 1626, power was given for the additional appointment of two extraordinary members to the Council. Later, the Director-General, who was the mercantile head just at the Governor-General was the political head of the
2—Request—In conformity with the dictates of justice the “Saint Jean” should be restored to us within twenty-four hours.

Reply—The same as the one given to the preceding article.

3—Request—That all the officers, soldiers and sailors taken by the Dutch during their attacks on our guards should be returned on board the above-mentioned vessel, the “Saint Jean”, failing which they should be allowed to return to France within eight months of the signature of the treaty.

Reply—We give an undertaking that all the above-mentioned men along with such other Frenchmen as have been arrested shall be sent to Batavia from where they will be shipped to Holland at the earliest opportunity. Thereafter, the destination of these men shall be left to the decision of our sovereign masters.

4—Request—That all deserters, whether soldiers or sailors should be shipped back to us on the above-mentioned ship, the “Saint Jean”.

Reply—The decision on this article is to be left to the discretion of our sovereign masters.

5—Request—We should be allowed to retire from Sun Island with full military honours with drums beating, our matches alight and our artillery well primed. We should also be allowed to take all ours arms, cannons, munitions, food provisions and luggage with us. In short we were to be allowed to carry away everything that belonged to us.

Reply—Permission is granted to the French to leave the garrison with standards flying and drums beating. They may

Company in the east, was expressly appointed as Second in Council. He was to succeed the Governor-General in office in case of vacancy. All the Councillors belonged to the politico-mercantile service of the Company. It was only in 1786 that the first professional military member was appointed to the Council when the Colonel (Commander-in-Chief) was allowed to take his seat. He was, however, given the lowest rank and could only vote in military matters. This Council was virtually sovereign. Occasionally, the Seventeen attempted to exercise some control by appointing Commissaries or independent Fiscals. These Fiscals who combined the offices of Controller-General of Finance and Public Prosecutor, were independent of the Supreme Council of Batavia. Dutch Records, p. 29.
have their guns loaded and carry away their baggage. All the surplus is to be left behind and is to be disposed of either by the home government or by the Governor-General and the Council for the Indies at Batavia.

6—Request—We should be given one month to effect our departure. During this period neither the Dutch nor any of their adherents are to set foot on the island.

Reply—The French are asked to surrender the island without further delay, the time limit being fixed for the following evening. The French are to leave behind two commissaries who are to be present when the inventory is being made of the arms, and munitions belonging to His Very Christian Majesty on the island. The commissaries are to leave after the inventory has been signed.

7—Request—During our withdrawal we should not be exposed to any humiliation.

Reply—Permission granted.

8—Request—that the French colours on the said island shall not be removed until we have moved out of the bay.

Reply—With regard to this article please refer to the protests which had been made to de la Haye.

9—Request—that we should be given surety and be provided with facilities to effect a passage either to Goa or Surat so that we could arrive at our destination by the twentieth day of the following month, that of September.

Reply—Refer to article three. No further comments.

10—Request—that the Dutch are to provide the food and refreshments necessary for this voyage for which they will receive payment.

Reply—Each officer and soldier shall be accorded the treatment due to his rank. The Dutch shall be guided in this matter by the practices prevalent among their own men. As for the rest please refer to article three.

11—Request—that the natives within the fort who are subjects of the King of Kandy should be sent to Kottiar from where they are to be allowed to go wherever they desire.

Reply—the blacks shall be surrendered to our discretionary power.
12—*Request*—We should be allowed to take all the gear and tackle of the "Indienne" in conformity to the inventory drawn up by His Majesty's writer on this vessel.

*Reply*—An inventory shall be made of the said gear and tackle and its subsequent disposal shall take place in accordance with the wishes of our sovereign masters or those of the Governor-General and Councillors at Batavia.

13—*Request*—That a passport assuring us security of passage for our return to France be issued to us. If the said passport is denied to us by the Dutch we will hold them responsible for all misadventures befalling us as a result of our encounters with their ships.

*Reply*—Every assurance will be given to the French with regard to their relations with our nation.

14—*Request*—That all the officers, soldiers and sailors on Sun Island shall be accommodated on one ship.

*Reply*—The accommodation given to the French will depend on the space available on our ships. The responses which I have given above formed the basis of the articles of the treaty which was accorded to us. The decree was couched in the following terms.

Drawn up and proclaimed on the island belonging to our Company on 19 July 1672. Signed: Reynclf Van Goens,108 Laurent Pitt; Preter de Grae,here, Simon Van Wardens; Jean Nollen; M. Huisman; Peter Martins; Wilt Wangh; Jean Frederick; Jean Boon.

It would be relevant here to add the preface which preceded the main body of the treaty.

Articles negotiated and decreed by the undersigned, Reynclf Van Goens, Councillor Ordinary for India, Superintendent, Admiral and Commander-in-Chief for all military operations by land and sea, expressly deputed by the Governor-General, Jean Mard Suicker,109 and MM. the Councillors for the Indies to defend the island of Ceylon and the Madura, Coro-

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108 The original spelling has been retained.
109 Johan Maetsuycker, Governor-General, 1653-1678.
mandel and Malabar coasts, jointly with the defence squadron and the nearest commanders of the island, do hereby accord the articles which shall serve as a rejoinder to the articles proposed by MM. de Lesboris, Commander, and Reverend Father Maurice, Intendant, of the Dutch island stretching across the entrance to the bay constituting the winter quarters of our fleet being part of the territory of the fort of Trincomallee. We call upon them to make a restitution of the said island and the bays belonging to the East India Company of the Low Countries which had been unlawfully seized and retained as a result of the injustice perpetrated by M. de la Haye, the French General.

After the articles had been drawn up and signed in this way, the garrison numbering fifty men some well, some ill, marched out of the fort on 20 July. The officers were included in the above number. The distressing aspect of this rendition was that 80 to 100 Singhalese, subjects of the King of Kandy, who had been sent to us as reinforcements, were abandoned to the discretion of the Dutch. These men were put into irons and treated like slaves. The Dutch made an inventory of everything which they found here. The French officers, soldiers and sailors were distributed among different Dutch ships and sent to Negapatam. On their arrival here, our men found some of their compatriots who had been seized during the encounters which had taken place in the bay, as also those who had been taken as a result of the capture of the "Phénix" and the "Europe". The officers were reasonably well treated. The soldiers and sailors were enclosed in a large house and accorded the same facilities as the Dutch gave to their own men of similar

100 De Lesboris had tried to secure the same terms for these men as had been accorded to the French but had failed. French relations with the King of Kandy cooled as the latter was greatly upset by the abandonment of his subjects to the Dutch. B.N., N.A., 9352, (54).

101 The Dutch obtained cannon, a large quantity of powder, bullets and grenades, gun carriages, fuses, 150 lasts of rice, 24 lasts of lentils and also wine and liquor. D.R., 20, pp. 261-62. Sufficient provisions to last till October had been left in the hope that after this the inclement weather would force the Dutch to withdraw. Carré, II, p. 423.
rank. The Dutch had refrained from pillaging the “Phénix” and the “Europe” after their capture.

Caron had entrusted a large sum of Company funds to a merchant\(^{102}\) aboard the “Phénix” for the purchase of food on the Coromandel coast. The latter had been unable to utilize the entire sum and eighteen thousand livres remained with him at the time of the Dutch capture of the ship. The King’s officers decided to divide this money among themselves declaring that if such a large sum was left undistributed the Dutch would certainly come to know of it and seize it. The merchant was forced to relinquish the money into their hands. He was allowed to retain thousand livres as his portion. A Capuchin priest who was present was also given one thousand livres. The officers soon regretted this partition. They asked the Capuchin priest to return the purse with one thousand livres which was done. They also went in search of the merchant to take back the two thousand livres. Upon his refusal, they threw themselves on him and assaulted him as a result of which he relinquished what he had with him.

After spending some time at Negapatam the Dutch embarked some of our men on some ships which were proceeding directly to Batavia.\(^{103}\) The rest were distributed between ships which were making stops at Bengal and Masulipatam prior to their departure for Batavia.\(^{104}\) It was from the men who came to Masulipatam that we learnt about the subsequent events at Trincomallee.

I received a letter from de Lesboris in which he asked me to try and meet him on the ship as he had important matters to communicate to me which he could not set down in writing. I excused myself saying that I could not leave my duties but when the request was repeated in a second letter I concluded that he had something important to say which would have a bearing on the services we owed to our King. I did not wish to neglect any

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\(^{103}\)Father Maurice, along with a hundred other prisoners was placed on board the “Europe” which sailed directly to Batavia. *Ibid.*, p. 432; *D.R.*, 20, p. 275.

\(^{104}\)The Dutch were combining the organization of their trade along with the disposition of the French prisoners. *Carré*, II, p. 431.
opportunity which might improve our position and did not hesitate to run some risk. I applied to the Dutch Chief for permission to visit the ship on which de Lesboris found himself confined without mentioning the names of the visitors I intended to send on board. The purser granted permission. I timed my visit in such a way as to reach the ship when the captain was away on the shore. My conversation with de Lesboris was not significant in any way. De Lesboris only wished to find out what had happened to the squadron after it had left Trincomal-lee bay. He confirmed all that I have written about the capture of the fort and added one detail about which I had been ignorant up to now. De la Haye had proposed that Caron should remain behind at the bay. Caron had made his acceptance conditional on the retention of four hundred men for the defence of the bay. This would have greatly enfeebled the squadron, and, therefore, it was decided that de Lesboris would be left behind with fifty-five men. Thirty-three of this number were ill, including two gunners who had been placed in charge of the fort. De Lesboris informed me of an additional circumstance. Not a drop of water was available on the island on which the French fort had been constructed. All the requisite supplies had to be brought in from an island within the distance of a pistol shot, called Caron island. Our fort could be easily covered from this island and the first step of the Dutch was to seize the latter island and raise their battery here.

There were twenty-four Frenchmen along with de Lesboris on the ship and the total crew from captain to ship’s boys comprised only twenty-six men. It would not have been too difficult a task for our men to seize the boat. The proportion between Frenchmen and Dutchmen was the same on the other ships in harbour, and, to speak plainly, since the Frenchmen were in a stronger position than the Dutchmen, they could have quite easily seized the ships had they acted with a little vigour at the opportune moment. I spoke about this to de Lesboris and also hinted at it to the officers on board the other ships. The officers showed so much resentment towards de la Haye that they stated they preferred imprisonment in Batavia to the performance of such a signal feat which would have so distinguished them and have served to weaken the enemy, the ships being richly
laden. They acknowledged that they could quite easily overpower the Dutch and anchor before San Thomé within thirty hours but not a single one of them wished to go back to de la Haye. They preferred, therefore, to satisfy their passion born of their hatred for de la Haye, rather than obtain the glory which would have been theirs as a result of such a fine deed.

This was not the only instance of our men having failed to rise to the occasion. When the Dutch had sent the flute, “Europe” from their fort in Trincomallee Bay to Negapatam there were more than a hundred French soldiers and sailors imprisoned between decks and fifteen to twenty officers on the upper deck, whereas the Dutch crew numbered between thirty and thirty-five men. Among the French prisoners was a carpenter who suggested a plan to the officers. Three or four blows with an axe to be found on the bridge would be sufficient for him to break open the grating above the hatches through which the prisoners between decks could escape and overthrow the crew at work. The plan could not but succeed. The captain of the very same flute who was be found among these officers opposed the plan. He said that he had given his word as a gentleman to Rijklof that no attempt would be made against the crew. All my acquaintances agreed that such an engagement could not be regarded as binding and our captain could quite easily have disregarded it without being accused of breaking parole. I left the ship at nine o’clock in the evening and arrived at midnight at the Point.

We learnt during this month that the Dutch ambassador had left Golconda without having been able to gain any of his demands. It was not that this embassy had not cost the Dutch anything. They were able, however, to get back their costliest presents as the envoys had been instructed not to give these unless they were assured of success.

October 1672

Towards the end of October, the north-easterly winds became very strong, so much so that of the six Dutch vessels in the harbour two were forced to set sail. Neither of the two ships were ready for departure. The cargo had not been fully loaded onto one and as for the other, the captain, the writer, one of
the pilots and the entire crew of the long boat were absent ashore. They were so convinced that the Frenchmen on board could assert their mastery over their own crew that the takeover of their boats by our men formed the subject of wagers among the Dutch at their lodge at Masulipatam. The incident did not, however, assume such a turn. Our men lacked the drive which would have brought them to complete such an easy task which would have bought them so much honour. Indeed, they went to the opposite extreme. As the crew provided by the Dutch was very inadequate to navigate the ships our men came to their help and thus hastened on, by their efforts, the time when they would find themselves imprisoned at Batavia.

The Dutch had some difficulties in their relations with the Governor during this month. The size and weight of the bales which they disembarked at the customs shed encouraged the belief that these contained cannon. When the Governor was informed about this, he ordered the impounding of these packages. The Dutch bided their time and then attacked the customs shed and took away the packets by force to their own lodge. The parcels did in fact contain cannon. When the Governor spoke to them of their violent behaviour the response which they gave him was that as they were at war with us they had to place themselves on guard. There were no further developments to this incident. Towards the close of October, the remaining Dutch ships at the roads set sail for Batavia.

November 1672

GUESTON AND BLOT—DEATH OF BLOT

On 3 November, I received a packet from Surat which included letters for de la Haye and Caron. From the letters which Gueston and Baron wrote to me I learnt about the death of Blot, one of the Directors, and also of the events which had taken place at this counter after the arrival of Gueston there.105

105. By a Decree of the Council of State dated 12 November 1670, the Supreme Council at Madagascar had been abolished. The letters patent of 21 January 1671 reinstituted the Supreme Council which, it was declared, was to be instituted at Surat or at any other place chosen by the Directors. The Council was to consist of four Directors in order of superiority. Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 34.
Even before their departure from France, Gueston and Blot had formed such a close friendship that the bond between them could almost be called a fraternal one. This relationship remained unaltered for some time after Gueston had arrived at Surat. I do not know if it was the divided authority which existed at Surat which was responsible, but this relationship began to change. Despite the many good qualities possessed by Gueston—and his reputation in this respect had even reached the court—he was a bit dilatory in his methods, and, without maligning him, it may be said that he had a tendency to give undue importance to minor details. Blot was possessed of an entirely different temperament. He was thorough but quick in his manner of work. As a result of his tendency to procrastination, Gueston wished to defer decisions on many items which were brought up for discussion. Blot did not allow himself to be hampered by this attitude and even took several commercial decisions on his own authority. From this time onwards, they started to bicker. The incident which brought matters to a head was the loss of the “Saint-Esprit” on which Gueston had sailed from France to India. This ship was to have proceeded to Bantam but while it was being loaded at the roads, it was found to be leaking too badly to be sent on this voyage. It was decided to unload the consignment and bring the vessel into the river for repairs. The merchandise was placed on board two or three barks. All that remained on the “Saint-Esprit” were a few hundred sacks of wheat which perhaps had been left behind to avoid putting too much of a strain on the small crafts. The ship then entered the river but ran aground on a sand bank. It was impossible to extricate it and the “Saint-Esprit” sank. The only person who could be blamed for this accident was the ground pilot who was responsible for guiding the ship into the river. Despite this, Blot began to publicly blame Gueston for this loss. This incident finally severed the last threads of the relationship which had bound the two men together and from

106 Carré (Carré, II, p. 416), states that Blot would not brook any interference in matters of internal trade as he felt he knew far more in this field than Gueston, who was a newcomer.

107 Martin contradicts Carré who stated that the “Esprit” had foundered along with the entire cargo. Ibid., pp. 416-17.
now onwards they began to quarrel without any restraint. I will not repeat the words which they exchanged on several occasions within full hearing of Company agents and servitors at the lodge. Baron tried very hard to bring about a reconciliation but did not enjoy the necessary standing with the two parties to bring about a compromise. It was nothing short of open war now. A strict watch began to be maintained for the arrival of express messengers and the one who succeeded in laying his hands first on the packet would open it without calling in his colleagues. Those who had to execute orders were placed in a very awkward situation as one would refuse to sign an order issued by the other. There was chaos at the lodge and short of physical confrontations, matters could not have been worse.

When conditions were at their worst Blot fell ill and died on 24 August. The Company would certainly be affected by his death. He was one of the best merchants to have come to India, firm of resolution, enterprising and a man of action whenever necessary. He had, however, been too optimistic in his initial estimates. He had made the General Assembly believe that vast profit could be derived from the carrying trade of India. Had he lived longer he would have been forced to revise his original estimates quite considerably. Blot had been somewhat curt in his behaviour towards the employees on his first arrival at Surat, as a result of which they were quite unmoved by his death. The knowledge which he had imbibed after coming was beginning to change him and there is reason to believe that he would not have an unpleasant master to serve in subsequent years. With his death, peace returned to the lodge. Gueston now assumed sole control and reversed all the directions which had been given by Blot with regard to the assortment, of merchandise. He even went to the extent of having merchandise intended for despatch to France sold to demonstrate his disapproval of his late colleague. His own conduct did not meet with the approbation of the General Assembly which had relied a great deal on Blot. These gentlemen felt it was very reprehensible on the part of Gueston to have lost no time in revoking all the arrangements which had been made by Blot. They concluded, and with justification, that Gueston had been motivated more by prejudice than by any consideration of the welfare of the Company, but
it was too late by then to retrieve the situation. Baron appeared unperturbed and exerted himself only when Gueston expressly chose to take him into confidence. Despite this, the two men verged on the brink of a quarrel. Baron possessed the diary of Blot which the latter had given to him prior to this death. On learning of this, Gueston demanded that the diary should be handed over to him, and when Baron refused to do so, he threatened to dismiss Baron and send him back to France. Gueston did not appear to possess this power, his only authority stemming from his position of *primus inter pares*. In order to avoid a relapse into the conditions from which they had just emerged, Baron gave up the diary on condition that it was later returned to him. This promise was given but Gueston felt under no obligation to abide by his word. A witty man at Surat who was quite familiar with the guiding genius of Directors, quipped at this time that Directors could be placed into three categories—those who made their own profits along with those of the Company, those who neglected to advance the success of the Company but did very well in their own private ventures, and finally those who had an equal record of failure both in Company ventures and their own. This classification appeared quite accurate.

Another ship was found to replace the “Saint-Esprit” for despatch to Bantam and the merchandise was transferred onto this boat. This is all there to report about the news of Surat. On the same day—3 November—I sent the letters which I had received for de la Haye and Caron by express messenger to Madras.

During this month, the English and the Dutch had several disputes with the Governor because the latter claimed the right to open all packets carried from their ships to their lodges to check if arms and ammunition lay concealed to any of these. These incidents had no further repercussions as the Governor did not proceed any further when he realized the determination of the foreigners not to allow any departures to be made from the privileges which they had traditionally enjoyed.

On 18 November, the Second at the Dutch lodge came to see me at the Point where we were to be found encamped. The sole
purpose of his visit was to attempt to draw out any information we may have received about the war in which we were at the time engaged in Europe. I regaled him well but that was all that he was able to extract from me.

On 21 November, I received letters from the principal members of our lodge at Bantam. They informed me that the “Vautour” had arrived safely. The Bishop of Heliopolis, that great prelate of the Overseas Missions, had embarked on this vessel at Surat intending to proceed to Siam. He had been unable to find the opportunity of doing so and had decided to go to Bengal from where he would take advantage of a boat sailing to Tenasserim. The Bishop sent me letters addressed to the Directors-General and did me the honour of writing to me himself.

On 25 November, I received letters from Surat in which I was informed of the arrival of a Company hooker. This small vessel had left France at the beginning of the year in Company with the 800-ton vessel, the “Orient”. It had lost contact with the latter ship at Cape Verde and subsequent to this the hooker had not received any further information about its companion ship.

The gales of Saint Francis called the “Elephant gales” in Surat have caused a great deal of dislocation. The river which had risen alarmingly had swept inland as far as a quarter of a league. Two ships of the royal navy were damaged—The “Saint Jean de Bayonne” which was being repaired and the “Guillot”, a hooker, which had put in subsequently.

The Directors had sent two well-armed ships, the “Saint Paul” and a Company hooker into the Persian Gulf to escort the

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108 This was the 90-ton “St. Robert” which had left La Rochelle with the “Soleil d’Orient” on 12 March 1672. Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 654.

109 The gales were perhaps so named as the feast of St. Francis of Assissi fell on 4 October. The end of the rainy season coincided with lunar asterism called Tail of the Elephant. The storms which occurred at this time were called fit tooofani or Elephant Gales. J. Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia, I, Liechtenstein, 1967, p. 127 n. The derivation of the word seems to have been the absorption of the Indian term गृह्य नक्षत्र denoting Elephant Constellation into Persian as Fil Baran or Fill
“Saint François” which was expected to sail in from Basra. They were worried about the safety of this ship because of the Dutch War.

THE TOBACCO INCIDENT

Towards the end of this month, we had a disagreement with the Governor. One of the men I had left behind at the lodge permitted a local resident to store tobacco in an apartment at back of the lodge. Tobacco is a contraband article as it is a royal monopoly. Because of the high duties charged on it, no declaration had been made at the time of storage. When the Kotwal or Provost came to know that we had this physic with us, he came to the lodge with fifty to sixty soldiers to seize the supply. Two clerks who were at the lodge at this time put up opposition and a third, who fortunately chanced to pass by, also joined in. The Muslims were repulsed and the Kotwal was forced to withdraw. Our men had the presence of mind to remove the tobacco after this. I was informed about this incident in the evening. I disembarked with six well-armed men and entered the lodge. I made an enquiry into all the circumstances and severely chastised all those who had allowed the tobacco to be hoarded. All of them, however, denied that they had anything to do with their affair. I did not anticipate any further developments and returned to the ship, taking with me one of the clerks whom I suspected of some involvement in this petty imbroglio. The next day I learnt that after we had left, the Kotwal had returned with strong reinforcements. He had forced open the door to the store-room where the tobacco had been kept but had found nothing. There were two clerks in the lodge who judged it wise not to offer any resistance, and indeed, they were not in a position to offer any, being two against eighty or one hundred soldiers. The Kotwal then went to the homes of the two servants of the lodge whom he arrested. One of the retainers had taken service with me. Both were released without any delay.

I returned to the mainland on the following day and sent my complaints about the violent behaviour of the Kotwal to the Governor through our interpreter. The Governor replied that
he had also not approved of the actions of the Kotwal and had dismissed this official. However, we were also in the wrong for we had taken tobacco belonging to private merchants inside our lodge despite our knowledge that we were thereby acting in contravention to the decrees issued by the King. I repeated my complaints but the matter was not carried any further.

I received several letters from Golconda during this month. My correspondents informed me that each day several of our men were deserting to the enemy at San Thomé. The King of Golconda was taking these men into his service with promises of good pay. This was quite a clever policy on the part of the King who was said to be acting on Dutch advice. Among the deserters, they mentioned one person called La Duc who had served as the secretary of Caron. La Duc was afraid to return to France with Caron as crimes involving capital punishment had been preferred against him. He was also uneasy about continuing him to stay at San Thomé as he no longer had anyone to protect him there now. He decided to quit and seek his fortune in India. There is reason to believe that Caron had some knowledge about his plans and had tried to help him.

All the Englishmen in the city, those belonging to the Company as well as the private merchants, had their goods carried outside the city. They were afraid that our ships would appear and our men would disembark and set fire to Masulipatam.

December 1672

On 1 December, the Second at the English counter paid us a visit. He proposed on behalf of his Chief that we should act together against the Dutch who were now our mutual enemy. He added that the English had taken the decision to withdraw to Madapollam, an aldea close to Narasapur, where they would be safe. They invited us to come with them and forge a common front. I thanked the Second for his offers but declared that we could not leave our post without receiving orders either from de la Haye or the Directors. The English and the Dutch now began to encourage the local residents to remove their possessions from the city. The Governor, wishing to check this

\[110\text{Madapollam in the text.}\]
outflow and also fearing that the situation could lead to the outbreak of some disorder, forbade the transport of any more goods outside the city. He placed guards to maintain watch at all the gates, and having traced the root of the panic to the conduct of the Europeans who were having all their possessions transported elsewhere, he sent a message to them forbidding them to remove anything more. Shortly afterwards, the English were stopped at one of the gates. The second now emerged from their lodge, leading ten well-armed Englishmen, fifty native soldiers and several porters. They went to the customs shed which they took over. They kept three pieces of cannon trained on a large road leading to the customs shed, and while some of the men guarded the entrance against attack, the others loaded all the merchandise they had there onto fourteen barks which were then dispatched to Narasapur. After this, the Englishmen returned to their lodge.

The Governor was extremely exasperated by this action of the English. He got all the merchandise belonging to them unloaded from a boat which was at the port and placed the entire consignment in the customs shed. After sending a contingent of one hundred and fifty men there he demanded payment of one thousand pagodas from the English as a form of compensation for their violent behaviour. The commencement of the following year will show what was the sequel to this affair.

**MARTIN DECIDES TO RETREAT TO SAN THOME**

Although the terms of the firman by which we were allowed to remain at the Point and retain our lodge were quite clear, the Governor had promised to accord us wider terms which he had engaged himself to procure for us from court. I had pressed him several times through our courtier and interpreter to keep his word and to extend terms of the firman to cover all Frenchmen, irrespective of rank, who were living in Golconda or who were travelling through the kingdom. The Directors had instructed me to obtain this assurance, with a view perhaps, to one of them proceeding by this route to San Thomé as the

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*Carre places this figure at 2,000 pagodas. B.N., N.A., 9352 (54).*
Dutch war had made the sea route an extremely hazardous one. The Governor kept putting us off and finally told us that it would cost us the further sum of 1000 pagodas if we wished to obtain the kind of firman which we wanted. I spurned his proposition and decided to withdraw to San Thomé. I ordered our men on a mainland to gather together a supply of food which we could take with us so that our presence would not throw a further burden on those who were already facing a siege. They sent us food but were careful to send us only a little at a time so that our plans would not be revealed.

**DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE INDIANS** AT MASULIPATAM

Ever since their outbreak at the customs shed, the Governor had placed soldiers at all the avenues leading to the English houses to prevent supplies of water, wood and other necessities from being taken in to them. As I have already stated, this is the first step which is always taken by the Moors in Masulipatam to indicate their animosity towards any nation. The first few days passed by without causing any inconvenience to the English. When however, they began to experience water scarcity, they sent a message to me requesting that when the bullocks, which we sent out of city to procure water for us returned, they should be made to skirt their lodge so that the English could seize them. I could not see any snag in giving these orders to the men who were leading the bullocks. They for their part endeavoured to carry out my instructions on their return, but the guards on duty would not allow them to enter the avenue and forced them to take another road. The English who had assembled at the lodge to celebrate Christmas in their traditional style—it was 4 January 1673—came out numbering

112 This is the first time that the word Indian is specifically used.
113 The Gregorian calendar had been in usage in France since December 1582, but the English continued to adhere to the Julian calendar, ten days in arrear of the Gregorian calendar, until the date September 1752. Henceforth when dates given according to the old Julian calendar are made to synchronise with the Gregorian calendar an oblique line separating the two dates will indicate the concordance.
ten to twelve poorly armed men followed by twenty-eight to thirty native soldiers. The Governor’s men refused to yield. A few parries were exchanged after which the English fell back. In the meanwhile, a private English merchant, on hearing all the commotion had come out to join his countrymen. The Governor’s men pushed him back until he reached a Moor’s residence within which he retreated. His pursuers followed him inside, wounding him several times with their swords. These injuries proved fatal to him. Several soldiers belonging to both parties were wounded after which each group returned to its previous position. The local merchants tried to arrange some accommodation and the English solicited my help.

The next day I sent an envoy to the Governor and represented to him that this was not the way in which he should behave towards Europeans. The Governor replied that it was not he who had started the action. It had been the English who had been the aggressors and they would have to pay for their misdemeanour. He demanded the sum of 4000 pagodas from them while the English were prepared to offer between 1000 to 1200 pagodas. We were told later that the Governor had extracted 1,600 pagodas from this affair. When on 5 January the six English ships which had been sent to Bengal returned to Masulipatam, well-armed launches were sent ashore before the vessels cast anchor. The English hoped to intimidate the Governor by this action. The latter remained on guard and without resorting to any extremeties he still managed to gain his objectives insofar as the English were concerned.\(^{114}\)

**DEPARTURE OF FRANÇOIS MARTIN FROM MASULIPATAM AND HIS ARRIVAL AT SAN THOMÉ (15 JANUARY 1673)**

It was only after I had completed all the arrangements for our journey to San Thomé, had discharged our debts and embarked the most precious of our possessions from the counter that I conveyed our decision to the Governor and the principal

\(^{114}\)The English had refused to come to any arrangement until their ships had arrived from Bengal. When their attempt at intimidation failed they appear to have agreed to pay the 1,600 pagodas mentioned by the Diarist. *B.N., N.A.*, 9352 (54, 57).
merchants. I had added that our decision to depart did not mean that we wished to break off all relations and as a token of this, I had left behind two Frenchmen at the lodge, trusting in the firman of the King of Golconda.

These men conveyed their displeasure at my proposed departure but had nothing new to offer which could serve to dissuade me. The Governor sent me a private message saying that de la Haye could be quite frank with Sayyid Muzaffar who would be happy to advance our interests in the San Thomé affair. The Governor promised to protect the two Frenchmen I was leaving behind, and promised that he would not allow any harm to befall them. The first among the two was Sieur Malfosse. Two clerks who wished to return to France asked for permission to proceed to Surat. I gave them permission and the Governor issued them a passport which would enable them to travel safely through the territories of the King of Golconda. The remaining men were then embarked. I agree that if we had continued our sojourn at Masulipatam we may have been able to secure some advantages at a later date. However, I had not received any reply from de la Haye with regard to the offers of mediation made by Sayyid Muzaffar. The Directors, in the meantime, wrote indignantly that I was prolonging my stay at Masulipatam simply because I was afraid to go to a place which was under siege. In view of all this, I had no alternative but to leave Masulipatam and I advised the Directors accordingly. I left the letters with Malfosse to be forwarded to Surat and instructed him as to how he was to conduct himself.

We set sail for San Thomé on 10 January. Although it was easy to navigate the route between Masulipatam and San Thomé during the northern monsoon, since we did not have any pilots on our ketch on 12 January, we found ourselves amidst the shoals which stretch along the coast in front of Armagon.

We extricated ourselves with difficulty and being aided by a favourable wind we passed by Pulicat in the afternoon of 15 January. We anchored at night two leagues to the north of Madras wishing to put in during the day. We lifted anchor at

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116 Martin brought fifteen men with him from Masulipatam. Ibid., (67).
117 Armegon in the text.
four o'clock in the morning on 16 January and moored three hours later before San Thomé. I descended after we had fired a 384 salute. We found de la Haye by the seashore where he had stopped while returning from a visit to the surrounding region.

Before continuing with my narrative, I feel it would be better to recapitulate the important events which had taken place at San Thomé between the time of its fall and that of our arrival there on 16 January.
After his conquest of the city, de la Haye went to all the places in person to apprise himself of local conditions. Apart from those who had already been arrested and made prisoner, there did not appear to be any further enemy resistance. After posting soldiers at various points and distributing them along the bastions, de la Haye went to the cathedral to offer a *Te Deum* in thanksgiving. The Muhammadans had a great deal of respect for this cathedral and had not meddled with it in any way. The pictures showed no signs of disarray and the ornaments, enclosed in large cupboards in the sacristy, had not been touched. Even the copper chandeliers remained unchanged. As we shall see later, the Dutch were not to emulate this behaviour. According to tradition, St. Thomas had been inside the chapel which stood on the right side to the entrance of the cathedral. I do not know if it is a result of a belief which has gained common credence among these people who hold St. Thomas in such high veneration, but this much is true, that as soon as one enters this chapel, one is seized by a holy fear which takes one quite by surprise in the beginning. There are few who have not had this reaction
on entering this chapel. The cathedral was very imposing. De la Haye considered the timber roofing to be the most outstanding he had seen because of the beauty of the wood and the boldness of execution. The vault was supported by a single key-stone.

The city was intersected by extremely well-laid-out roads. The houses had once been well-built, but most were now ruins as the Moors had not only neglected to maintain them but had even used doors and windows for firewood. Given a little time and money, this city could outdistance all the others along the coast.

One day after the city had been captured, a public proclamation was made proscribing incitement to any disorder on pain of death. The people living outside the city were not to be harrassed in any way and nothing was to be taken without payment. In order to avoid confusion all commodities were to be bought and sold at regulated prices at a market to be held at a stipulated place. The price lists were to be put up for display at several places. These were wise steps, but on two points de la Haye betrayed lack of judgement. The first miscalculation was the establishment of a small checkpost where a duty was charged on all commodities being brought in from outside. The second was the minting of coins which would not enjoy currency outside San Thomé. The paucity of dues which were paid revealed the ill-considered nature of these steps. The fanons\(^1\)—this being the name of the local coins minted here—were rejected outside.

Those who are more versed in politics than I, are in a better position to judge if such a policy was best designed to win the confidence of the city people and those in the countryside.

The ship, the "Triomphe" had been condemned. The cannons of this vessel were taken out and brought to the land as the bastions were to be strengthened by them. The Governor of Madras\(^2\) sent two of the leading members of this Council to congratulate de la Haye on his conquest and offered his best services. De la Haye thanked him and assured him that he would be happy to reciprocate.

\(^1\)The fanam.
\(^2\)William Langhorn — 1670-1677.
The walls of the city on the landward side were badly preserved in several places. De la Haye immediately issued orders that the necessary repairs should be carried out. The Commissary was asked to make a list of all that had been found in the city, to enumerate the number of houses, and prepare a report on the territory, its dependencies and any other matter relating to the city.

August 1672

A woman who was bringing in provisions for sale in the market was forcibly deprived of these by two soldiers on one of the streets. When complaints were lodged about this, notices were served and the two men were arrested. A court martial was held on 1 August and both the unfortunates found themselves condemned.

After the fall of San Thomé, several Portuguese had rushed to return to the city. Quite a few of the houses were taken over by them on the pretext that they had been dispossessed of these by the Moors. De la Haye issued another proclamation by which the Portuguese in the city were asked to register themselves with the Commissary, and submit their names, details of their status, along with any claims which they wished to advance.

FIRST MENTION OF PONDICHERRY

De la Haye foresaw the contingency of shortage of food at San Thomé and sent one of his guards to Pondicherry. The Governor of the territory of the King of Bijapur in this region was Sher Khan Lodi, of whom I have already spoken. We had been corresponding with him since the close of 1670. When Sher Khan heard of our capture of San Thomé, he wrote to de la Haye offering us a site in his dominions where we could establish ourselves.

THE ATTACK OF 9 AUGUST

The work on fortifications continued. Commanding officers and detachments of soldiers were placed on the bastions which were mounted by cannon and furnished with adequate stocks of
ammunition. On 7 and 8 August, a few false alarms were sounded to test the preparedness of the garrison.

On 9 August, de la Haye was informed that 1500 of the enemy had taken up their positions at a village called Corumbat, about a league distant from the city. From here they were preventing the country people from bringing in provisions to San Thomé. Within a few days these men were expecting to be joined by a much larger contingent of soldiers. The importance of performing some significant feat of arms at the initial stages made de la Haye decide to attack these men in their camp. He disembarked sailors when he drilled himself and nominated the officers who were to participate in this adventure. The contingent formed by him consisted of 300 men. Included in this number were soldiers, sailors, his own personal attendants, the company of cadets, and volunteers among whom ten to twelve Portuguese could be counted.

At two o'clock on the morning of 10 August, these troops took their departure relying on the services of guides who had been hired for this purpose. The guides had been asked to make a detour so that the enemy could be caught at the flank or rear. It is not known if the guides were ignorant of the layout of the land or were activated by treachery—de la Haye was inclined to suspect them of the latter—but throughout the remaining part of the night our men were made to continuously traverse bad roads. To our men, it certainly seemed as if they were covering more than the four leagues which had been expected of them. When they finally approached the camp it was broad daylight. The enemy, having been warned about our sortie, placed themselves on guard on sighting our men. They appeared determined to put up a good defence but their resistance crumbl-

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5Martin is incorrect when he states that the Golconda forces were expecting further reinforcements. In fact, the entire army had arrived but each of the three generals was to set up a separate encampment. The position which the French now intended to attack was that of Mondal Nayak. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
ed at our very first fusillade. They vacated their camp which was occupied by our men. The Moors were pushed back to the plain where they rallied together. The skirmish lasted for two hours and during this time several hotly contested actions took place during which our officers gave a very good account of themselves. De la Haye was always to be found at the places of greatest danger, and indeed, he was reproached for exposing himself too much. He found himself attacked by four members of the Rajput⁵ caste which is held in high esteem by the Hindus. In spite of putting two of them out of action it would have been difficult for de la Haye to have extricated himself but for the timely intervention of the soldier, La Jonquière. One of the enemy had succeeded in putting the tip of his halbard against the chest of de la Haye when he was killed by a musket shot aimed by La Jonquière. De la Haye was thus saved. The Moors charged several times but were repulsed each time. De la Haye now decided to call off the attack and recalled the men. The camp would have yielded rich booty had it been let over to pillage, but upon the orders of de la Haye nothing was despoiled. The troops were assembled in proper order and the signal to start the retreat was given. For a long time, Moorish horseman followed at the wings awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack. They were unable to do so since a group of musketeers was detached from the main body of French troops to guard the flanks and rear. The Moors were driven off whenever they came within musket shot range. It was in this way that our men returned to San Thomé. The Moors sustained losses in this action while we counted two or three men dead and an equal number wounded. This action won us great renown among the country people who are unused to such vigorous action. The next day the enemy retreated and set up their camp further away.

On 14 August, an envoy of the king of Golconda arrived at Madras bringing a conciliatory letter for the Governor. He also brought the customary gifts which consisted of a jacket, a shirt, a belt, and turban. The French court feared that the English

⁵Tribu des Rajas in the text.
would not join in a common cause, but attempts were being made to effect this.

**Seizure of an English Ship**

When our squadron arrived at the roads at San Thomé it was found that a small ship bound for Atjeh belonging to a rich private English merchant of Madras had preceded us here. The owner of the vessel was a person called Jearsey. This man had previously been in the service of the English Company having officiated as the chief of the English counter at Masulipatam. Jearsey was by nature a proud man. He did not wish to acknowledge the authority of the Governor of Madras and had even considered withdrawal to San Thomé. He possessed a large house there outside the city which he had further extended by constructing additional rooms. The Governor of Madras who was dissatisfied with Jearsey wrote about him to de la Haye, adding in his letter that Jearsey was in correspondence with the Dutch. De la Haye was advised to be wary in his dealings with this merchant. The Governor had pointed out that Jearsey, who considered himself to be exempted from such practices, had obtained neither a commission nor a passport for his vessel. We could, in all justice, seize his boat. The English functionary had his own reasons for advocating such a line of conduct although, at the time, these were hidden to de la Haye. It was the intention of the Governor to use the incident to improve his own relations with Jearsey as he realized that the

*Gersey in the text.

Vide supra, Chap. 1. n. 10. William Jearsey was possessed of a somewhat checkered career in the service of the English East India Company. Jearsey was in service from 1650 to 1655 when he had put in some work at the English counter at Pegu. He was dismissed for insubordination in 1655 but was reinstated in 1662. Between 1662 and 1669 he had served as Chief at the English counter at Masulipatam when he had carried on a very profitable private trade. This had caused his dismissal in 1669 when he was ordered to produce his accounts and return to England. He commanded so much influence in India that he was able to defy the Directors for sixteen years. After 1686, he reached an understanding with the English authorities after which he was left undisturbed until his death at Fort St. George in 1690. Bowry, op. cit., p. 251 n.

This was the "Ruby", vide infra., p. 394.
latter could be of use to him at a later date. He calculated that once we had seized the small vessel, Jearsey would be forced to take recourse to the offices of the Governor to secure its release. The Governor would be able to perform this service quite easily as a result of which he would be able to win over Jearsey. I am dilating on this episode as it created quite a stir among the English.

By the time the Governor’s letter reached de la Haye, the small boat had lifted anchor and had moored itself somewhere between San Thomé and Madras. De la Haye sent out a launch which had been armed with an officer on board. On reaching the ship, the officer had asked to see the commission or passport. When the captain had replied that neither of these two documents had been taken, the ship was brought away and anchored amidst the French squadron. The crew was made to disembark and guards were installed to protect the ship. As the Governor had foreseen, Jearsey now appealed to him. The former, after raising a few objections, wrote to de la Haye requesting for the release of the ship.

The affair dragged on for a long time. Several letters were exchanged and special envoys were sent from Madras to San Thomé. The matter was not treated lightly by us for de la Haye had no intention of allowing himself to be used as a passive instrument for the satisfaction of the Governor’s emotions. He wrote that since the ship had been detained upon the advice of the Governor, it could not be released now, but the matter would be discussed at the ships Council which was being convened. The officers who had been called to meet on board the “Navarre” a few days later were of the opinion that the English vessel constituted a legal prize, with the reservation that Jearsey was free to make an appeal in Europe against the seizure of his boat. It would not be proper for me to believe that de la Haye could have offered to submit the case for adjudication to the King of England and that he had refrained on Jearsey indi-

10Conseil de Marine in the text.
cating his preference for accepting the verdict given by the
officers as to his ship constituting a prize. A letter was then
written to the Governor of Madras. Our action, which was
quite lawful, aroused the indignation of the English who knew
nothing of the secret background. A few of our officers, how¬
ever, believed that it would have been wiser to release the prize
and propitiate the Governor, since it was conceivable that we
would require the services of the latter at a later date. The prize
was in a good condition and when an inventory was made of
the merchandise on the ship it was found to be worth 12 to
1,500 livres.  

September 1672

REPEATED ATTACKS ON SAN THOMÉ

We continued to mount cannon on the bastions and the captains
of the ships were ordered to come in and moor as close as
possible to the city so that in case of attack they could be pro¬
tected by the batteries facing the sea. From time to time, de la
Haye would descend and make a tour of the countryside so that
the natives could become familiar with their new masters.

On 3 September, the enemy numbering 2,000 men was sighted
at a distance of half a league from the city. Some of their men
separated and began to set fire to the straw huts on the outer¬
most periphery. When de la Haye marched out, these men
retreated and rejoined the main body of their army. There was
a temple in the middle of the villages 400 ft. from the city which
we fortified. Perriers were mounted and twelve to fifteen men
were placed here under a commanding officer to beat off the
enemy.

On the night of 5-6 September, the enemy raised a disturbance
in the villages outside. The shots aimed at them from the city
and the temple fell wide of their mark and on 6 September, our
force had advanced within musket shot distance of the city. De
la Haye, placing himself at the head of a detachment, pushed

11The Dutch stated that Jearsey’s vessel was full of rice. D.R., 20, p. 327.
12The three Moorish generals had by now established their camps at
various places close to San Thomé. Carré, II, p. 454.
13Mortars which projected stone balls.
them back into the plain. On the night of 6-7 September, the enemy appeared again. Our men fired at them at random. On 7 September, they again showed up with 1,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. They gained their way to the seaward side and approached within cannon shot distance. Three or four volleys of cannon shot forced them to reach back into the mainland.

Since the small boat had been adjudged to be a lawful prize, the men seized on board had been detained at San Thomé. At the request of the Governor of Madras, these men were released on 10 September.

On 13 September, the enemy made a vigorous intrusion into the outskirts. At first, the native soldiers who were standing guard here fell back, but they were succoured by a detachment of Frenchmen who put back some heart into them. The Moors were made to retreat with a loss of ten men. The enemy then began to set up an encampment close to the outskirts of the city where they fortified themselves. This betrayed their intention to lay siege to the city, their strategy being framed in accordance with this aim. Realizing this, de la Haye destroyed all the houses closest to the city under cover of which the enemy could sneak right up to the base of our wall. Native navvies and sailors were used for this work.

**Caron Returns to France**

Caron decided, in apparent concurrence with de la Haye, to return to France to make a presentation of affairs in India and stress the importance of sending reinforcements without any delay. The "Jule" was chosen for this voyage. The captain of the "Breton" was also embarked on this ship as the Council had declared him to be unfit for his job. The captain of a Company hooker was also ordered to make preparations for a voyage to Surat. De la Haye made use of these operations and those which were to be undertaken later as many as 500 huts were destroyed by de la Haye. *B.N., N.A.,* 9352 (58).

There were other explanations also for Caron's return to France. One version had it that Caron had fallen out with de la Haye and was, therefore, returning. According to another, the home administration had summoned Caron to provide an explanation of his activities. *B.N., N.A.,* 9375 (7).

This hooker was "St. Louis". *Carré, II,* p. 459.
of both these ships to send letters to court. While we were engaged in these preparations on 20 September, sixteen Dutch vessels appeared from the south. Our General went on board the "Navarre" to organize defensive measures in case we were attacked, and the officers in the other boats were also ordered to take the same precautions. The sixteen ships passed us by, proceeding towards the north.\(^{17}\)

The demolition work continued and 400 feet south of the city, a little fort was constructed to offer protection to a group of native soldiers encamped close by as also for that of a village of fishermen.\(^{18}\) The fort was given the name of Sans Peur. When the native soldiers complained that they could not support themselves on their pay they received an increase of 30 livres per month. As a result of this, they were now receiving a salary of one pagoda which was equivalent at that time to six of our livres.\(^{\text{sic}}\)

The Moors burnt their camp and on 25 September they approached within a musket shot range of the city. The village houses, which were to be found here in copious numbers, provided them with ample shelter to push forward with their works. On the same day a small Portuguese boat charged with a cargo of arrack—a country liquor—and provisions put in at the roads. De la Haye bought the entire cargo.

On 27 and 28 September, the enemy\(^{19}\) attempted to advance their entrenchments. De la Haye, placing himself at the forefront of the earthworks on the French side, repulsed them with loss. The General cannot be sufficiently praised for his extraordinary activity which made him appear to be everywhere at once, and, to give him his due, no soldier or officer exposed himself to as much danger as he did.

\(^{17}\)This was the Dutch squadron under the command of Van Goens. After stopping at Negapatam, Van Goens was proceeding towards Pulicat. B.N., N.A., 9352 (54). Of the sixteen ships viewed by the French 6 proceeded to Masulipatam the rest of the vessels remaining at Pulicat. Fawcett, E.F., II, p. 52.

\(^{18}\)The diarist used the term Maquois.

\(^{19}\)According to de la Haye, the Moorish forces at this time consisted of 12,000 men. B.N., N.A., 9352 (58).
India in the 17th Century

The Moors Cut Off Our Communications with Madras

Although the English were none too pleased to see us in such close proximity, and had been displeased by our detention of Jearsey’s ship despite the interest they had taken in the affair, we were still able to procure food from Madras which was of great help to us, in sustaining our garrison. The private English merchants also made their profits from this. The Moors wanted to cut us off from this small succour. They posted their troops on the roads which connected Madras with San Thomé and on 29 September, those who were returning to San Thomé with supplies from Madras were arrested. De la Haye despatched the guardsmen under their captain, Sieur d’Estreville, to drive away the enemy. D’Estreville was further supported by a detachment of fifty men and a few natives under the command of de Rebrey and de Maillé. The Moors were attacked and repulsed. They now sent out a stronger detachment which took up a fortified position in a temple approximately equidistant between Madras and San Thomé. They were now able to seal off the land route whereby we had been obtaining supplies.

On the night of 29-30 September, the enemy approached within 200 feet of the city. From the refuge of the huts here they opened a brisk fire at us. De la Haye could not tolerate the presence of the enemy at such close proximity. Heading a group of 150 men and taking with him two pieces of cannon, which were to serve him very effectively, de la Haye attacked the Moors at close quarters. The latter put up resistance for some time but the loss of forty men caused them to retreat to their large entrenchments. The huts which had provided them with shelter were subsequently burnt down. Some of the Moors had converted a temple to the south-east of the city into a fort so that their entrenchments could be advanced further. The enemy army at this time was reported to comprise 6000 infantry and 2000 horse under the command of Baba Sahib, Trimbak Bussora Raja, and Mondal Nayak. The latter two were Hindus

**Identified by Love as the Parathasarathy temple in Triplicane—Love, op. cit., p. 322, n. 2.

*Babasaib, Trimourcoursouraja, Moudelnaique respectively in the text. Vide supra, Chapter Three, n. 3.
and Baba Sahib, a Muslim, had been placed in supreme command. Each general was allowed to plan his own strategy and had been provided with an independent army. Below these generals, several reputed officers were also to be found.

**ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PROVISIONS FROM PONDICHERY**

On 1 October, de la Haye came on board the “Navarre”. The captain of this ship along with those of the “Breton”, the “Diligente” and the “Rubis”—the latter being the ship belonging to the English merchant adjudged to be a lawful prize—were ordered to sail to Tranquebar, and take on stocks of food. The vessels were to come back *via* Porto Novo and Pondicherry from where the additional quantities of food for which orders had already been placed were to be embarked. The captain of the “Jule” received his orders to sail to France while the captain of the Company hooker was directed to proceed to Surat. De la Haye took leave of Caron and after handing over the packets, he returned ashore. The ships set sail at night. Only two of our vessels were now left in the harbour, the “Flamand”, and the flute the “Sultane”.

Some of the huts which had provided shelter to the Muslims were still standing. On 2 October, a detachment was sent to burn these down. This task was completed successfully. On the same day, a few cannon shots were fired from a battery which had been recently constructed. On 3 October, several palmetto trees growing near the city were cut down. This caused a minor skirmish.

On 4 October, the enemy advanced their line of entrenchments to reach a temple which they wished to enclose. De la

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**Footnotes**

11Both Porto Novo and Pondicherry were in Bijapuri Carnatic. The French seemed aware of the rivalry between Golconda and Bijapur in the Carnatic and used this to their own advantage. *B.N., N.A.*, 9375 (7); *Ibid.*, 9352 (58).

12This proved to be the last voyage of the “Jule”. At the Straits of Gibraltar, Caron received warning from another ship that difficulties were being prepared for him in France. Caron managed to bribe the captain into changing the ship’s course towards Lisbon. At the entrance to this harbour, the “Jule” foundered on some rocks plunging Caron to his death. *B.N., N.A.*, 9375 (7).
Haye went there with a force consisting of his guards, the company of cadets and volunteers. After a hotly contested encounter lasting an hour, the enemy retired counting a few of their numbers dead and many wounded. Twenty-five officers on our side were wounded. They succumbed to their injuries after a few days.

On 5 October, the task of the demolition of huts which were the closest to the city continued. Our men also busied themselves in raising the outer works which were to enclose the bastion of St. Louis as the enemy lines on this side had advanced considerably.

Six soldiers deserted to the enemy on the night of 5-6 October. When de la Haye was informed about this, he addressed the troops whom he had assembled in the square. He impressed on them their duty and stressed how much harm they would be doing to themselves by abandoning the King's service in favour of slavery among the infidel.

The demolition of huts which bordered on our fortifications continued on 7, 8 and 9 October. On 10 October, we attacked the enemy in the trenches close to the pagoda. De Rebrey who was at the head of a detachment of thirty men, was the first to leap inside and attack whoever came in his way. The Moors lost twenty-five to thirty men. De la Haye's ensign of the guards received a fatal injury which caused his death within a few days. Two of our soldiers were also wounded. On 12 October, one of the advance posts of the enemy was attacked. Victory was almost within our reach when a torrential downpour forced our men to retreat. The wind then became stronger and more turbulent. This forced the officers of the 'Flamand' and the 'Sultane' at the roads to cut their cables and anchors and make for the open sea.

In the morning, six Dutch ships and a fly boat were sighted to the north. These proceeded on a southerly route steering clear of San Thomé. On the night of 14-15 October, the two ships which had been torn away from their moorings returned to the roads. At daybreak a contingent was sent out to continue the work of demolishing the huts adjacent to the city. The Moors fired at our workmen from their entrenchments and we returned their fire.
On 16 October, an enemy spy who had been sent to find out if we still had ample stocks of food left with us was apprehended. He was interrogated and condemned. On 17 October he was beheaded.

The enemy had constructed a new battery from which they fired at the bastion of Saint Louis on 18 October. On 19 October, they were continuing to dig their entrenchments and advance their lines.

On 20 October, the captains of two native companies in our pay had a quarrel and had almost decided to settle the issue by fighting it out with their men when de la Haye managed to effect a conciliation. The enemy continued to advance their entrenchment towards the bastion of St. Louis. We tried to circumvent them by digging one on our side.

On 21 October the "Flamand" set out on its quest to procure food from the southern coasts.

On 23 October a skirmish took place in which two of our officers were wounded. A gunner named Gourdon deserted during the night of 23-24 October. He was a courageous man and it had been believed that he was completely loyal. He had been holding command over ten sailors in the temple. This despicable man took service under the Moors and embraced their religion. After this, he always took the lead when the Moors directed their batteries against us. His death is known to have taken place since those days under penurious circumstances.

On 24 October, the "Navarre" and the "Rubis" returned to port with provisions bought at Tranquebar. The frigate, the "Diligente", had been leaking very badly and had entered Porto Novo for repairs.

Leaving their camp on 27 October, the Moors attacked our men who were working at the outskirts. In the resulting skirmish, the Moors were forced back into their trenches after the loss of a few of their men.

The enemy worked night and day at their entrenchments which continued to advance. We also persevered in our countermeasures. On 31 October de la Haye received the news that 200 country troops had been raised at Porto Novo. A few
Portuguese and topas were included in this number. On the same day, he received a letter from Mondal Nayak, one of the enemy generals, who offered to come and join us with his army. This man was extremely inconsistent and had often changed sides during the Carnatic wars. De la Haye, who had been warned about the past record of Mondal Nayak, sent the reply that while the French would be willing to show him every reasonable consideration, Mondal Nayak would have to send his wife and children to San Thomé as security. The envoy who had brought the letter was greeted with a present. This affair had no further consequences and it looked as though Mondal Nayak had simulated this desire to join us only so that he could betray us at the proper time.

The Moors banked up a large house on which they hoped to raise a battery. They brought forward one of their trench-lines to enclose the building, and to judge from the way in which the fortifications were being planned, it appeared as though Europeans were involved in the process.

November 1672

On 3 November, de la Haye marched out to investigate the possibility of attacking this post. His men consisted of the troops normally deputed to these hazardous missions—his personal guards, the company of cadets, some volunteers, and two companies of soldiers. On advancing as close as possible to the enemy lines, he found these to be buttressed with strong embankments and breast works with fascines which were solidly bound together. There was a wide b...three to four feet high. Numerous loopholes could be seen. The entire work was impervious to cannon shot and was well flanked. De la Haye felt it would be imprudent to attack. There was a minor skirmish but nothing more was attempted for the time being.

THE ATTACK OF 5 NOVEMBER

As it was vital to drive the enemy from this post, it was decided that a general attack would be made. The necessary preparations were made on 4 November. Arms were examined, rockets...

These troops arrived at San Thomé in February 1673. B.N., N.A., 9352(58).
were tested, and orders were issued to the detachments. On the morning of 5 November de la Haye emerged with the veterans reserved for important engagements. Two companies of soldiers and 200 sailors were also included. The officers placed themselves at the head of their detachments and led the men to the points which were to be attacked. As soon as the signal was given, the enemy was attacked simultaneously from the front and the flank and it must be acknowledged that our men could not have conducted themselves with greater resolution. The enemy, numbering 2000 was well-protected in their entrenchments. The Moors put up a brave defence but were finally forced to yield. Our grenadiers particularly distinguished themselves in this attack. The officers and volunteers seeing the enemy thus engaged, were the first to cross the lines. The Moors fled to their main camp from which 500 cavalry emerged. The horsemen dismounted as they advanced towards us. When they had approached, de la Haye, who had rallied his men, marched at their head to meet the enemy. There was now a hand fight. In the beginning the enemy stood their ground very well, but finally they ceded and retired in disorder. The French followed in pursuit and in this retreat, which could well be called a flight, many of the enemy were killed. The sailors performed extremely well, thrusting at the fleeing enemy with their pikes and even with spades. The cannon fire from the city was also very well directed. As the enemy had been routed, the sailors and pioneers who had been brought busied themselves during the remaining part of the day in demolishing the entrenchments. De la Haye had as usual functioned both as a soldier and a general and the officers had also distinguished themselves. The day had been theirs because they had resisted the first onslaught of the enemy and had then struck home on noticing the confusion among their antagonists. Among the 200 men whom the enemy left behind on the field, some of their bravest soldiers could be counted. This was the most hotly contested action of the siege but we only sustained the loss of four men who were wounded. Immediately upon the return of the troops at seven o’clock in the evening, a thanksgiving mass was held in the Cathedral. We spent the 6, 7 and 8 November in demolishing the entrenchments which had come into our hands. The enemy aimed a few
cannon balls and musket shots at us. The Moors were disheartened and fired their fusillades from a distance not daring to come closer to us.

On 7 November, the "Flamand" returned and re-anchored at the roads. It had sailed up to Tranquebar from where a consignment of food had been brought. While returning, the "Flamand" had encountered a bark belonging to the English at Madras. The owners were sending this vessel to Ceylon with a cargo of food and haberdashery. A part of this consignment was pillaged by our men. I do not know the pretext found by the crew of the "Flamand" for indulging in this action. The interested parties in Madras complained but as they received no satisfaction, our relations with the English at Madras became even more embittered.25

They continued with their demolition work of 9 November. There was a small temple in the middle of the entrenchments. This was fortified and some men were placed inside it to prevent the Moors from attempting to retake it.

On 10 November, the small boat, the "Rubis", set sail for Porto Novo on the pretext of obtaining food from there. The captain who had been entrusted by de la Haye with packets for France, was, however, secretly instructed to make directly for France from Porto Novo. The reason why the destination was shrouded with secrecy in this way was because de la Haye did not wish anybody else to write to France. Leaving Porto Novo on 21 November, the "Rubis" was able to return to France safely.

During the days that followed, the demolition of the Moorish entrenchments continued without the enemy putting up any resistance. It was also ordered that no food was to be bought at a

25Langhorn had received news of the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1672. The Dutch, however, did not receive these reports until the end of the year. Langhorn was very circumspect in his behaviour both towards the French, to whom he rendered help as discreetly as possible, and towards the Dutch to whom he did not blazon forth the news of the rupture of relations between England and the Low Countries in Europe. The reason for the latter action was the Governor's desire to prevent hostilities with the Dutch until the English ships had left for the continent with the cargo of the Company. Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 51-3.
price higher than the stipulated one. This was a somewhat unreasonable restriction, in view of the current scarcity of food resulting from the Moorish hold on all the roads leading to San Thomé. Those who had taken risks to bring in food so long as it had been profitable to do so now desisted on finding it unremunerative. The other restrictions were more sensible. No arms were to be sold at Madras on pain of death. Several soldiers had engaged in this commerce and people connected with the stores were also accused of this practice. On 16 November, detachments were sent out not only to continue the task of demolition of enemy lines but also attempt a deeper inroad into enemy territory. A captain with thirty soldiers was stationed in a building to serve as an advance guard and stave off enemy attacks while the men were engaged in their task of demolition. When the soldiers asked this officer for permission to cut down some coconut trees with fruit on them close by he was compliant enough to agree. When the enemy saw our soldiers scattering, they descended on them in large numbers and pushing through them, the Moors made their way to the guard house in which only the captain with four soldiers were to be found. The captain defended himself bravely for a long time but on being wounded on the cheek by a pike, he would have been forced to give in but for the fact that de Rebrey, being informed about the plight of the captain, came to the latter’s rescue with forty men. The enemy was then pushed back to their base. The demolition work continued till seven o’clock in the evening when the men returned to the fort. The enemy lost fifty to sixty men in this encounter while our losses consisted of twelve to fifteen men who were wounded and seven, including three officers, who were dead. This loss was due to the indulgence of the captain in allowing his men to disperse themselves.

On 20 November, de la Haye wrote to the Directors in Surat giving a detailed description of San Thomé and stressing how important it was that the French should occupy this city. He requested the Directors to add to the vessels belonging to the Company at Surat those belonging to the Crown and use these to send reinforcements of munitions, provisions and money to San Thomé. The conservation of this place would be extremely profitable for the Company as the trade of one year alone would
serve to demonstrate. De la Haye also wrote to Baron inviting
the latter to set sail on ships which were being asked for, and
join the squadron at San Thomé.

It looked as though the weather would become squally. On
22 November a group of sailors who had come ashore were sent
back to the ships and the captains were instructed to make for
the open sea if the weather turned. They were, however, to
return and anchor before San Thomé as soon as it was possible
to do so. Attempts were made to drill some knowledge of mili¬
tary discipline into the native recruits in royal pay. Each was
provided with a red cap as a mark of distinction.

On 26 November the enemy attacked one of our redoubts on
the outskirts. They were repulsed with loss.

On 29 November they approached the temple which we had
fortified and garrisoned with ten men. Their cannonade was
heavy and their musket fire was also quite intense. Our men
returned the fire and their morale was fairly high. The
enemy surrounded the temple and established a kind of
blockade.

December 1672

De la Haye did not allow this to impede him from going to our
men with a detachment to provide some encouragement to
them. Food, powder and balls were conveyed to the men. He
went at night up to the entrenchment of the Moorish camp.
The camp was very quiet but de la Haye raised an alarm as he
was withdrawing by firing a discharge of musket shot.

On the night of 29-30 November, fifteen prisoners escaped
from the "Navarre" while a soldier and a sailor deserted from
the garrison. On 1 December, the Moors directed a brisk fire
at the city from their batteries. The same evening, a bark
charged with food and refreshments came in from Madras.

On 2 December the enemy advanced close to the temple and
from their formation, it appeared as though they intended to
launch an offensive. However, they retired without attempting
anything. While the work of demolition was being continued,
two envoys sent by General Baba Sahib from his camp appeared
in the city. They brought a present of fruit and remained
closed for a long time with de la Haye. One of them was sent
Catamarans—C Gold, Oriental Drawings
back to camp on 3 December. He returned on 4 December and both the envoys took their departure in the same evening. The 5, 6, 7 and 8 December were spent in putting the temple into a state of defense and pulling down the huts around it. This was not achieved without some skirmishes taking place. The enemy always lost some of their men in these while our losses totalled three sailors, who were wounded. One of our soldiers deserted on the night of 7-8 December. A notice was issued proscribing the sale of spirit or arrack by any person whatsoever.

On 9 December, the enemy made considerable progress towards Bastion Colbert and advanced their entrenchments close to the village of fisherfolk. De la Haye sent two small pieces of cannon to Fort Sans Peur which had been erected for the defense of this village. Although it rained every day, the Moors persevered in their work. We continued putting the temple into a proper state of defence on 10 December. On 11 December, an enemy soldier was captured. On interrogation about the conditions prevalent in their camp, he stated that there was shortage of food and that the men had not received any pay. Despite this, they had been ordered by the King of Golconda to continue the siege.

The officers of the “Navarre” made a representation to de la Haye about the unsatisfactory condition of their ship which was deteriorating day by day at the roads. There was, however, no means of improving the situation.

On 18 December packets were received from court. These informed us of the rupture which had taken place between France and Holland.

The attempt made by the Moors to take over a small redoubt on the northern side led to a hotly contested engagement on 15 December. The enemy lost five or six of their men, while on our side, a soldier who had received a wound died after four hours. On the same day, the enemy advanced their works towards the Porte Royale. They engaged in two major attacks, their targets being Porte Royale and Bastion Colbert. On 16 and 17 December, de la Haye came out as was his wont and inspected the enemy works to see if any enterprise could be undertaken. He was wounded by a musket ball which, after
piercing his buffskin gloves, his jerkin and shirt, made no further progress. Through good fortune or divine intercession he was able to escape with only a contusion.

**FOOD SUPPLIES ARE BROUGHT IN FROM MADRAS BY CATAMARANS**

It was during the night that catamarans would put in from Madras with consignments of food. On the night of 18-19 December, de la Haye came out as was his usual habit. He advanced right up to the base of the enemy entrenchments to see if any project would be undertaken. He found his adversaries sleeping in the trenches virtually shrouded in their loin-cloths. He did not however, consider it advisable to attack. On the same night three catamarans charged with pigs, poultry and other refreshments came in from Madras.

On 20 December, all the Portuguese at San Thomé were assembled together. De la Haye proposed that in view of their experience in this field, the Portuguese should bring in supplies of food from Madras. He assured them that they would be allowed a profit margin of cent per cent on this commerce. The latter promised to do whatever they could.

**THE FEAST OF SAINT THOMAS**

To celebrate the feast of Saint Thomas, a high mass was held on 21 December. De la Haye took part in it along with the chief officers and later he attended a dinner given for all Company servants by the Abbé Fertyer, nominated to the Cathedral parish. Towards the end of the meal, news was brought in that two horses had strayed into the region lying between the city walls and the enemy entrenchments. De Rebrey, believing that he could carry off these animals, rose precipitately from table. De la Haye feeling that de Rebrey was being too impetuous advised him not to do anything. De Rebrey brushed this aside and emerged at the head of ten men. The enemy had been lying in wait, anticipating just this reaction. After allowing de Rebrey to approach closer, they sprang on him with 200 men. Our men defended themselves to the best of their ability and managed to repulse the Moors. Being unable to carry back the two horses, they killed both these steeds but

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26 Sertier according to the Carré (*Carré*, II, p. 445).
several others remained to them. De Rebrey, however, was
pierced by a bullet on his right side below the ribs. A lieutenant
who had received a similar kind of injury on his shoulders
succumbed to his wound on the following day. The assistant
medical officer was wounded on the head and one of the guards
of de la Haye was killed. The body was left to the enemy who
heaped a hundred indignities on it.

On receiving news on 22 December that the enemy intended
to attack the temple, ten men were sent there to serve as
additional reinforcements. When the initial dressing had been
removed, de Rebrey’s wound was classified as an extremely
serious one. The grave condition of this officer, much respected
for his courage and integrity, cast a sense of gloom over the
entire garrison.

On 23 December, we received information from some private
merchants at Madras that they would be sending us a bark
loaded with food. They were giving out a false destination for
the ship which we were asked to intercept. After receiving this
advice at daybreak on 24 December, a small boat was sighted
on the northern side at the distance of a musket shot from
Bastion Dauphin. De la Haye came out with his guards and the
company of cadets to apprise himself of the situation. He sent
some men out by country craft to approach closer to the boat.
Four natives in the boat now plunged into the sea. They swam
ashore and sought refuge among a group of neighbouring
Moorish soldiers. At the same time, a large enemy platoon
appeared and took up its position near a small dip in the terrain.
They appeared poised ready to strike should our men make the
least advance. After ordering the seizure of the bark, de la Haye
withdrew, taking his men with him. On his return to the city,
our General received a letter from the Governor of Madras in
which the latter laid claim to the bark stating that it was an
English one anchored at the roads which had got cut off from its
moorings during the night. Although this explanation appeared
implausible, an immediate restitution of the bark was made.27
The Temple Incident (23 December 1672)

At noon on 23 December, the enemy, numbering more than 2,000 cavalry and infantry, emerged from their entrenchments to attack the temple. At the same time, others came up from the right and left-hand sides to prevent our soldiers from leaving the city. The attack was vigorous and the defence no less so. The eight men we had posted at the temple did everything which could be expected of brave and determined soldiers. They put the grenades, the fire-balls and the other pyrotechnic weapons at their disposal to good use. The Moors, who were under cover, opened a brisk cannonade on the city, but we were well served by our arms. De la Haye emerged from the city with some soldiers intending to help our men in the temple. When, however, he was told that in the neighbouring banana grove 2,000 of the enemy were to be found, crouched to the ground, sword in hand waiting to throw themselves on him, he gave up the idea, considering it too risky. Laroque, the chief steward of de la Haye and a brave man, offered to carry powder to our men as it was believed that their stocks were running low. He left the company with some large cartridge bags, but scarcely had he advanced thirty feet when he was slain. After three hours of resistance, the temple was taken by a general onslaught, our men having run out of all ammunition. Among the eight Frenchmen, a sailor named Ladmiral, afflicted with eight wounds of which three were considered fatal, succeeded in fighting his way through the enemy to the city. Of the remaining seven, two were killed on the spot. The remaining five who were wounded were relinquished by Baba Sahib into the hands of Mondal Nayak who had asked for them. This brute had them brought inside his tent where they were executed before his eyes.

Apart from the loss of these seven men and that of the chief steward of de la Haye, we had an officer and two soldiers who were wounded. The Moorish losses were estimated at more than 200 men killed and a much larger number disabled. Later, we could evoke on the part of the Qutbshahi authorities. Vide Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 49-51. On the whole, Langhorn managed to walk the tightrope linking the English to the French, the Qutbshahi's and the Dutch with considerable finesse.
came to know that the enemy had been sending in their agents from time to time to sell arrack and fish to our men at the temple. These spies reported on the small size of our post there and the negligent manner in which our men kept guard. It was this information which had drawn on us the enemy attack.

The enemy batteries continued to be directed against Porte Royale and bastions Colbert and Saint Louis. Four of our workmen were wounded while engaged in their duties on 26 December. It was on the same day that the "Flamand" set sail for Porto Novo.

FEARS OF A GENERAL ATTACK BY THE MOORS

On 28 December, the Moors constructed a new battery on the southern side. They opened fire at us from here on the same day keeping this up in the succeeding days also. The parapets of Porte Royale and Saint Louis were brought down but were restored as a result of the efforts of de la Have who could be found day and night either on the walls or at the works. We received information from Madras that strong reinforcements had reached the Moors who were now preparing for a general onslaught on San Thomé. There was little evidence that matters would come to such a head but the necessary precautions were taken. All the vulnerable points were strengthened. The officers and soldiers who were not on guard were ordered to bivouac at night and they were joined by the volunteers and the officers of the ships who happened to be on land. Each was in readiness to perform his duty. On the night of 31 December, the Moors fired a cannon ball and discharged their muskets into the air. This was believed to be the enemy signal and each of our men rushed to his appointed place. There was, however, no action on the part of the enemy whose main preoccupation appeared to be that of fortifying their camp and advancing their entrenchments closer to the city. Their workmen were engaged in the latter activity day and night without intermission.

January 1673

On 1, 2, 3 January, several catamarans arrived from Madras loaded with food. The Moors continued to thrust forward their entrenchments.
On 4 January, a position close to Bastion Colbert was opened. A secret sortie was to be made during which a house close by was to be burnt down. It was said that the enemy intended to open a mine here. On 6 January, the Moors were back at work at this spot again.

On 6 January, a detachment of twenty sailors under a captain and a lieutenant was sent out to demolish the house. De la Haye stood at the foot of the bastion with the troops usually used on such occasions to lend support to these men. Our soldiers delivered a vigorous onslaught on an enemy corps comprising nearly 200 men. At first, the latter had riposted by opening up a sharp fire, but being unable to withstand the drive, they had retreated to their main entrenchments. They left behind fifty-three men on the field. After razing the house to the ground, our men withdrew. De la Haye then had a ditch dug around Bastion Colbert and advanced a boyau in the direction of the enemy to provide us with cover in the progress which we were making towards them.

The condition of de Rebrey's wound was good and it was anticipated that it would heal.

On 8 January, a small Danish boat put in at the San Thomé roads charged with 150,000 pounds of white rice. De la Haye bought the entire consignment which was unloaded and placed in the store rooms.

Work was continued on 9 January on the entrenchments at Bastion Colbert and the Porte Royale which were protected by a counterscarpment.

On 10 January, the Moors suspended all work on the trenches and fired a number of cannon shots at Porte Royale. A brick pillar which had been erected on the parapet of the bastion on which the colours were flying was knocked down. We returned the enemy cannon fire. We continued to work at the moat which was to run at the base of Bastion Colbert and Porte Royale. On 10 January, the Moors fired two cannon balls which killed a soldier at Fort Sans Peur and a sailor at work on a bark. These were the only shots fired from their batteries on this day. Catamarans continued to come to us each night charged with refreshments from Madras.
On 13 January, a Moorish envoy arrived at San Thomé. After conferring with de la Haye for two hours he returned to his camp. On 14 January he came back but matters were not advanced any further. On the night of 14 and 15 January, the enemy flung fire-balls at a redoubt we had established close to their main entrenchments. I am now resuming my narrative at first hand.

First Contact Between de la Haye and François Martin (16 January 1673)

As I have already related, when we arrived at San Thomé on 16 January, we met de la Haye at the sea-shore. He had just finished going on his rounds. He welcomed us very warmly and took me home with him. I informed him about conditions at Masulipatam while acquainting him with the news of the court at Golconda. I also imparted the message entrusted to me by the Governor on behalf of Sayyid Muzaffar. Later I accompanied de la Haye on a tour of the walls when he was kind enough to point out the positions from which the enemy had advanced to attack and the places which had been cleared of their presence. The enemy had concentrated at two points. The first was at Porte Royale where extensive entrenchments erected by them were to be found within a range of 200 yards. The second was at Bastion Colbert where the distance separating us from the enemy was only that of a pistol shot. We were later provided with a house where we took up residence. During the ensuing days, I had the food which we had brought with us from Masulipatam conveyed to our lodging.

On the night of 16-17 January, the redoubt close to the major Moorish entrenchments, where we had hitherto maintained guards, was abandoned by us. During the night, several catar- marans arrived bringing us food from Madras.

The English at Madras had fallen out with the Moors as the latter had upbraided them for sending us food. The Governor

^In the letter dated 9 February 1673 written by de la Haye at San Thomé he complained that all the French efforts to secure a peace treaty had been negated by the Dutch who feared that any success on the part of the French would spell complete commercial stagnation for their nation. B.N., N.A., 9352 (58).
had even been forced to proscribe this practice for a time. The Moors had not, however, stopped complaining and had even seized some bullocks loaded with merchandise which were being sent to the English from the interior. The pretext they had given for this action was the help the English were extending towards us. The Governor now began to defy the Moors. He permitted the residents of Madras, to trade with us provided the goods were brought to us by catamaran. My report of the disagreements between the Governor of Madras and the Moors is based on the news which was brought to us. The English certainly profited from this trade as we paid very dearly for the food which they sent to us, but it is also true that in the absence of this source, our garrison would have been in great distress.

On 18 January, the enemy kept up a continuous cannonade at a redoubt held by us on the northern side. They made a breach which was large enough to permit three men to enter abreast. It was only a question of time before the enemy captured this position. De la Haye sent out a detachment of twenty men under an assistant medical officer to help the eighteen men we had at this redoubt to withdraw. The retreat to San Thomé was affected in an orderly manner.

On the night of 18-19 January, an attempt was made on the enemy entrenchments closest to us. A group of forty musketeers and grenadiers was to attack from one side while a contingent of infantry was to deal a blow from the other. The enemy sentinal and all their guards were found asleep. After attacking everyone they encountered, our forces retired in good order without sustaining the loss of a single man wounded or killed.

It is indeed remarkable that each time we had embarked on a nocturnal attack against an advanced enemy entrenchment, almost invariably we had found the enemy asleep. It must be remembered, however, that it was the practice among them for the officers and the regular troops to move into the fortified forward positions leaving only the workers, pioneers and a few soldiers in the trenchlines.

On 19 January, the Governor of Madras wrote to de la Haye that he had been informed that a squadron consisting of twenty
English ships and an equivalent number of French ones had left Europe and could be expected to arrive in India soon.\textsuperscript{29} It was known that the Moors were becoming weary at the prolonged nature of the seige at San Thomé which was involving them in fresh losses each day. This letter was believed to be a strategam devised by the English. They hoped that by holding up this prospect of the speedy arrival of reinforcements, we would be sufficiently encouraged not to treat with the Moors.\textsuperscript{30}

An eighteen pounder cannon exploded in Bastion Saint Louis killing one soldier and wounding two others. The side of the city wall facing the enemy was extremely weak in some parts and at a few places the cracks had even caused the wall to cave in. Repairs were carried out wherever necessary.

On 20 January, de la Haye wrote asking the Governor of Madras if it would be possible for the two of them to confer together and devise a policy against the Dutch, who were their common enemy. De la Haye would be willing to go to any venue suggested by the English for this purpose. We continued to receive supplies of food which were sent to us from Madras.

On 21 January, the enemy confined their activities to the storing of fascines in a small hut close to Bastion Colbert which had formed part of the larger house which we had demolished earlier. On the morning of 22 January, it was noted that the enemy were starting a new entrenchment using the fascines which had been brought and stored in the hut during the previous twenty-four hours. Some of our troops were now brought out and positioned at the works which had been constructed at the foot of Bastion Colbert. A contingent was

\textsuperscript{29}This information was not quite accurate. Because of the exigencies of the European war Colbert found it impossible to send reinforcements on the scale suggested here to de la Haye. (Kaeppelin, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 41-2). The English Company, however, sent out a squadron of ten ships which appeared on the Coromandel coast in June 1673 having taken its departure on 15th January 1673. Fawcett, \textit{E.F.}, II, p. 235; Bruce, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{30}As has been seen Langhorn was facing a very difficult situation and had to maintain a delicate balance in his relations with the French and the other powers. The French presence at San Thomé was certainly unpopular among the English and to that extent Langhorn may have wished hostilities between the French and the Qutbshahi forces at San Thomé to continue.
detached from these men and sent to set fire to the fascines and to the bundles of hay found intermingled with the fascines. Despite the strong cannonade and musketry fire kept up by the enemy, our men performed their task well and without any loss. On the same day a letter from the Governor of Madras was received in reply to the one written on 20 January. The Governor declared his inability to attend the meeting suggested by de la Haye on the excuse that he had to be very circumspect in his relations with the Moors. The latter would be certain to take offence if they found the Governor in open communication with us. Some of us felt this to be a specious excuse but it is certainly true that any severance in the relations between the English and the King of Golconda would have grievous repercussions on the trade of their Company.

Upon receiving information at ten o'clock at night that the enemy was at work on the entrenchments near Bastion Colbert de la Haye came out of the postern with some of his guards. Leaving these men at the foot of the bastion, he advanced alone towards the enemy. I followed him even though he had forbidden me to do so. He climbed on top of one of the entrenchments and for the duration of a miserere\(^*\) he looked at the seven or eight men who lay stretched out on the ground fast asleep enveloped in their strips of cloth which also serve to clothe them.

After this, de la Haye retired. The capacity of these men to be able to lose themselves so tranquilly in sleep when they are in such close proximity to their enemies cannot but evoke admiration.

On 24, 25, and 26 January, the enemy continued to improve their lines and build up parapets to protect themselves against cannonades. The material which was used was a mixture of clay and straw which when hardened by air, became, with the passage of time, as strong as stone.

In the night of 26-27 January, six English ships put in at Madras from Bengal. We had seen these at Masulipatam prior to our departure for San Thomé, but they had then numbered seven. After a few days, the seventh vessel also arrived.

\(^*\)For the duration of the recitation of the fiftieth Psalm.
View of Madras—Thomas and William Daniell, *Oriental Scenery*
François Martin is sent on a mission to the Governor of Madras (27-29 January)

On 27 January, de la Haye sent me with a letter of greeting to the Governor of Madras. I was to represent to the English Governor that with the arrival of their ships it would be easier to hold the meeting suggested by de la Haye, who could present himself on board any vessel which the Governor chose to name. De la Haye asked me to stress the importance of the two leaders meeting to confer and devise a common policy against the Dutch. This would further the interests of both our monarchs also. I was further charged to gauge the English attitude towards us and find out if the officers of these ships would sell us powder, matches, and bullets. I was also to compliment the captains on the completion of their voyage to Bengal. I got into a chelingue and boarded the Admiral's boat in the evening. I wrote to the Governor from here asking for permission to disembark so that I could greet him in person and hand over the letter which I was carrying for him from de la Haye. I spent the night on board the ship.

On 28 January, I received the reply of the Governor. He declared that although he was very anxious to see me, he still had to consider the repercussions this would have on the Moors. He was convening his Council to decide if I should be allowed to land, and indeed, I would myself be incurring some risk if I decided to do so. While awaiting the Governor's reply, I talked with the officers who came on board to find out if they could let us have powder, matches, and munition. One of the captains promised to convene his colleagues and discuss what could be done under the present circumstances for they would need to conserve some of their ammunition for their own return to Europe. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the commanding officer of the fleet, accompanied by a member of the Madras Council, Sieur William, came to the ship with a letter from the Governor. The decision as to whether I was to disembark or not was left entirely to me. We then set down to dinner as the captain was unwilling to let me go without this repast. The conversation turned on current topics during which Sieur William who had become a little high, could not restrain himself
from complaining at our seizure of the “Rubis” belonging to the Englishman Jearsey and to the looting of this bark by the crew of the “Flamand”. William had himself been interested in the “Rubis” to the extent of 80 to 100 pagodas. I tried to excuse these two actions as best as I could, but my arguments failed to satisfy the interested parties. After this, I descended and the Governor who was at the shore gave me a very friendly reception. We entered the fort and had a discussion for two hours on the points which de la Haye had asked me to represent to the Governor. The Governor said that he could not agree to the idea of the conference as suggested by de la Haye for the Moors would get to know about it and the interests of the Company would suffer as a result. The English found themselves now more than ever before forced to be careful in their dealings with the Moors. Facing the prospect of Dutch attacks on the seaward front, the only way in which they could preserve their position was by maintaining friendly relations with the local people. To this I replied that if the French and the English co-operated as closely in India as they were doing in Europe, they would be sufficiently strong to deal with any enemy. The Governor refused to be swayed by this argument. He promised to give every assistance, as he had been doing in the past, provided this did attract any punitive action from the Moors. He refused to commit himself to an alliance against the Dutch, nor could I obtain any other pledge from him. With regard to the munitions which we wished to buy, he said that as this involved the officers of the ships, he would consult them about it.

The Governor called for the Capuchin priests, Reverend Fathers Ephraim and Zenon, with whom I had a talk. The two priests were somewhat unpopular with de la Haye as they had not come to see him after the capture of San Thomé. The Reverend Fathers had their own reasons for this. They believed that they were bound by reasons of charity not to abandon the Madras Mission which they had set up by their own efforts.

Father Zenon was a native of Bauge. He had accompanied Father Zenon to Madras in 1642 and had died there in 1687. Manucci, op. cit., II, p. 297, III, p. 429.
If they had entered into open relations with de la Haye, they would have become suspect in the eyes of the Moors and the English. They were constrained to be prudent and had judged it more politic to approach de la Haye by means of letters. They had incorporated all the information at their disposal in the correspondence which they had opened with the General. Those who thought ill of the conduct of the Fathers were doing them an injustice. They had always been loyal Frenchmen and had extended us as much help as had lain within their power.

After these talks which had lasted a long time, the Governor insisted that I should stay for supper. The sound of a big cannonade from San Thomé interrupted him and I took this opportunity to take my leave. After further conversation on the same topics, I embarked at midnight. The Governor entrusted me with his reply for de la Haye and when the time came for me to take my leave, he tried to convince me of his warm feelings towards us.

I returned to San Thomé on 29 January and reported on the outcome of my negotiations to de la Haye. From what I had seen of the English, they had appeared very aloof. They were not at all pleased at our establishing ourselves at such close proximity to them.

This is the reason for the firing which had taken place during the night. There was an open area in front of Porte Royale which was used as a market place by us. On the night of 27/28 January, the enemy had enclosed the entire area by a new line of entrenchments. This would provide cover to a large number of their troops and enable them to advance their lines. De la Haye was determined to dislodge the enemy from here.

On 28 January, he had the entire Porte Royale bricked up leaving only a small wicket-gate for the purposes of entry and exit. During the rest of the day, the troops who had been chosen for the attack were prepared for their task. While the enemy was engaged in a light skirmish in which we lost a guard, our troops marched out at eight o’clock in the evening. Our men attacked in their customary manner and took an entrenchment from which they removed the fascines. This task engaged our men right through the night. During this time, the Moors kept up a brisk fire from their side which we returned.
We did not have a single person killed or wounded in this engagement with the exception of a soldier, who, thinking himself to be outside the enemy range, had exposed himself on the walls and had been carried away by an enemy cannon ball. Our contingent returned at dawn to the city. De la Haye, followed by the officers, went straight to the Cathedral to offer thanks to God for their success. The next day it was learnt that this action had cost the Moors more than one hundred men killed and several who had been wounded.

On 30 January, we learnt from Madras that Rijkloff Van Goens was engaged in equipping a squadron at Ceylon. Lacking the necessary number of soldiers he was pressing men belonging to the commercial cadre into service. We were also informed that a French ship had been to Point Galle. This was the hooker which had sailed for Surat in November. The ship did not have any consignment of merchandise but was carrying the personal effects of Caron including a part of his silver table service. Although it was believed to have been quite unnecessary, the captain of the ship in association with the lieutenant and another passenger who had once held command in one of the most important ships of the Company, had decided, of their own accord, to put in at Point Galle for water and refreshment. We cannot say for certain what transpired between the officers of this ship and the local Dutch commander, but several of the sailors on the hooker have deposed that our men acted in intelligence with the Dutch authorities. To cut short this story our hooker was seized. The officers incurred no losses them-

28From 1670 to 1675, the Dutch were engaged in a bitter contest with King Rajasimha II for the control of the Ceylon trade. This had involved them not only in conflicts on land but had also led them to attempt to blockade of all the ports of the island. During these hostilities, the Dutch were successful, on the whole, in the north-eastern part of the island. Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, 1965. pp, 116-18. Any involvement in the affairs of San Thomé, therefore, placed a considerable strain on the resources available to the Dutch, which explains their inaction at the time of the fall of San Thomé, and also to their employment of civilians to man the fleet to which Martin makes a reference here.

29M. Herpin, formerly captain of the "St. Jean Baptiste". He was sailing to Surat from where he was to go by the overland route to France. He was carrying important packets to Court. Carré, II, p. 458.
selves but it is averred that the personal effects of Caron,\textsuperscript{36} which were quite considerable, and his silver table service, were divided between the three groups. The officers were treated well and were even sent back to Surat by the Dutch on board one of their ships.

De la Haye sent an envoy to the Moorish camp to ask General Baba Sahib if he had received any response from Golconda to the letters the General had claimed to have written on the subject of the proposed treaty. The General had replied that the express messenger whom he had sent had not yet returned. On 31 January, the Company ketch sailed to Porto Novo to take on a cargo of provisions.

**February 1673**

**ENGLISH REFUSAL TO SELL US MUNITIONS OF WAR**

On 1 February, I was sent to the English ships to find out if the captains had come to a final decision with regard to supplying us with war munitions. I met four officers on board the Admiral’s boat who appeared to me to be very distant. They informed me that in view of their current hostile relations with the Dutch they could not afford to give us any of their powder or bullets. I had been told that they had munitions to spare and urged them to try and accommodate us. One of the captains finally opened himself to me and said that although they had every inclination to help us, they did not find a similar disposition on the part of de la Haye. The pretext on which our General had the vessel of the Englishman, Jearsey, seized, was completely novel in view of the customs prevailing in India. If we agreed to make a complete restitution of the ship, they would undertake to supply us with one hundred barrels of powder and as much of the other munitions as they could. I tried to convince them about the legality of the prize, but they refused to budge. De la Haye had discoursed on the same subjects as I had been charged to raise in my discussions in a letter which he had written to

\textsuperscript{36} Carré (Carré loc. cit.) states that for reasons which were not very clear Caron had preferred to despatch his silver to his son Balthazar whom he had left behind at Surat, rather than take it with him or the “Jule”.
the Governor of Madras. In forwarding this letter to the Governor, I also enclosed one written by myself. In his reply to me, the Governor confirmed in writing what had been already conveyed to me orally. He declared that he had to be extremely cautious in his dealings with the Moors in order to preserve the commercial interests of the English Company. He could not afford any rupture in his relations with them. The same night I received orders to return immediately to San Thomé as Baba Sahib had obtained orders to open negotiations. De la Haye wished me to conduct these negotiations. I left immediately by the same chelingue which had brought me the letter. I left a clerk on board an English ship with the money which I had brought with me, just in case the captains changed their minds about selling us the munitions. I arrived at San Thomé at three o’clock in the morning and informed de la Haye of my activities.

First Round of Negotiations with Baba Sahib, The Moorish General

De la Haye had proposed to Baba Sahib that while negotiations were in progress, neither side should indulge in any activity and everything should remain at the present level. Baba Sahib had agreed, but in spite of this, it was known that the enemy was continuing to advance its frontlines, or to be more exact, that there had been no cessation to its activity. De la Haye felt it was necessary to lodge a protest at this breaking of the agreement and sent a native who had visited the Moorish camp several times, to point this out to Baba Sahib. Baba Sahib acknowledged the justice of our complaints, but declared he had no other course open to him as he wished to hide his intention of treating with us from the other Generals. He also tried to minimise the importance of the works. De la Haye refused to be hoodwinked and determined to send a French

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**Initially, the Qutbshahi generals had agreed to initiate negotiations only as a ruse to gain time. Baba Sahib’s attitude, however, underwent a change. If a peace treaty were to be signed, not only would he make personal gains but the credit for the pacification would redound to his reputation since it was he who was in supreme command. Ibid. II, pp 477, 479.**
emissary to emphasize the same complaints. I offered my services to de la Haye but he preferred not to utilize them, wishing to keep me in reserve for the conduct of the actual negotiations for peace. Seiur Deltor, who had been the second at Masulipatam, was sent with the same native. Baba Sahib received Deltor cordially with many kind words. He said he would issue positive orders that all work in progress should cease at once. He added that he expected within the next two or three days to receive the final authorization from court with regard to the negotiations. Deltor was then presented with a loin-cloth brocaded in gold and silk such as is commonly worn in the country, and sent back. He returned to San Thomé at four o’clock in the morning and gave in his report. Baba Sahib’s promise that all work would be stayed was ill-observed in practice, for the next night itself they began to construct a new trench on the Bastion Colbert side. De la Haye showed them that they could not defy us in this way with impunity. At nine o’clock at night, our men made a sortie into their lines. They attacked whomever they encountered and then returned to their base. The enemy lost fifteen to twenty of their men. We had four men wounded by arrows, while a servant of de la Haye had his throat completely slashed.

On 5 February, the “Flamand” put in from Porto Novo. It brought in 200 native soldiers who had embarked there, and food, munitions and various tools necessary for the construction of earth works.

From Pulicat we received the news that the Dutch had publicly proclaimed that they were at war with us and the English. They had fasted and had prayed that God should confer on them a return to peace. In the past when they had been at war

*Baba Sahib may have been sincere in this belief. Carré, (Ibid., p. 480), states that there was a strong party at court in favour of peace but it could do nothing in the face of the opposition on the “Nawab” (wrongly identified both by Carré and Fawcett). Among the three Qutbshahi commanders, Baba Sahib’s attitude appeared to bear an affinity to that of Sayyid Muzaffar, while Mondal Nayak and Trimbak Bussora Raju supported Musa Khan who had succeeded Neknam Khan as Qutbshahi Governor of the Carnatic. Musa Khan, as a rival of Sayyid Muzaffar, was bitterly opposed to any idea of accommodation with the French.
with the English they had prayed for victory against their enemies, but now they had changed their tune. They commenced hostilities against the English by siezing three of their barks loaded with Company merchandise which were on their way from Masulipatam to Madras.\(^\text{38}\)

On 6 February, an envoy from Baba Sahib came to confer with de la Haye. After discussions lasting for two hours, the emissary was sent back. The success of the negotiations now hinged on the present demanded by Baba Sahib. The secretary of the latter came back on 7 February but the talks still proved inconclusive. On the same day, we received packets from France via Madras but these had been written some time ago.

The lascars who had arrived from Porto Novo were reviewed. They were positioned at a fortified redoubt close to the city.

On 8 February, the clerk I had left on the English ship returned with only twenty-five balls, which we had bought. De la Haye was extremely annoyed at this. Such a small purchase would give the impression that we were prepared to scrounge for ammunition. The English would conclude that our stocks were running out and this would certainly be conveyed to the enemy. De la Haye, therefore, had the bullets returned. Some of the officers at the garrison had commissioned the clerk to buy a few cases of wine for them at Madras. The clerk had accordingly purchased twenty-six small cases. This consignment was stopped at the city gates as it was being brought in. When de la Haye was informed about this, he had all the cases broken on the spot.

De la Haye spent the day of 8 February in preparing his despatches to be sent to court by the English ships. I had the honour of writing to Monsieur Colbert and the General Assembly in Paris. The packets were entrusted to Sieur Cavois, a

\(^{38}\)\text{When the English ships which arrived at Madras on 16 January had set sail from Masulipatam on 14 January 1673, it had not been possible to load the entire cargo on them. The English agents at Masulipatam had arranged to send the consignment at a later date to Madras on seven barks. These had sailed for Madras from Masulipatam on 21 January in sets of three and four respectively. It is to the Dutch seizure of one of these sets that Martin made a reference. Fawcett, \textit{E.F.}, II, pp. 55, 233-34.}
Assembly Hall of the French East India Company, Paris
—Courtesy Musee de la Marine, Paris
Protestant captain who was being sent back to France. He had been wounded and as his injury was not healing properly at San Thomé, it was hoped that his progress would be more satisfactory in Europe. He embarked on the ship on 9 February and the boat sailed on the same day. There were seven Englishmen also returning to Europe by the same boat.

On the same day, we sent our usual envoy to the Moorish camp. The Moors had constructed a new battery before Porte Royale and were keeping up a brisk fire from it. Our man returned on the following day. Baba Sahib had sent a message asking for twelve days time within which he expected to receive final orders from Golconda. He promised to cease all military activity during this period. Despite this undertaking the enemy lines continued to advance.

On 12 February, de la Haye came out of the city with his guards and repulsed about one hundred of the enemy who had emerged from their entrenchments. The latter retreated at the first discharge.

On 13 February, we received letters from Surat which informed us about the extraordinary victories which His Majesty had achieved at the expense of the Dutch. We went to the Cathedral to thank God for all these fine victories, and to ask Him to extend His protection over our monarch. We cannot describe with how much joy the garrison greeted the news of this important accomplishment.

On 14 February, de la Haye sent packets to Surat via Madras. He enclosed duplicates of the letters he had sent to Paris on the English ships.

AN ENVOY OF THE KING OF KANDY AT SAN ThOME

An envoy of the King of Kandy arrived at San Thomé. He had been asked to inform himself about the state of our squadron as the Dutch had spread the rumour in Ceylon that they had succeeded in capturing a few of our vessels and in sinking the rest. The emissary from Ceylon assured us that our envoys at court were well and held in high esteem by the King. The only reason why they had not written to us was because the king had felt it was better to keep back the news of the despatch of the
emissary from them. That the King should have considered it necessary to take such a precaution reflected unfavourably on the position enjoyed by our envoys.

While returning from Porto Novo, the “Flamand” had encountered a Bengal bark laden with rice which had been captured by the Danes. Our captain had stopped this boat. He had placed his lieutenant on it with orders to proceed to San Thomé. It had arrived on 14 February and its cargo was unloaded on the following day. In order to satisfy the Danish Governor at Tranquebar as to the value of the contents of the prize, an inventory was drawn up in the presence of a Danish officer.

On 16 February, our usual envoy was sent to the Moorish camp with a proposition. In order to ensure that neither side engaged in any military constructions, hostages should be exchanged until the orders from the court had been received. The Moorish General refused to accept this proposal. He sent back our man with the reply that since he was a man of honour he would certainly abide by his plighted word. They fired twice at the city from the Moorish camp but with blank cannon balls. We returned the fire in the same way. The assurances which were given did not prevent the Moors from continuing their work. On the night of 16-17 February, they brought a part of the old site of the market place within their line of entrenchments.

On 18 February, the envoy of the King of Kandy embarked on a vessel sailing to Porto Novo. He had to make some purchases there before returning to Ceylon. De la Haye wrote to the King and to the French envoys at the court.

*After the Danish East India Company had established itself at Tranquebar, it had participated in the trade of Bengal but had found the Government unwilling, after its experiences with the Portuguese, to offer the Europeans any foothold in the interior of Bengal. The Company was, however, allowed to establish a counter at Balasore in 1636, from where it could carry on its trade in this region. Between 1640 to 1674, the Danes were involved in hostilities with the local government largely on the issue of trade facilities to be accorded to the Company. Bowry, op. cit., pp. 162-63 n. 183, 189; S. Ghosh, Archives in India, p. 63; C. Stewart, History of Bengal, Calcutta, 1903, pp. 275-76.
On 19 February, the Company ketch returned with food and munitions acquired at Porto Novo and Pondicherry. In the evening a group of enemy soldiers left their trenches and came to cut wood close to the city. De la Haye drove them away with his guards and forced them back to their entrenchments. We received a message from Madras that the Dutch were giving out that they had captured Caron. We discountenanced the rumour.

The wound of de Rebrey had healed almost completely and on 19 February he went to the Cathedral to render thanks for his recovery. The cannonade of the enemy killed a surgeon and wounded three sailors in the city. In the evening, work was started on a boyau which was to connect Porte Royale to Bastion Colbert. It was intended that communications between these two points would be protected by it. On 20 February, a spy who had returned to us from the enemy camp informed us that the Moors had started a mining operation. We received this information with reservations as we could not find any supporting evidence for it. At night we continued our work on the lines which we had opened.

The officers of the ships made a representation to de la Haye on the defective condition of the ships and the necessity of sending them away for repairs to some other port.

**Capture of a Small Moorish Ship**

On 21 February, a small ship was seen sailing towards the south. The captain of the “Navarre” was ordered to reconnoitre this ship. This officer sent out two well-armed launches which brought the boat into the harbour. De la Haye sent his secretary to find out further details about the vessel. It was learnt that the vessel belonged to Moorish merchants and was sailing from Bengal to Porto Novo with choice merchandise. It is not uncommon in India for native craft not to be provided with any commission during their voyages but passports are generally issued to them by the European Companies. This vessel, however, had neither a commission, a letter nor a passport. Among the passengers were seven Portuguese and one Englishman. They were to have disembarked at Madras but the captain had
refused to stop there. De la Haye now sent the Commissary to make a report on the cargo and disembark the captain and the passengers from the ship. This was done and after a little while the captain was interrogated. As he was found to contradict himself on several issues, he was placed under arrest in the adjutant's quarters. The passengers dined at the table of de la Haye.

On 22 February, the Commissary was sent back to the ship seized the previous day to have the rudder removed, the sails dismantled and the crew disarmed. All this was done. The arms which were brought back consisted only of swords and bows and arrows. The captain was questioned again and he now declared that the ship belonged to Sher Khan Lodi, a friend of our nation about whom I have already made mention. De la Haye wrote to Pondicherry and Porto Novo for further corroboration.

THE CRITICAL SITUATION AT SAN THOME—THE NOCTURNAL SORTIE OF 23 FEBRUARY

The captains of the ships came ashore to discuss the representation which they had made on 20 February. A meeting of the Council was convened at which all the officers were present. De Rebrey, the Commissary and I also attended. De la Haye declared that if the ships were to proceed elsewhere for repairs, some of the men serving at the garrison would have to be withdrawn. He emphasized the danger of weakening our position at a time when the enemy was at a distance of only one hundred feet and was advancing closer each day. At this juncture, the primary consideration was that of repulsing the Moors. It was only after this had been accomplished, that the repair of the ships could be taken up. These judicious arguments of de la Haye could not be countered in any way and were accepted. It was decided that a massive night attack would be launched against the principal enemy battery which was causing us considerable hardship. One cannon of this battery was particularly effective and had its balls been of iron rather than stone, each one would have weighed 140 pounds. The captains were instructed to disembark their crews and the sailors alighted on the shore at dusk.
We received letters from Malfosse whom I had left behind in Masulipatam. He told us that the Dutch were trying very hard to prevent the Golconda court from entering into peace negotiations with us even offering to lend a squadron of several ships to chase us from San Thomé. So confident were the Dutch of seizing San Thomé from us that they had already decided on the places where de la Haye would be displayed in India as the biggest trophy of their victory. The English at Madras greeted the news which they had received of the debasement of the Dutch in Europe by firing several discharges from their cannon and muskets.

Apart from the expiry of the time limit for which Baba Sahib had asked, the decision to embark on the sortie had been taken because we could see very well that the Moors had not discontinued the advance of their works in the least. At two o'clock in the afternoon the more experienced among our lascars, as our native soldiers are called, were stationed at the entrenchments which had been made at the foot of Bastion Colbert, while the newer recruits were placed in those in front of Porte Royale. At dusk, the gates of the city were shut and the soldiers within were placed under arms. De la Haye drew up the detachments which were to attack. A lieutenant with fifteen men was placed at the head. The chances of these men returning alive were remote. They were to be supported by an infantry captain, thirty musketeers, and the more experienced of the lascars who had been recalled to the city. Some of the newer recruits among the lascars were also joined to this contingent. As the men got ready to march out of the city, a Protestant captain with thirty men was ordered to bring up the rear. Further reinforcements were provided by four naval captains who were each accompanied by fifty sailors. Volunteers were to be found scattered among the detachment. De la Haye, with the members of his household and a portion of the company of cadets, were the last members to bring up this force. Before leaving the city which was to be held by de Rebrey, it was agreed that at a prearranged signal, two false alarms would be sounded so that the men in the trenches at Porte Royale and Bastion Colbert could create a diversion.
After all these details had been arranged, our troops left the city at midnight. The troops who were to spearhead the attack and those who were to give them support advanced towards the enemy. The men whom we had deputed to ward off attacks launched by the enemy from any point in their entrenchments took up suitable positions. A brave soldier, a carpenter by profession, named Monsieur Pierre, was placed at the head of fifteen men with orders to burst or spike the cannon after the capture of the master battery. At the pre-arranged signal, the false alarms were sounded. While de la Haye led the first detachments himself, the officers and soldiers attacked with the same vigour as they had demonstrated in so many previous encounters. At first, the enemy stood firm but was finally forced to yield ground. Our men climbed over the earth works, plunged through the lines and took the master battery situated at the rear of their camp. While the carpenter, Pierre, spiked the cannon, a detachment advanced to cut off reinforcements should the enemy decide to send any. The only cannon left unspiked was the large one which I have already mentioned. Because of its efficacy, the native called it the “Arrow of Ram”, Ram being the name of one of their Gods. This piece was crammed to the brim with bullets and cannon balls and then set alight. The noise with which the cannon burst cannot be conceived. The disturbance in the atmosphere persisted for some time, and pieces lay scattered over a distance of a quarter of a league. The enemy, taken aback by this unforeseen attack, set up a great commotion in their camps. They fired briskly from their remaining batteries accompanying this by musketry fire. They threw fireworks from their trenches to test if we were making any advance. However, they went no further than this.

After seizing the master battery, it had been de la Haye’s intention to advance further and attack the enemy through a gap in the rear where the two lines of entrenchments converging at this point had not been joined. He hoped then to be able to push on to the main camp of the enemy. He was unable to accomplish this on account of the disorder which broke out among the newer recruits among our lascars. These men, not

*Maitresse batterie* in the text.
yet accustomed to battle, performed their role in such an indifferent manner that several of them were mistaken for the enemy and shot by our men. This prevented us from proceeding further and our men began to withdraw. They returned to the city on 23 February at four o'clock in the morning. The Moors lost more than one hundred men in this offensive. We lost a sergeant, a good soldier. It was suspected that his death had been caused by our own men. A grenade which had burst prematurely in his hand carried off the arm of a grenadier and four soldiers sustained light injuries. Apart from this, eight or nine of our new lascars had been killed by mistake and five or six more had been wounded. After their return, a thanksgiving mass was held at the Cathedral.

**Fresh Negotiations with Baba Sahib**

De la Haye sent our usual emissary to Baba Sahib. Our man was to inform our adversary that we had been impelled to take action the previous night because of the failure of the latter to keep his word. We wished to demonstrate to Baba Sahib that it was he who had more to gain by treating with us inasmuch as we had succeeded in destroying his master battery situated right at the back of the entrenchments. It would have been easy for us to push on from here to the General's quarters, but we had desisted out of consideration for him. This would be the last time that de la Haye would send an envoy to find out if Baba Sahib had received the authorization to start negotiations. The French commander would not tolerate any further postponement and would consider himself absolved from his commitment if peace parleys were not immediately initiated and if Baba Sahib did not put a stop to all military constructions at once. Our envoy returned on 24 February. Baba Sahib had conveyed his strong protests at what he termed as our perfidious action of the previous night. Despite this, he was still ready to start negotiations provided de la Haye laid down the terms. The Moors fired eight cannon balls from the battery which had been seized by us the previous night. They appeared to have succeeded in unspiking the cannon.\(^41\)

\(^{41}\) De la Haye had been forced to content himself with the spiking of these guns as he lacked the necessary means to bring these away. *Carré*, op. cit. II, p. 494.
Since the past eight days, de la Haye had been receiving reports that a French squadron had arrived at Cape Comorin and Ceylon. The Governor of Madras wrote to confirm this news but we continued to be sceptical. At nine o’clock in the evening, ten or twelve grenades were thrown into the enemy entrenchment. This caused an alarm in the entire camp but there were no other consequences.

On 25 February, our usual envoy was sent to the Moorish camp with our conditions for peace couched in Portuguese and the country language. The most important article was that the French should be given outright possession of San Thomé and its dependencies, that a present of 3,000 pagodas would be given to Baba Sahib, and an annual rent of five hundred pagodas would be paid to the King of Golconda.

On 26 February, the Moors fired some empty shots from their batteries which we returned from our side. Notwithstanding this, they continued their military works while we carried on with ours on the connecting boyau.

On 27 February, a small Portuguese ship anchored at the roads. It had stopped at Porto Novo from where it had picked up rice and refreshments for us as also forty native soldiers who had been raised there. The captain descended and came to greet de la Haye who ordered the cargo to be unloaded.

Our envoy returned from the Moorish camp. Baba Sahib had made several demands which he knew very well we would be unable to grant him. The crux of the matter was that we should secretly give him a much larger present than that which we had openly declared.

March 1673

On 1 March, the Company ketch, the “Postillon”, set sail for Porto Novo where it was to take on a consignment of food. When the captain of the Portuguese ship which arrived on 27 February came to take his leave, de la Haye presented him with a watch in a golden box. The captain was proceeding to Madras where his ship was to be loaded after which he was to proceed to Manilla. He left San Thomé on 2 March.

On 3 March, an alarm was raised in the Moorish camp as some grenades had been thrown into their trenches. On 4
March, a bark which had been loaded with several kinds of refreshments arrived from Madras.

An enemy group which was attempting to advance towards the city was forced back to the trenches by our cannon fire. After a general revue of the troops on 5 March, de la Haye reconnoitred enemy positions in our immediate vicinity. He spent almost three hours in doing this, going around and scrutinizing enemy posts to assess which were the strong and which the weak ones. He was doing this because he was seriously contemplating another attack. During this period, several shots were fired at him.

On 6 March, we received a letter from Sher Khan Lodi in which he laid claim to the vessel which we had seized on 21 February. De la Haye immediately ordered the captain to be found. The Commissary was directed to conduct the captain back to the ship taking care to restore everything that had been removed. On 7 March the ship set sail and continued on its route.

**De la Haye Prepares for a Decisive Action Against the Moors—The Attack of 9 March**

The weapons from the ships were disembarked on 8 March. The native recruits were drilled to prepare them for the decisive assault. De la Haye had told me the previous day that it was essential for us to profit from the advantage which we had gained while the enemy was still stunned by our seizure of their battery. They had indeed, been very quiet since then and appeared to be considering a retreat rather than a continuation of the siege. Our men were eager to perform their duty and their faith in the military capacity of their General gave a further fillip to their ardour. Several of the spies whom we sent to the enemy camp agreed that the Moors no longer wished to pursue their previous objective. There were quite a few deserters among them and unless strong reinforcements reached them from Golconda, they would be unable to hold out for very long. It was obviously in our interest to take advantage of these factors. De la Haye intended to do so, but in truth we were also helped by the play of chance.
On Thursday, 9 March, three or four donkeys which belonged to our lascars ambled away towards the enemy lines. Some of the Moors emerged from their trenches to seize the animals. When our men saw this, they ran to rescue their beasts. Both parties received reinforcements and in the ensuing skirmish, the advantage rested sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. The struggle intensified when all our native troops and a few Frenchmen joined in the fray while the Moors reinforced their men in the same way. The conflict lasted a long time and the battlefield resembled the breakers of the sea, sometimes advancing and sometimes receding. De la Haye surveyed the scene from a vantage point along the walls, and after three or four hours, he gave the signal for a general attack. With the exception of the guards who had returned the same morning, and those who refused to get involved in the conflict, all the inmates made an exit through the postern at Bastion Colbert. Among those who went out there was not one who had not resolved to fight well and who was not burning with the desire to attack. De la Haye took note of the alignment of the enemy. The trench nearest to us was bristling with pikes and halberds and all the others presented the same appearance. They were making a good show with their musketry but their cannonade was weak and ineffective. This posture of the enemy caused de la Haye to pause and wonder if we would be able to carry our adversaries before us. Numerically they were far superior to us, sheltered as they were behind their strong entrenchments, into which we would have to clamber before we could engage them in a hand-to-hand combat. While we could always take advantage of a subsequent opportunity to attack when we found our enemy less well prepared, the present occasion was decisive. Any failure on our part would encourage our adversaries a great deal.

All these considerations made our General decide to return to the city. The order to withdraw had already been given to the major when four grenadiers were commanded to test the enemy by throwing grenades into the nearest entrenchment. The grenadiers

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4 Carré, (Carré, pp. 497-98) makes particular mention of a native convert called Manique (Manik?) who was the captain of the lascars.
proceeded with the utmost expedition. They climbed the trench and although they could scarcely keep themselves upright because of steepness of the slope, they accomplished their task as successfully as could be anticipated. There was a loud noise followed by a considerable agitation of pikes and halberds indicative of the confusion caused by the explosion. De la Haye felt that the time had come and gave the order to attack. Each man acted with all the agility and bravery with which he had been bestowed. The enemy succeeded in rallying together and resisted for quite a long time. Our men were able to engage the enemy at close quarters. When finally, the most indefatigable of our soldiers cleared a ditch surrounding the enemy entrenchments, their resistance crumbled and they took to flight. Our men pursued them without giving them time to reform. Our foes had expected support from the second line, but the men from there had been withdrawn after the discomfiture of those on the first line. De la Haye, who was bringing up the rear of these troops with a corps of regular soldiers to give support in case of any set-back, now advanced. He did not feel it wise to penetrate beyond the third line even though this was the last defense of the enemy. The enemy had set up two additional positions here. One was a large house close by which had been embanked, and the second was a temple which flanked the entrenchment. The most substantial part of the enemy forces had been placed at these two stations and there was considerable risk in attempting any further advance.

This made de la Haye decide to stop where he was. He stationed an officer with twenty soldiers at the advance post which had just been taken. These men were to be supported by the company of cadets who had been placed in the nearest entrenchment. Another detachment was established on the right to grapple with the enemy in case the latter decided to make a bid from their large entrenchments in front of Porte Royale. Our troops were also distributed in various other places with orders to keep up a brisk fire while our sailors and pioneers engaged themselves in demolishing the trenches in closest alignment to the city. The men to the left of the main attacking forces who had started the skirmish in the morning had also repulsed the enemy when they had seen us attacking. They came up later and rejoined
us. Many were the feats of bravery performed in the course of the action and during the remaining part of the day. The Moors made three or four attempts to regain lost ground but were repelled vigorously each time. They finally confined themselves to keeping up a brisk fire. Our men stayed at their positions until seven o’clock in the evening when de la Haye ordered them to return to the city. Detachments, however, were left behind to ensure the protection of the positions which had come under our control. After we had returned, the first thing which we did was to go to the Cathedral and offer thanks to God for our successes of the day.

Although we removed only five dead from the trenches, we were sure that the enemy losses had been far more severe. The bodies which we found had been very badly injured. With the exception of those who had died on the spot, the enemy had taken back all those who had shown even the least sign of life. Subsequently, we came to know that they had lost two hundred men. Trimbak Bussora Raju, one of their generals, was wounded at the elbow and was to be incommoded by this injury, for the rest of his life. I was to meet this man at a later date. He conceived a lively admiration for us as a result of this injury and this caused him to make many generous offers of assistance to us. It was inevitable that we should also sustain some losses in an engagement of such importance. Of the three guards of de la Haye who had succumbed to their injuries, one had been in close proximity to the General when he had been hit by a musket shot. Two of our officers had been killed while a Portuguese named Manuel Gomez, a man who had never been found to be wanting in any sortie, was also injured and died. Four of our soldiers met with the same fate, one being killed by a cannon-ball from our side. Eight to ten others were wounded, but all of them recovered. During the night, the Moors made a great clamour in the entrenchments which still remained to them. We learnt later that they were removing the

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43 S.P. Sen, *The French in India*, Calcutta, 1958, p. 205, basing his judgement on Abbe Carré declares that this general, Trimbak Bussora Raju, was mortally wounded.
cannon from their batteries, knowing that their position had become untenable.44

**The Moors Raise the Siege of San Thomé**

At dawn on 10 March, our men left the city and took up the same dispositions as they had done on the previous day while our sailors and pioneers continued with their work of demolition. There were petty engagements which lasted till eight o'clock in the morning. De la Haye ordered breakfast to be brought in and while a suitable site for this repast was being chosen, a cry arose that the enemy was forcing our advance post. Everyone rushed to give support, but on arrival all was quiet and the Moors did not appear to be contemplating any attack. After leaving some of the reinforcements at the advance post, de la Haye withdrew, taking the remaining men with him. It was noticed that the pikesmen and the halberdiers were gradually defilading from the big entrenchment closest to us. Our men were trying to indicate something from the city by signalling with their caps. We could not understand their message but we assumed it to be that the enemy was withdrawing for we could no longer hear any musketry fire. Among the men who had been left at the outpost was a gentleman from Normandy and captain of de la Haye's guards, Sieur d'Estreville. He had given ample proof of his bravery right through the siege having sustained an injury when a bullet had hurt him in the cheek. Without exception, all his men urged him to take advantage of the situation and attack. He was himself sorely tempted to assume the offensive but held back, fearing that if he failed, the onus would fall on him. Urging each other on, the entire group converged on the boyau leading to the entrenchment. After this, withdrawal was out of the question. The sudden appearance of our men took the enemy completely by surprise. They took to flight as our men approached. Not a single soldier remained behind at his post inside the large entrenchment. Our men then proceeded to the right towards the fortified temple and the embanked house. The enemy had

44According to the English, Baba Sahib had not paid his men. Some of the best among them had, therefore, deserted. This had contributed to the discomfiture of the General. Fawcett, E.F., II. 61.
abandoned the temple but there were 200 of them in the house. At the first pistol shot, they relinquished this position also. So great was their haste to get away, that fearing that they would not have time to reach the door through which the others were fleeing, several among them threw themselves down from the top. Our men continued to advance. Their plan was to make a two-pronged attack from the rear and flank and take the big entrenchment.

When de la Haye was informed about this, he wanted to order the most advanced of our forces to withdraw, but de Rebrey was of the opinion that there was not enough time for this. There was no alternative but to lead the company of cadets into the fray. The other forces were lined up to bring up the rear and act as reinforcements in case of any repulse. These men arrived at the rear of the large entrenchment just as the enemy had emerged from them. The latter had not offered any resistance when our advanced forces had attacked them, and indeed, they could think of nothing but flight. It can be said that only the laziest among them stayed behind, for not one of them put up any resistance. Mondal Nayak, one of the generals, was hit by a musket ball as he was trying to mount his horse to get away. He fell and was killed by one of our officers. A salvo of shots was fired at the Commander-in-Chief, Baba Sahib. He escaped lightly with only the loss of a thumb.\footnote{Acc. to S.P. Sen (\textit{op. cit.}, p. 205), both these generals lost their lives.} We had only two men wounded. In an unguarded moment, Chavalier des Augers was wounded by the pike of one of the fleeing enemy. He received a gash which pierced right through his body on the left side above the heart. I was quite close to him when he received this injury and I have rarely seen a worse wound. He fell on me covering me with blood imploring me not to abandon him. I disencumbered myself as we were still on the alert. I handed him over to a soldier and a sailor and asked them to carry him back to the city where he later recovered from his wound. Our second casualty was a sailor whose face had been injured by a fleeing cavalier who had thrust his sword at him. This constituted the sum total of our losses in this action.
It is a rare pleasure to watch 2,000-3,000 men in flight across the countryside with none in pursuit. De la Haye rallied all the men and posted them in the plain 200 feet beyond the entrenchments.

The enemy retreated to a village 500-600 feet away where they had kept their cavalry and baggage. While awaiting their next move, we reconnoitred the big entrenchments. De la Haye acknowledged that he had never seen any which were so strong or so well-flanked. The only lapse was that the rear had been left completely open and unprotected. Twenty-five or thirty of the enemy, including two high-ranking officers, who had not wished to leave their positions, were found in these. There were the carcasses of three horses which had been killed. All the cannon had been taken away and only three falconets were found in the batteries. At night, a prisoner was captured. From his accoutrement, he appeared to be a man of noble birth. He was sent to the city. A little later, two horses were seized. The fact that there was nothing in the camp that could be looted made us believe that the enemy withdrawal had been a premeditated one. The discovery of fifty to sixty scaling ladders and nearly 200 leather jerkins led to the conclusion that the enemy had planned to escalade the city. There was no appearance of any mine although they had dug a subterranean channel underneath their big entrenchments facing Porte Royale. This was five feet in depth with loopholes level to the ground. It offered ample cover for the enemy and if they had chosen to attack from this direction, they could have caused us a great deal of damage.

While our soldiers remained at their positions in the outer limits, the demolition of the entrenchments continued. At three o'clock in the afternoon, two of the enemy emerged from the village under their occupation carrying a white flag. They were allowed to come towards us and were taken to de la Haye. These men presented the compliments of Baba Sahib and declared that

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4^Langhorn referred to him as being a local Nayak. This would mean that this gentleman was a Hindu. Fawcett, E.F., 11, p. 62. Martin uses the word "gentil" but the context does not clarify if the meaning to be given to this word should be "Hindu" or "nice".
their commander had no desire to pit himself against a General of such proven skill and ability as ours. Baba Sahib also acknowledged that the French were the bravest of all nations. In order to avoid the risk of another attack, he was withdrawing his troops to Poonamallee, a fortress which was situated at a distance of four to five leagues from the city. He requested that the corpse of Mondal Nayak who had been killed in this action should be handed over. We had been unaware of the fact that this General had been left behind on the battle-field. However, from the description which was given, we were able to form a rough estimate as to where the body could be located. The two envoys were blindfolded and led to the spot where the body was found. The envoys identified the corpse. De la Haye sent to the city for a palanquin and the body, which was placed on one white flag and covered with another, was carried to the enemy camp. Our troops accompanied the palanquin to a distance of fifty feet when they returned to their positions after firing a discharge. The enemy envoys were detained to ensure the safety of our men who were carrying the body. As the palanquin neared the village, large numbers of the enemy emerged. Our men stayed at their posts until six o'clock in the evening. The enemy made no inimical moves during that day. Three of their horsemen had advanced within the distance of a musket shot and after firing a few times had withdrawn. On our return to the city, we went to the Cathedral to render our thanks to God for our victory. It was quite manifest that we had been blessed by His personal intervention which had ensured us this success. Everyone then congratulated de la Haye for the favourable outcome of this great day.

At dawn on 11 March, our men were sent out to continue with the demolition of the entrenchments. Our lascars were sent to man the advanced positions. A detachment of Frenchmen was deputed to reinforce the latter in case the enemy attempted to advance.

Two natives came into the city of their own volition to tend to the prisoners of the previous day. This confirmed our suspicion that the prisoner was a man of importance and de la

*Mentioned as Pondemali in the text.*
Sketch map
of
Madras and its Environs

Madras and its environs
—drawn by the Department of Geography,
University of Bombay on the basis of data supplied by the author
Haye ordered me to find out his identity. I had the prisoner inspected by the two men who had been sent the previous day to ask for the body of Mondal Nayak. I ensured that they did so, one at a time, without allowing themselves to be seen. One of them said he had seen the prisoner very often in the company of Baba Sahib and believed him to be a personage of importance. The second declared that the prisoner had come to the camp just a few days previously and he was not aware of the latter's identity. I reported this to de la Haye.

Baba Sahib sent back the palanquin in which the body of General Mondal Nayak had been carried the previous day. He sent a message to de la Haye in which he repeated the sentiments which he had expressed the previous day. At the same time, we noticed soldiers filing out of the enemy camp preceded by elephants, camels and carts loaded with their belongings. They set fire to several straw huts which they had constructed.48

**Relations with the Governor of Madras**

In order to ensure that the road was kept open, twenty lascars were stationed at a big temple named Trivilcany,49 midway between San Thomé and Madras. The captain of the “Sultane” complained that his ship was leaking at the bottom. On 14 March, the Commissary was sent to inspect the ship and he attested to the complaint. It was decided that after all the valuable things had been removed, the ship would be beached.

On the same day, it was proclaimed by ordinance that none of the soldiers or sailors were to leave the city without permission. The local people were not to be harassed in any way and food was to be bought only at the place specified to serve as the market. Work was continued on the demolition of the entrenchments.

De la Haye set out on horseback for Madras. He was accompanied by five or six mounted officers and thirty guardsmen on

48 In a letter dated 15 March 1673, de la Haye stated that the Moorish army now consisted of barely 6,000 men. *B.N., N.A.* 9352(57).

49 This was the Parthasarathy temple at Triplicane to be referred to henceforth as the Triplicane Temple. The name Triplicane was derived from “Tiruvalikeni”—the Sacred Lily tank—which formed a part of the Parthasarathy temple erected in the 8th century A.D.
foot. As he approached his destination, he sent the captain of the guard and Chevalier de Maisonneuve to thank the Governor for the compliment he had paid to our General in the letter which he had written to mark the occasion of the raising of the siege of San Thomé. These two officers were received very well.

The toasts were drunk to the accompaniment of a cannonade and after spending two hours there, they came back and rejoined de la Haye. Outwardly, the English pretended to be very happy at the raising of the siege but inwardly, they were extremely vexed as they found our presence in such close proximity highly distasteful.

The gentleman who had been made captive on the day of the raising of the siege was sent along with the other prisoners at San Thomé to the "Navarre" where all of them were to be kept under guard. I had not mentioned that de la Haye had received a letter from the Governor of Madras two days ago in which the latter had tried to secure the release of our aristocratic prisoner. The Governor had tried to represent that our interests had been served by the prisoner during the siege. Baba Sahib had placed him over one hundred native soldiers and had asked him to ensure that no food was brought into Madras. The gentleman, having been won over by the English, was negligent in the implementation of his orders allowing everything brought to his post to percolate into Madras. The English had been able to help us by sending provisions during the siege only because they had been in a position to replenish their own stocks by this method. The Governor had further added that if we were seeking to ransom this prisoner, he would be willing to meet our demands to a limit of 200 pagodas. De la Haye had reason to believe that the prisoner had fulfilled a role other than that attributed to him by the English Governor and gave little credit to the statements made by the latter. He sent back a reply to the effect that as the prisoner now belonged to the monarch of France, de la Haye did not possess the authority to release him.

The Governor again wrote to de la Haye on 15 March requesting that as the villages in the vicinity of the temple at Triplicane belonged to the English Company we should not
attack these.\textsuperscript{50} We knew very well that the only terrain the English possessed was that of Madras—that is to say, the city alone. The English themselves had acknowledged as much as could be seen in the letter which the Governor had written to us in the early days after our seizure of San Thomé. De la Haye replied that just as no territory belonging to His Britannic majesty or to the English Company would be attacked, so would any territory brought under the authority of the King of France by force of arms be conserved. The Governor was offended by our refusal and later, other causes also contributed to increase his animosity towards us.

On the same day, the letters which we received from Pondicherry informed us that the King of Golconda had complained to Sher Khan Lodi at the assistance which the latter was extending to us. Sher Khan had replied that while he was servitor to the Sultan\textsuperscript{51} he was also a friend of our nation. If we asked him for any help, he would never refuse if it lay within his power to gratify us.

A longboat which had been kept at sea for two days was sent to Pondicherry to take on arms and ammunition.

The English were suspected of harbouring the intention of occupying the temple at Triplicane. To prevent this, a French contingent was sent there on 17 March.

\textbf{The Mission of François Martin at Pulicat (19 March 1673)}

Several days had elapsed since de la Haye had asked me to go to Pulicat on the pretext of asking Sieur Pavilioen,\textsuperscript{52} the Governor, to hand over the Frenchman taken at Trincomallee Bay and aboard the “Europe”, “Phénix” and the “Saint Jean”. This was to serve as the excuse for my entry into Pulicat. The real reason for my journey was to make an assessment of

\textsuperscript{50}William Langhorn made this claim on the basis of a chaul given by Neknam Khan in 1672. Love, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 325.

\textsuperscript{51}Sher Khan owed fealty to the Adil Shah but as was common to Persian letter writers, he may have referred to himself as \textit{dādar} or slave in his letter to the Qutbshah which may have misled to Europeans.

\textsuperscript{52}Pavillon in the text.
India in the 17th Century

Dutch sentiments and gauge their reactions to the reverses they were suffering on the continent. I was then to open talks on the possibility of effecting a truce in India even though our compatriots were engaged in hostilities elsewhere. I was quite ready to follow these instructions but I wanted to be protected by a passport in case we encountered a Dutch ship on the way. When I asked de la Haye for this, he refused me several times stating that it was not his practice to grant passports. Finally, he agreed to give me one. The passport was accordingly drawn up and along with it, de la Haye gave me a letter written in an extremely overbearing style for Pavilioen. I was to hand it over only if I deemed it fit to do so. Sieur des Cartes, lieutenant of one of the companies, was ordered to proceed along with me. We left by the launch of the "Flamand" on the night of 18-19 March. At dawn, we saw a small Portuguese ship which had left Madras the previous day which I had been ordered to intercept. After talking to the captain, we continued on our route for Pulicat. We arrived there at four o'clock in the evening and anchored at a distance of a league from the city. Since no catamarans came to our ship, I gave a letter for Pavilioen to a sailor asking him to swim ashore with it. The sailor returned at one o'clock at night with the reply in which Pavilioen stated that he would come the next day to meet us where we were. At dawn, a tent was brought and erected. A little later Sieur Smit, the Dutch second at Pulicat arrived after which we descended. He greeted us and at eleven o'clock, Pavilioen reached this place. After the first civilities had been performed, I told him that de la Haye had sent me to negotiate the release of the French prisoners. Pavilioen had replied that if I had come only for this purpose I had engaged on a fruitless quest. The prisoners were apparently in Batavia and Pavilioen himself had no voice in this affair. We then started on a general discussion. He confessed that he had been very put out by the bad news from Europe but he hoped that the very successes of our King would contribute to the alignment of other powers behind Holland,

The explanation for this trip given by Carré (Carré II, p. 511) is quite different from that found in the Memoirs.
since these powers would not want Holland to be completely extinguished. As to my proposal that the two nations should live in amity in India, Pavilioen had stated that he would have to obtain the consent of his superiors as such an accommodation lay outside the scope of his authority. Lunch was now served and the conversation continued to centre on subjects of general importance. The Governor declared that although it was in the interests of the Dutch company that we should be unsuccessful in India, he was very happy that we had been able to force the Moors to raise the siege of San Thomé. Had they succeeded the infidels may have become haughtier and they may have been encouraged to attempt to chase the other Europeans away from the coast. We then drank to the health of de la Haye and the Governor-General at Batavia to the sound of eleven-gun salutes. We followed this by drinking to the other members of the Company. These toasts were accompanied by seven-gun salutes. We stayed till six o'clock in the evening when we re-embarked to return to San Thomé. We arrived at our destination the next day at two o'clock in the afternoon. I reported all our actions to de la Haye.

The same day a large detachment of the enemy cavalry appeared close to Madras. De la Haye, proceeded towards them with a group of French soldiers and one of native recruits. A few shots were fired from afar after which the Moors retired. Our men continued the work of demolishing enemy entrenchments without any respite.

On 22 March, the longboat returned from Pondicherry charged with munitions of war.

From Madras, we got letters that a cavalry corps had stationed itself close to the city. The commander kept railing that if the English had refrained from helping us during the siege, San Thomé would assuredly have fallen to them. He was demanding money from the English, failing which he threatened to burn all the houses in the suburbs.

There was an alarm at eight o'clock at night when we heard muskets being fired from Fort Sans Peur. The men were alerted as we tried to find out the cause. Our men fired at a light which they could see in the distance assuming it to have been caused
by matches lit by the enemy. Later, they found that it was a fire
which the enemy had lit below a coconut tree.

A review of the lascars was held on 23 March. Their total
strength came to 463 men.

The Governor of Madras wrote to de la Haye complaining at
the insolent conduct of some of the soldiers from our garrison
who visited the city. He asked de la Haye to take some steps to
curb this. We should not shy away from the truth and what
the Governor was saying was quite correct. It was not only
the men who were raising disturbances in Madras. Our officers
were also guilty—so much so that on one occasion they had
overpowered the guards posted at one of the city gates. The
English had been very restrained on this occasion and had
abstained from taking the law into their own hands. It was
such behaviour which caused the English to be apprehensive
about having us as their neighbours. De la Haye sent his reply
to the Governor. In order to prevent the recurrence of such
episodes, he asked the Governor to permit only those soldiers
who carried passes signed by himself to enter Madras.

The flag at Porte Royale had been carried away by one of
the enemy cannon-balls. As a new white flag was being hoisted
aloft here on 26 March, our soldiers who were standing under
arms in the city fired and our cannoniers also let out a salvo
from the battery at this gate.

The work of demolition continued. De la Haye was almost
always present among the workers to encourage them in their
task.

On 23 March the flute, "Sultane" fired a cannon shot to let
us know that the bottom of the ship was leaking. The Comis-
sary was sent to remove all the cargo after which the vessel
was to be beached.

De la Haye went to inspect all the villages within the radius
of a league around San Thomé. He took with him seven to eight
horsemen while 100 lascars followed on foot. We received
letters from Masulipatam on 22 March by which we were
informed that the Dutch were urgently soliciting the Golconda
court to send back an army to San Thomé. They promised to
reinforce these land forces by a powerful naval armament.
A bark arrived from Pondicherry on 30 March. Thirty native soldiers who had been raised there were on board as also a cargo of food.

**De la Haye Wishes to Proceed to Masulipatam—Asks for Help from Surat**

On 31 March, de la Haye confided to me that he had decided to go to Masulipatam with the "Breton" and the "Flamand". He would try and impede the commercial activities of the Moors and in order to force the King of Golconda to sign a peace treaty, he might even sweep down on the city at the appropriate moment.

I told him that if we had not been at war with the Dutch his plan of action would have promised the best chances of success. Under the circumstances, however, it was possible that the Dutch would take advantage of the absence of de la Haye to start the blockade of San Thomé at a time when the garrison had also been weakened by the withdrawal of its best soldiers whom de la Haye would have to take with him for this enterprise. De la Haye could not think of any other plan of action and insisted on undertaking the voyage.

The lascars raised an alarm at night by firing several shots. They had got accustomed to receiving a reward from de la Haye if they performed their duties well or made any discovery. As a result, they often brought in fraudulent information and raised false alarms. This was one example of the latter. The soldiers were threatened with dismissal if they repeated such action.

On 1 April, we received letters from Surat which informed us about developments there. When de la Haye had written to the Directors about the capture of San Thomé, he had stressed the importance of this conquest and had sketched the benefits which

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44 Carré (Carré p. 509) puts the blame for this plan on Father Ephraim at Madras. This priest had written to de la Haye that several richly laden Moorish ships were to be found at Masulipatam. It was suggested that de la Haye should make a sudden sweep on Masulipatam and capture these vessels.

45 De la Haye had sent his letter in October 1672 and it had reached Surat in December of the same year. Carré, II, p. 512.
would accrue to the Company from the retention of this acquisition. He had followed this up by a request that they should send him reinforcements of men and also additional supplies of money, munitions, provisions and ships. He had even suggested that Baron should be sent to meet him so that measures to retain San Thomé could by jointly devised. The soundness of this suggestion could not be doubted and the Directors had accepted as much. Baron had written to de la Haye that he would set sail during the season and join him. Gueston, however, later resiled from the consent which he had given for this voyage. Perhaps when he had given his consent, he had not taken up the idea of leading an embassy to Persia which he later declared to be his aim. It was obvious that both Directors could not be absent from Surat at the same time. This meant that if Baron proceeded to San Thomé, Gueston would have to stay behind at Surat. It was for this reason that he began to oppose the departure of Baron, but Baron remained firm in his resolution to proceed to San Thomé. These opposing aims had led to fresh altercations. Both Directors, however, agreed that the senior members of the lodge should be brought together and their views should be elicited. The conclusion which was arrived at was that the voyage to San Thomé was quite indispensable for the advancement of the interests of the King and those of the Company, and that Baron could not possibly avoid undertaking this journey. Being unable to contravene the plan openly, Gueston now began to refuse the most essential requirement—that of money. All the remonstrances which were made on this score proved quite futile. The excuse advanced by Gueston was the one of which I have already made mention—that he possessed the orders of the General Assembly not to provide the royal squadron with any thing.

Departure of Baron for San Thomé—Gueston Leaves for Persia

At this time, the ships available at Surat consisted of the “Bayonnaise” and a hooker, both vessels belonging to the royal navy, and a hooker which belonged to the Company. The squadron which was to be sent to reinforce the position of de la Haye at San Thomé was to consist of these three ships. These
ships not as well suited as others at the disposal of the Company to undertake a voyage made mainly hazardous by the possibility of an encounter with the Dutch vessels. Baron, who had allowed himself to be wholly taken over by the renown which would accrue from this action, contented himself with what was available, being unable to secure anything more. Several barrels of salt meat were taken from the stores and distributed among the three ships. The absence of this commodity would have caused considerable hardship. Persian wine, a few munitions, cordage and tackle were also embarked. As for money, which was the one thing of which we stood the greatest need at San Thomé, Gueston was quite adamant in his refusal to allow any to be embarked, even though there was no shortage of this at Surat. At the time of his departure, Baron was carrying only one thousand sequins. We received letters which informed us that Baron was ready to set sail. We shall return later to the success of this voyage.

Gueston was apparently of the view that the departure of Baron did not necessitate any change in his own plans. Indeed, he appeared even more determined to proceed on the embassy to Persia, a decision which he had taken on our own accord. It is true that the Company had sent orders that one of the Directors should undertake this journey and it had been decided that this would be done. The implementation of these orders, however, could have been deferred as circumstances could not have been more inopportune. There was no prospect of engaging in any commercial enterprises for the duration of the war. Taking this into account, there appeared little justification for undertaking a journey which carried with it the risk of an encounter with the Dutch vessels. Gueston chose to ignore all these considerations. Two clerks were nominated to conduct the affairs of the counter in the absence of the Directors. Lured by the hope which had been held out to him that he would be sent as Ambassador to the Mughal court, Sieur de Lespinay.

"Persian wine was among the most highly prized variety of wine in India. P. Anderson, English in Western India, Bombay, 1854, p. 103.

De Lespinay, who had served as the King’s Procurator at the Supreme Council at Fort Dauphin, stood third in rank after the two Directors at Surat. Carré, II, p. 514; B.N. N.A., 9352 (79).
remained on at the Surat lodge. During the period of his stay there, he had been asked to keep in touch with the two merchants for day-to-day affairs while the latter were instructed not to do anything without the advice of de Lespinay.\textsuperscript{58} Having settled matters in this way, Gueston made preparations to leave. Even though it was essential for us to send ships to France if we wished to maintain continuity in our trade this was not done. The "Saint François" had returned from Basra having left behind a portion of its unsold cargo there. The other voyages did not meet with any better success. After the "Vautour" had reached Bantam, it had been sent to France where it had arrived safely. Since then, the "Perle" had been seized by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{59} The ill-conceived course on which this ship had engaged led to its seizure. This policy was attributed to the merchant on board.

I will now go back to affairs at San Thomé. Baba Sahib sent three men who appeared to be merchants to de la Haye. De la Haye refused to listen to them and sent them back with a

\textsuperscript{58} A connected narrative of these events would be useful at this point. When the "Saint François" and the flute mentioned by Carré (Carré, II, p. 513) arrived at Surat from Basra, Sieur d’Estoile, the Company merchant at Persia had also come on board one of these vessels. He described conditions in Persia. The King of Persia was much incensed because although the French had been granted a firman for trade six years previously, not a single high ranking person had visited his court. If this were not immediately rectified, all the concessions given to the French would be withdrawn by the Shah. Apart from this, two other problems had to be faced. There was the question of the help which was to be sent to San Thomé. The second arose from the fact that it was customary for the European Companies at Surat to cater to the insatiable thirst for novelties on the part of the Mughal Emperor by giving suitable presents now and again. The Governor of Surat was pressing the French Company for these presents.

It was decided that Gueston should go to Persia, de Lespinay to the Mughal court and Baron to San Thomé. The departure of de Lespinay was delayed and he finally died in Surat, leaving the counter to be managed by the two clerks, Adam and Pilavoine.

Gueston left for Persia with the "St. Paul" and the "Espérance", both richly charged. Baron was provided with just enough men to man the three ships placed at his disposal. B.N. N.A., 9352 (79, 86).

\textsuperscript{59} The owner of the "Perle" was Samson, the French broker at Surat. This ship had been freighted by the Company and had been sent by Caron to Bantam. It had been captured and brought into Bantam by the Dutch on 15 January 1673. Carré, I, p. 145; D.R., 21, p. 13.
message. If Baba Sahib wished to negotiate with the French in good faith, he should send a man of rank and authority. De la Haye would give a hearing to any proposal brought forward by such an envoy.

The servants of de la Haye’s household had gone hunting near a village. They had often been here since the raising of the seige. The officer who dealt with the kitchen had strayed away from his companions. He encountered a group of Moorish cavalry who attacked and killed him. His comrades who had been unable to rescue him returned with the news to the city. De la Haye suspected that the villagers had told the Moors of the Frenchmen who often came to hunt in their vicinity. To this extent, they could be held responsible for the death of the mess officer. This made de la Haye take the decision to send out the company of cadets at nightfall. He also added a few detachments from the different companies and one hundred native soldiers. Sieur Maille was placed in command. Maille had been instructed to lift the cattle, loot the village and set it aflame. The women and children were to be left alone but the men were to be brought back prisoner. The contingent arrived at the village at eleven o’clock at night and the orders were carried out. Only one villager was killed while he was trying to shake off his captors. Nine prisoners and twenty-nine heads of cattle were brought back to San Thomé.

We continued to demolish the entrenchments and level the ground. Two thousand of the enemy infantry and cavalry appeared in the village which we had burnt down the previous night. De la Haye did not consider it wise to seek any encounter.

A Moorish cavalier followed by two servitors appeared at the gates of the city asking to speak to de la Haye on behalf of Baba Sahib. They were sent back with the same reply as had been given the previous day to the three men who had been sent by Baba Sahib.

On 4 April, a public proclamation was read by which all men, irrespective of rank, were prohibited from going to Madras without express orders. Nor were they allowed to move outside the city beyond the range of a cannon shot. The Company ketch returned from Pondicherry loaded with munitions, implements for digging, and a small quantity of refreshments. The valet of
the treasurer at the garrison had gone to Madras without a pass. On his return on 6 April, he was placed under arrest. On 7 April, a courtmartial was held while the soldiers stood under arms. The valet was interrogated about his trip to Madras. He said that he had been sent by his master to get provisions from there and had been quite ignorant about the new regulation. De la Haye did not wish to make an example of this man who appeared to be quite sincere. The valet was released while his master received a reprimand. The interdictions were then repeated. Baba Sahib sent two more envoys but they were also sent back from the city gates.

FRANÇOIS MARTIN STANDS OPPOSED TO THE MASULIPATAM TRIP—DEPARTURE OF DE LA HAVE (11 APRIL)

On the morning of 9 April, de la Haye told me again that he was quite determined to go to Masulipatam. I took the liberty of repeating my earlier reservations which were even more pertinent now. We had been given positive news that Admiral Rijkloff Van Goens was present on the Malabar coast at the head of a very strong squadron—and this at a time when the season for navigation to these coasts had opened. De la Haye refused to change his plans and resolved to embark the next day without any further delay.

"On the east coast, Langhorn had come to an understanding with Dutch Governor at Pulicat, Pavilioen, as a result of which overt Anglo-Dutch hostilities on any significant scale had been avoided. The situation on the west coast was, however, somewhat different. The Dutch interest in the Coromandel textile trade was marginal as compared with its involvement in the pepper trade of the Malabar. They were, therefore, far from lukewarm in their desire to displace the English at Bombay whom they regarded as potential competitors.

During the French preoccupation with the first siege of San Thomé, the Dutch appeared to have taken the decision to attempt in some way to advance their interests on the west coast. From January 1673, the English at Bombay lived in daily fear of a sudden descent by the Dutch.

After leaving the Coromandel coast, Van Goens took on additional soldiers from Ceylon and Cochin and when the Dutch fleet put in at Vengurla, it consisted of two sailboats on which 6000 men had embarked. Knowing the inimical relations between Shivaji and the English, Van Goens hoped to come to an understanding by which the Dutch would conquer
On the morning of 10 April, de la Haye informed de Rebrey of his intention to proceed to Masulipatam. I was the third person to be present at this conversation. De la Haye pointed out that his voyage formed an integral part of his plans to force the Moors to sign a peace treaty. If we opened negotiations at San Thomé, it would provide an excuse to the Moors to send an army towards the city. It was important to catch the attention of the Moors by creating a diversion. This could be done most effectively by cutting into mercantile activities at Masulipatam, the only commercial outlet of the King along the coast of Golconda. The merchants of this city who possessed considerable credit at court could contribute a great deal towards arranging an accommodation and could even press for the conclusion of a definitive treaty to avoid any retardment to their trade. Much as these arguments appealed to de Rebrey, it could not be gainsaid that in the absence of de la Haye the Dutch could come and lay siege to San Thomé by sea and perhaps even cut off de la Haye from re-entering the harbour. These important considerations had no effect on de la Haye, who remained firm in his resolution. The troops were ordered to assemble at the square. De Rebrey had already been nominated as Governor. This was now publicly announced and the officers and soldiers were told to obey him in the absence of the General. De Rebrey's battalion was now placed under Sieur de Treville who had served as captain of the guards. De Maille, the commander of the cadets was ordered to embark along with his company. These forces were further augmented by the addition of thirty men, the volunteers and about one hundred and fifty native soldiers. Having put things

Janjira from the Siddis and hand it over to Shivaji in return for which Shivaji would allow the Dutch displace the English at Bombay.

Van Goens appeared with seven ships before Bombay on 20 February, leaving the rest of the squadron at Vengurla. The understanding with Shivaji was, however not achieved and Van Goens refrained from attacking Bombay in view of the defensive measures taken by Aungier. On 7 March, the Dutch fleet sailed towards Surat and after spending a few days in the Gulf of Cambay Van Goens retraced, his route to the South. By the end of March, the English noted that the entire Dutch fleet on the Malabar coast had dispersed. Despite his strength, Van Goens had not indulged in any hostilities during this voyage. Fawcett, E.F., I, pp 60-63, 71, II, pp 53, 59; H.G. Briggs, Cities of Gujarashtra, Bombay, pp. 79-80.
in order and leaving instructions as to how de Rebrey was to act in his absence, de la Haye embarked with the members of his household at five o'clock in the evening. I followed him with two men in the service of the Company whom I was taking with me.

The garrison which had been left behind at San Tomé was still quite a powerful one. The ability of the officers and the number of French and native soldiers within it contributed to this strength. There were sufficient provisions in the stores to last four months and the treasurer had provided de Rebrey with 25,000 livres for the payment of the troops. The levelling of enemy works had been virtually completed and it would be difficult for the enemy to start another siege soon.
On 11 April, all the troops on board the "Breton" were reviewed. There were...Frenchmen and...lascars. Of the latter, half were sent to the "Flamand". Our ships consisted of the "Breton", the "Flamand" and the longboat. De la Haye, accompanied by his guards, the cadets and the volunteers had sailed on the "Breton". We steered eastwards and at noon we changed our course south north-eastwards so that we found San Thomé to the west north-west of us at seven o'clock in the evening. We took this course to hide our intention to sail to Masulipatam from the English. We waited until dark and then set sail to the north-west.

On 12 and 13 April, we unfurled all our sails as the wind and the current were in our favour. The officers warned de la Haye that if we sailed at this speed we might overpass Masulipatam. It was necessary to sail closer to the shore so that we would be able to recognize Masulipatam. De la Haye refused to accept this advice, believing himself to be better informed. This over-confidence was to lead to the failure of the expedition as will become evident in my description later. We continued this way until nightfall when some of the sails were taken in.
We advanced along our route with our foresail and two top sails reduced to mid-mast until the fourth bell of the second quarter when soundings were taken. These initially revealed a depth of twelve fathoms and subsequently of five, at which point we dropped anchor. A launch was then sent to take soundings of the surrounding sea-floor which was found to be of fairly uniform depth varying between five, six and seven fathoms.

At dawn, the shore was revealed to us at a distance of about two leagues. It was low-lying and covered with trees. Nobody could recognize the area, although those who were more familiar with the countryside were of the opinion that we had by-passed Masulipatam. This had been concluded from the manner in which the squadron had been navigated. The long-boat and the launches were armed and de la Haye placed detachments of cadets, guards and volunteers on board. These men were instructed to reconnoitre the countryside and capture whichever vessels they should find.

The General had done me the honour of calling me to his room in the morning and asking me as to how best the Moors could be made to expeditiously sign a peace treaty, and what could be done to further the interests of the Company. I took the liberty of asking de la Haye if he intended to project himself as a warrior or as a merchant. As for the reflections which he wished to draw from me, I told him that if he desired to adopt military methods, it would be very easy to take Masulipatam by surprise, for his presence would be unexpected in a city which had no soldiers. Two hundred men set ashore by longboat and launch would be sufficient to capture the place where no resistance would be offered. De la Haye could then take whatever steps he considered necessary, for such an exploit could be followed by momentous consequences. If, however, and with the General’s permission this appeared to me to be a better policy, he wished to adopt a softer approach, he could seize all the ships belonging to the King of Golconda and his subjects which we found at Masulipatam at the time of our arrival there. Boats entering or leaving the port were to be dealt with in the same way. Men of rectitude and probity should then be placed on these prizes to prevent the outbreak...
of any insurgence. After this, the Governor of Masulipatam was to be informed about our actions and be warned that if the King did not sign peace immediately, hostilities would be continued. It is indubitable that the merchants, already affected by our capture of the ships in which they were interested, would write to court in the fear that all their commercial enterprises would be brought to a halt. Orders would certainly be issued directing the initiation of negotiations for peace. To me the second course of action appeared better suited to achieve our objective. If, after appropriating the property of a few merchants at Masulipatam, we were to return to the city again, the traders, who would continue to harbour their resentment against us, would certainly find occasion to harm us.

De la Haye, who gave me a very patient hearing, told me that it was his intention to use the gentler approach. However, de Maille, the commander of the company of cadets ordered to embark with one of his detachments on board one of the launches, showed me the orders which he had just received from de la Haye. He had been directed to sail close to the coast and seize all shipping which belonged either to the King of Golconda or to any of his subjects. If any resistance was offered, the opponent was to be cut down and if our men felt that they would be unable to bring back the captured ships, they could burn these.

The longboat and two large ships’ boats left soon after. A little later we saw two barks sailing close to the shore proceeding from the south towards the north. We kept a catch and a launch in readiness and sent these to the two boats. The people from the barks swam to the shore. One of the barks sank while the other was brought in and anchored at the distance of a musket shot. The sailors from this boat, however, managed to get away to the shore. Our launch which had accosted the latter boat returned with the news that it was carrying fifty or sixty pounds of rice and a small quantity of salt and betel nut. The men who had escaped from the two barks now raised an alarm along the entire coast and the news soon reached

1The meaning is not very clear. The word used in the text is cateche. This could perhaps refer to a small twenty ton boat called catch by the Dutch. See Bengal and Madras Papers, I, p. 344.
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Masulipatam. Finally, we learnt that the place we had chosen for our anchorage lay twelve leagues to the north of Masulipatam and two to three leagues south of Narasapur. Our destination now lay on our leeward side and we would find our progress hampered by contrary winds. Such is the result of the obduracy of a man who prefers to cling to his own views rather than accept the advice of a more experienced person.

On the morning of 15 April, we saw a small vessel hugging the coastline and proceeding on a northerly route from the south. We sent out a launch to reconnoitre this vessel and as the launch came nearer, the ship hoisted Portuguese colours. There were three Persian merchants on board. Our men brought back the captain and one of the three Persian merchants to de la Haye. They said that they were coming from Masulipatam and were on their way to Bengal. The ship belonged to a Portuguese merchant at Balasore. The Persian merchant contradicted himself on some query which was put to him but this could well have been due to a lapse on the part of our interpreter. The latter had not been trained for this language and had difficulty in understanding what the Persian merchant said to him. This ship, however, immediately aroused the suspicions of de la Haye. He detained the captain and the merchant and sent for the two remaining Persian merchants. An officer with some men were sent to the small boat. They were ordered to steer vessel in the wake of the "Breton".

The launches which we had sent the previous day along with the longboat returned without having seen or encountered any craft with the exception of two catamarans. The men from the catamarans had come on board one of our vessels in all good faith. They had been detained by our people who had also managed to accommodate one of the catamarans on board their craft.

The captain of the Portuguese vessel informed us that at the time of his departure from Masulipatam, there had been five ships and eight large barks in the harbour. Among the ships, one belonged to the English, one to the Portuguese, one to a local Moorish merchant, one to the King of Siam, and the fifth to a merchant at Porto Novo. Three of the barks had arrived recently from Tennasserim with a rich cargo. This caused de la
De la Haye at Masulipatam

Haye to decide to arm the longboat and two other vessels and send these in advance to Masulipatam. The men were ordered to seize all the ships which they found at the roads. However, no ship belonging to the English, Portuguese, the King of Siam or any of our other allies was to be touched. The orders given to de Maille were identical to the orders which I have outlined. I wanted to remonstrate with de la Haye and try to secure the withdrawal of the order with regard to the burning of ships but de Maille pleaded that he would be lost if de la Haye came to know that the orders had been divulged to me. I restrained myself and the boats went off. In the meantime a south-westerly wind sprang up and we set sail. On the way, two barks passed within cannon shot range of the “Breton”. The longboat and the two launches fired on the barks and gave chase. During this time, it began to grow dark. The wind fell and we dropped anchor at eight o’clock in the evening.

On the morning of 16 April, we found out that we were anchored before the river Gudavalleru, six leagues from Masulipatam. The small Portuguese vessel, the longboat and the two launches which had been picked out to go to the roads at Masulipatam were ranging along the coast and had approached close to the shore. We also noticed a launch behind which was bringing along a bark. We were worried about the fate of another launch on which the volunteers and the guards of de la Haye had embarked. This vessel had fallen before the wind and the men had neither food nor water. By the evening we had lost sight of the longboat and the two launches. We lifted anchor, tacking our sails to the maximum and on 17 April, at two o’clock in the afternoon, we moored within sight of land. We lifted anchor on 18 April, sailing parallel to the coastline and moored a little to the windward of the spot from which we had set out on 16 April.

A bark appeared from the north and sailed close to the “Flamand”. We fired a few cannon shots which made it draw up towards us and anchor. We siezed the ship, but only found a supply of provisions for the crew on board.

*River Gondepolam in the text.*
NEWS OF SURAT

On the morning of 19 April, a catamaran came to our ship. It had been sent by de Malfosse, the person whom I had left behind at Masulipatam at the time of my departure for San Thomé. He wrote that he was sending a packet which he had received from Surat being quite certain that I was to be found on board. We learnt of the departure of the Director Baron for these coasts with the ships which I have already mentioned. We also learnt that Gueston had set out on the “Saint Paul” to lead the embassy to Persia. De Lespinay wished to go to Agra with presents for the Mughal Emperor but from the difficulties which were being raised by the Governor, we could gauge that this official was opposed to the step being contemplated by de Lespinay. Although the courtier Samson claimed that it was the Governor who was raising all the problems, in truth, it was he himself who was manufacturing all these difficulties. Samson was doing this on the orders of Gueston who had resolved to go as ambassador to the Mughal court himself, after finishing his affair in Persia. As de Lespinay had been lured into staying on at Surat only by this promise, Samson distracted him until the season for undertaking such a journey was over, attributing to others the pitfalls dug by himself. Samson did not have to play this role for very long. Within a few days of the departure of the Directors, an apoplectic stroke put an end to the life of de Lespinay.

Malfosse informed us that people were going away from the city. Masulipatam was gripped by consternation, but troops despatched from Golconda were being expected.

The catamaran also brought us the news that the longboat which had sailed along the coast at night had run aground. The breakers which are rough in these seas had soon pounded the vessel to smithereens. The mishap was attributed to the negligence and incompetence of the officer in charge who had lost

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1According to the letter written by Carré dated 24 January 1674, Gueston was to have proceeded by the overland route to France on the termination of his embassy to Persia. B.N., N.A., 9352 (79).

2Carré, Carré, II. p. 533. places the blame on de la Haye for sending out these men without any briefing as to the lay-out of the land or the navigational hazards they could expect to encounter.
all control over the craft. The crew managed to reach the shore, some even taking their arms with them but all else on the craft was lost. These men were very worried as to what they were to do, but fortunately they were near a garden which had been farmed out by us and on which some of our servants were to be found. One of the servants, chancing to meet these men, had recognized them as Frenchmen. He walked with them right through the night along the shore until he had guided them to the point where we had camped the previous year. Our men had found a bark loaded with iron here which was on its way to the roads. The bark was easily captured and the ships lying in the harbour were taken with equal facility there being no men on board to put up any defence. The two launches arrived a little later and we now had a sufficient number of men to distribute among all the prizes.

I sent back the catamaran with a letter for de Malfosse which I wrote on the orders of de la Haye. I directed de Malfosse to transmit news of everything happening at Masulipatam to us while we tried to come to the roads with our ships as expeditiously as possible.

We left at four o’clock in the afternoon and had to tack our sails. At eight o’clock in the evening, we anchored about four leagues away from Masulipatam. A little later, we noticed a large conflagration in the harbour. I knew very well that this had resulted from the orders given to de Maille.

Incendiaryism and Seizure of Ships at the Masulipatam Roads—Protests of the Governor

At dawn, we could make out six ships in the harbour at Masulipatam. We fired a cannon ball which made four of these ships set sail and come and anchor close to us. De Maille came later to give an account of his expedition to de la Haye. He described the loss of the longboat, the captain of which had tried to exonerate himself as best as he could. De Maille added that when he had arrived at the Masulipatam harbour with the two launches, he had found that all the vessels at anchorage had already been seized by the crew of the longboat⁵. The

⁵Carré (ibid., loc. cit.) describes the adventures of the men in the longboat in greater detail.
prizes consisted of a total of eight ships and some smaller vessels. De Maille had set fire to four ships as he had felt that he would not be able to bring these away with him. Among these, one was a completely new ship, another had been recently renovated but had not possessed any tackle. The other two were similar to ketches in their construction. Of these four ships, one belonged to a Moorish merchant at Masulipatam named Mir Abdullah Baqir who had very warm feelings for the French. The three others belonged to Hindu merchants. Of the four prizes which had been made, the largest belonged to the same Moorish merchant, Mir Abdullah Baqir, and indeed it was the very vessel on which we had taken shelter the previous year. Another of the prize ships belonged to a private merchant at Porto Novo. Of the two remaining ones, one was a newly built boat on its maiden voyage. Two ships remained unharmed at the roads of Masulipatam. One belonged to the King of Siam, and the owner of the second one which had come in from Macao was a Portuguese gentlemen who was to be found on board.

De Malfosse had boarded one of these boats. He told de la Haye that on seeing the ships ablaze he knew that he would no longer be safe at the lodge. He had slipped away from the lodge during the disorder which had broken out in the city and had embarked on a small canoe taking with him five sailors and the other Frenchman whom I had left behind at the lodge. The guards and volunteers about whom we had been so anxious had placed these sailors on a bark which they had seized. In the absence of any food supply, these sailors had grounded their bark but had possessed the good fortune to later come upon our counter. In the beginning, they had not even dared to consider the possibility of using the canoe to cover the passage of fifty feet. Necessity, however, left them with no other choice but to brave all the perils to which they had exposed themselves. They had crossed the bar without any mishap and had boarded one of the prizes. A native who served as interpreter was left behind at our lodge. De Malfosse confirmed that there was complete confusion in the city. The English and the Dutch had withdrawn from Masulipatam. However, the indigenous troops had begun to trickle into the city. I learnt from de Malfosse in
private that the ships which had returned from Tennasserim were richly charged with gold, silver and fine merchandise worth five to six thousand crowns. All this would have been ours without the firing of a single shot had we taken the right route. When they had received news from the direction of Narasapur that our ships had arrived and that we were giving chase to all the vessels which passed by us, they had pressed all the barks at Masulipatam into service right round the clock to unload the merchandise off the ships which had come from Tennasserim. These operations were so effective that when we seized these ships we found nothing on board.®

Shortly after the arrival of de Malfosse, a catamaran brought us a letter from the Governor of Masulipatam written by a Portuguese priest who conducted services at the church for local Christians. The Governor protested at the burning of the ships, particularly as we had been provided with refuge at Masulipatam despite our warfare with the King of Golconda. We were asked to spare the property of merchants who had tried to promote our interests. The Governor then expanded at some length on his complaints and ended his letter by asking us to state our demands clearly so that he could communicate these to court. De la Haye asked me to write a reply and sent de Malfosse back to the shore with a verbal message for the Havildar. Our General declared that we would continue hostilities until the Golconda troops had been withdrawn from the region around San Thomé so that we could enjoy the possession of this place free of any threat. In my reply to the Governor, I had added a postscript offering to come ashore myself if the Governor indicated that my presence would in any way contribute to the restoration of peace. De Malfosse left in the evening to return to the city.

The Commissary was sent to make an inventory of the prize vessels on 20 April. Needless to say, he did not require much paper as most of the cargo had been unloaded. De la Haye inspected the prizes on 21 April.

*Carré (ibid., II, p. 523), states that the inhabitants of Masulipatam had received warning about the presence of de la Haye four days prior to the arrival of the French General at the roads and hence had time to take precautionary measures.
De Malfosse returned on board with refreshments on 22 April. He told de la Haye that he had spoken to the Governor who had complained bitterly at our having burnt the ships. De Malfosse had replied in accordance with his instructions. The conversation had ended by the Governor requesting de Malfosse to ask de la Haye to send me ashore. I was to be fully briefed on all our claims so that the Governor could inform the court expeditiously. An accommodation could then be reached.

A large number of soldiers had arrived, among whom a number of Persian cavalry and Dutch soldiers were to be found. Two batteries were erected, one at the entrance of the bar and the other to the interior of the port.

We received news that the launch on which the guards and volunteers numbering twenty-seven persons had embarked, had been prevented from joining the ships by adverse winds and currents. As they had neither food nor water, the men had been forced to disembark at the river at Narasapur. Two private French merchants here, Sieurs Junet and Peyron had welcomed our men most warmly. Our men could not have arrived at a better time. Several Englishmen from the surrounding areas had also withdrawn to the same spot and the marriage of an English couple was being celebrated. As soon as our men landed they were brought to the wedding. As a result of their participation in the festivities which form part of occasions such as this, our men were able to recover their spirits which had been affected by their recent hardships.

**Mission of François Martin with the Governor—the First Interview**

I was ordered to embark and proceed to Masulipatam where I was to meet the Governor and lay before him the reasons making us deplore the insults to which we had been subjected at various times at the hands of the officers of the King of

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^The hostilities against Aurangzeb had been terminated by this time (Fawcett, *E.F.*, II, p. 232). This may have allowed the diversion of some soldiers to Masulipatam. Carré, *Carré*, II, pp. 536-577, however, states that the expense of 4,000 lascars raised by the local administration was borne entirely by the Dutch.
Golconda. It was this treatment which had impelled us to embark on our present course of action.

De la Haye gave me minute instructions as to what I was to say. In conclusion, I was to demand the withdrawal of all their troops from San Thomé and an assurance that our claim to this city should not be placed under any jeopardy. De la Haye was prepared to grant seven days for the reception of the reply from court and during this period, neither side would indulge in any hostility. It was only when orders for the withdrawal of the troops had been issued that we could proceed to negotiate the terms of a comprehensive peace treaty.

We left the ship at seven o'clock in the evening and we arrived the next day, 27 April, at Masulipatam. At the head of the bay I saw three hundred men and a battery which was under construction. A little further inside the port I noticed a crude fort made of mud and supported by the trunks of palm trees on which a battery had been erected. Another battery with two cannons had been constructed at a small gate leading to the sea close to our lodge. I disembarked at the customs shed with de Malfosse, and a lieutenant of the “Flamand”. At the entrance, there stood five to six hundred armed men of whom a little more than two hundred were Persian. The latter, distinguished by the physique and accoutrement, belonged to Sayyid Muzaffar who had sent them at the head of the contingent. There were also twenty Dutch soldiers under a sergeant.

I climbed up to the reception hall where the city officials and important merchants had already gathered. The complaints about the burning of the ships was first discussed. The merchants who had been the most affected by this, recapitulated the good services they had rendered us on several occasions, and indeed, several of them were quite correct. I could not refute them in any way and could only reply that the fortunes of war were such that the innocent suffered along with the guilty. I then enlarged on the reasons which had instigated de la Haye to seize San Thomé. I described the arrogance of the Governor of San Thomé contrasting this with the restraint which de la Haye had shown. The city was about to fall into our hands but when the Governor agreed to provide us with what we wanted on a payment basis, de la Haye had stopped and had not gone any
further. It was only when the Governor had broken his word that our General had resorted to strong action. This had resulted in Baba Sahib laying siege to us. We had almost concluded a treaty with Baba Sahib when the latter had proved his perfidy but we had made him pay the price for this.

The Governor had an explanation for each one of the points which I raised. We continued these arguments for almost two hours after which a more conciliatory note became perceptible in our conversation. The Governor told us that we should write to court ourselves stating our demands, and he would also write from his side. He wanted twelve days' time to receive the answer from court. I opposed this very strongly, saying that it was sufficient for us to keep the Governor informed about our demands. It was not necessary to apprise the court and the Governor should take the decision on his own authority. In any case our General was not prepared to wait for more than seven days for the arrival of the answer from court.

They objected that seven days was too short a time and pressed us to write to the King ourselves. The Governor added that if we were to enclose a polite letter for Sayyid Muzaffar, it would have a favourable effect. I protested again, but finding that they were quite adamant on two points—that we should write to court ourselves, and that they should be given a time limit of twelve days—I told the Governor that I would write to our commander about the conversation which had taken place. Meanwhile, we would withdraw to the lodge where we would await the reply. The Governor gave his consent.

I wrote to de la Haye about my conversation with the Governor and asked for further orders, I sent this letter by catamaran. Upon the orders of de la Haye, I also wrote to the guards and volunteers at Narasapur asking them to come by land to Masulipatam.

I heard that 1,500 soldiers had arrived at the city. They were expecting the arrival of further numbers as it was their intention to form a corps of 3,000 men. It was said that the Dutch were bearing a portion of the expenses of these men and that they had sent 1,000 pagodas to the Governor the previous day.

I contacted the principal merchants and pointed out to them the extent to which their own interests would be served if they
pressed for an early conclusion of peace. They promised to take
some steps. The Governor and some of the merchants presented
me with hampers of fruit.

On the morning of 24 April, I received a reply from de la
Haye in which he gave me complete freedom of action. De la
Haye always avoided issuing specific instructions so that if any
enterprise failed, he could always blame his agent. Such a policy
has its pros and cons but I felt that the present enterprise was
far too important for me to take action without specific instruc-
tions. I decided to return to the ship to turn the matter over
with the General. When I informed the Governor, he agreed
that the action which I wished to take was very necessary and
asked me to make haste. I embarked on the launch and we
arrived at the Admiral’s boat at three o’clock in the afternoon.

François Martin Receives Authorisation to
Write to the King of Golconda

I give a verbal report of my conversation with the Governor
and of the demands which the latter had made. De la Haye
stated that since we had little alternative, I should write to the
King of Golconda and to the minister Sayyid Muzaffar. I took
the liberty of pointing out that since the General happened to
be on the spot, the letters should be written in his name. To
this I added that I did not believe that it would be derogatory
in any way either to his profession or to his rank for de la Haye
to write to the King, who was one of the leading rulers in India,
and to a highly reputed minister. De la Haye, however, refused
to change the decision which he had already taken not to write
himself. He felt that if I could create the impression that I was
trying to improve matters on my own initiative by virtue of
the position which I had held at the Masulipatam counter, and
if I could further insinuate that I had brought de la Haye
around to my views, our proposals would be better received at
court. De la Haye refused categorically to write himself and I
was finally forced to cede on this point. He provided me with a
memorandum through his secretary in which he listed all the
insults which had been offered to our men on the arrival of our
squadron at San Thomé. He asked me to add any additional
information I might have on the exactions perpetrated on the Company in other parts of the kingdom. I was to ask that they should no longer threaten our position at San Thomé or any of its dependencies and that we should have the right to trade in any part of the kingdom. If these demands were acceded, we would secure their affirmation by a peace treaty. This would result in strong and stable relations between the two countries. I left at seven o'clock in the evening with these orders.

The crew of the launch rowed right through the night and until five o'clock in the evening of the following day which happened to be 25 April. Despite all our efforts, we were able to advance only one league to the north of Masulipatam. We cast anchor here. The men were exhausted and we had both the wind and the current against us. I do not think the sailors would have spent a more exhausting period of twenty-four hours. The wind strengthened and the waves which inundated the launch made us fear at least twenty times that we would sink. The cable broke and finally, at ten o'clock at night, we decided to make for the open sea and return to the ship which we arrived at midnight.

At six o'clock in the morning of 26 April, we re-embarked on the launch of the “Breton”, which was a lighter bark than that of the “Flamand”, on which we had earlier sailed. Right through the night, the men rowed with their customary vigour but could make no progress. We were forced to return to the ships where we arrived at nine o'clock in the morning of 27 April.

De la Haye was extremely upset by this delay and I was no less so. De la Haye proposed that I should take his catch, which I could ground and then proceed to Masulipatam. I pointed out that such a venture would be far too risky if we took into consideration the rough seas and the reefs which ran along the coast. It would be impossible to escape these and I could not swim. I added that I would scarcely be making a contribution by risking my life in such a futile manner. De la Haye was not the kind of person to allow himself to be easily crossed. However, he summoned all the officers of the ship to obtain their views on my refusal to utilize the catch. All of them, with

“Caleche” vide supra, Chapter Four, n. 1.
the exception of a lieutenant of the "Flamand" who happened to be on board, concurred that in view of the rough seas, the chances of survival after being grounded ashore were very slim. De la Haye retired to his room much vexed at this response saying that I could do as I pleased but that he would hold me responsible for the opposition which I was raising to his orders. I went to meet him a little later when I made bold to ask if he would provide me with a launch once again. This time I would take a catamaran which was on the ship with me inside the launch. We would row the launch as close as possible to the shore and if we could not reach by this method I would transfer myself to the catamaran and make for the shore. He agreed and we left at four o’clock in the afternoon. The crew of the launch was a fresh one and the men spared no effort. We let down the anchor from time to time to give our oarsmen a chance to rest. At length, after a great deal of trouble, we reached Masulipatam at eleven in the morning of 28 April. The Havildar was observing a retreat in his home. It was the tenth day of the feast held in commemoration of the death of Ali celebrated by the Muslims who belong to this sect.

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCHMEN AT NARASAPUR

Upon my arrival, I found letters from Narasapur awaiting me in which I was given information about the guards and volunteers who had put in there. When they had noticed that Moorish troops were coming into Narasapur, these men, in fear of their lives, had gone to the Governor and had asked for a boat so that they could get back to their General. They were led by Junet, the French merchant about whom I have already spoken. Junet went to the extent of threatening the Governor when the latter refused to provide our men with a boat. An open fight had almost ensued. Our men realized that it would be hazardous for them to prolong their stay here. This was also the advice given to them by Peyron and Junet. They seized a bark which happened to be in the river and sailed downstream up to the bar. Here, food was sent to them and they were provided with an English pilot who was to guide them back to their ships. When the Governor became aware of the flight of our
men he had seized Junet whose house was taken away while he himself was kept in chains at the residence of the Governor.

Soon after my arrival I received another letter from Narasapur in which I was informed of the fate of another batch of Frenchmen. Four French sailors from the "Flamand" had been put on a small boat belonging to a prize. These men had been unable to get back to their ship, and being without food and water, had been forced ashore close to the river Gudavallaru. The Frenchmen had saved themselves and had been treated very kindly by the country people who had taken them to Madapollam, close to Narasapur. The Governor heard of their arrival. He was the official who had been threatened by our men. Enraged at the way in which the latter had slipped through his fingers, he was determined to vent his spleen on these four wretched unarmed sailors. He sent his men with orders to search out and kill these Frenchmen. The sailors who had been apprised of these orders, took refuge in the English lodge where they thought that they would be safe. At that time, the defence of the lodge had been entrusted to a clerk and several peons. These men could have prevented the entry of the Governor’s forces, as indeed they were honour-bound to do, but instead of this, they had allowed the minions of the Governor to come in. The Frenchmen were seized and dragged to the door where three of them were killed. The fourth was happily able to escape. He attached himself so firmly to one of the Governor’s men that he could not be shaken off. The aggressors, fearing to strike at him in case they wounded their companion-in-arms threw themselves on the three corpses which they smote thousand times with their swords. They struck off the heads which they exhibited on stakes. Their passion now began to abate. The fourth sailor who had managed to escape this measure was caught and imprisoned but was later released.

I sent our interpreter to the Governor at Masulipatam demanding justice for the massacre of our men at Narasapur as also for the humiliation to which the other Frenchmen who had taken refuge at Narasapur has been exposed. I added that if the Governor refused to give us satisfaction I would immediately retire as it would then be quite obvious that they were only playing with us to get more time to harm us. The Governor
replied that his authority did not extend up to Narasapur and, therefore, he could not be held responsible for what had happened there. He had issued instructions that we were not to be harmed in any way in the territory under his control. He would write to Narasapur but that was all that he could do. We had to content ourselves with this reply which I sent on to de la Haye. I also sent him letters which an express messenger had brought for him from San Thomé.

Although the Governor at Masulipatam had not been implicated in the deed committed at Madapollam, he was certainly acting in an underhand way against us. He had issued instructions at all the forts between Masulipatam and Narasapur that our men were to be refused all rights of passage. Several peons who had been sent out by us were placed under arrest.

In the evening, I was informed that the Governor had been instructed by the Golconda court to prolong our affairs as much as possible as the Dutch had raised their expectation by stating that one of their squadrons had arrived. I was further informed that the Governor had been ordered to entice me ashore and then place me under arrest. Although I did not put my entire credence in this news, I excused myself when the Governor sent me a message saying that I could come and speak to him at his residence at ten o’clock at night. I asked de Malfosse to go. The conversation lasted for one hour and it was decided that I was to write the next day to the King of Golconda and to Sayyid Muzaffar. We spent 29 April in drafting these letters and having them translated into Persian. Several times, the Governor made enquiries as to whether the letters were ready.

De la Haye wrote to me that he had learnt from letters from San Thomé that Abbé Carré, who had been sent from court with letters from the King and Colbert for de la Haye, had arrived at Madras. I wrote out my reply and sent back the launch to the ship with refreshments.

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*According to Carré (Carré, II, p. 523), the Dutch fleet under Van Goens had been sent to the west coast to intercept Baron. Cf. Chapter Three, n. 60. After his return to Ceylon, Van Goens left with his fleet for San Thomé on 25 May 1673. D.R., 21, p. 208.

*Carré arrived at Madras on 14 April 1673. Carré. II, p. 376.*
On 30 April, de Malfosse went to meet the Governor with the letters which we had written to the King of Golconda and to Sayyid Muzaffar. The Governor made some changes in the text but left the general sense unaltered. He told de Malfosse that our letter should also contain an indication of what we were prepared to offer in order to secure the full and free possession of San Thomé and its dependencies. De Malfosse had replied that de la Haye was prepared to offer peace not to buy it. The matter was not pursued any further for the time being.

After signing and sealing our letters, I sent them to the Governor through de Malfosse on 30 April. De Malfosse found the Governor engaged in writing his own letters. The latter sent back de Malfosse to find out on what basis we wished the grant of San Thomé to be made to us—whether we would be content if we were given the same terms as the English at Madras and the Dutch at Pulicat. He also asked for information about the clauses of the proposed treaty with Baba Sahib so that the court could be informed. I replied that the circumstances at the present moment were very different from those which had prevailed when we were treating with Baba Sahib. No one could now contest our right to San Thomé. Our success in forcing Baba Sahib to raise the siege had bestowed on us incontrovertible possession of the city. Since we were already in complete control over the fort, our only demand was that all the Golconda forces should be withdrawn from the territory around San Thomé. As soon as this was done, we would cease hostilities. If the King wished to raise any additional points, these should be explained in a letter to which we would send our reply. Although the Governor was not satisfied by this reply, he promised to help us in this affair.

**Refusal of Food Supplies by the Governor of Masulipatam—Interception of Our Correspondence**

De la Haye had asked that during my stay at Masulipatam I should try and gather together wooden boards suitable for planking and sails and send these to the ships after the boards had been joined together. I was also asked to send supplies of
food, water and wood as they were running low on these stores on board our ships. I searched out owners of barks and workmen wishing to utilize their services, but they said they could not do anything without the Governor’s orders. The interpreter went to the Governor to ask for his permission. The Governor replied that with regard to the barks which I wished to send to the ships, I was free to come to my own arrangement with the owners, but he could not allow the artisans to be employed by us without express orders from court. I sent several messages to the Governor. The owners of the barks were holding out for written permission. As for the workers, I pointed out that under the present circumstances, I could not see why their services should be prescribed to us. The refusal of the Governor would be certain to induce de la Haye to resume hostilities. All these responses and remonstrances had no effect. The Governor remained firm. I could do nothing but wait. The Governor was, indeed, quite anxious to help us, but the Dutch with all their promises and presents made any negotiation on our part impossible. I reported everything to de la Haye.

May 1673

On 3 May I learnt that my letter to de la Haye had been intercepted and it was now in the hands of the Governor. The Dutch had wished the Governor to understand that I was keeping de la Haye posted about conditions within the city and the way in which Masulipatam could be attacked. The tenor of their whole conversation had been to try and insinuate that the sole purpose of my coming to Masulipatam was to try and gauge the favourable moment for an attack. I do not know how the Governor reacted to this intelligence, but I conveyed my complaints at the interception of my letter to this official. At first, he denied that such an action had taken place but later he acknowledged it. He exculpated himself by saying that it had been done without his orders. He even offered to return my letter to me. I had taught the interpreter what to say and he replied that since I had no use for the letter, the Governor could keep it. We could not continue to stay at a place where our needs were denied satisfaction, where we were intolerably insulted and where all promises were faithlessly broken. The Governor should provide us
with the means to withdraw and rejoin our General. The Governor dismissed the interpreter saying that he would consider our request. After this, the interpreter visited the homes of the important merchants in the city complaining at the behaviour of the Governor and asking them if they could provide us with some vessel on which we could withdraw. The merchants offered to intervene with the Governor with regard to the intercepted letter and insisted that I should not even consider withdrawing. The negotiations for the peace treaty were proceeding well and we could be assured of a favourable response from the court. If I did anything to precipitate matters now, it would ruin everything. I had to accept the situation as I could not think of any remedy. I was suddenly struck by a thought as to how I could ensure that my letters reached de la Haye without any tampering. This was through the agency of a Portuguese gentleman whose ship lay in harbour. He agreed to have letters delivered to de la Haye through his own ship’s boat. Before engaging in this, I wished to test if they were still attempting to intercept our letters. I wrote a letter which I gave to two of our peons to take out by catamaran. I told these men what they were to do.

The peons returned at four o’clock in the morning saying that they had been accosted by four of the Havildar’s soldiers at the place where they were to have got into a catamaran. One of these men had insisted that they had been ordered to seize all letters. I protested to the Governor and the principal merchants in the city with redoubled ardour. One of the merchants who had a lively affection for our nation undertook to speak to the Governor. At this point, we noticed that a launch had been sent to us from one of our ships. I asked for permission to send out a canoe with a Frenchman to meet the launch. Permission was granted but only on condition that no member of the launch set foot ashore. The unabated severity of the treatment to which we were subjected led me to send a message to the Governor to the effect that as we now had the means to withdraw I was going to embark with all the other Frenchmen at the lodge as I was unable to put up any longer with the humiliations to which we were continually exposed. The Governor told me I could do as I pleased. Since I was so
impatient I could withdraw, but I should consider well that such an act would entail a complete break in our relations. This curt reply made us reflect on the repercussions which were likely to follow in the wake of our embarkation. While we were in this state of irresolution, one of our friends assured us that we would certainly be arrested at the Customs House if we attempted to leave. Trying to make a virtue of necessity, I informed the Governor that I was prolonging my stay out of consideration for him. I asked for permission, however, to send food to the ships. The Governor expressed his satisfaction at our decision and gave us permission to send the victuals.

French Lodge Placed Under Threat

I sent to the private English merchants in Masulipatam to ask for arms. Our stocks were very deficient but we could not replenish them as whoever we approached found some reason to refuse us. We had, therefore, to make the best use of what we had. We filled several English glass bottles with powder, put fuses in them and then corked them. We intended to use these as grenades in case of attack. We laid up a supply of wood at the top of the house intending to set fire to the building if we were pressed too hard. We were only four Frenchmen and eight peons, but we were determined to put up a bold front and were resolved not to leave without inflicting some damage on the enemy.

At two o'clock on the morning of 5 May, the Kotwal, with about one hundred peons, came quietly up to the door of the lodge which he gently pressed as if to test if it had been closed securely. We were always watchful, particularly at night and were not, therefore, taken by surprise. We noted the Kotwal's action and felt certain that we would be attacked. Not wishing to take the initiative, we silently took up our positions within the lodge to defend ourselves. In the meantime the Kotwal withdrew with his men. The next day we learnt about the circumstances of the Kotwal's visit. Since the arrival of our ships, the Governor had taken to sleeping at the custom's shed. The second at the Dutch lodge chose the time when there were no merchants with the Governor to visit the latter. The Governor,
swayed by the reasons brought forward by the Dutchman and by the promise made to him that he would be given a substantial present if he ordered our arrest, directed the Kotwal to evict us from the lodge. The merchants of the city being fully aware of the hatred borne by the Dutch against us, and of the facility with which the Governor could be incited to violence by means of presents, were careful, in their own interests, to maintain their agents near the Governor to warn them about any decisions which might be taken. These agents immediately notified their masters about the order given to the Kotwal. The merchants came to the customs shed without delay and remonstrated that all their efforts to preserve peace would be undone by this action which was against all precepts of international law and justice. The Governor was moved by these remonstrances and immediately countermanded his orders to the Kotwal. From what we could judge, these orders reached the Kotwal just as he was on the point of forcing the doors to the lodge.

We agreed to abide by the advice given to us not to spread the news of this incident. The launch, followed by a bark loaded with different varieties of provisions, was sent back to the ships. We heard that the guards and volunteers who had been forced to land at Narasapur had managed to navigate the mouth of the river and had rejoined our ships. Mir Abdullah Baqir, one of the leading merchants of Masulipatam, about whom I have already spoken, asked me to send him our interpreter. We sent our interpreter and Mir Abdullah Baqir had a long talk with him about the present situation. Mir Abdullah Baqir had emphasized the point that we should not lose patience. In spite of all the difficulties created by the Governor, we should bear with him and not break off relations. These are minor details when compared to our main affair which was proceeding well. The Dutch at Golconda were taking extraordinary pains to contravene us at court, but we could rest assured that we would obtain a favourable response. He complained at our having burnt the boats in the harbour and finished his conversation on this note. These people always came back to this point. The sincerity of Mir Abdullah Baqir could not be doubted and I thanked him for all the goodwill he had shown us. On 7 May,
our ships appeared a little closer, and on the following day they had anchored at the usual position in the roads. As our ships drew closer, the Hindu and the Muslim merchants made haste to transport all their most precious possessions outside the city and the troops were made to take up their positions. There were at this time about 4,000 soldiers at Masulipatam including 600 Persian cavalry. The latter were of good physique, well-accoutred and appeared quite courageous.

When I sent our interpreter to the Governor to ask for permission to send water and wood to our ships, this was refused to us on the pretext that the necessary orders had not been obtained. Our interpreter had been received in the presence of the Dutch chief and his deputy who had come to listen to a firman which had been sent to them by the King of Golconda. We felt that the refusal may have had something to do with the presence of the Dutch. After this, I sent our interpreter with our complaints to Mir Abdullah Baqir, our unfailing source of strength. Mir Abdullah Baqir said that the Governor was not altogether to blame as his orders from court permitted him very limited freedom of action. Our benefactor promised to intercede personally so that we were allowed complete freedom to send what we wished to the ships. The Dutch were continuing their solicitations at court and had further improved their position by the sumptuous presents which they were giving. The firman which had come for the Dutch contained the declaration made by the King that he was extending his protection over them. The Governor was instructed to follow Dutch advice in opposing any move at disembarkation which we should make. More than

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11 The position of Mir Abdullah Baqir may be gauged from the fact that he had once held the position of Havildar at Masulipatam. Fawcett, E.F., II, p. 229.  
12 The Dutch resident at the Golconda court was Hartsinck. Carré, II, p. 530.  
13 Carré, (ibid., II, p. 531), gives further details of the agreement which had been arrived at with the Dutch. It was decided that the Qutbshahi forces would not be recalled from San Thomé but would await the arrival of the Dutch squadron. The Dutch would capture San Thomé and restore it to the Qutbshah in return for which they would be allowed to retain all the French artillery in the town and be exempted from all taxes throughout Golconda for ten years.
anything else, it was important for the Governor to prolong negotiations with us until the squadron promised by the Dutch should appear. This merchant advised us that if our fleet was not to be augmented in any way it would be unwise on our part to prolong our stay at the roads. There were plenty of places to the north of Masulipatam where we could put in and be assured of procuring provisions and the other articles which we required. As for San Thome and its dependencies, unless we were prepared to put ourselves to some expense all our efforts to gain these places would fail. He asked us to base our future actions on these assumptions. Our interpreter reported the entire conversation to me.

THE IMPRESSION CREATED IN GOLCONDA BY THE ARRIVAL OF OUR SQUADRON—THE GOVERNOR OF MASULIPATAM IS AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE

On the same day I received a letter from a French merchant at Golconda who wrote that the arrival of our squadron had created a great sensation at court. The principal merchants had immediately met Sayyid Muzaffar and had tried to impress upon him the importance of reaching an accommodation with us to prevent a total stoppage of trade. The minister had replied that he was quite aware of this and had wished to speak to the King, but unfortunately our setting fire to the ships had incensed His Majesty greatly. Under the circumstances, it was more appropriate to expel us from the kingdom. The merchants, affected by these reactions of the minister, now withdrew. Sayyid Muzaffar had then sent for the chief of the Dutch counter in the capital. He had asked for naval help to force us to leave the coast. The Dutchman had given an assurance that a squadron would arrive on the coast within a month at the latest. Sayyid Muzaffar, however, had second thoughts on the consequences of this war and had decided it would be more advantageous to settle for peace. He had sent a royal firman which we would be receiving. The Governor had also been sent orders to find out on what basis we were prepared to negotiate a peace treaty.

In the evening, we were given permission to send refreshments and wood to the ships. I sent a bark to the ships with a message
for de la Haye informing him about all the news which I had received.

A new battery enclosed by a stockade was constructed at the tip of the bay on 9 May. The Governor, to ensure that no time was wasted, spent the whole day there in the company of the Dutch second. It was for this reason that the departure of the boat in the harbour was delayed for it could not be sent without the permission of the Governor. I had approached the Governor but he had told us that the sanction would be issued to us only after his return. As he did not come back until ten o'clock at night, our men, who had grown tired of waiting in the boat, had returned to the ships.

**Frenchmen Placed Under Arrest on Divi Island—**
**Arrival of the Director Baron at San Thome’**

On 10 May, I received information that a boat carrying Frenchmen had run ashore on the island of Divi, close to Masulipatam. The Frenchmen had been arrested. They had been forced to give up the letters which they had been carrying and these had been handed over to the Governor. I did not know what to make of this news, but I sent two peons all the same to find out if this report was really true.

The bark which I had sent to the ships the previous day returned with empty casks which had been sent for refilling. De la Haye had sent a gentleman to get full details about the current situation from me. This gentleman had come in the launch which was following behind the bark. As he got down at the Point, which he had to do for purposes of identification, he took the opportunity to make a quick appraisal of the battery and the disposition of the soldiers. A Dutchman now appeared and showed his extreme annoyance that a Frenchman had been allowed a view of their post. A Moorish officer, however, gave short shrift to the Dutchman who was forced to go away. The Frenchman was treated with extreme politeness and allowed to re-embark. When the latter came to the lodge, he handed over the letter which de la Haye had written to me. The gist of the letter was that I should press for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations and that I was to send food, water and wood to the ships. De la
Haye had also enclosed a letter for the Governor in which he had voiced the complaint that despite the promises which had been given to us, when we had approached the Governor for permission to send barks to the ships we, had found impediments in our way. This letter was handed over to the Governor in the presence of the Dutch second who was with him. The Governor showed his consideration for the Dutchmen by offering him the letter to read, but the latter excused himself.

The Governor again made difficulties over allowing us to fill our water barrels. I had to send our interpreter, but the Governor refused to change the obdurate stand which he had taken. It was only when two of the principal merchants standing close by interceded on our behalf that the Governor gave his consent. In accordance with the instructions which we had given to him, our interpreter next made mention of the fact that it had come to our knowledge that our men had been arrested at Divi and that our letters had been intercepted. The Governor claimed complete ignorance about these affairs. He asked our interpreter to inform me that he had received orders from Golconda to enter into negotiations with us. It was now up to us to put forward our conditions. I thought it would be better to receive more accurate information and sent de Malfosse to the Governor. The Governor confirmed that he had received orders from court to start negotiations and it was now up to us to propose the articles for peace. I sent all this information to de la Haye through the person whom he had sent so that the General could issue me the necessary orders. Unfortunately, this gentleman could only leave on the following day, 11 May.

I was reliably informed that a launch carrying some Frenchmen had entered the island of Divi through a branch of the river Krishna. The men had been arrested here. The packet of letters which they had been carrying had been taken away and sent to the Governor. The letters were opened in the presence of the Dutch second. There was one letter in code which they had been unable to decipher, but the others had so upset the Dutchman that he had retired to a Company garden outside the city in which their goods were stored. Since I was now so sure of these events, I again approached the Governor about the arrest of our men, but he continued to disclaim all knowledge.
He added, however, that he had sent some people to the spot to make enquiries. It was our belief that the launch had been sent from San Thomé.

On the same day, we learnt that the Governor of Narasapur had set Junet at liberty in return for the sum of 300 rupees. A Dutchman coming from Pulicat informed us that the Director Baron had arrived at San Thomé. I do not know if it was this news which had prompted the Dutch to withdraw their belongings from the garden outside the city further inland. The Dutch tried to make us believe that they were paying 800 rupees a day for the upkeep of the troops within the city. On 12 May, I informed de la Haye about the arrival of Baron at San Thomé and sent a bark full of refreshments to the ships.

I again sent the interpreter to the Governor with a message that surely now the Governor could not deny that some of our men were prisoners at Divi, that their letters had been taken away, and that these letters had been sent to him. The news of this incident had spread so far that the Governor could not claim ignorance any more. The letters were relinquished to the interpreter who brought them to me. The cover of the packet had been torn off and discarded. Only two of the letters appeared to have been opened. These had been resealed. The letters had been written by the Director Baron at San Thomé. One letter was addressed to me but all the rest were for de la Haye. These confirmed that Baron had arrived at San Thomé. I was later told that there were some more papers at the customs shed which had come by the same route. I asked for them and they were handed over to me. The documents consisted of a map of the coast, a manual of navigation and a kind of log-book of the voyage undertaken by the launch. It appeared that the men had left San Thomé on 5 May and had been forced by adverse weather conditions to enter into a branch of the river Krishna. After sailing two leagues up the river, shortage of food and water had forced them to disembark at a village. They had been immediately arrested and put inside a large house which was guarded by several soldiers. They had been disarmed and dispossessed of their money and their letters. Apart from this they had been treated well. The launch had been very badly navigated despite the presence of an extremely able officer and a
reasonably efficient pilot on board. I sent de la Haye these letters and papers by catamaran.

I sent to the Governor to ask that our men who had been arrested on the island of Divi should be restored their liberty. While promising to have these men brought to Masulipatam, the Governor asked that the three Persians who had been arrested on the small Portuguese ship near Narasapur should also be freed. He declared that he was making this request only through charity as the three Persians belonged to the same faith as himself. I replied that I would write to de la Haye but I was sure that the official's wishes would be gratified. On 13 May, de la Haye informed me that he had received the letters and the packets. Although he was very satisfied by the news he had received from San Thomé, I was still to try and conclude negotiations as speedily as possible. I sent de Malfosse with an interpreter to the Governor to draw attention to the fact that as the time limit of twelve days requested by the Governor to receive the reply from court had elapsed, I would like to know what course this official now intended to pursue. The Governor had replied that although the response had not yet arrived, he had no doubt but that it would reach soon. However, as he had received the necessary authorization from court, he saw no reason why we could not enter into a treaty. We should meet on the following day. The Governor was sure that it would not take more than two hours to settle our affairs. He had remarked to de Malfosse that in his opinion, the Customs shed, where he was usually to be found, was too public a place to carry out any negotiations. He was returning to his residence outside the city and he suggested that I should come on the following day and meet him there. Before concluding the conversation, the Governor made a second request that the three Persians should be released. De Malfosse promised him satisfaction on this score and also accepted the arrangements for my meeting.

The merchant, Mir Abdullah Baqir had sent his compliments for the good news which we had received from San Thomé. I sent our interpreter to thank him. Mir Abdullah Baqir told our man that our affairs were proceeding well and there was every likelihood they would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. However, the merchant was certain that during our interview
with the Governor our tempers would ride high. It would be prudent on our part to keep cool, adopt a moderate stance and not to allow ourselves to be discouraged by the demands which would be made by the Governor. Mir Abdullah Baqir would try and help us but he was certain that we would not be able to gain very much if we did not give a present at court. Upon the return of the interpreter, I wrote again to de la Haye asking for fresh instructions with regard to the visit I was to make to the Governor.

The gentleman whom de la Haye had sent the previous time was sent again. On 14 May, he came with a duplicate of the letter which I had already received. I was asked to bring the affair to a speedy conclusion but I was not given any indication as to whether I was to undertake to give a present or make any other kind of offer. And yet these constituted the essentials of our dilemma. The lack of any directive made us put off the meeting with the Governor which was to have taken place the next day.

François Martin has Another Interview with the Governor—Refusal of de la Haye to make any Presents to the King of Golconda for the Cession of San Thome'.

At dawn on 15 May I sent out a launch filled with refreshments. I also sent a letter to de la Haye in which I asked for precise instructions on two points. Firstly, as to the demands which I was to advance to the Governor to secure possession of the city of San Thomé and its dependencies, and secondly as to what I was to say when I was asked about the present or the sum of money which was being claimed. I added that it would be impossible for us to terminate the affair without incurring some expenditure but I would do nothing without specific instructions.

The three of us, the gentleman sent by de la Haye, de Malfosse and myself then went to meet the Governor. After the first civilities, the Governor informed us that a firman had been sent to us and that as it was fifty feet away from where we were, we should go and present ourselves to receive it. We went immediately accompanied by one of the principal officials. We
received the firman with the usual ceremony and then brought it to the residence of the Governor where it was read out. The contents were in conformity with the description which will be given by me later. The firman, which was in my name, had been drafted in reply to the letters which I had written. In substance, the King declared that he was greatly surprised at the way in which we had captured San Thomé and at the resultant hostilities. He reminded us that it was he, who during the reign of the late King, had secured us the firman by which we had been allowed to establish ourselves at Masulipatam. He complained that not withstanding our obligation to him on this score, we had yet to send an envoy to court despite his accession to the throne. He was, however, quite agreeable to forgetting the past but he wanted us to maintain good relations in the future. The King then stated that he had instructed the Governor of Masulipatam to withdraw himself from all his other preoccupation and devote himself entirely to our affair and draw it to a speedy conclusion. As soon as the Governor sent word to court that the articles of peace had been determined and an accord had been reached with regard to the value of the present, which was being demanded for the unconditional cession of San Thomé and its dependencies, the King would immediately order his troops near San Thomé to withdraw. Thereafter, the firman granting us full possession of San Thomé and its dependencies would be issued to us but only when our present had reached Golconda. At the bottom of the document, Sayyid Muzaffar had inserted that it was only because of the consideration which he enjoyed with the King that the latter had issued the firman.

After the firman had been read out, we started our talks. The Governor began to make exorbitant demands claiming that his sovereign should not only be compensated for the loss of San Thomé but should also receive recompense for the expenditure incurred during the siege. I replied that there was no justification for these claims as our General had attacked the city only after having been repeatedly insulted by the Governor. After having conquered the city, we had been subjected to a long siege which had been raised only after a show of force by us. Our claims could even be stated to rest upon
a kind of double conquest. As for the city, everyone knew that it was now in a totally ruined state and did not yield any revenue. If the question of compensation were to come up, we also could advance our claims. The siege had forced us into incurring a sizable expenditure and we had lost several extremely valuable ships as a result of it. If the losses were to be compared, ours would certainly outbalance those of the King of Golconda. I then added that it might be more politic on their part to take advantage of the present circumstances and negotiate with us now. We were expecting our squadron each day and, after the arrival of our ships, perhaps they would find us less accommodating. Another factor was the close understanding between our General and the Hindu princes of the Carnatic who would undoubtedly join us if war broke out again. The Governor for his part was not at any loss for arguments, and at times, we even took recourse to threats against each other. Whenever we became too excited, the emissary, who had been sent to us with the firman would interpose himself between us and try to calm us. The Governor would not reduce any of his claims and demanded more than 100,000 crowns. I refused to commit myself despite the urgings of de Malfosse and the gentleman who had come with us. At length, I stated that it would be futile on their part to hope for a present from our General. However, since the Company had entered into an agreement to send envoys to court, we would send an emissary and observe the customary etiquette. However, we could not bind ourselves in any way with regard to the present for this was surely tendered on a voluntary basis. Nor could we give any time limit for the arrival of our envoy at court for this would depend on the orders which we received from our superiors. The Governor returned to the point of the money we were to pay but I would not change my position. We finally agreed that I was to give de la Haye a full appraisal of these talks and obtain his final instructions.

We left the Governor and when we had come to our lodge, we saw a launch which had been sent to us from our ships. We went across by boat and the commanding officer handed me a letter from de la Haye in which I was asked to positively conclude the negotiations without, however, being provided
with any further directives on the matter. Verbally, however, I was given to understand that I had been allowed complete freedom in the conduct of the negotiations and was authorized to make any minor adjustments I considered necessary. I felt that these instructions offered me were far too inadequate a basis to make any offers, and I became even firmer in my resolve to return to the ships. We reached our vessels at eleven o'clock at night.

I gave de la Haye a complete account of everything which had taken place during our stay at the lodge—of the opposition we had encountered, of the set-backs we had faced, the policy we had adopted and of the arrival of the firman which I had sent to the General along with its translation. I then expanded on our conversation with the Governor. I had hoped and expected that our handling of the situation would meet with the approval of de la Haye and that he would be happy to hear that the firman had arrived. However, I found him quite cold in the reception which he accorded to us. He began to berate me for not having concluded the agreement, for not only had I been given wide powers but the Governor had also received the necessary authority. I replied that it was true that I had been given these powers but as de la Haye had not said anything about the present which was being claimed, I could scarcely be expected to make any commitment on my own authority. De la Haye had replied that in his position he could not make any gift, but as for me, since I was in the service of the Company, I could make the necessary advance if I felt this to be conducive to the Company interests. The only response which I could make to this was that I was too junior in rank to be given the authority to make advances of this order. I could do nothing without written orders. At this point, the meeting came to an end. De la Haye retired, saying we could resume our discussions the next day.

The attitude of de la Haye would surprise all except those who know him. I have already pointed out that the General never gave written orders, thus reserving for himself the opportunity to either praise or blame his agent according to the way in which the matter turned. It was this attitude which had prompted him on the one hand to write to me to terminate the
affair at Masulipatam without laying down any guidelines and on the other hand, to send me verbal messages through officials despatched by him, to the effect that the situation was left entirely in my hands and I was given the fullest discretionary authority to make whatever adjustments I considered necessary. De la Haye had hoped that by giving me these assurances I would be induced to come to an agreement with the Governor with regard to the present or the sum of money expected from us. De la Haye would then repudiate the agreement but would insist that I honour the compact that had been made. By this expedient, pacification would be ensured without the General himself being forced to shoulder any portion of the expenditure which was a necessary adjunct to the cessation of hostilities. I was well aware of de la Haye's intentions and what had proved the most displeasing to the General was my refusal to enter into any commitment which I would later find compromising.

De la Haye did not appear to have confidence in the translation of the firman which had been made. He summoned the three Persians on board the ship to read it to him. The intermediary he chose to use was a Portuguese who knew a little of the Moorish language but who proved almost unintelligible to the Persian merchants. As far as we could make out, the first excuse advanced by the Persians was that they could not decipher the firman. This pretext was ignored and pressure was brought to bear on them. Seized by fear, they read what they could, while the Portuguese interpreted to the best of his ability. In this explanation, the most essential point, namely, that the King of Golconda was delegating complete responsibility for the direction of negotiations to the Governor of Masulipatam, received no mention at all. Nor did they say anything about the sending of an envoy or the giving of a present. I was present during these proceedings and several times I could not help ejaculating to de la Haye that these men could make nothing of the letter. If he had reservations about the translation which I had brought, it would be very easy to have a Persian scriven conveyed to the ship in company with our interpreter and have all doubts cleared by these two men. De la Haye would pay me no attention since

14 It is possible that the "Moorish language" referred to here was Urdu.
this translation accorded so well with his own views. He refused to take any further steps and sent me to the Governor with the message that our General was under no obligation to make any kind of payment for obtaining full rights of possession over San Thomé and its dependencies. This was to be taken by the Governor as the final decision of de la Haye. I was also to ask that the Frenchmen arrested at Divi should be freed. De la Haye promised, for his part, to restore to liberty the three Persians. De la Haye ordered a gentleman to go with me and be present during the interview with the Governor. We left the ship at three o'clock in the afternoon. As we approached the point where the batteries had been constructed, we noticed that most of the soldiers had been withdrawn. Doubtless, this had been done because it had appeared that peace was about to be restored. After our arrival at the lodge, I sent a message to the Governor to inform him that we would be coming to see him on the following day.

THIRD INTERVIEW WITH THE GOVERNOR—THE OBSTACLE TO PEACE

I went to see the Governor in accordance with the message I had sent to him on the previous day. I handed over de la Haye's letter which was only one of civility and good wishes. After this, we started our conversation. The Governor persisted in his demand that a present should be given to the King and to his minister, Sayyid Muzaffar. He alleged that the Dutch had offered a considerable sum of money for the exchange of Pulicat for San Thomé, and it was essential for us also to make some offer. I repeated what I had said on my first visit and added that the demands of the Governor impinged on the sovereignty of our nation and the authority of our General who would prefer to risk everything rather than bestow the smallest gift. San Thomé was now in our possession. We would not give it up and it was not in their power to recapture it. Moreover, we could inflict more damage on them than they could on us. I was, however, prepared to confirm the earlier undertaking which I had given that the Company would send an envoy to the Golconda court. The envoy would, as was customary, carry a present with him. As the latter aspect of the mission was quite voluntary, no stipulations could be laid down with regard to the value of the present
which was expected. As on the first occasion, tempers began to rise. An official of the city and one of the principal merchants who were participating in the meeting attempted to mediate between us and calm us down. When the Governor found he could not secure any promises from us with regard to the presents for which he had been asking, he declared that he could not continue to negotiate with us on such a basis. We should write directly to the court with regard to the firman which we had received, clearly indicating all our reservations. During the intermediary period, there would be no change in our relations. We now asked the Governor to release the Frenchmen detained on the island of Divi. The Governor promised that within two days we could expect them back on our ships. He in turn requested that the three Persians should be set at liberty to which we complied. After this we withdrew.

Before returning to the ship I sent my thanks to the official and the merchant who had attended the meeting for the way in which they had tried to help us. I do not know their true sentiments but they had certainly been very open in their support of our interests. The merchant informed me that we should show a little flexibility now. Although our affair was proceeding well it would be advisable for us to take the decision to make some gift to ensure that everything was terminated on a successful note. We then embarked to return to the ships. The sea was high and we did not attempt to cross the bar that night. We arrived on board only on the morning of 18 May.

**De la Haye Decides to Send a Mission to the King—Upon Refusal of François Martin Châteaupers is Sent on this Mission**

We reported our conversation with the Governor to de la Haye and described how it had ended. The General thereupon told me to prepare myself for a trip to Golconda. I replied that it would be much easier for us to settle our affairs at Masulipatam rather than at the capital. Here, we had only the Governor who had to be contended with. At court, we would be unable to avoid giving presents to a few people at least. This would assuredly arouse the cupidity of others who would be unwilling to be left
out. Moreover, there was also the fear that the Dutch would create obstacles. These considerations should be balanced against the fact that the Governor of Masulipatam had been empowered to sign a treaty with us, and once he had done so the whole incident could be regarded as closed. I further added that unless the King and Sayyid Muzaffar each received a present, it would be futile to undertake the journey to court. I ended by saying that it was not advisable to reject an opportunity to negotiate when we had been provided with the occasion to do so.

De la Haye replied that he had no intention of spending any money. If, however, I felt that it was appropriate to make some gifts on behalf of the Company I was free to make the necessary advances. I would, however, have to act on my own authority as de la Haye would have no part in it. To this I replied that I had no authority myself. I was quite ready to undertake the journey provided I was given the necessary orders and furnished with the means calculated to give my mission a reasonable chance of success. De la Haye refused to give me either the instructions or the funds and declared that he would make me go on his terms by force if necessary. He became angry during the conversation, and I had to put up with many insults which he hurled at me. I remained firm and refused to go unless I was given clear instructions and provided with adequate means. The conversation then came to an end.

De la Haye now had a private talk with the gentleman who had accompanied us when we had gone to meet the Governor. An officer who had been present during this talk told me that the gentleman had claimed to de la Haye that it would be much easier to reach a settlement than I had been trying to make out. He had tried to put forward the claim that all that was required to secure peace and the cession of San Thomé and its dependencies to us was for de la Haye to send a friendly letter to the King of Golconda through this gentleman. I do not know if the gentleman spoke in this way in good faith, but de la Haye seized upon this advice and decided on the spot to send this gentleman to court. The General had allowed himself to be carried away all the more easily as the advice had accorded so

well with his own views. It had also been reported to de la Haye that the major portion of the militia which had been summoned to Masulipatam from outside had been withdrawn. This made him feel that he was already master of the situation. He would not have cared if the members of the Company had been excluded from the honour of concluding a peace treaty. According to his own calculation, everything was proceeding well and he had no further role to play. Despite this, he suggested that I should accompany the gentleman to court. I returned to my earlier stand—that I was quite prepared to do anything on condition that I was given the proper directions and provided with the necessary means. However, it transpired that this proposal had been made to me only for the sake of appearances and the only response which I was able to elicit was a tirade. For some time I was treated with disdain after which I found myself thrown aside. It was only because of the efforts which I had made in the past that the situation appeared so favourable now. The callous treatment to which I had been exposed had been so totally unexpected by me that I fell into an illness which lasted five to six months.\(^{16}\)

On 19 May, I was ordered to write to de Malfosse directing him to inform the Governor that de la Haye had taken the decision to write to court but would delay doing so until the Frenchmen arrested on the island of Divi had been set free. I was already very upset at the way in which I had been treated and some of my feelings overflowed into the letter. De la Haye was so angry when the letter was read out that he tore it to shreds and addressed several scathing allusions to me. I drafted a second letter which met with his approval and was sent to the city.

We received duplicates of the letters which had been sent on board the launch which had run ashore on Divi island. Upon the orders of de la Haye, I wrote to the French merchants at Narasapur to keep a ready stock of cordage, refreshments, arrack and oil for us as we needed all these articles.

\(^{16}\)De la Haye, being suspicious by nature, believed that Martin was trying to advance the interests of the Governor, and refused to accept the arguments of the diarist on merit. Ibid., II, p. 541.
On 21 May, the Frenchmen who had been arrested on the island of Divi arrived on board. Sieur Herpin, a lieutenant of the royal navy who had accompanied Baron and who had embarked on the launch to come and inform us of the arrival of the Director, told de la Haye that they had left Surat on ... and had sailed for Bombay. They had entered this port and the President who administered this place on behalf of the English Company had welcomed them very warmly. They had spent a few days here and during this time, seven Dutch ships had come up and anchored at the entrance to the port. These vessels had then sailed away towards the north. Our three ships had stopped at Rajapur and Goa to find out the whereabouts of the Dutch fleet which was known to be sailing along the Malabar coast. After leaving Goa, our ships had made for the open sea. Our men had managed to guide themselves by observing the coast of Ceylon and had then approached between Tranquebar and Porto Novo. They had subsequently sailed up along the coast and had moored before Pondicherry where they had taken on food and munitions. They had then cast anchor before San Thomé on ... Herpin added that after their departure from San Thomé by launch, a sudden squall which they had thought would cost them their lives, had driven them on to Divi Island. When they had been set free here, their arms and money which had been taken away from them at the time of their arrest had been restored to them.

We learnt later that after our departure from San Thomé, the enemy had made several appearances before the city. This had resulted in skirmishes. We had lost one of our lascar

17Baron had left Surat on 15 February 1673. He had four ships with him, the royal ship, the “Bayonnais”, the “Guillot”, a flute, and two hookers of the Company, the “St. Denis” and the “Nobert”. B.N., N.A., 9352 (73).
18Gerald Aungier.
19Baron had arrived at Bombay on about 12 February, 1673 (O S.). The English gave him a warm reception as they were relieved to have additional resources in the face of the Dutch threat. Fawcett, E F., I, p. 62. Baron had arrived at San Thomé on 4 May, 1673. B.N., N.A., 9352 (73). Bellanger de Lespinau, who was at Pondicherry at this time records a curious incident of clairvoyance, when, through the agency of some Indian fortune tellers, he was able to see exactly what had transpired at Bombay at the time of Baron’s arrival there. R.Q.H., 1897, pp. 193-94.
 captains, a good soldier and also some of the men who had belonged to his contingent. The captain had met his fate when, followed by these men, he had advanced a little too far towards the Moors. The Moors had again made an appearance on the day our vessels had arrived. They had dispersed as they were under the illusion that these boats were those of de la Haye.

The Director Baron cannot be given sufficient praise for the courage he had shown in resolving to engage in a voyage which he knew could prove hazardous on such feeble vessels as the “Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne” and the two hookers. The Dutch had been informed about the preparations in which Baron had engaged and had sent thirty vessels to range along the Malabar coast. To judge from the steps being taken by the Dutch, it appeared unlikely that Baron would be able to escape their net. Gueston, who had left for Persia, ran as grave a risk of falling into their hands. Despite this, the Dutch failed to capture either one of the two Directors.

The Commissary was ordered to go ashore with the three Persians and present them to the Governor. The Governor conveyed his thanks to de la Haye.

The merchant, Mir Abdullah Baqir, sent his greetings to de la Haye through two of his men whom he sent with a present of fruit. These men asked us to release the vessel which belonged to their master. We agreed, but before returning the ship, we took off three small pieces of cannon and kept back as much of the rigging as we wanted. It was wrong to treat a person who had openly declared his predilection for our nation in such a manner. Mir Abdullah Baqir singled me out to voice his complaints but I no longer enjoyed the standing to plead his cause before de la Haye.

**DEPARTURE OF CHÂTEAUPERS FOR GOLCONDA**

Everything was ready for the departure of the gentleman who was being sent to Golconda. On 23 May, he left for the mainland where he was to gather his requirements for the journey.

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This would explain why van Goens had proceeded to Surat and the Gulf of Cambay after his departure from Bombay. *Vide* Briggs, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
The guidelines given to him were very simple—that our right to San Thomé and its dependencies should not be questioned. In describing the extent of these dependencies several villages which had never featured in such a list in the past were now included. The present for the King consisted of a triple barrelled gun and a pair of double-barrelled pistols. The minister Sayyid Muzaffar was to be given a gold chain weighing a mark and six ounces, and a total of 500 crowns was provided for expenses of the trip. Two letters, one for the King and the second for the minister were sent with the envoy. These were polite letters of credential written partly in Spanish and partly in Portuguese. The interpreter provided for Châteaupers was a Portuguese called Antoine Cattel, a sensible man, but totally ignorant of court etiquette. I could not help pointing out again to de la Haye that the envoy would not be able to accomplish anything and that something more was required if de la Haye wished to ensure success. I urged him to consider that if he was prepared to make some adjustment the whole matter could be decided in Masulipatam. De la Haye refused to be swayed by any of these arguments.

The gentleman embarked for his journey accompanied by his suite to the sound of a five-gun salute. Without maligning the envoy, it may be said that his knowledge fell far short of that required for engaging in a mission of this nature. Even had he been fully conversant, he could not have hoped for a successful outcome in view of the fact that he possessed neither the orders nor the necessary means to ensure it. This same gentleman had stated on a later occasion when he had found himself in good company that although he had secured his nomination by making advances to de la Haye, he had himself regarded the mission only as a diversion.

The Governor sent his reply to a letter from de la Haye which had been handed over to him by our envoy. He showed his annoyance at our refusal to negotiate through him even though he had been so deputed by his King. He had, however,

*De la Haye attempted to excuse himself for these paltry gifts by stating that as a soldier these were the only gifts he could offer. Carré, II, p. 542.*
De la Haye at Masulipatam

added that he would write to court nonetheless recommending our envoy.

News of San Thomé

The Company ketch, the "Postillon" anchored on 25 May amidst our ships. The captain had then boarded the "Breton" with letters from Baron which he had handed over to de la Haye. They had despatched this ship from San Thomé to find out about us as they had not received any information from us since the time of our departure. We learnt that the enemy had continued to remain on the plains from where they had been preventing the local people from bringing us any supplies of food. Our people had been reliably informed that the Dutch had prepared a squadron at Ceylon which was ready for despatch to these coasts. Baron appeared to be pressing de la Haye to return to San Thomé.

The captain of the ketch told me privately that after the arrival of Baron at San Thomé, de Rebrey, who had been appointed to govern San Thomé in the absence of de la Haye, had visited Baron on board his ship. He had handed over the instructions of de la Haye by which Baron had been asked not to disembark until de la Haye had returned. Nor was anything which had been brought from Surat to be discharged. The food and munitions which had been brought to the ships at Pondicherry constituted the only portion of the cargo which could be unloaded. Baron had respected these orders punctiliously and had not stepped ashore. The only judgement that can be passed on this conduct of de la Haye is that he was quite sure that he would be able to conclude peace at Masulipatam. He did not wish it to be said that the Company had played any part in either the conquest of San Thomé or its preservation. It was because of the same consideration that he had never acknowledged the praise worthy, and at times, the distinguished services which had been rendered to him by many of the Company servants during the siege of San Thomé.

"Postillon" had left San Thomé on approximately 13 May. Vide ibid., II, p. 526.
On 26 May, we were informed that the gentleman had taken his departure for Golconda. On the same day, we released the small Portuguese ship which had been taken close to the river at Narasapur. The voyage of this vessel had been delayed as a result of this seizure.

The captain of the ketch was sent to greet the Governor and assure him that his services to us would be recognized. The latter received the greetings very coldly. He complained at our refusal to negotiate with him and declared that he had expected to be recompensed by something a little more than mere thanks for the way in which he had treated us and for the letters which he had written on our behalf to the minister, Sayyid Muzaffar. The only present which he received was a piece of ambergris weighing four and a half ounces which de la Haye sent to him on the day prior to the departure of the French vessels.

As the month drew towards its close, each day we received barkloads of food, refreshments, wood and water. We were running out of these commodities. If the Governor had been at all serious about his threat not to allow anything to be taken out of the city, we would have been forced to seek food elsewhere. Three of the ships which had been captured at the Masulipatam roads were still with us. The Governor had asked us to return them several times. De la Haye had promised that the ships would be sent back from San Thomé. If we wished to win over this official, surely we could have been less adamant on this point. Officers and crew members were sent to man the prizes with orders to follow the same route as the Admiral. Just as we were about to leave, a man came on board with a letter from Sher Khan Lodi. Sher Khan laid claims to one of the prize ships with belonged to a merchant at Porto Novo. De la Haye immediately withdrew the Frenchmen on board and returned this vessel.

*Carré states that the Governor had his own motives for sending all these provisions. The trade of Masulipatam had been brought to a complete standstill as a result of the presence of de la Haye there. The Governor wished the French to depart as quickly as possible so that commercial operations could be resumed. *Ibid.* II, p. 541.
DEPARTURE OF DE LA HAYE FROM MASULIPATAM (31 MAY)—His return via Pondicherry

Everything was ready and on 31 May we started on our return trip. We had the “Breton”, the “Flamand”, the ketch and the two prizes. We had two alternatives before us. We could either reach San Thomé by sailing close to the coast so that we could take advantage of the current of air which blows out from the land each year during the month June, or we could sail into the open sea as close as possible to the wind and make our way southwards. The first course appeared the more promising one, but since wind movements cannot always be foretold with complete accuracy, de la Haye decided against it. We would have to sail within easy visibility of the coast and de la Haye had reason to be apprehensive about such a course as it increased the chances of our encountering the Dutch squadron about which there was talk. It was decided, therefore, that we should sail into the open sea. Orders were given to the officers of the other boats and the point which was the most emphasized was that each individual should do his utmost to ensure that the vessels did not separate from each other. The weather could not have been unkind as we discovered when we attempted to sail towards the south. We encountered persistent south south-westerly and west south-westerly winds. The sea was high and the currents were also against us. However, once we were well out at sea, the weather proved a little less harsh.

June 1673

The prize ships which we had brought with us were unable to contend against the winds as effectively as the “Breton” and on 2 June, one disappeared from our sight. The next day, we lost view of the second prize, as also of the Company ketch, while the “Flamand” lagged behind. We lost a considerable portion of our time waiting for this ship and were finally compelled to sail back to it. We fired two cannon shots at intervals of time, this being the signal for the crew to place their ship before the wind and join us. The more we advanced

Van Goens had left Ceylon with a squadron of 17 ships on 25 May 1673. D.R., 21 pp. 201, 208.
towards the "Flamand", the more it seemed to retreat before us and it appeared as though there was some design in this manoeuvre. When de da Haye realized that we were losing time in this pursuit, he ordered his ship to resume its route. On 4 June, not one of the four ships could be seen. The weather was continuously cloudy and it was not possible to take the altitude of the sun. We lost several sails and were often reduced to navigating only with our masts and ropes. Throughout this difficult passage, de la Haye functioned both as captain and sailor and the success of our voyage was largely due to his leadership and alertness. The officers on the ship were also extremely skilful sailors and they resented the fact that de la Haye would often seek the advice of Chevalier de Maisonneuve, another naval officer on board this ship. They began to be lax in their duties, or rather, to refuse to perform them. Some of the crew members became infected by this example and refused to carry out orders on several occasions. We all suffered during this trip, I, perhaps more than the others as I barely had the strength to survive. De la Haye possessed a special knack for pushing all those whom he did not like to the absolute limit. My refusal to go to Golconda had utterly enraged him. The members of his household were instructed not to give me anything I wanted and for three or four days even fresh bread and water were denied to me. Finally, however, the attitude of de la Haye changed. Perhaps the state to which I had been reduced moved him to pity. He withdrew his earlier orders with regard to the treatment to be meted out to me.

An Encounter with the Fleet of Admiral Rijkloff—An Open Battle is Averted

At last we succeeded in placing ourselves on the southerly route and our pilots assured us that we now had a wind which would propel us towards San Thomé. We steered towards the land and on 21 June we sighted three high mountains which we recognized. One of the pilots who had made two trips to Pondicherry claimed that these were the mountains at Sadras,\(^{25}\) ten

\(^{8}\text{Sadraspatam in the text. The Dutch had established themselves here in 1647.}\)
to twelve leagues south of San Thomé. De la Haye showed a
better sense of judgement when he identified these as being the
mountains which lie three leagues to the south of San Thomé. It
was the identification of the pilot which finally prevailed and we
only realized our error when we discovered between eighteen to
twenty small and large ships ranged in a line along the coast.
Because of the mistake of the pilot, we no longer had the wind
behind us. Had we accepted the surmise of de la Haye, we would
have sailed close to the wind and have found ourselves to the
windward of these ships which we recognized to be those of the
Dutch. This was the much vaunted fleet of Rijkloff.

De la Haye decided what was to be done without the least
hesitation. He declared that we should continue our route,
sailing as close as possible to the wind and anchor at San
Thomé where the Dutch vessels were to be found. This decision
was fraught with danger. We were almost within the reach of
the enemy cannon and we would have to run the gauntlet of
their fire. At this point, there was a sudden squall. The direction
of the wind changed and our foretop sail collapsed. This was set
right and the squall subsided as quickly as it had arisen.
Although the accident was a minor one, it robbed us of much of
our advantage since some of the enemy ships now manoeuvred
themselves to our windward. Consultations were held. The naval
officers and the pilots agreed that it would now be impossible
to enter the San Thomé roads and we should be thankful if we
were even able to reach the Madras roads.

As there was no way of getting round this obstacle, it was
decided that we should sail into the open sea and then proceed
towards the south. One of the enemy ships now detached itself
and began to pursue us. It was a swift vessel and having placed
itself before the wind it could have easily come upon us. How¬
ever, it stopped when it had reached within the distance of a
musket shot and opened a cannonade. For some time we did
not respond but later we brought our cannon into play also.
Three more Dutch ships set sail to join the first one. It was by
now seven o'clock in the evening and we expected a rough night
ahead of us. The three ships had come within cannon range of
us when we heard the sound of a distant shot. This must have
been a signal because the four ships immediately changed their
route and rejoined the other ships belonging to their squadron. We were taken completely by surprise but pleasantly so. We had cause to be relieved as we could not have battled for long against the four ships. The ship which had started the attack had fired one hundred and fifty cannon balls at us. Our sails were riddled, our riggings broken and three men were wounded by three cannon shots which found their way into the hull of the ship. The Dutch themselves did not go scot free. Some of their men were killed and others were wounded. We continued our route, trying to maintain ourselves on a southerly course. In view of the importance of the engagement, the decision taken by the Dutch Admiral was indeed amazing. The Dutch had recognized the "Breton" which was sailing alone. They also knew that de la Haye was on board. They had only to seize this ship to terminate the war. The four ships sent by the Dutch Admiral after us were more than adequate to either sink us to the bottom of the sea or to cripple us completely. And yet, when there could be no doubt that they were within easy reach of victory, they had withdrawn and had allowed us to get away. The only way in which their conduct could be explained, and this interpretation may not satisfy everyone, was that the Dutch had been very reliably informed that a squadron of ten ships had been equipped in England for despatch to this coast. It was Rijklof's fear that if the ships which he had despatched after us were to sail too close to the wind it would take them a longer time to rejoin his fleet. Since it was the season the English could well make a sudden appearance at this very juncture, and if he allowed his fleet to divide itself in this way, he would not be strong enough to put up an effective resistance. This is the only way in which the conduct of the Dutch Admiral can be excused. De la Haye decided to make for Porto Novo or Pondicherry to find out about conditions at San Thomé. We continued our route trying to maintain ourselves on a southerly course. On 23 June, a review was held of the men on board. A regulation was made that as we were running out of water each person was to be allowed a pint\textsuperscript{26} per day without any distinction. We were also beginning to run very low on our stocks of food for

\textsuperscript{26}The French pint is approximately equal to the English quart.
the crew. This caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the men.

Until 27 June, we continued on the same route, our rate of progress being determined by the winds. We then turned to the mainland which we sighted on the morning of 28 June. It was felt, however, that we should move a little further towards the south. We attempted to resume our old course but found ourselves hampered by the contrary winds. We had made little progress by midnight when we anchored ourselves at a depth of twenty fathoms.

De la Haye anchors before Pondicherry (30 June)

On 29 June, we once again approached the shoreline. We recognized ourselves to be somewhere between Porto Novo and Cuddalore. De la Haye had many reasons for his preference to land at Porto Novo, the most important being his fear that the Dutch vessels had anchored before Pondicherry. Apart from this, Pondicherry did not possess the facilities for quick provisioning, whereas at Porto Novo we could be assured of a plentiful number of barks and chelingues. We steered as much as possible to the windward, but when it was found that we were making no progress, it was decided that we should anchor before Pondicherry. As we were proceeding on our way, we were met by a catamaran carrying a reasonably well-dressed man. He claimed that Sher Khan Lodi had sent him to reconnoitre our vessel. He was, however, recognized by one of our lascars as a person in Dutch service. The man was detained and then interrogated. He confessed that he had been sent to find out if de la Haye was present on board. At nine o’clock in the evening, we cast anchor about a league to the windward of Pondicherry. On 30 June, at eight o’clock, in the morning, we entered the roads. De Lespinay a guardsman of de la Haye

27Bellanger de Lespinay had embarked on the squadron of de la Haye on 2 February 1670. He was appointed personal guardsman by de la Haye, on 16 March 1671. After the capture of San Thomé de la Haye had sent him to procure provisions and powder down the coast. De Lespinay visited Porto Novo and on 18 December 1672 he was authorized by de la Haye to pay a personal visit to the court of Sher Khan Lodi at Valikondapuram. He arrived there on 30 December 1672. After his interview with Sher Khan, de
who had been sent to Pondicherry the previous year, immediately came on board and handed over the letters which had been written by de Rebrey to de la Haye. De Rebrey wrote that fifteen days previously, a portion of the Dutch fleet had sailed past. These vessels had been followed by seven more after an interval of two days. These ships had anchored at Sadras and our enemies had made it known all along the coast that they were going to blockade San Thomé by sea while the Moors laid seige to it once again by land. Our people at San Thomé had been able to hear the cannon fire with which the Dutch had greeted the arrival of the squadron which had subsequently anchored out at sea. Among our ships, the "Navarre" and the "Sultane" had been grounded, while the other ships had been brought in as close as possible to the town so that they could be defended by the cannon from the bastions overlooking the sea. The entire cargo which the "Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne" had brought from Surat had been unloaded. The Director Baron had disembarked and was now in the city. All this news provided de la Haye with ample material to occupy his thoughts. He sent de Lespinay back ashore with orders to send food, refreshments and water as quickly as possible to the ships. The General also entrusted him with several letters for the Director Baron, for de Rebrey and for Sher Khan Lodi and directed that these be despatched as soon as possible. Two launch loads of water were brought to us on the same day. They also sent us food and four thousand of powder.28

Lespinay returned to Porto Novo and in his report he pointed out the feasibility of establishing a French settlement at Pondicherry. Geographically, Pondicherry had much to recommend it. It was situated on the coast twelve leagues to the north of Porto Novo and was, therefore, admirably suited to serve as the centre from which reinforcements could be sent to San Thomé. De la Haye, obviously impressed by these arguments of de Lespinay ordered him to install himself at Pondicherry on 4 February 1673. De Lespinay devoted himself to the task of collecting munitions and food. The assistance of a Hindu by the name of Madanna eased his task a great deal. R.Q.H., 1897, pp. 186, 188-89, 191-92.

28 "Quatre milliers de poudre" in the text., De Lespinay claimed to have accumulated stores of ammunition sufficient for 900 men. Ibid., p. 192.
On 1 July, de la Haye himself came ashore to urge the men to greater diligence. He presented Sher Khan's men with fifty crowns and returned to the ship after an hour. We had stationed a man on top of the main mast to keep a watch for any vessels. He caught sight of eight to ten ships sailing from the south towards the north. He indicated what he had seen. We immediately fired a cannon ball to recall the man who had gone ashore. After the expiry of fifteen minutes, we fired a second shot. With the exception of six to seven men who had separated from the main party, all the others returned. We disembarked all the lascars we had on board directing them to proceed to San Thome.\(^{29}\) We handed over the men who had come to us the previous day by catamaran to the officers of Sher Khan Lodi. De Lespinay was ordered to gather together stocks of food and munitions. We then set sail directing ourselves along the coastline but keeping fairly well out to sea.

**FROM PONDICHERRY TO SAN THOME’—CONDITIONS FOUND BY DE LA HAYE ON HIS RETURN TO SAN THOME’ (5 JULY)**

At ten o'clock in the evening, we saw six to seven ships anchored to the north of us. These were the Dutch vessels which had moored before Sadras. In order to avoid these, we steered towards the open sea veering southwards after a little while. We continued on this course until 2 July when at three o'clock in the morning we saw seven to eight ships bearing towards us from the south. To avoid their path, we steered right out into the open sea and the ships passed us by without recognising us. At eight o'clock in the evening, we observed a small ship coming towards us. When it had drawn within the range of our cannon, we fired several shots to force it towards us. The captain came to us by launch. He said that he had been on his way from Bengal to the Maldives with a cargo of rice and other food. On the way he had been encountered by some Dutch ships which had forced him to go to the island of

\(^{29}\) According to Langhorn's estimate, when de la Haye had left Musulipatam he had about 250 Europeans and 350 natives with him. Fawcett, E.F., II, p. 66.
Ceylon and sell his cargo at Colombo. From Colombo, he had gone to the Maldives where he had taken on a cargo of cowries or shells. While returning, he had come upon nine English ships which had arrived from Europe and for three days he had sailed in company with them, having parted from them only on the previous day. It must have been these English ships which had been sighted by us. Two small ships were also sailing with the squadron, one was an English one and the other was a Portuguese vessel which had been encountered somewhere along the route. The squadron was proceeding to Madras. When the English Admiral had come to know that the captain who had come to visit the English commander's ship was carrying a packet for Admiral Rijklof, he had forced the captain to hand it over. After opening the packet, the Admiral had allowed the captain to retire. We learnt from the captain that the entire region along the coastline of Ceylon was up in arms. De la Haye had made the captain repeat his story several times to find out if he would contradict himself. His narrative remained uniform and de la Haye allowed him to return to his ship and continue his voyage. The information which de la Haye had obtained from the captain made him decide to sail to San Thomé. We had to set the ship carefully on its course if we wished to make for this place. We sailed north north-west until four o'clock in the evening when we sighted land. At night we changed our direction to south-west taking care to sail close to the wind.

On 3 July, we headed initially north north-west and then towards the south-west, the wind being in a northerly direction. A sudden squall, however, caused us a great deal of damage.

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30Since the year 1670 open clashes had been taking place in Ceylon between Rajasimha II and the Dutch. In February 1973 Van Goens, the Younger, had reported that the Dutch forces had been withdrawn from the Chinnecalatte and Pulianthivu forts in the Batticaloa region. Despite these reverses, the Dutch succeeded, on the whole, in maintaining their hold along the coast line. Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, 1965, pp. 116-17.

31Martin does not give any evidence to support Carré’s contention that it was only a favourable wind which enabled de la Haye to escape the Dutch fleet which had completely encircled the “Breton” at Pondicherry. Carré, II, p. 574.
Our main top sail was shattered, the mizen halliard broken and our rigging was in a pitiable condition. The officers were unremitting in their labour and the crew followed their example. We had frequently to change course on 4 July, but at six o'clock in the evening, we anchored two leagues away from land and three leagues to the north of San Thomé. At night, several conflagerations at Madras and San Thomé came to our view.

We set sail again on 5 July and saw two ships anchored before Madras and three before San Thomé. As we approached the shore, a catamaran came towards us. The Governor of Madras had sent it to find out who we were. The men on the catamaran told us that of the two ships which were the closest to us, one was English and the other Portuguese and both had come in from Atjeh. The three ships which were to be found anchored before San Thomé had been brought in by Baron. It was three days since the Dutch had retired. The Moors had pitched their camp three leagues inland but the road between Madras and San Thomé was unobstructed. There was, however, no news of the English ships which we had encountered. All this good news gave us indescribable joy.

De la Haye sent back the catamaran with a letter for the Governor of Madras. We continued our route towards San Thomé where we intended to anchor. We had approached within a league of our destination when a launch met us with Baron and de Rebrey on board. After the first civilities, these gentlemen withdrew to hold their consultations in private.

We learnt that after the arrival of the Dutch squadron, six of their ships had moved forward and had ranged past our three vessels at the roads in quite close proximity. Both sides kept up a brisk fire which was further augmented by the discharge from

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32 Abbé Carré gives an eye-witness account of the events which took place at Madras during the absence of de la Haye at Masulipatam. Because of scarcity at San Thomé, Carré had decided to go to Madras on 29 May and stay there until de la Haye had returned from Masulipatam. *Ibid.*, II, p. 530.

33 The English squadron under Admiral Basse had come within sight of Ceylon on 10 June. It had then turned up the Coromandel coast. On 21 June, a letter from Langhorn and the Council of Fort St. George was received off Porto Nevo. Basse was warned of the presence of the Dutch fleet at San Thomé and directed to proceed to Masulipatam. The fleet arrived at Masulipatam on 26 June. Fawcett, *E.F.*, II pp. 235-36.
our bastions overlooking the sea. Our position was far from
strong but Baron, who had chosen to stay on the "Saint-Jean-
de-Bayonne" remained quite steadfast despite the severity of the
action. We had ten men killed and several wounded on the
ships. The two Dutch ships were damaged and they had lost
several of their men also. The remaining part of their squadron
had sailed at large and had then anchored further out at sea. De Rebrey and the officers felt that Baron was running a con¬
siderable risk by remaining on board and requested him to come
ashore. Baron was loathe to depart from the orders given by de
la Haye and it was with considerable reluctance that he agreed
to disembark.35

De Rebrey and Baron confirmed that the Moors had retreated
a fair distance away from San Thomé but continued to appear
on the plain from time to time.36

The major, a worthy and experienced man, who had been left
at San Thomé had died. Among the men more than fifty
soldiers and sailors had deserted. Some of these men had taken
permission to go to Madras for two or three days. They had
overstayed their leave and fearing the punishment that awaited
them at San Thomé, they had preferred to find refuge elsewhere.
The "Navarre" and the "Sultane" had both been beached. The
"Sultane" had already been condemned but it was felt that the
fate of the "Navarre" had been decided somewhat hastily. The
Council had not been convened nor had any resolution been
taken on this issue. Had the operation been a little better
planned a considerable amount of equipment could have been
saved from this ship. I had it from a reliable source that when
this vessel had been sent out ten chests of costly arms and other
effects belonging to de la Haye had been left on board. All this
was lost. These goods were valued at more than 40,000 livres.
I am reporting only what was told to me.

It was several days since any food had been brought in from
Madras. The English had excused themselves saying that the

34 This engagement had taken place on 6 June. Ibid., II, p. 66.
35 According to Langhorn, the French possessed 800 Europeans apart
from their native soldiers at San Thomé at this time. Ibid., loc-cit.
36 Trimbak Bussora Raju and Baba Sahib remained in command over these
Golconda forces. Ibid., loc. cit.
Moors had threatened to lay siege to their city if they allowed any food to be conveyed to San Thomé.⁷

While the Dutch squadron lay before San Thomé, a Frenchman in Dutch service escaped from Rijklolf's ship and managed to swim across to us. This man told us that the Admiral's ship was armed with sixty pieces of cannon and there were 300 Europeans on board. The other ships had approximately thirty to fifty pieces of cannon and each of them was carrying between 100 to 120 men. Natives constituted half the number of these men. I had been unable to speak to Baron since we had come to the ship, but I felt that he needed time to talk to de la Haye. I was sure, however, that the General would try and prejudice Baron against me, but I waited for my turn to meet the Director. He called for me two hours after his arrival on board. After the first civilities, he began to talk to me, castigating me severely for my refusal to go to the Golconda court. De la Haye had spoken to him about it and Baron was astonished that I had not taken this opportunity to distinguish myself by negotiating the terms of the peace treaty. Letters had recently been received from the gentleman whom de la Haye had sent to court. He had been very well received and was looking forward to a successful termination of the proceedings which would redound to the credit of our nation. He expected to receive a firman within a few days which would secure to us the peacable possession of San Thomé and its dependencies. I replied that de la Haye was fully conversant of the way in which I had conducted negotiations during my stay at Masulipatam. I had brought the affair forward to a point when it had only required the finishing touches to be placed by de la Haye. The true reason why I had

⁷Langhorn was advancing this excuse to protect English interests as he was currently on very good terms with the Qutbshahi generals. The English Governor was even more apprehensive of Dutch presence at San Thomé than that of the French. He had no desire to help the French. At the same time, he was trying to encourage the local Qutbshahi authorities to stake their own claims to San Thomé rather than relinquishing it to the Dutch. Langhorn geared his policy to suit the contingency of the expulsion of the French from San Thomé by the joint Qutbshahi-Dutch forces while ensuring that San Thomé reverted to Golconda and that the Dutch secured no further accretion to their strength along the Coromandel coast. Vide Ibid., II, pp. 65-7.
refused to go to Golconda was because of the categorical rejection by de la Haye of my request for funds without which my mission had no chances of success. I was, indeed, happy that the gentleman had managed to emerge with success from the affair, but it would be wiser to await subsequent developments to arrive at a more mature evaluation of his work. I complained about de la Haye but Baron had been so won over by the General that he refused to countenance my grievances. Before leaving, he asked me to go ashore and strive to recover my health. We disembarked on the same day. De la Haye was greeted with a cannonade. His arrival evoked a singular joy on the part of the garrison and the country people who had good reason for reposing all their faith on the physical presence of the General. The first action of de la Haye was to proceed directly to the Cathedral and to render his thanks to God for his felicitous return.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE MASULIPATAM VOYAGE

The decision of de la Haye to go to Masulipatam has, on the whole, been condemned rather than applauded. It was against overwhelming odds that he managed to return safely to San Thomé. If the Dutch had maintained a strong stance, not only would it have been impossible for de la Haye to have entered the roads here, but, as I have already remarked, it would have been quite easy for the enemy to have either captured his ship or to have sunk it. From the beginning, I have made known my views on this subject. I had been quite categorical in my opposition to this venture, having taken into account our current relations with the Dutch, and keeping in mind that it will always be the aim of the Dutch to prevent us from establishing ourselves in India. Despite these reservations, our journey could still have borne fruit had de la Haye been agreeable to incurring some small expenditure. A sum of 20,000 to 30,000 crowns at the maximum by way of presents would have brought the affair to a conclusive end. Placed as we were in our present circumstances, it was very important to take very careful stock of our situation.

Our naval strength had by now dwindled to two vessels. Against this, the Dutch possessed a strong squadron and could, if they chose to do so, cut us off from all help. The best we
could do was to put up a bold front. If the King of Golconda had been our only adversary, we could have forced him to accede to all the demands with which we presented him. However, it is only common prudence to also be able to give in sometimes and it is on this score that we could be said to have failed.
On 6 July de la Haye toured the plain on horseback after which he reviewed the lascars. These men were quite overjoyed at the return of the General. De la Haye then wrote to the Havildar at Masulipatam informing him of our arrival at San Thomé and reiterating his desire to sign a peace treaty. He declared that as soon as he was informed that the treaty had been concluded, the two ships which had been brought from Masulipatam would be returned.

The Governor of Madras also wrote to de la Haye congratulating him on his return. This official was, however, actuated by ulterior motives.

At San Thomé we met Abbé Carré who had brought us letters from court. As the Abbé had been delayed, these letters were all of an old date.

On 7 July, the Governor at Madras informed de la Haye that the English ships from Europe had put in at Masulipatam. When the squadron had been sailing past Porto Novo, orders had been despatched to it recommending the route to Masulipatam as the Dutch squadron had anchored before San Thomé.¹

On 8 July, we received letters from the gentleman who had been sent to the court at Golconda. He said he had met Sayyid

¹*Vide*, n. 33, Chapter IV.
Portrait of Siddi Musa Khan
—Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
Muzaffar to apprise himself of the latest position. The minister had informed him that the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Siddi Musa Khan, who had been gained over by the Dutch, was totally opposed to the cession of San Thomé to us. As a result of the presents given by the Dutch court, sentiment which had been in our favour when he had first arrived, had now swung against us. We could not hope to achieve any success unless we were prepared to give presents. He informed us that he was on the point of embarking on his return voyage.

On the same day, we received letters from Surat which informed us that Gueston had arrived at Bandar Abbas and had then left for the Persian court. The packet also brought us letters from officials on the Malabar coast who informed de la Haye about the affairs in that region.

On the northern side of the fortifications at San Thomé, the curtain was very low. A redoubt was constructed here and it was later named Fort d’Orgoret after the commanding officer who held the position here.

-Sidi Musa Khan in the text. Siddi Musa Khan was an Abyssinian eunuch. Fryer, op. cit., I p. 83 n.

-Vide, Chapter II, n. 40, n. 84. It was not Dutch bribery alone which had turned Musa Khan against the French. It also stemmed from the nature of political alignments at court. Despite the help which had been given to Abul Hasan at the time of his accession to the throne both by Sayyid Muzaffar and Musa Khan, the King found both men equally unpalatable. To secure his own position against undue encroachment by either one of these two individuals, he hit upon the expedient of so dividing office between Sayyid Muzaffar and Musa Khan that each would act as a check on the other. Sayyid Muzaffar was given the title of Mir Jumla and appointed Diwan while Musa Khan was appointed General of the army and received the title of Khan Khanan. Upon the death of Nekham Khan, Musa Khan was appointed Nawab of the Carnatic on 30 March 1672. As the sworn enemy of Musa Khan, Sayyid Muzaffar could be expected to be sympathetic towards the French. Sayyid Muzaffar had persuaded Abul Hasan to cede San Thomé to the French for 10,000 crowns but Musa Khan was adamantly opposed to any such settlement. B.N., N.A., 9352(58); Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 38, 93; Siddiqui, op. cit., p. 188.

-Châteaupers was kept amused by all kinds of civilities while the Dutch and the Moors prepared for a second siege of San Thomé. B.N., N.A., 9352 (79).
FAILURE OF THE ALLIANCE PROPOSED BY DE LA HAYE TO THE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS

On 9 July, some of the enemy cavalry camp up until they were within cannon shot range of the city. De la Haye emerged with a detachment of Frenchmen and forced them to retreat. De la Haye suggested to the Governor of Madras that if our ships could be joined with the newly arrived squadron from England, the joint forces would prove more than adequate to destroy the Dutch squadron. This would weaken the Dutch position in India a great deal, thus providing us with opportunities to encroach on their power. In his letter, de la Haye marshalled all the reasons which made such an alliance desirable against our common enemy. He even offered to bring in his best soldiers and bear the burnt of the attack. The English Governor gave two reasons why he could not accept this offer. He had to maintain friendly relations with the Moors, and his superiors had ordered him only to harm Dutch commercial enterprise, not to emerge in warfare against them. Even if the Governor had been given freedom of action, it is unlikely that he would have chosen to help us. This was because, each day, the English found our presence increasingly irksome. The misconduct of the Frenchmen who visited Madras was a continual source of irritation, and furthermore, the Governor took umbrage at certain terms used by de la Haye in his correspondence. The Governor began to be more circumspect in his relations with us and later we gave him enough cause to throw all vestiges of politeness to the winds.

On 11 July, all the troops in the fort were reviewed. There were 204 soldiers belonging to different companies and 357 sailors. The officers, the valets, the personal retinue of de la Haye, the Company personnel under Baron and the volunteers were not included in this number.

DIFFICULTIES OF REVICTUALMENT BY WAY OF MADRAS

Several days had passed since we had received any food or refreshments from Madras. De la Haye wrote to the Governor reproaching him for his harsh attitude towards us and remarked that it appeared as if the Governor had been directed from
De la Haye at Masulipatam

England to keep his distance from us. If this was so, the General prayed that he should be informed as to the content of these instructions. The Governor replied that he had been instructed to live in perfect amity with the French but his main duty was the protection of English commerce. As for sending provisions to us, the Moors to whom the region belonged, were permitting food supplies to reach Madras only on condition that none of it found its way to San Thomé. The English found themselves in an extremely vulnerable position at Madras, for if the Moors cut off their food supplies, they would starve. And yet it was very important for them to conserve their position in this city. However, the Governor would place no hindrance to the efforts made by private inhabitants at Madras to procure food for us from the surrounding countryside. The English found themselves in an extremely vulnerable position at Madras, for if the Moors cut off their food supplies, they would starve. And yet it was very important for them to conserve their position in this city. However, the Governor would place no hindrance to the efforts made by private inhabitants at Madras to procure food for us from the surrounding countryside. De la Haye did not give up and continued to write to the Governor trying to persuade him to join us in a common front against our mutual enemy. Our General again made use of certain expressions which the English Governor found offensive. This made the latter declare brusquely that he had been ordered by his Company to maintain peaceful relations with the King of Golconda, to conserve the city and devote himself exclusively to the expansion of English commerce.

Desertions Which Take Place

We found Frenchmen continuously deserting from our side. It was said that it was the English Governor who encouraged our men to desert when they came to visit Madras. This could not, however, be proved and no condemnation is justified on the basis of mere prejudice. There were others whom we had antagonized. Jearsey, the owner of the bark pillaged by the crew of the "Flamand", as I have described, and the other Englishmen who had invested on this boat, were extremely incensed against us. They gave every encouragement to our soldiers and sailors to desert. They had even given money to

*While making these excuses to the French, Langhorn was trying to undermine their position as his correspondence with Trimbak Bussora Raja makes quite clear. Fawcett, E.F., II, p. 68. The attitude of Langhorn proved to be in marked contrast to that of Aungier on the west coast. Vide Su pra, p. 234.*
some of our men who had subsequently made their way to Pulicat where they had joined the Dutch. There were others who were more wary and had preferred to make their way to Golconda. Rijkloff had ordered that these men were to be provided with money to enable them to reach the capital where they were to take service. Our men were attracted to Golconda by the pay of ten to twelve pagodas per month and the complete lack of restraint which they would enjoy in that service.

Right through the month, they remained hard at work at constructing the redoubt which was being erected near Bastion Dauphin. The Dutch ships continued at their moorings near Sadras. Towards the end of the month, we learnt that the ships had passed by Pondicherry during the night and were sailing towards the north. Baba Sahib sent an emissary with some propositions to de la Haye. De la Haye gave him a hearing and then sent back the same man. This incident had no further consequences. The repair of the ships at the roads was now taken in hand so that these could be put out to sea again. De la Haye visited the vessels and issued the necessary instructions.

**FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GOLCONDA—FRENCH SHIPS ARE SEIZED AT CHICACOLE**

On 29 July, we received a letter from the gentleman who had been sent to the Golconda court. He informed us that he had returned to Masulipatam from where he intended to go to Madras by an English ship. From here he would proceed to San Thomé. He had been unable to achieve anything at court but he would await the honour of rejoining de la Haye before submitting a full account of his mission.

On the same day, we received information about the two prizes which we had taken at Masulipatam. We had set out with the two prizes but we had lost sight of them as they had been unable to keep up with the “Breton”. The two vessels had put in at Chicacole on the Gingelly coast which was a dependency of Golconda. The extreme civility of the Moors misled the

*Gergely in the text. The Gingelly coast was the name given to the Golconda coastline which extended from the estuary of river Godaveri in the south to Puri in the north. The Coromandel coast started to the south of this region. Bowry, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-1; Moreland, *Relations*, p. 51.
captains of the ships into believing the Moorish statement that peace had been made between us and the King of Golconda. They had thus been lured into the harbour, but as soon as the vessels had entered the port, the Moors had seized the ships and had imprisoned our men inside their castle. The captains of the ships should be censured for their imprudence in trusting to the promises made to them by the Moors. This had made them place themselves quite voluntarily in the hands of our enemies. While it is true that the ships were very poorly provisioned, there was also the consideration that the season was now very favourable for a voyage to Bengal where our men would have had nothing to fear. The passage would have taken them only two or three days. They were provided with enough leisure later to repent of the foolish decision they had taken.

August 1673

A lascar captain had volunteered to take letters to the King of Kandy on the island of Ceylon. De la Haye sent him out on 30 July. It was doubtful if the messenger would be able to reach the island since all the avenues to Kandy and the entire coastal region was under Dutch control. We, however, took the risk of sending these letters to the King and to our envoys at court.

A few days previously, a deserter had been caught. The commissary had initiated the necessary proceedings and the date of the trial had been fixed for 31 July. There was a unanimous decision in favour of the death penalty. The convicted man belonged to the so-called reformed religion but during the trial, he had been receiving instruction in ours. While the investigations were still going on, he abjured his faith on the day he believed he was to die. He was pardoned at the instance of the officers. This was followed by a proclamation of a public amnesty to all those who returned within a month to their colours or to the Company counters. The time limit would be adjusted according to the distance covered by our men during their return.

On the same day, a lascar captain seized a flock of sheep which he had found grazing at a distance of half a league from San Thome. He had brought the animals into the town. The next day, a man who had been sent by the Governor of Madras declared that the sheep belonged to some of the servants of the
India in the 17th Century

English Company. Even though there was plenty of ground for doubting this assertion, the sheep were released.

From a letter which we received from Pondicherry on 3 August, we learnt the Dutch at Negapatam were preparing to return to San Thomé. The Moors were to converge on the same spot by land.

Scarcely a day passed without de la Haye drilling the men at the garrison. He devoted particular attention to the sailors whom he wished to train. The lascars, several of whom were good soldiers, were also taken in turn.

On 7 and 8 August, de la Haye visited several of the neighbouring villages on horseback and was well received everywhere. He even went to a village which was only half a league away from Madras and asked the villagers why, unlike their practice on previous occasions, they were refusing to bring in food to San Thomé. The villagers had replied that the English had forbidden them to do so on pain of death. However, the attitude of the villagers could be gauged by the fact that the entire place appeared completely bare.

On 9 August, nine English ships anchored at the roads before Madras. These were joined by one more on the following day. These were the vessels which made up their squadron. De la Haye sent his greetings to the English commander through de Maisonneuve and de Maillé and made an offer of his services. These two gentlemen were also asked to bring back the envoy who had returned from Golconda on one of the English ships. The English commander received the two French gentlemen well and talked to them very politely. The French envoy who had been sent to the Golconda court came back with them. De la Haye could be very subtle when required. He received the envoy extremely well and was even willing to meet him half-way.

Despite his best attempts, all that he could garner from a conversation with the envoy was that the only way in which negotiations at the Golconda court could be carried on was by incurring the expenditure of making gifts to the principal ministers.\(^7\) It was by pursuing this method that the Dutch had

\(^7\)The principal ministers consisted of the Peshwa and twelve ministers with the title of Zi Shaukat (His Eminence) who assisted the Peshwa. K. Sharwani and P.M. Joshi, ed., *History of Medieval Deccan*, I, 1973, pp. 479-480.
De la Haye at Masulipatam

won their successes.

I have already said that even if this gentleman possessed the qualities necessary for this kind of transaction, which he did not, he could not possibly have succeeded with the poor resources at his command. He had been given a very cordial welcome at court, because it was believed that he had more to offer than courteous phrases. When they found out the truth, they dismissed him with every politeness. Both the King and Sayyid Muzaffar gave him a set of Moorish costume and told him that if he could make more reasonable overtures he could be sure of a hearing. The Dutch, who were ever active, now persuaded the Moors to make another attempt against San Thomé promising assistance both by sea and land. De la Haye gave no indication of his reaction to the failure of the mission. He placed the envoy in command over the volunteers. However, he did not forget that Châteaupers had led him to believe that the negotiations would be simpler than I had made out. He nursed his resentment until he had returned to France. This gentleman and another person who had incurred the displeasure of de la Haye were now treated very badly. Both were ignored when it came to giving employment to the officers who had returned from San Thomé.

De la Haye received information that on 12 August when the last quarter of the old moon was to merge with the conjunction of the new moon, the Moors would come to bathe themselves in a small lake at the distance of a cannon shot from Madras. De la Haye sent some lascars to set up an ambush on the road to be taken by the Moors. He himself led some troops to a neighbouring village where he took up position to lend support to the ambushing forces. The Moors appeared to have received some warning about the fate being prepared for them, for they took a different route. Despite this, de la Haye thrust forward and exposed himself to the enemy with only two horsemen who

*The King bestowed a vest, a turban and a valuable embroidered scarf on Châteaupers. The only firman granted was that by which the French Company was allowed to trade at Masulipatam. Carre, II, p. 655.

*The Shias followed the practice of ceremonial washing at this time in order to cleanse themselves of the sins committed during the past month. For further details about the incident vide ibid., I, p. 231 n., II, p. 604.
were following him. He threw himself upon the body of the enemy and wounded one person who seemed to be an important personage to judge by his dress. The two horsemen seconded his efforts, but as the foot soldiers could not move swiftly enough to support him, de la Haye withdrew after several spirited attacks. He brought back two prisoners who were conducted to the city. The enemy tried to retaliate. They came towards San Thomé and attacked some of our men who had strayed out. The only result was a skirmish during which several shots were fired without much effect.

**THE ENGLISH REFUSE TO GIVE US ANY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**

On 14 August, Baron, accompanied by three officers from the garrison went on board the English ships anchored before Madras on which the Governor came to meet him. Baron marshalled all the arguments in support of his contention that the English should now make common cause with us to achieve the overthrow of our enemy. The Governor and the officers of the squadron, however, refused to be shaken from their view that their duties extended only to the protection of their commerce. The rest of the time was taken up at a banquet during which numerous toasts were drunk to the sound of a cannonade from the squadron and the fort. Baron returned at 9 o'clock in the evening.

On 16 August, we learnt that Baba Sahib had been ordered to withdraw to his own administration. He was to be replaced by one, Chinnapalli Mirza.¹⁰

¹⁰*Chinapelly Mirza* in the text. Martin was not quite correct in this statement. Baba Sahib was not withdrawn but was superseded by Chinnapalli Mirza. Fawcett, *E.F.*, II, p. 64. It was Musa Khan who had been recalled on 26 June (O.S.). The Government of the Carnatic had then been bestowed on Musikmea with the title of Namdar Khan. *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 75. Sherwani, *J.I.H.*, 1968, p. 326, refers to the successor of Musa Khan as one by the name of Mardan Khan. Musikmea may have been the same person as Mussbuke to whom there is a reference in the Mackenzie Manuscripts. The identification of Mussbuke with Muhammad Ibrahim by Bendre is untenable as there is a clear reference in the English records that early in 1676, Muhammad Ibrahim secured his own appointment as Nawab of the Carnatic in place of Musikmea. Bendre, *Q.G.*, p. 6 and n.; Fawcett, *E.F.*, II, p. 164. There also appears to be some confusion with regard to the
On the night of 16-17 August, d’Orgeret, a brave officer, led an attack on the Moorish camp with 300 lascars. The advance sentinels of the Moors were killed. D’Orgeret withdrew after this as he had not been instructed to advance any further.

On 17 August, Baron accompanied by the same three officers paid another visit to the English ships. The object of his visit was to approach the English for a loan at Madras which would be repaid to them at Surat. In order to reduce the chance of loss the English Company had sent out this squadron in a body. It was ultimately to go to Surat. The ships were carrying the funds intended for the commercial operations of the Company on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts. By lending us money here and securing repayment at either Bombay or Surat, according to their choice, the English would in fact be reducing the hazards to which they were exposing themselves. We had expected our proposal to be acceptable to the English but found that they had other considerations in mind. As none of the officers were to be found, Baron disembarked at Madras. The Governor declared that he could not take any decision without the concurrence of the naval officers. The officers took care to ensure that all of them could not be found together at any time. When they had heard that Baron wished to meet them on board they had decided to disembark, and now, when it had come to their knowledge that the Director had gone on to Madras, some of them returned to the ships. Those who were to be found at Madras declared quite bluntly that our proposal was totally unacceptable to them as they were bound by the orders which had been issued to them in England. In the beginning, we had asked for the sum of 

identity of Chinnapalli Mirza. The English refer to him on two occasions as being the brother of Madanna. If any identification is to be made, the name Chinnapalli could perhaps be taken as a corruption of Mrutunjoy, the youngest brother of Madanna. It is, however, difficult to accept this as the English records are quite specific that Chinnapalli had held office previously in the Carnatic whereas according to the Mackenzie Manuscripts, Madanna’s brother rose from obscurity only after Madanna’s own accession to power. Ibid., II, pp. 64, 102, 106; Bendre, Q.G., pp. 187, 195.

England did not pursue a uniform policy towards France during this period. Whereas Charles II was drawn towards Catholic France, ruled as she was by a King who was a strong adherent of the Divine Right theory
Rs 50,000 but even though we later reduced this to Rs. 10,000, the English had found both propositions equally distasteful. Jearsey, who acted against us quite openly because of our seizure of his ship, had managed to win over all the officers of the squadron by making out that our action was an affront to their national honour. Baron saw that he was only wasting his time and returned to San Thomé on 18 August extremely dissatisfied at the English attitude. There was no way of obtaining a loan from the English. Even the Governor had become alienated by our bickering and he no longer made any attempt to hide his antipathy for us. The weakness of our position now became starkly clear.

De la Haye decided to make another appeal to the English officers on 18 August. He wrote a long letter on the seizure of Jearsey’s ship, trying to point out that we had not done anything to which the English Company could take exception. He even offered to throw open the entire proceedings so that the English could judge for themselves. Chevalier de Maisonneuve had boarded a launch to deliver the letter when the English ships hoisted sail and appeared to be on the point of leaving for Masulipatam. The Chevalier managed, however, to reach the Admiral’s ship but could speak only to the pilot who undertook to deliver the letter to the Admiral who had not yet arrived on board. Our officer could not have received a greater discourtesy at the hands of the English. Finding he could do nothing more, the Chevalier returned to San Thomé when he described to de la Haye the outrageous manner in which he had been received. De la Haye wrote immediately to the Governor at Madras enclosing a copy of the letter which had been sent by him to the officers of the squadron.

of kingship, the English Parliament was far more sympathetic towards Protestant Republican Holland. This rift between the English crown and Parliament came into the open in 1674. Charles II was forced to abjure the Secret treaty of Dover which he had signed with France in 1670 and come out in open support of Holland. The Dutch war between France and the Low Countries came to a close in the year 1679.

A few private English merchants, however, are said to have offered a loan on the security of some ware from Masulipatam. B.N., N.A., 9375(7).
On the same day, we received the news that the “Flamand” and the Company ketch which had left us during our passage from Masulipatam to San Thomé had sailed for Bengal and had anchored at the Balasore roads.

ABBE CARRE' AND HIS MISSION IN INDIA

Abbe Carré, who had been despatched to us from court, had been sent to Madras. He managed to lodge there on various pretexts but his real purpose was to keep us informed about any news which we might find useful in the context of the present political situation. The Abbé had been approached by one of the leading native merchants in the service of the English Company. The merchant had spoken to Trimbak Bussora Raju, the commander of the Moorish troops, and he desired this conversation to be reported to de la Haye. The Moorish General had wished this merchant to write to us proposing a truce period of twenty-five to thirty days. During this time, Trimbak Bussora Raju would ensure that he was provided with the necessary powers from the Golconda court to sign a definite peace treaty with us. He also promised to sort out our differences if only we agreed to entrust these into his hands.

When de la Haye received this news from Carré, he reflected on it. He took Baron into confidence and both of them realised the game that was being played. At this time, the Moorish army consisted of 2,500 infantry, the majority of which consisted of very poor soldiers. Some of these men had been forced to take service and several of them did not even know how to use firearms. However, this infantry division was supported by a cavalry corps of 500-600 horsemen among whom several

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13 This was the merchant, Viranna. Carré, II, p. 608.
14 Trimourboursourjah in the text. This General had been earlier referred to as Boursourajah. Vide supra, p. 428.
15 Carré (Carré), II, 610 gives a somewhat different sequence. The two envoys sent by Trimbak Bussora Raju whom Carré had met at the house of Viranna proceeded to San Thomé. They had discussions with de la Haye but the talks broke down as de la Haye insisted that the Moors should retreat to Poonamallee during the truce period while Trimbak Bussora Raju pleaded his inability to do so in the absence of any definite orders from court.
cavaliers of great resolution were to be found. The commander, Trimbak Bussora Raju, who had already felt the strength of our arms was afraid to stay in his camp with such troops lest we attack. He had heard from Golconda that powerful reinforcements were being sent to him.\textsuperscript{16} He, therefore, tried to lure us with the prospect of reaching an accommodation until these troops had arrived.\textsuperscript{17} It was with this in mind that he had written to the merchant an the subject of a truce. It is possible that the merchant may himself have been deceived which may have brought him to approach Abbe Carré in all good faith.

\section*{An Attack on the Moorish Camp (20 August)}

De la Haye could not be duped easily and it could almost be said that he swung to the opposite extreme if he received any written or verbal information from a source which he considered suspect. He had assessed only too well the motives of the enemy General and had already been preparing for an attack since the past few days. He was well aware that the camp which was at the distance of about one and a half leagues from the city, was extremely well fortified. The Moors had protected their front and sides by mud walls and a small moat. It is true that the rear had been left open, put this part could only be reached after an armed confrontation. We could not hope to take the enemy by surprise as they would certainly be kept posted of our movements by the spies whom they maintained among our native levies. To reach the enemy, we had to cross a wide plain which was completely bereft of any cover. Since we had no cavalry, the enemy horsemen would enjoy a considerable advantage over us. Our armed forces were greatly diminished at

\textsuperscript{16}Chinnapalli Mirza had been deputed to proceed to the Carnatic with 5,000 cavalry and an equal number of infantry. Fawcett, \textit{E.F.}, II, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{17}The explanation given by Carré in his letter dated 22 January 1674 differs from Martin's analysis of the situation. There was a rift between Baba Sahib and Trimbak Bussora Raju. This caused the latter to approach Carré with a tentative offer of peace. The Qutbshahi General desired a truce period of one month. The talks broke down (\textit{vide supra}, n. 15), as de la Haye wished the Moors to withdraw to a distance of one day's journey whereas the Golconda camp was currently at the distance of one league from San Thomé. \textit{B.N., N.A.}, 9352 (80).
this time. The sailors who were in a majority could not be counted upon to stand their ground under attack as they were not sufficiently well disciplined. It is true that there were several trusty men among the officers and volunteers who made up the household of de la Haye. If we called out these men, the city would be quite denuded and we would have no reserves to fall back on in case of defeat. These considerations were counterbalanced by the fact that our stocks of food in the city were at a perilously low point and could be made to last for only another two months. The enemy army prevented the country people from bringing in any supplies to us. We were assured that their reinforcements were on the march and our situation would become even graver if we allowed them to fortify themselves in added strength. We would not hope to attack them then and it seemed better to strike a blow now. Even if the enemy chose to retreat and we only succeeded in forcing them to abandon their camp, they would still lose some of their men. We could then devise some method of procuring food and it was always possible that such resolute action on our part might have the effect of discouraging the enemy from coming back and laying siege to us once again. These important considerations which stemmed from our present situation made us resolve to attack the enemy. Five hundred men including officers, soldiers and volunteers were organized into detachments under commanding officers for this action. The naval officers who had been ordered to disembark from their ships also found themselves included in this task force. Four hundred lascars or native soldiers were further added. They also considered it advisable to take along two cast iron four pounder cannon on field carriages. The necessary number of artillery officers was also provided so that the cannon could be brought into play to cover the withdrawal of our men.

After all these preparations had been completed, our men marched out of the city on 20 August at 10 o'clock at night. Ten men who had little chances of surviving marched 100 feet in advance of the main body. Halts were called several times to ascertain if the detachments were marching in proper formation. Our men had reached within musket shot distance of the entrenchments at the enemy camp when they heard the sound of
trumpets and the beating of drums emanating from the enemy camp. This made it obvious that our enemies had been warned.

We moved a little to the right of the entrenchments so that we would be able to open our attack on the northern side where the gap had not been enclosed.

After taking their dispositions, our men moved forward to attack. They were greeted with musket fire which killed a volunteer and a grenadier. Our men attacked all those whom they found. It transpired that the only persons who had remained behind were merchants, artisans and others who had come to sell food at the camp. However, nothing could be seen in the dark and every person whom our men encountered was treated as an enemy. Although the men had been expressly forbidden to loot, the lascars and several soldiers began to pillage the camp. The camp was in an opulent condition as the merchants had believed themselves to be quite secure. Everything for which there was any need was to be found there. De la Haye felt that the best expedient was to set everything ablaze. The men were rallied and the troops were placed in proper order. De la Haye led the men towards the base of the camp to prevent the enemy from reassembling there. The camp was enclosed by a small river at this point. The enemy had effected their withdrawal by crossing over to the other side of the river. The rest of the night was spent in keeping guard and ruining the camp by setting it all on fire. The enemy was too dispirited to attempt a re-entry. At dawn on 21 August, our men were ordered to withdraw. Some cattle had been seized and they wished to bring back these animals to San Thomé. The herd, along with the people who were to steer them towards San Thomé, were placed in the front. The different detachments of soldiers were kept to the right, the lascars were positioned in the middle, while the sailors and the company of cadets brought up the left. The volunteers were dispersed among all the men while de la Haye with his retinue behind him marched at the head.

We made our exit from the camp in this order. The enemy cavalry was riding ahead of us—some to the right, some to the left and the rest straight in front.\textsuperscript{18} All kept themselves outside

\textsuperscript{18}The enemy cavalry consisted of 1,500 men divided into four squadrons. Carré, II, p. 621.
the range of our muskets. They maintained the same pace as us. Several times they made as if to attack but always from a distance. Had it not been for the bravado shown by some of our men, we may have succeeded in completing our withdrawal in this fashion. Twelve to fifteen of our guards and volunteers kept lagging behind the main body at a distance of fifty-five feet. From time to time, they would fire their muskets if the enemy came too close. The possibility of cutting off and routing these men before they could have a chance of rejoining the main body occurred to fifteen to twenty of the enemy horsemen. Separating themselves from the companions, they suddenly threw themselves on our men and scattered them. When our men found themselves in this condition with the enemy riding at them full tilt, they tried to get back to the main body. A few, however, managed to remain firm. Seven or eight of our men were cut to pieces by the enemy cavalry who now wished to follow this success by a general attack on the entire battalion. One of them, seemingly unable to control his horse, cut into one of the angles formed by our men. The sailors took fright and pressed upon the lascars. This caused general disorder but the officers soon set everything right. De Rebrey, in particular, made himself quite noteworthy for the firmness and vigour which he displayed in this action. Our men fired and managed to lay low almost all the enemy horsemen along with their steeds. One of the lascar captains performed a feat of arms by cutting one of the enemy cavalry almost in two by a single sabre thrust. This small enemy detachment had performed very well, but the men were now fighting in sheer desperation. Had the remaining body of the cavalry followed their example and thrust themselves on us in a similar manner we would not have been able to escape. A few among them broke into the front portion of our battalion and drove out the cattle which were being conducted to San Thomé. During this small disorder, some of our lascars who were anxious to reach a village close by, pushed themselves forward. They were attacked by the enemy horsemen who laid some of them low on the ground. The remaining lascars returned to the main body in which each one had taken up his post. We continued our withdrawal. The cavalry followed us for some time until we came to a river
which we crossed. The enemy now fell back. Our contingent returned to San Thomé at about 10 o'clock in the morning to the relief of Baron and the others who had been extremely worried as to the outcome of our action.

This action had cost us the volunteer and the grenadier who had been killed at the approach to the enemy camp, as also ten or twelve of our men who had been wounded by the Moorish cavalry. Of the latter, two had died two days later. Among the lascars we lost a captain, a brave man, and eight to ten of his followers. We could not form an exact estimate of the enemy losses. I have already described how everyone found at the camp had been attacked and how almost all the horsemen who had detached themselves from the main body had been decimated. The latter could be counted as the bravest among the entire corps.

**Arrival of a Dutch Squadron at San Thome**

On 22 August, twelve vessels and eight Dutch hookers or ketches sailed in from the south and anchored before San Thomé. We kept some of the men posted right through the night on the bastions which faced the sea. On the morning of 23 August, they fired a cannon-ball from the Dutch Admiral’s ship while the colours which signified that a Council was being held were also hoisted aloft the same vessel. Five of the Dutch ships set sail and one of these came within musket shot distance of our bastions which covered the roads. The Dutch ships opened fire. Our men from the bastions did the same but they concentrated their fire on the single Dutch vessel which was forced to withdraw. Some of our bullets had penetrated into the body of this ship.

On 24 August another Dutch ship came to join the squadron, after which sixteen of the vessels lifted anchor and sailed towards the north. The remaining five moved further out to sea and anchored two leagues to the south of the fort. It was said that they sent messengers ashore from here to obtain news of the Moorish camp. They were surprised to learn that the

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Moors had been defeated and that the forces which remained to them had retreated further inland.  

De la Haye now devoted himself to the task of improving the food position within the garrison. He mounted on horseback and together with some officers and guardsmen he visited the neighbouring villages. He penetrated inland to a distance of two leagues reassuring the villagers and trying to persuade them to bring in food. He then passed by the enemy camp which was quite deserted and still smouldering. He found some villagers there who complained that they had been treated badly.

On 25 August, at dawn, de la Haye again mounted and being followed by some officers of the guards and thirty musketeers, he went to the villages which lay in the direction of Madras. The peasants were happy to see him and presented him with fruit. He also distributed largesse to encourage the inhabitants to bring in food to us. Twenty to twenty-five of these good men, each carrying a sack of husked rice on his head came to San Thomé, where they received handsome recompense from the General. This had such a beneficial effect that on the same day 280 oxen charged with unhusked rice appeared. Acting upon the instructions which he had received from de la Haye, Abbé Carré had joined the General outside Madras. They had returned to the city at eleven o'clock in the morning and had later attended high mass at the Cathedral at which all the officers at the garrison had been present.

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21 According to Carré, Carré, II, p. 623, when this news was conveyed to Van Goens, the latter decided to defer any further action against the French until further reinforcement from Golconda had arrived.

22 Carré mentions a religious factor which was brought into play at this time. The peasants who brought in grain were Hindus and the good treatment meted out to them by de la Haye made these poor people look on the French as their protectors against the Qutbshahi officials who treated them badly on account of their religion. Ibid., II, p. 628.

23 The feast of St. Louis fell on 25 August. This feast was held in commemoration of the death of King Louis IX. King Louis IX had died on 25 August 1270 and had been canonized in 1297. St. Louis may have been the patron saint of Louis XIV which would explain the dual nature of the celebrations taking place on this day referred to by Abbé Carré. De la Haye had invited the Abbé to San Thomé so that he could also participate in the festivities. Ibid., loc. cit.
There was a French physician by the name of Sieur Destremeau at the Golconda court. On 26 August, letters were sent by express messengers to this gentleman who was to forward these to the King. De la Haye had declared in his letter that even though he had repulsed the Golconda forces for a second time, he was still agreeable to signing a favourable peace treaty. Destremeau, for his part, was asked to communicate frequently about conditions at court and also send advice as to how best the signature of the peace treaty could be achieved.

Envoy from the King of Bijapur

On the same day, a man who claimed to have been sent by the King of Bijapur, arrived at San Thomé. He conferred for two hours with de la Haye and Baron but I could not find out what they had discussed. Our General had got into the habit of presenting these envoys with gifts on a scale which was extravagant to the point of prodigality. As a result, many spurious envoys appeared, claiming to have been sent by various persons and who even produced false letters of credential to ensure that they were received. The truth of my statement is borne out by the fact that none of the propositions brought forward by these men bore any fruit. The above mentioned envoy was given a piece of gold embroidered brocade and presented with some money prior to his withdrawal on the following day.

Sieur de la Motte, an ensign on the “Breton” was sent to Pulicat with a letter for Admiral de Rijkloff. De la Haye complained that our men from the garrison at Trincomallee were being detained at Batavia despite the terms of the capitulation according to which they were to have been sent back to Europe. De la Haye also lodged a protest at the manner in which our men were being treated there.

The Incident of a Consignment of Wheat

Abbé Carrè, who had returned to Madras, informed us that he had succeeded in obtaining some wheat for us. We despatched

De la Motte was sent to Pulicat on 27 August. Ibid., II, p. 630.
The Abbé had returned on the evening of 25 August itself. Ibid., II, p. 628.
thirty men to escort this consignment to us. These men returned empty-handed with a letter for de la Haye from Abbé Carré to the effect that the Governor had refused to allow the grain to be carried out. This caused our General to write a very strongly worded letter to the Governor. The Governor was accused of colluding with the Dutch, our common enemy, and de la Haye threatened that he would carry his complaints against the Governor to the King of England. This letter elicited an equally haughty response. Letters were exchanged back and forth and from this time, the English lost all sense of restraint towards us.

Since I have set myself to relate the truth to the best of my knowledge, I must give some further details about the wheat incident. Abbé Carré, having gathered together this consignment of grain, had informed de la Haye about it. When he received the instructions of de la Haye to forward the grain to San Thomé, Abbé Carré had asked the Governor of Madras for permission to take the grain out of the city. The Governor gave permission on condition that the bullock carts and porters followed a specified route which entailed the crossing of a small river. Thirty sackloads were sent by this route, but some of the sacks got wet when the river was being crossed. De la Haye wrote to Abbé Carré advising him to find some other route. Abbé Carré requested the Governor for permission to send the

Langhorn had supported the Roundheads during the civil war in England and his sympathies, therefore, may have reached out with a greater degree of spontaneity to the Dutch, with their staunchly Republican Protestant traditions, rather than to the French with whom his monarch, Charles II, had forged an alliance. Carré refers to a meeting which took place between Langhorn and Van Goens at Pulicat on 26 August. During this meeting, it was decided that the Protestant religion which was common to the two countries could act as a great cohesive force binding the two nations together. It was not necessary to extend the European war to India and the Dutch and English Companies could not do better than to follow a policy of neutrality in India and concentrate on their commercial operations. This would mean the preclusion of English support from Madras to the French at San Thomé. Ibid., II, pp. 628-29, 635. De la Haye, however, claimed that the English refused to help the French as they did not wish to disrupt their private trade in any way. They followed the practice of passing off their own goods as those of the Portuguese or Moors and did not wish to break off relations with the latter B.N., N.A., 9352 (60).
remaining part of the consignment by another track which cut
well into the countryside. The Governor refused to give per-
mission as he feared that the Moors would get wind of the
transaction. There was some argument on this point after
which the Abbé informed de la Haye about the refusal of the
Governor. This was the background to the correspondence I
have already described. Had the Abbé been possessed of a less
impetuous temperament he may have adopted a less inflexible
stand, thus assuring himself of success. This only proves how
important it is to choose the proper people to undertake diffe-
rent kinds of enterprise. Abbé Carré had been so sure of his
stand that he had been too outspoken. The Governor had
replied to him in the same vein. The Abbé had not cared to
endear himself in any way and the Governor saw no reason to
attempting conciliate him.

On 28 August, the five ships which had anchored to the
south of San Thomé lifted anchor and sailed towards the
north.

Every day, fresh loads of rice were brought into the city. The
neighbouring people began to bring in their ware and the mar-
ket began to re-establish itself.27

On 29 August, de la Motte returned from Pulicat and made
his report to de la Haye. Admiral Rijkloff had accorded him a
very fine reception and when his toast was being offered the
Dutch had fired their cannon. Rijkloff had, however, declared
his inability to do anything about the prisoners made at Trin-
comalle. Our men had been sent to Batavia and the Dutch
Admiral no longer had any control over their fate.

On 30 August, de la Haye mounted on horseback, and taking
with him a part of the garrison and some lascars he visited
several villages bordering on Madras. He threatened several
village chiefs that their villages would be burnt if they did not

27Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 74-5, testifies that the French took advantage of
the absence of the Dutch fleet to push to the maximum the advantage they
had won over the Moors as a result of their triumph of 10 August. While
the Moors were expecting reinforcements on the one hand, 200 cavalry
and 4,000 infantry had been withdrawn to participate in hostilities against
Bijapur. B.N., N.A., 9352 (60). For conditions in Bijapur on the death of
Ali Adil Shah II on 24 November 1672 vide Sarkar, Aur., IV pp. 159-60.
bring in provisions to San Thomé. They promised to comply and sent several oxen loaded with grain to the city on the same day. On his way back to San Thomé, de la Haye came across twenty horses laden with cloth. The people leading these horses assured de la Haye that this consignment was being taken to Madras. De la Haye paid them no heed and forced them towards San Thomé. All the bullocks loaded with rice encountered during the return journey were also forced to adopt the same path. The Governor of Madras sent an agent on the following day to lay claim to the cloth. Even though there were grounds for doubting if the cloth belonged to the English Company, all of it was handed back.

On the same day, 31 August, we learnt that the Dutch squadron had lifted anchor at Pulicat and had sailed towards the north. Provisions of rice continued to reach the city from outside.

September 1673

On 1 September, de la Haye wrote a very detailed letter to the Governor of Madras. He discussed the current situation and emphasized once again how important it was for the English to unite with us so that we could encompass the downfall of our common enemy. The letter was couched in strong language and the English Governor could take offence at some of the terms which had been used. This letter did not prove any more efficacious than the previous ones. The English had become even more determined to confine their activities solely to trade and shun all involvement in military exercises.

Desertion by Members of the Crew of the “Breton”

The captain, the lieutenant and the ensign of the “Breton” transferred their goods on to the ship’s launch and made their way to Madras. This news was brought to de la Haye while he was engaged in drilling some of the garrison. It caused considerable excitement and, in truth, desertion in this manner by such high-ranking officers is, indeed, amazing. Although their

28 They were de Champignolle, de Villeneuve, and de la Motte. Carré, II, p. 640.
action was inexcusable, I will give the reasons which prompted these men to take this step.

The captain of the “Breton” had held the rank of lieutenant when he had originally set sail from France but he had been commissioned to succeed as captain at the very first vacancy. When the captain of the “Breton” had embarked on the “Jules” to return to France, this lieutenant had taken his place. The other officers had also been promoted. I have already described the extent to which these officers incurred the displeasure of de la Haye during the voyage to Masulipatam. After their return to San Thomé, their performance had showed no signs of improvement. They betrayed complete lassitude in their work, spending the major portion of their time ashore. It was this which had induced de la Haye to appoint the Chevalier de Maisonneuve, chief of the squadron, so that he could keep a check on the repairs which needed to be carried out on the ships. This appointment made the officers lose all sense of restraint and they now began to voice their complaints loudly. De la Haye reproved the captain of the “Breton” for his indifference but had been good enough to explain that the authority given to de Maisonneuve would not affect his own standing in any way. The captain was quite beside himself and refused to be swayed by any of these explanations. The lieutenant and the ensign were even more antagonistic, although they could offer no reason other than that they were not receiving their salaries which, indeed, de la Haye was in no position to pay. They formed their plans after this and persuaded the captain to join them in their cowardly course. The two junior officers had been contemplating flight for a long time, but as neither possessed the resources necessary for a voyage of long duration, they had been unable to act. The captain, however, was known to have a good sum of money stacked away and after several attempts they had succeeded in seducing this officer. Their plans were then drawn up and executed in the manner which has been described. De la Haye wrote several times to the Governor of Madras asking him to send back these deserters. The Governor had refused saying he could not give up these officers who had come to him appealing for his protection. The three men later

**Vide supra, p. 392.**
sent to Surat from where they sailed to France on a Company ship which had put in at La Rochelle. Believing that they had sufficient grounds to justify their desertion, they had voluntarily even themselves up so that they could account for their action. It is said that an influential person connected with one of the three officers who could see better than these men as to how their affair was developing contrived to secure their release from prison before the orders from court could reach La Rochelle. These officers were not taken back into the Company service and a long time they had to remain in hiding. In the meantime, Commissionary investigated the circumstances and prepared the material for the trial.

The people from the outlying areas continued to bring rice to the city. On 4 September, a large body of enemy cavalry appeared within cannon shot distance. De la Haye came out to pulse them accompanied by a few detachments but the Moors withdrew before our men could come within musket shot range.

On 7 September, twenty-five lascars who had been placed toward a temple deserted from their post. They were dissatisfied; they had not received any salary for several months.

They were still bringing in bountiful supplies of rice to San home. De la Haye continued to travel around the vicinity to encourage the local people to send cartloads of food to the city.

We received some old letters from Surat on 11 September. These did not yield any fresh information to us.

**[AVAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH]**

In the same day, seven ships appeared from the south. An officer in a masuri was sent to reconnoitre these vessels and, if

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*At the request of de la Haye, Langhorn had agreed not to provide accommodation to these men on the English fleet which was sailing to Europe. (Infra, n. 39). However, the English Governor with the connivance of Father Ephraim, had provided the men with the facility to travel to Surat by the overland route. Carré, II, p. 675. The deserters returned to France on the "Solid d'Orient". Infra, p. 603.

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Carré puts the number at 100 Ibid., II, p. 647.
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**Naval Conflict Between the English and the Dutch**

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32Carré puts the number at 100 Ibid., II, p. 647.
they proved to be English, he was directed to board them. Having taken these precautions and on finding that the vessels were English our officer boarded their flag ship. He learnt that shortly after the departure of the squadron from Masulipatam, it had encountered the Dutch fleet under Rijklof. A stiff engagement had then taken place. Four of the English ships had steered well out at sea and had not participated in the combat. They had lost three of their ships, one having been sunk and the remaining two having been captured.

Some of the captains had given a very good account of themselves and if all the officers had performed their duty and had all the English vessels engaged in the conflict the outcome for Admiral Rijklof would have been very different. Three out of the seven ships of the English squadron were in a very bad shape. The squadron passed by San Thomé and anchored at Madras. De la Haye wrote immediately to the English Governor offering to place our troops and the ships lying at our roads at his disposal. The Governor thanked him very politely.

On 12 September, eight hundred bullocks loaded with rice came into the city. On 13 September, two officers were sent to the English ships to offer our services to the captains. The latter expressed their thanks in the usual way.

On 15 September, four hundred bullocks entered the city bringing in husked rice as well as paddy. Our stores were now well stocked and each day our General rode out on horseback to ensure that all the roads were open.

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**The English fleet had reached Masulipatam on 15 August (O.S.) and had set out for Madras on 20 August (O.S.).** Fawcett, _E.F._, II, p. 241.

**The “Ceasar” had not participated in the contest at all while four other vessels fell away during the course of the conflict leaving five ships alone to bear the full brunt.** _Ibid._, II, pp. 242-5.

**The “Antelope” sank the day after the engagement while the “President” and “Sampson” were captured by the Dutch.** _Ibid._, II, pp. 245-6.

**The Dutch squadron consisted of thirteen warships, two flutes and two or three hookers. The flutes and the hookers did not take any part in the engagement. Van Goens was stated to possess 1,200 Europeans and 120 natives on the fleet. The engagement was hotly contested but the advantage rested with the Dutch. They sustained the loss of sixty dead and sixty-seven wounded but obtained 270 prisoners from the English.** _D.R._, 21, pp. 310, 321; Fawcett, _E.F._, II, p. 237.
We learnt on the same day that 500 Dutchmen had landed at Sadras to the south of San Thomé. They were to join the Moors by the overland route and start the siege of San Thomé. The men were hard at work raising an entrenchment in front of Porte Royale and digging a channel in the river so that it could be opened to launch traffic.

On 17 September, we heard the sound of ten to twelve cannon shots which came to us from the landward side. We concluded that this marked the junction between the Dutch and Moorish forces.

On 19 September, we received information that Admiral Rijkloff had left Pulicat with a detachment of his men to come to San Thomé. When he was only three leagues away from the city, the soldiers who had disembarked at Sadras came up and joined him.

When de la Haye learnt that the English squadron was to leave within two days time, he wrote to the English Governor asking that accommodation should be provided for Abbé Carré on board one of the vessels. He also requested that passage should be denied to the three officers who had deserted from our side. The Governor acceded to this request.

Three ships had been despatched from Batavia for the Coromandel in July 1673. One more ship appears to have been added to these at Ceylon. The fleet was under the command of Laurensd Suyker. These ships landed 800 men at Sadras. On 14 September, these men were reported to have advanced to Vallur. D.R., 21, pp. 198, 200-1; Carré, II, pp. 657, 659-60; Fawcett, E.F., II, p. 77.

Rijkloff had advanced from Vallur to hold consultations with Trim-bak Bussora. When the two leaders met, a salute from five pieces of cannon was fired. Carré, II, p. 666.

The two requests were not linked together in any way. On 14 September, Langhorn had promised the French officers that they would be taken back to Europe by the English fleet. De la Haye had sent his first request to Langhorn not to accommodate these officers on 17 September. There was no mention of the departure of Carré at this time. It was only after Carré had come to San Thomé and had held discussions with de la Haye on 20 September that the decision was taken that the Abbé was to go by sea to Surat and then proceed from there by land to Europe. De la Haye thereupon wrote to Langhorn requesting that Carré should be taken up to Surat by the English fleet. Langhorn agreed. At the same time the withdrew from the promise which he had earlier made to the three French officers and agreed only to transport some of their luggage. Ibid. II, pp. 657, 667, 672.
THE DUTCH TROOPS CAMP IN FRONT OF SAN THOME—TROOP MOVEMENTS WHICH TAKE PLACE

On 20 September, two natives came to de la Haye with a letter from Admiral Rijkloff. The Admiral had requested that a safe conduct should be provided for an officer whom he wished to send to confer with de la Haye. De la Haye agreed and on 21 September, an officer, Tacq, commandant of a company, arrived. He was accompanied by a trumpeteer. He had a long conference with de la Haye but I do not know what they discussed. There was a rumour that the Dutch officer had been sent to demand the rendition of San Thomé. The meeting was followed by a banquet during which toasts were drunk to the sound of cannon fire. After this, the Dutch officer went back. Carré came to San Thomé from Madras to receive his papers for embarkation on the English ship. He was given some packets for court after which he embarked, the English ships being already under sail.

Since the past few days, the Dutch who had stationed themselves at the site of the Moorish camp which we had burnt, moved up closer and established their camp within view of the city. It was believed that the Dutch had come to an understanding with the English by which neither party would engage in any hostilities against the other. Envoys sent by the King of

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40 Carré gives an account of the meeting which appears entirely plausible. The ostensible reason for the despatch of the Dutch envoys was that Van Goens wished to convey his response to de la Haye's complaint at the way French prisoners were being treated in Batavia. (Supra, p. 512.) The real reason was to find out the conditions prevailing at San Thomé. De la Haye was aware of this and tried to dazzle the Dutchmen by a show of French strength and munificence. Carré, II, pp. 673-4.


42 Van Goens left Pulicat in mid-September with 500 Europeans, the same number of native troops, six cannon and all the materials necessary for engaging in a siege. He stopped at Madras and received further reinforcements along the way consisting of the contingent which had been sent from Sadras. By the time he reached San Thomé on 18 September his forces comprised 1000 Europeans and 1000 lascars. B.N., N.A., 9352 (80), Kaeppelin, op.cit., p. 113.
Golconda were in Madras and it was they who had persuaded the English to enter into this agreement.\(^{43}\)

Rijkloff's envoy returned to San Thomé on the same day. He had a meeting with de la Haye for a quarter of an hour after which he returned to the Dutch camp.

On 23 September, a soldier was shot for having wounded his commanding officer by two cuts of his sword. In the evening, 500-600 Dutchmen supported by a corps of Moorish cavalry arrived within half a league of the city. They retreated soon after.

Since the past two days, we had not received any supplies either from Madras or the interior. The English defended themselves by saying that they had been threatened by the King of Golconda that if they gave us the least assistance they would find themselves blockaded and all their supplies of food from the interior would be cut off. We also received letters from Madras which informed us that the Moors had forced the English to respect their injunctions by seizing bullocks which had been coming in for the former loaded with rice.\(^{44}\)

On 24 September, the Dutch shifted camp and lodged themselves in the temple of Triplicane less than half a league outside the city. The Moorish camp lay at the distance of about a quarter of a league to the right of the Dutch. Our morale was high and we were ready to face even a hand-to-hand conflict.

On 25 September, there was an indecisive encounter between some of our men and a few of the Dutch who had moved forward. We received positive information that the Moors and

\(^{43}\)The Golconda envoys do not appear to have any part in this understanding which was achieved by the efforts of the two European partners alone. Van Goens had been in communication with Langhorn since the time of his arrival in the Carnatic. On 22 September O.S./ 2 October N.S. Langhorn had formally agreed to Van Goens' proposal that the English would not attack Dutch forces in the employ of the King of Golconda. Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 76-7.

\(^{44}\)For further details vide Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 78-9. In this context it must be remembered that although the new Commander-in-Chief, Chinnappalli Mirza, had been sent by Abul Hasan against the French at San Thomé, the same official had made no secret of his dislike for the English in the past. Ibid., p. 64.
the Dutch were not allowing anything to enter Madras, not even wood.

On 26 September, Admiral Rijklof with 300-400 men, and the Moorish General, Chinnapalli Mirza, heading a cavalry corps, came up to the Luz Church, 600 feet away from us. It was believed that they had come to reconnoitre this place intending to fortify themselves here so that they could press against us from closer quarters. De la Haye came out of the city at the head of 200 men. He advanced within musket shot distance while the cannon from our walls sprayed a well-directed fire on the enemy. A few of the enemy were killed. Rijklof, who had asked for some bottles to be brought intending to regale himself, was quite taken aback when a bullet whizzed past him and shattered the glass. They fell back on Triplicane with their troops where their men were reformed. Both parties to the conflict sent out their respective contingents but the resultant skirmish proved quite indecisive.

On 27 September, de la Haye rode across the plain at the head of some cavaliers. On the same day, the Governor of Madras held a grand banquet to which he invited some Dutch officers who had come to visit him in order to settle their affairs. When the toasts were drunk, these were accompanied by the firing of more than 200 cannon balls.

At night, Deltor was sent to Madras. He was to try and find out what was happening there and if possible he was to attempt to secure some assistance.

Our men worked hard at the fortifications which were being constructed outside Porte Royale.

On 28 September, de la Haye emerged from the city at the head of a group of horsemen. A lascar contingent followed behind him. He wished to carry out a reconnaissance of the fortifications the Dutch were constructing at Triplicane which could be viewed from a distance. We fired a few cannon shots from the fort and two of our balls hit the enemy camp.

On 29 September, Deltor returned from Madras. He confirmed that nothing was being allowed to be brought into Madras

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48 *Eglise de Sainte-Luce* in the text.
49 Carré refers to Deltor as being the personal emissary of Baron. *vide op. cit.*, II, p. 631.
and that the surrounding villages had been ruined by the Dutch. Despite this, it was believed that the English and the Dutch would sort out their differences. It would be futile for us to expect to draw any assistance from this place.

A party of Moorish and Dutch cavalry made a detour around the fort and burnt some villages to the south of San Thomé. While returning, some of them capered up close to the city. One of them was carried away by a cannon shot. This caused the others to retreat.

On the morning of 30 September, four Dutch ships appeared from the south. They anchored at a distance of half a league from the city. A party of Moorish cavalry supported by 500-600 of their infantry made their way to the south to devastate the villages. De la Haye caused a diversion by marching out with a few detachments towards Triplicane temple. This caused the enemy to move back. De la Haye thereupon withdrew as he had no intention of engaging in a combat with such unequal forces.

October 1673

At dawn on 1 October, the four Dutch ships raised anchor. They sailed close by to our ships firing as they did so. We returned their fire both from our ships and from the fort. We learnt later that the cannonade from the “Breton” had killed and wounded a great many men on two of their ships. Even though the “Breton” was hit by twenty-four balls not a single man was lost. Our only casualty was the petty officer of the hooker “Guillot” who had his arm blown off. The Dutch ships moored before the temple which was now flying Dutch colours. They set ashore a consignment of artillery and munitions here.

On 2 October, thirty lascars who had deserted from the Dutch came to offer their services to de la Haye. It would have been impolitic to turn them away but at the same time we could not immediately repose complete confidence in them. They were posted at a small temple at some distance from the fort. Our own men posted here were to keep them under observation.

"Vide supra, n. 37."
On 3 October, de la Haye came out with a contingent of soldiers and sailors. They cut down several trees which were within falconet range of the Dutch camp. De la Haye also set fire to several piles of hawsers\(^*\) behind which the Dutch could take shelter or prepare to ambush us. They fired several cannon-balls at us from the temple but without any success. We opened fire from the fort to which the men had returned after fulfilling their task.

On 4 October, two Dutch battalions supported by a corps of Moorish cavalry passed within cannon shot distance of the town. They went towards the south where they burnt four villages on the pretext that the villagers were supplying us with food. Some of our men came out to see if there were any opportunities to engage the enemy in a skirmish. The enemy was careful to keep together during the march and by the evening, the group returned to camp. On the same day, a ketch sank before the temple where they were off-loading cannon and other materials. Some of the shots fired from the temple proved that they had a few eighteen-pounders in the temple. The Dutch fortified themselves in the temple while the Moors improved their position in the camp.

We continued the work outside San Thome. On 6 October detachments of soldiers along with fifty sailors were sent out with axes. The remaining trees were cut down and a mound behind which the enemy could take shelter was levelled down. A bark which was sailing from the north towards the south was stopped by our launches. It belonged to the Danes and was carrying a cargo of cloth. It was released without any delay.

On 7 October, a soldier belonging to the company of cadets deserted, taking with him a horse belonging to d’Orgeret, the commanding officer of the fort of the same name. The cadet had been arrested and detained at Fort d’Orgeret for having slapped a Portuguese. As soon as he found a suitable opportunity, the cadet had escaped from the fort. Finding this horse which was standing at the foot of the wall, he had jumped on its back and had ridden full tilt to the Dutch camp.

\(^*\)The word in the text is “hazière” which has been taken as “haussière”.
Admiral Rijkloff Hands Over Charge to the Governor of Pulicat and Returns to Ceylon

On 8 October, we learnt that Rajkloff had embarked to return to Ceylon. He had handed over command of the Dutch forces consisting of 500 Dutchmen and a corps of lascars to Pavilioen, the Governor of Pulicat.

On the night of 9-10 October, two soldiers deserted. This was a malady for which we could not find any cure. Some of the officers could be held indirectly responsible for this as they had held discussions in full hearing of the garrison to the effect that our chances of receiving help from France were very poor.

On the evening of 10 October, seven Dutch ships appeared from the north. The vessels were tacking as they wished to anchor before Triplicane.

On the same day, we received letters from Golconda which informed us that the Dutch were claiming that they would be able to capture San Thomé within a few days. The King himself had nothing against us but the leading ministers who had been bought over by Dutch presents, were urging their monarch to lay siege to San Thomé for which they desired the necessary orders to be despatched to the generals. Since we did not have any representatives at the court, the Dutch had a free hand.

On 11 October, the seven Dutch ships anchored before Triplicane. They set sail again in the evening taking a southerly route. Our ships were well-prepared to face attack and the officers were all on board. We had also ensured that a lively fire would be kept up from our bastions. Three of the Dutch ships

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44 Langhorn stated that Van Goens had hoped to attack Madras but had been deterred by its defences and the good relations between Langhorn and the Golconda administration. Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 81-2 n. The information given by Martin (Supra, p. 518), as to the difficulties created by the Dutch for the English would lend some credence to this view.

45 The withdrawal of Van Goens was interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it was rumoured that the Portuguese were expecting ships and men from Europe. After their arrival these forces would be used to oust the Dutch from the erstwhile Portuguese possessions on the Malabar coast. The second explanation was that fearing that reinforcements had been sent to the French from Europe, Rijkloff wished to cut these off as the season for this traffic had opened. B.N., N.A., 9352 (6.5)
ships\textsuperscript{51} had remained behind at their anchorage before the Dutch camp. In order to protect disembarkation activities on the seaward side, the Dutch erected a small wooden fort surrounded by a palisade of coconut trees, and protected by a moat. A battery was raised and a garrison of 100 men was stationed here. The fort, which was named Fort Pavilioen, after their commander was equidistant to the seashore and to Triplicane Temple.

On 12 October, a Brahmin came into the city and told de la Haye that he would send us rice. Although it appeared doubtful that he would be able to carry out his promise, de la Haye treated him with courtesy and civility hoping this treatment would prompt him to keep his word.

On 13 October de la Haye went out on a foray and sent back two small bow chasers which had been found near a bridge on the Dutch side at a distance of 500 feet from the fort. After this, he detached himself and advanced with his troops towards the Dutch camp. A corps of the enemy advance guard was first attacked. These men did not put up any resistance. Dutch soldiers now emerged from the entrenchments. The skirmish lasted for some time during which a few cannon-balls were also fired. De la Haye did not wish to penetrate any deeper, and on finding that the Dutch could not be incited to advance, he withdrew with his troops. The fighting had not taken place at close quarters and the engagement had not cost us a single man dead or wounded. The enemy also did not appear to have sustained any losses. Our men continued their work outside.

On 14 October, de la Haye received a letter from Baba Sahib who had commanded the Golconda forces at the time of the first siege of the San Thomé. Baba Sahib asked our General to send an accredited envoy to him as there were important matters on which he wished to hold communications with us. We sent a Brahmin whom we sometimes employed to carry our letters.

On 15 October, all the troops of the garrison were reviewed after which there was a parade. The soldiers were being extremely

\textsuperscript{51}Van Goens had taken the major portion of the squadron back to Ceylon. The three Dutch ships which had been left behind had 550-600 men on board. \textit{D.R.}, 21, p. 322.
well looked after. Every day they had fresh meat, a sufficient quantity of rice some brandy, and on occasion, each received thirty sous a week.

The Brahmin who had promised to send us rice brought in four of his children who were to serve as surety for the promise which he had made to procure rice for the city. He requested our General to send an escort of lascars to a place indicated by him. Here, 300-400 loaded bullocks were to be found which our men could seize. Two officers were nominated to the command of two hundred lascars who were to constitute the escort. The party started out from the city at dusk.

We saw six ships tacking on the high sea. They appeared to be the Dutch ships which had set sail a few days before. One of the lascars who had deserted to us from the Dutch, was taken by surprise and apprehended while on his way to their camp. He was confined to the guard house. These men could not be trusted. The work outside the city was being pursued with a great deal of urgency.

On 16 October, we learnt that the men who had been sent to collect the rice had been set upon by a group of fifteen to twenty Dutch and Moorish cavalry. A few musket shots had caused the horsemen to withdraw. Our man had then proceeded to the place which had been indicated to the officers but had found nothing there. They waited for an hour but there were still no traces of any bullocks with rice. Fearing that the enemy would attack them, they turned back. When the contingent had reached within two leagues of the city, we sent out some men to support them in case of enemy attack. They returned to San Thomé at nine o'clock in the morning.

On 17 October, de la Haye marched out at the head of 700-800 cavalry, members of his guard, fifty soldiers and 100 lascars. After advancing one league into the plain, our men thrust themselves inside some huts. There were two Dutch horsemen and forty footmen here. All of them took flight. While returning our men met a group of fifty to sixty Dutch and Moorish cavalry. Spurring on his horse, our General took aim at one of the enemy horsemen who had advanced the furthest but missed his mark. The enemy detachment retreated and our men returned to the city.
Deltor was sent to Madras on 18 October. He was to stay there and send us whatever information he could gather and also strive to convey some refreshments to us from there. He was entrusted with a letter of courtesy for the Governor of Madras. He was also carrying other letters to be sent to Masulipatam and to the captain of the "Flamand", who was believed to be still in Bengal.

The launch which had taken Deltor to Madras during the night returned with a pocket of letters which had been sent from Masulipatam. Among these there was one for me from Golconda. Our men who had been captured on the two prizes at Chicacole were undergoing a great deal of misery.

The Brahmin who had promised us the rice came to meet de la Haye with whom he conferred for two hours. He apparently apologized for not having been able to keep his word.

A squadron of the enemy cavalry which was proceeding towards the south passed by within cannon shot distance of the fort. We fired two cannon-balls at them.

De la Haye was informed that the captain of the hooker, "Guillot", was said to have stated that he would take the first opportunity to set sail for France. He was also suspected of some kind of complicity in the plot which had been formed by the three officers who had deserted. The Commissiary was sent to take off the sails and the rudder of this vessel. The captain descended to vindicate himself. There were a few who believed that these suspicions were quite unjustified.

An envoy of Chinnapalli Mirza came to the city with a letter in which his master made fulsome offers of his services. De la Haye wrote his reply immediately.

A general revue of the garrison took place on 22 October. After this, the sailors were embarked on the "Breton" to take part in an enterprise which had been planned by de la Haye.

On 23 October, the envoys of the Moorish General returned. De la Haye conferred with them for two hours outside the fort. He then had a letter written to their General recapitulating the events which had taken place. He described what had happened subsequent to the arrival of our squadron before San Thomé.
He delineated the attempts we had made to secure a favourable treaty from the King of Golconda. He pointed out that our desire to achieve this had not abated. We were ready to offer our friendship and perform any service desired of us. The King was requested not to lend any credence to the Dutch who were our open enemies. De la Haye ended his letter by saying that he was awaiting the response of the King.

We heard from Madras that each day the Dutch officers were feasting with the Governor and the relations between the two parties could not have been better. All provisions were now flowing into Madras without any obstruction.

We received letters from Golconda in which we were informed that one of the principal ministers, Mudsacan, had offered to act as our intermediary and secure the signature of a favourable treaty for us. Should our General desire to send an envoy to court, Mudsacan would secure a passport for us by which the safety of our envoys would be assured. If we could send a resourceful man with sufficient funds to cover, in particular, the gifts which were so important, it appeared likely that we would be able to end our affair without recourse to violence.

On 24 October, the Dutch fired several cannon-balls at the sappers who were working outside the fort but without any success. We riposted from the fort, firing several volleys which penetrated inside their camp.

The cadet who had deserted to the enemy from Fort d’Orgelet, wrote to two of his companions trying to incite them to act in as cowardly a manner as himself. He tried to encourage them by the grand promises which he held out to them. These two gentlemen cadets gave the letter to the Governor, de Rebrey, who handed it over to de la Haye. The two women who had brought the missive had their noses and ears cut off. The only response sent back were these two women in their mutilated condition.

On 26 October, sailors were embarked on the “Breton” which was also loaded with arms. De la Haye held a grand conference on this day attended by all the officers of the ships.

*"This person could perhaps be Musa Baig Khan mentioned by Siddiqui (op. cit., p. 231), as having been appointed Sar Khail in 1674. It is unlikely that he could have been Musa Khan for owing to the machinations of Sayyid Muzaffar, Musa Khan had been in disgrace since July 1873. Vide Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 69, 94-5.*
THE ATTACK BY THE DUTCH SQUADRON (28 October)

On 27 October, the entire garrison was assembled at the square. The sailors were separated and embarked on the ships which lay at anchor at the roads while arms, munitions and everything else required for combat were also laded on board. The Council was convened and during the meeting de la Haye remonstrated on how extremely important it was for us to attack the three Dutch vessels at the roads. Our naval strength was sufficient to ensure our success in this action so much so, that even if we were to find the enemy prepared, the outcome would not change for us. By seizing the Dutch vessels not only would we be assuring ourselves of complete freedom of navigation on the seas but, what was more important, our exploit would serve to totally discredit the Dutch. The Moors might then come around to agreeing to sign an impartial treaty in all good faith. These arguments which were so entirely plausible found a ready acceptance. Our General who had never desisted from participating in any enterprise, included himself in this one also. He embarked on the "Breton" at night taking with him his guards and twenty musketeers, not wishing any of the others to accompany him. The officers and soldiers were embarked on the other boats.

The squadron consisted of the "Breton", a good battleship, the "Bayonnais" and two hookers of which one belonged to the Company. It was felt that the captain of the "Bayonnais" did not have the qualities necessary to lead such a warlike action. A more experienced officer was placed above him while the command was entrusted to a third person who was a relative to de la Haye. This arrangement proved to be an insalutary one. The commander of the "Bayonnais" was ordered to copy the manoeuvres of the "Breton". The hooker, the "Guillot" was to act in concert with the "Bayonnais" and the Company hooker was to support the "Breton". All these ships set sail two hours before dawn on 28 October. A slight wind helped their progress towards the enemy. When our adversaries perceived our movements, they put up a good show. The three Dutch vessels manoeuvred into a straight line with their anchors apeak. Noticing at mid-course that the other ships could not keep up with the "Breton", de la Haye brailed the foregaff
and waited for the others to catch up. The officers on the “Bayonnais” followed to the dot the verbal instructions which they had been given and duplicated the operation of the “Breton”. The more intelligent officers were well aware that the steps on board the “Breton” had been taken only to allow the other vessels to catch up. Their resentment at the way in which the command of the ship had been effected made them act in this obtuse manner. De la Haye became impatient. He ordered Chevalier de Maisonneuve, the captain of the “Breton” to unfurl the foresail and make straight for the enemy. This was the most dangerous manoeuvre and it was done in full view of the entire Moorish army and the inhabitants of Madras who had rushed to the shores to watch the battle. The “Breton” ranged beside the first two Dutch ships which delivered their broadsides into her. De la Haye wished to engage the ship belonging to the Dutch commander and the “Breton” advanced towards this vessel. Holding all its fire in reserve, the “Breton” came within musket shot distance of the Dutch vessel which aimed a broadside at her. The “Breton” continued to bear directly on the Dutch ship and it seemed as though it would be only a matter of minutes before we boarded her. The cry of “Long live the King” had already rent the air. So great was the panic of the Dutch crew which had taken complete cover that even the rammers from their cannon had not been removed. At this point Chevalier de Maisonneuve declared that unless we brailed the foregaff the wind would carry us beyond our target. Several sailors and officers did not accept this but the Chevalier’s advice prevailed. We clewed up our foresail and fell short of our prey. A Dutch sailor quickly seized this opportunity to climb up the bowsprit and cut the reefs of the sprit sail. We rained him with more than one hundred pistol and musket shots but he was quite undeterred. The sail billowed out and the ship moved away. All the sails were now unfurled so that the Dutch could gain the open sea thus escaping from their dangerous predicament. Our men tried to manoeuvre the “Breton” in the same direction but failed as the enemy cannonade had cut some of the tackle. The best that our sailors could do was to fire a full broadside at the Dutch in the vain hope that the enemy would thus be
crippled. The Dutch vessel drew away. It was only after our tackle had been mended that we could hoist our sails and give chase. It was a futile task as the Dutch ship was a far better sailor than the "Breton". In the meantime, the "Bayonnais" had advanced and had started a cannonade of the other ships. The fore top-sail of the smallest among the Dutch vessels was blown off and it would have been easy for the crew of the "Bayonnais" to have boarded and capture this ship. The officers remained as ill-intentioned as before in their conduct. They contented themselves by firing their cannon balls from a distance while the Dutch set themselves to mending the damage after which they sailed away in search of their commander's vessel. The "Breton" chased these ships for three leagues until they were almost lost to sight. It was impossible to board any of the enemy vessels. De la Heye finally gave up the chase and turned the prow of his ships around. He anchored before San Thomé at nine o'clock in the evening in an extremely mortified frame of mind at having lost such a fine opportunity. The "Saint Jean de Bayonne" and the two hookers had also come in. When the officers of the "Saint Jean" came on board the "Breton" they were given the treatment which they deserved. Two of them were arrested but this could not repair the damage which their mischievous conduct had caused.

De la Haye deserves the highest possible praise for the firmness which he showed during this action, on which indeed, the conservation of San Thomé depended. He was, however, blamed for his decision to appoint three captains to the "Bayonnais" and for neglecting to issue precise orders which could be clearly understood. This was, however, wholly in keeping with his practice of issuing verbal instructions of an equivocal nature at all times so that he could keep the door open for apportioning either praise or blame according to the outcome of the enterprise. The only losses which we sustained during this action was a sailor who was killed and a gentleman who was injured on the head by a cannon-ball. Two days later, we learnt that the Dutch had lost thirty men as also the captain of their flag ship.

On 29 October, de la Haye disembarked and was given a joyful welcome. A service was immediately held at the Cathedral to thank God for having conserved the life of our General.
De la Haye at Masulipatam

On 30 and 31 October, de la Haye was kept occupied by the work which was still in progress outside the city as also in conveying such materials as were necessary to the "Breton" so that the damage which had been sustained by this ship from the enemy cannonade could be rectified.

On 2 November, letters were written to the captain of the "Flamand" who was assumed to be still in Bengal. He was asked to charge his ship with food for San Thomé. He was also instructed as to how he was to comfort himself in view of the presence of the Dutch vessels before the city.

On 3 November, a Walloon soldier who had deserted from the Dutch side came into San Thomé. He told us that there was a total of 500 men in the temple and at Fort Pavilioen. Some of these men would assuredly have deserted to us had they been certain that we had sufficient stocks of food for those who had deserted to the Dutch from our side had spread word throughout their camp that our storehouses were virtually empty.

A north north-easterly and a north-westerly wind which had sprung up during the night of the 3-4 November became stronger in the morning. Fearing to be run ashore, the "Saint Jean de Bayonne" and the two hookers which had anchored very close to the land, now set sail. De la Haye, who feared for the safety of the "Breton" which lay at its moorings, drew up instructions for Chevalier de Maisonneuve, the captain of this ship. The Chevalier was to make for the open sea. If he was unable to return to San Thomé within two days, he was to proceed to Atjeh. De la Haye would give de Maisonneuve a letter of greeting for the Queen of this region. After charging his vessel with food at Atjeh, de Maisonneuve was to return to San Thomé. There were further details in the orders which were issued. Orders were also framed for the captains of the "Saint Jean de Bayonne" and the two hookers. All these orders proved of little avail as they could not be carried across to the

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43Four sultanas reigned in Atjeh between 1641-1700. The Queen referred to here by Martin was the second queen in this series. She reigned from 1669 to 1675. Vide Bowry, op. cit., p. 311 n.
ships. The wind which had strengthened and the high seas made any communication between ship and shore impossible. The three vessels which had sailed away did not reappear while the "Breton" which remained at anchor lost its main mast.

On the same day, another enemy soldier sought refuge at San Thomé. He confirmed the statements made by the first soldier. The weather improved a little on 5 November and we sent out a catamaran which reached the "Breton" with difficulty as the sea was still very high. The letters written on the previous evening were sent across. De Maisonneuve was asked, however, not to leave unless he felt it to be absolutely necessary. The Dutch ships did not reappear. They appeared to be at large. The enemy fired several cannon balls at the pioneers who were at work outside the fort.

On 6 November, the three Dutch ships returned and anchored a little out to sea. De Maisonneuve descended and informed de la Haye about the condition of the "Breton" on which the men had sustained considerable hardship. Carpenters were sent across from the shore to remedy the damage. On 7 November, express messengers were sent southwards. Letters were sent to de Lespinay at Pondicherry, and, on the assumption that the captains of the "Saint Jean de Bayonne" and the hookers had also set out on this route, letters were included for them.

A Convoy of Cattle Carrying Grain is Seized

Taking a detachment of five to six cavalry and some lascars, de la Haye left on horseback on 8 November and rode out into the country lying somewhat to the south of the fort. After covering three-quarters of a league, he asked lascar captain to get on top of an elevation and survey the land. On moving forward, this man saw 600-700 bullocks passing close by on their way to the enemy camp loaded with rice. The man returned with this good piece of news which he conveyed to the General. De la Haye immediately ordered the lascars to drive the cattle towards the fort. At the same time, he sent a horseman post haste to the fort with orders that our troops should come out of San Thomé as de la Haye was quite certain that the enemy would try to recover their cattle. This precaution proved very well-founded. While our men were driving the
animals towards San Thomé, and covering a lot of ground in this way, the enemy made a precipitate advance from its camp. The men poured out from their entrenchments while the Moorish cavalry rode out full tilt. Our soldiers who had been sent out from San Thomé now advanced and our musketeers took up favourable positions. This caused the Moorish cavaliers who had outstripped their infantry to come to a rearing halt. Our men moved back towards the fort firing at the Moors as they did so, while the cattle were herded forward. Proceeding in this manner, they came within the protective range of our cannon and halted at a coconut grove. The Moors, who had now been joined by the Dutch, attempted to storm this position. They found themselves completely paralyzed by the vigorous fire which was opened on them by our men. As before our officers were in the forefront. In the meantime, our soldiers had been further strengthened having been joined by a detachment sent from the fort. On perceiving the fine reception being prepared for them, our enemies made no attempt to move forward. The cattle had by now reached the city. Six hundred and twenty-six heads were counted and they brought considerable relief to the garrison. This incident cost us only one lascar who was wounded. A service was immediately held at the Cathedral to thank God for the happy outcome of this episode.

THE INCIDENT OF 9 NOVEMBER—OUR TROOPS PANIC

On the morning of 9 November, a group of the Moorish cavalry came out of their camp and passed within range of our cannon while proceeding southwards. De la Haye also left the fort at three o’clock in the afternoon at the head of 200 men. We went towards the temple where the Dutch had set up a well-entrenched camp. De la Haye made his first attack on a corps of enemy guardsmen who had stationed themselves inside a red house. As soon as our men appeared, the inmates fled. Our men continued their advance amidst the enemy huts until they had reached within musket shot range of the entrenchments of our adversaries. A Dutchman who had deserted to us, now informed de la Haye that if we continued our advance we would be greatly inconvenienced by the fire of three well-charged cannon which the Dutch had set up near a turning.
After making a reconaissance, de la Haye ordered a retreat. Thirty to forty Dutchmen headed by their major now came out of their entrenchments firing briskly. Our men returned this fire as they retreated. At this time one of the guardsmen of our General who was riding on an elevation caught sight of the advancing Moorish cavalry. He was imprudent enough to shout very loudly. "The Moorish cavalry is coming to attack us." Some of our soldiers were intimidated by this cry. They doubled their pace as they were withdrawing while others followed their example. During the ensuing passage of a little more than 200 feet, our soldiers appeared to be in flight. De la Haye stopped them by moving forward and placing himself at their head. He restored order while our officers and volunteers held back the Dutch who had been encouraged by the confusion in our ranks. As soon as discipline had been restored, de la Haye launched a direct attack at the Dutch who were forced to retreat. Our men returned to San Thomé. We lost one man, killed by the enemy cannon and had eight wounded. Among the latter were two cadets, good soldiers, who succumbed to their injuries two days later. They wrote to us from Madras that several Dutchmen had also been wounded. De la Haye praised the major who had always been at the head of his men and who had acted with much vigour. Fifteen to sixteen country merchants came in to claim the cattle seized on the previous day. De la Haye sent them all to help in pumping out the "Breton".

De la Haye again sent express messengers to Pondicherry with letters for the captains of the ships which had been forced out of our roads. These officers were ordered to charge their ships with rice and return to San Thomé as soon as possible. If they were negligent in carrying out these orders, they would be acting against the King’s interests and would have to bear the consequences.

Upon seeing that the Dutch and Moorish cavalry had moved within cannon shot range of San Thomé, de la Haye left the fort with his guards and a squad of artillery men drawn from the different companies. He gave chase to the enemy who withdrew after firing a few shots.

Nothing of any significance transpired on 12 and 13 November.
be found outside hastening on the work which had been started on the entrenchments.

When the troops were reviewed on 14 November, three soldiers were found to be missing. They had deserted during the night. It seemed impossible to check this evil. Neither the remonstrances of the General nor his appeals to their honour had the slightest effect.

A few days ago, two sailors had been imprisoned for having stolen and killed a cow. They were tried and the death penalty was passed on them. They were brought to the square where they made their last confession and prepared themselves for death. They were tied to a stake and the musketeers prepared to fire. At this point, de la Haye remitted their sentence and had them untied.

De Lespinay who had been corresponding with Baba Sahib, the previous commander of the Golconda forces, wrote to us from Pondicherry keeping us informed about his progress. There were no indications that this attempt by de Lespinay would meet with success. There were, indeed, several individuals who came forward with offers to negotiate a peace treaty on our behalf, but all of them demanded payment in advance. We were reluctant to meet this demand and, indeed, we were in no position to do so. A few days ago we had received letters from Balasore. These spoke of the cordial reception given by the Governor to the captain of the "Flamand" when the ship had anchored here. The captain had no money and the Governor had lent him the sum of 3,000 rupees for the subsistence of the crew. On 15 November, de la Haye wrote a letter thanking the Governor and asking him for his continued assistance. We would certainly repay him in conformity with the assurance which had been given. Baron also wrote a letter on the same subject.

Even though the members of the garrison were treated extremely well, three more of them crossed to the enemy on 15 November. These infamous deserters caused us the greatest possible harm for it was because of their assertion that we had

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44The Dutch and Golconda forces had already decided not to attempt to take San Thomé by storm, knowing it to be very strongly fortified, but to reduce it by starvation. Carré, III, p. 719.
exhausted all our food supplies that the Dutch and the Moors refused to stir from the positions they had assumed before San Thome.

On 17 November, de la Haye took a turn on the plain to assess if anything could be done. Upon his return, he ordered the disembarkation of two of the men who had come to claim the cattle we had captured on 8 November and who had been sent by the General to pump out water from the “Breton.” He proposed to them that if they arranged to bring us rice, for which we would pay, their companions would be released and they would be compensated for the seizure of their cows. These men agreed and asked for eight to ten days’ time within which they promised to bring in a convoy of bullocks laden with grain. De la Haye accepted their word and released them.

NEWS FROM SURAT—ARRIVAL OF THE “SOLIEL D’ORIENT”

News of the arrival of the “Soliel d’Orient” at Surat had reached Madras and was conveyed to us from there. This ship had set sail from France in 1672. Contrary winds, or rather the inept navigation of the officers had forced the ship to winter at Mozambique. Here, almost two-thirds of the crew died as a result of poor diet and disease. It had looked as though it would be impossible to leave Mozambique as the crew had become too depleted to be able to manoeuvre the ship. The Portuguese Governor, however, came to the aid of this vessel. The requisite number of hands was obtained by taking off men from the ships which had come to Mozambique from India. The Governor did not scruple to use force when necessary. The crew assembled in this way was just sufficient to conduct the ship to Surat where it arrived in September. This ship brought in a very rich cargo for the Company. The King had also entrusted a clerk who belonged to the accounts department of the navy with the sum of 200,000 livres which was intended for the royal squadron. An express messenger was sent the same day to Surat. De la Haye asked the clerk to await further orders from him. Baron wrote on Company affairs to the merchants at the counter at Surat.

This was a large ship of 1,000 tons Kaepelin, op. cit., p. 654.
This was Chevreuil, who had been appointed Commissary. Ibid., p. 118.
It was becoming very difficult to keep the garrison contented at San Thomé. Deltor had been asked to borrow money at Madras but nothing could be raised without security. Emeralds and other Company effects had been sent to him, and now a well armed launch was sent to Madras to collect the sum which Deltor had raised. Deltor himself came in the launch to San Thomé with the money which, I think, came to 2,000 pagodas, a small sum which was insufficient to cover even the day-to-day expenses of the garrison. This sum had been brought secretly to Deltor by a native in the service of the English Company. We were told that the English and the Dutch were on the best of terms now. Deltor was sent back to Madras after this.

The “Breton” was fitted out with a new main mast on 18 November. Within a few days, all the repairs had been completed and the “Breton” was once again in a sea-worthy condition. 535

De la Haye Aksa Sher Khan Lodi for Help—Pondicherry News—The Captain of the “Saint-Jean de Bayonne” Wrecks his Ship at Tranquebar

De la Haye wrote to Sher Khan Lodi asking him to help us by sending us a cavalry corps comprising 500 men. De la Haye declared that with the help of these men who would be joined to our own forces, we would be sufficiently strong to overcome the Dutch and the Moors. De la Haye held out several incentives to secure the help of this noble, including that of money, for without the last commodity no person in India will take any action.

On 20 November, some lascars who were on guard outside the fort brought in a paper kite which had been flown into the air and then released by the Dutch. The kite was inscribed on both sides and the message stated that the “Flamand” had been seized in the roads at Balasore. The Dutch also said that all those who deserted from our side would be generously rewarded. De la Haye tried to hide this unfortunate piece of news but it was repeated from so many different quarters that it could no longer be doubted. I will give further details later as to how this ship was captured.

A big skirmish took place on 21 November. A group consisting of thirty to forty Dutchmen, supported by their lascars and
a corps of Moorish cavalry advanced within falconet range of the fort. At first, an officer with fifty lascars was sent out against the enemy. These men kept up a steady fire. De la Haye then came out at the head of the guards and volunteers to support the first contingent. Our cannons at the fort were put to good use while the Dutch also brought theirs into play. The contest lasted for three hours after which the Dutch and the Moors left the field and our men returned to the fort. Sieur de la Sauvagère, who had commanded the fifty lascars, had been wounded on his thigh by a musket ball and one of our lascars was also wounded during this skirmish. The enemy lost a few of their men.

On 22 November, de la Haye again wrote to Pondichery. He sent orders to de Lespinay to try and persuade Sher Khan to send us the 550 (sic) horsemen for which we had asked. De la Haye reiterated the advantageous terms which we had previously held out.

On 23 November, we received letters from de Lespinay. De Lespinay informed us that he was on his way to meet Sher Khan. He had received letters from Sieur Véron, captain of the frigate the “Diligente” which was at Porto Novo. Véron wrote that the “Saint Jean de Bayonne” was on the coast in front of Tranquebar. As will become apparent in my narrative, I was later to be sent to the scene of the accident to gather information. I will, therefore, state what I know about the loss of this vessel.

On 4 November, a tempest had forced the “Saint Jean de Bayonne” and the two hookers, one belonging to the Company and the other being the “Guillot”, to set sail into the open sea. These ships had taken a southerly route without making any attempt to keep to the luff as they should have done if they wished to return to San Thomé. Upon reaching the fortress of Tranquebar, the captain of the “Saint Jean de Bayonne” who had been ill-intentioned from the beginning and had only been seeking an opportunity to slip away from the control of de la Haye, now represented to the officers that since the ship was leaking very badly, they should run it aground at Tranquebar. It is true that the ship was leaking but the water could have been pumped out. Moreover, instead of sailing south for two
days, 6 and 7 November, the captain could easily have returned to San Thomé within the same period of time. However, he was quite undeterred by any considerations of duty, or service to the King and remained firm in the decision which he had taken to sink the ship. He communicated his designs to the other officers of the ship who were no better disposed than he. Sieur Changon, a lieutenant, however, refused to be a party to this plot. The conspirators now drew up a formal report listing the reasons for running the vessel ashore. The governor of Tranquebar was asked for help and he sent out boats and men. On 7 November, the ship was run ashore. All the fragments of the ship were removed with great care and the operation could not have been more meticulously executed even within a port in France. All the rigging and the masts which were stacked lengthwise on the floor, were placed in the stores. The remaining parts for which there was no place in the stores were kept together on the shore. While awaiting further orders from de la Haye, the French officers with the help of the local officials drew up an exact inventory of all the articles.

The captain of the royal hooker, the "Guillot" had adopted quite a different course. Having sailed into the open sea, he took advantage of the weather to double round the island of Ceylon. He remained at sea for a long time until he reached Johanna Island. From what was reported, it appeared that both the captain and the pilot, died here overcome by chagrin. The crew, not knowing where to go next, decided to return to Surat. They arrived at their destination towards the close of 1674 after undergoing many tribulations and dangers.

The fate that overtook the Company hooker was quite different. When the storm had broken out, only the boatswain was on the ship, the captain being away ashore. The boatswain had sailed along the coast proceeding beyond Negapatam. Perhaps he, like the others, had no intention of returning to San Thomé. The ship was leaking very badly and there was no food on board. He decided to run his vessel aground on territory

\[57\text{Anjouan in the text. Johanna Island forms a part of the Comoro Island group off the northern tip of Madagascar.}\]
belonging to the Nayak of Madura. The Nayak’s officials not only took all the scrap collected from the ship but arrested the entire crew. The Dutch sent a request for the custody of these men who were handed over to them. Our men were brought to Negapatam and cast into prison. Some of them joined the Dutch later.

Every day our lascars and pioneers deserted despite all the remonstrances made by de la Haye.

On 27 November, we received letters from de Lespinay in which he described his visit to Sher Khan Lodi. Sher Khan wished to march against the Nayak of Madura with whom he was at war. He had advanced this as an excuse when de Lespinay had broached the French proposal to him. Sher Khan had declared that he could not offer the help requested by de la Haye for the defence of San Thome. Sher Khan could not denude his own province of all its troops. He was, however, quite willing to secure troops for the French provided the money was sent to him as he would have to secure fresh levies.

At ten o’clock at night on 29 November, we were informed that three soldiers had just deserted from Bastion Colbert. The men could not have gone very far in the night and guards and lascars were sent after them. The search party had advanced a considerable distance outside the fort when they were joined by de la Haye at dawn on 30 November. The three deserters, however, had already reached the Dutch camp.

On 1 December, we received letters from de Lespinay. He wrote that he had received information that the captain and officers of

The coastline belonging to the Nayak of Madura extended from Cape Comorin to the town of Vempar, the river Ultan constituting the boundary between Madura and the Maravas country. There were seven sea-ports along this coast. These had previously been under the hegemony of the Portuguese but were now loosely controlled by the Dutch, although the overall authority of the Nayak was never in doubt. The most important of these ports was that of Tuticorin where the Dutch had replaced the Portuguese since the year 1658. R.S. Aiyar, History of the Nayaks of Madura, Oxford University Press, 1924, pp. 242-3, 302, 324-5, 330. The Dutch authority was held in high respect in this part of Madura and it was for this reason that the French prisoners were handed over so easily.

De Lespinay had met Sher Khan at Vallikondapuram. R.Q.H., 1897, p. 196, n.
the "Saint Jean de Bayonne" had resolved to take the land route to Goa from where they intended to sail for Europe. De Lespinay had written counselling them against this course of action which would be tantamount to desertion. He had advised them to await the orders of de la Haye but he doubted if these men would change their plans. De la Haye immediately wrote to the captain asking him to stay at Tranquebar with the officers until he had received further orders. The captain should take particular care to ensure that the crew remained steadfast in its duties. Those who failed were to be chastised while every step should be taken to prevent desertion. De la Haye would write to the Governor of Tranquebar offering to pay fifty crowns for the subsistence of the captain and the officers, and five sous per day for each one of the sailors. This arrangement would continue until some provision was made to secure the return of these men to San Thomé. The letters for the Governor and the captain were sent to de Lespinay who was to forward these.

The Capture of the "Flamand"

On 2 December, the launch of the "Flamand" arrived at San Thomé carrying the Marquis de Clénac, Sieur de Courcelles, two volunteers and twenty sailors on board. They had left Balasore ten days previously. We were now informed about the circumstances which had led to the capture of the "Flamand".

After parting from the "Breton", this ship had sailed in the high seas for a long time. Scarcity of provisions had caused it to put in at the Nicobar Islands where the natives brought them considerable quantities of food by canoe. The number of these small barks which were all coming together towards the ship suddenly aroused the suspicions of our men. They were convinced by something which they saw that they were about to be attacked. They fired a discharge from their cannon and muskets at these natives. A number of these poor island people were killed while the rest withdrew. Our men then sailed along the coast of Orissa which lies southwards of the kingdom of Bengal. Many adventures befell the men who were despatched by boat and launch up the rivers along the coast in search of
food. At some places, they came to blows with the local populace. Several of our men were killed and the mate was wounded on the arm by an arrow. Finally, the decision was taken to proceed to Balasore where they anchored their ship.

The captain sent some envoys to the Governor. The latter received these messengers extremely well and offered them every assistance. The captain then came himself to meet the Governor who repeated his earlier promises. The Governor agreed to lend the captain the sum of Rs. 3,000 on the basis of a promissory bill. As the crew and volunteers were allowed complete freedom of movement on the shore and as everything could be bought cheaply, the “Flamand” continued its stay at the roads. The Governor and the principal merchants in the city warned our men several times that as the season when the Dutch ships customarily put in at the roads had started, our men should place themselves on guard.

Several days had elapsed since our men had been warned but they had not cared to take any action on the advice which they had received. It was at this time when more than sixty members of the crew consisting of sailors and volunteers were absent ashore, that three Dutch vessels had appeared. The captain of the “Flamand” prepared to resist with such of the men as had remained with him. The conflict lasted for three hours. The “Flamand” was cannonaded and finally boarded. The captain was compelled to give up his ship to the Dutch. The conquest of this prize was an unexpected achievement for the Dutch for they would never have succeeded had all the crew been present. The Dutch made a triumphant entry into the Ganges and proceeded up to Hughli taking with them the visible mark of their success.

In the meanwhile, some of the officers, volunteers and sailors who had been left behind at Balasore were perplexed as to what they were to do next. They decided to try and make their way to San Thomé. A Company ketch had also been abandoned at Balasore. This was now sold for the sum of Rs. 1,000. As our men had no funds, they used a portion of this money to buy

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60 The Governor was Malik Qasim. Fawcett, *E.F.*, II, p. 361.
61 This action had taken place on 22 August O.S./1 September 1673. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
food, devoting the rest of the sum to buying a bark and laying by a sufficient quantity of victuals. They had then embarked, distributing themselves between this boat and the launch of the “Flamand” which was at Balasore. It was their intention to sail to San Thomé. Those who are familiar with the seasons prevailing in India would be astonished, and with reason, at such a foolhardy enterprise undertaken at a period when tempests rage along the Coromandel coast, or, to be more exact, overrun the entire region from the base of the Bay of Bengal to the island of Ceylon. It is impossible to give sufficient praise to the volunteers for undertaking such a risk, especially the Marquis de Clénac and de Courcelles. Unlike the two officers who decided to stay on in Bengal despite their clear obligations to the service, these two gentlemen chose to return to San Thomé although they were under no obligation to do so. Heaven itself seemed to favour this generous resolution, for as I have already noted, the launch anchored before San Thomé on 2 December, while the bark arrived on the following day. These vessels brought in an officer of the Company who had commanded the ketch, twenty-five sailors, three Dutchmen who had deserted at Bengal and six lascars. De la Haye gave these men a fitting welcome and found out all the details of the capture of the “Flamand”. He also learnt that Sieur Duplessis, a Breton, had been left behind at Balasore. Duplessis was to go to Dacca, the seat of the Viceroy’s Government, to protest against the Dutch action. By their seizure of the French vessel, the Dutch had contravened the treaties which had been signed with the Mughal Emperor by which complete freedom and security had been promised at the Balasore roads.

On 4 December, de la Haye wrote to the Governor-General of Bengal with regard to the Dutch capture of the “Flamand” which belonged to the royal navy. He pointed out the consequences of this action which had a direct bearing on the Emperor. The Dutch had shown disrespect towards the Emperor by this infringement of the immunity which the Emperor had guaranteed would prevail in all his ports and roadsteads. We had entered the harbour only because we had been sure that we would be safe there. We were now asking for justice. Our ship should be returned to us with its artillery and everything 541
else on board at the time of its capture intact, and we should also receive compensation. De la Haye also wrote to the Governor of Balasore thanking him for the help he had given to our men and asking him to assist in the restitution of our ship. He addressed a letter to Duplessis asking him to devote himself to this affair which was of the greatest importance.

On 5 December, de la Haye made a tour of the plain and sent some horsemen close to the Moorish camp to find out more about its location and configuration.

Sieur du Tremblay, the Commissary of the squadron had been confined to bed since the past fortnight. De la Haye was told that the end was now approaching. The General sent two of his guards and some officers. The guardsmen were to watch over the property of the dying man, while the officers were to seal everything as soon as the death occurred. Baron was also requested to send his people so that the Company insignia could be affixed on the seals at the same time, thus ensuring that everything was in proper order. The Commissary died at six o'clock in the evening and was buried on the following day with the honours due to a man of his rank.

**Death of de Rebrey, Governor of San Thomé**

After reviewing the lascars, de la Haye mounted a horse and rode into the plain at the head of a few horsemen. He noticed from afar an advance guard of Moorish lascars whom he caused to be repulsed by deputing five of his own horsemen to ride out against them. As our men approached, all the Moors retreated leaving behind only two of their number who had chosen to make a stand. One of these men held a musket while the second clasped a lance. The musketeer withdrew after firing his musket but the lanceman stood his ground with his weapon in his hand. One of our horsemen came up and rode around this man taking care to keep himself well away from the lance. He fired both his pistols but missed his target. A second man now came up. It was de Rebrey, the Governor of San Thomé. De Rebrey also missed when he fired his pistol. The intrepid lanceman thrust

*The portion over which the French freely ranged extended to a depth of two to three kos to the south of San Thomé. Ibid., II, p. 98.*
his weapon two times into the body of a horse and killed the animal. A third horseman fired at this brave antagonist but he also missed and was wounded on the ankle by the lance. Finally our first horseman, de Maille, came up close and thrust his sword two or three times into the body of his adversary leaving him dead upon the field. This lascar was the most resolute fighter we had seen. The noise of our encounter reached the Dutch and Moorish encampments from which their troops emerged. The cavalry stationed itself behind Luz Church. During this time, the rest of their men advanced, the Dutch keeping on the right. We also sent out our men to check the enemy. There now ensued a skirmish at close quarters which lasted for three hours. During the entire period, de la Haye was to be found on horseback, darting from one side to the other according to the needs of the moment. He was not afraid to expose himself to the enemy musketry, sometimes coming within fifty feet of their fire. He had already decided on a clear line of action. After two hours of intense fighting, he ordered our troops to withdraw. Our men being thoroughly aroused, were reluctant to obey. When de la Haye reiterated his command, however, they began to retreat towards the city. On noticing our movements, the enemy advanced, jeering at us, hoping to intimidate us. De la Haye kept a close watch, and at the appropriate moment he ordered a sudden attack. The men cried out in joy and plunged at the enemy who were unable to withstand their attack. The Dutch mingled with the lascars in retreat, while we shot several of them down. Some of our men even crossed a small river which had acted as a barrier during the skirmish. The rest of our men would also have crossed over but for the fact that de la Haye recalled the men who had advanced too much to the fore, not wishing to engage the enemy too closely.

After a vigorous action during which the cowardice of the enemy was revealed, our troops fell into order, and with the volunteers at the head, advanced to attack the Moorish cavalry which was supported by their infantry. We had already dislodged their advance forces from their positions inside the huts from where they had been firing at us, when de la Haye was informed that de Rebrey was dead. The news had been brought
by a chief petty officer, Pierre Charpentier, a fine soldier and a
good worker. As soon as I saw him coming towards us, I knew
that he had something important to say. I went to him and
asked him what it was. When he told me of the death of the
brave Governor, I asked him to convey this news in very soft
tones to de la Haye. Bad tidings, however, do not take long to
spread, and within a few moments all our men were aware of it,
The resultant consternation cannot be described. De la Haye
felt it would be unwise to attempt any further advance in view
of the dejection of our men. He gave the orders for withdrawal
and we returned to the city.

De Rebery, who had stayed near the small river with a few
men, had defeated the enemy. There was a Dutch corporal
who had been wounded by a gun shot which had broken
the bone below his knee. Our men crossed the river to
despatch this man. De Rebery, moved by compassion, asked
our troopers not to kill the Dutchman but to bring him back
alive. The captive could be taken to San Thome where some
information could perhaps be obtained from him with regard
to the disposition of the enemy camp and the forces at their
disposal. As this party was proceeding to rejoin the body of
the army, a misdirected cannon-ball from the fort hit this wise
Governor and laid him on the field. His body was brought into
the city and in the evening he was interred at the Cathedral
with full military honours.

De Rebrey came from... He had all the qualities one could
wish to make up a perfect gentleman. He was wise, sober and
blessed with a remarkable presence of mind which he never
lost even under the most difficult circumstances. He was brave,
a devoted servant of the King, loved by the soldiers and, indeed,
by everyone else. One more quality, and a very essential one,
could be added to this list. He was a good Christian and often
demonstrated this publicly. All the inmates were saddened by
the death of the good Governor. De la Haye was particularly
affected by this loss. De Rebery had been a very good deputy
in whom de la Haye had reposed the fullest confidence.

This action, in which the Dutch and Moors sustained severe
losses, would have been even more glorious for us but for the
loss of de Rebrey. We had one lascar killed and a foot soldier,
valet to de la Haye, wounded. De la Haye as usual, drilled the troops, and went out with his guards on inspection tours.

De Maillé commander of the company of cadets, and who had in this capacity, given a thousand proofs of his valour and ability, was nominated Governor in succession to the late de Rebrey. To mark this occasion, there was a discharge of seven cannon-balls and 500 musket shots, while double rations were issued to the entire garrison. Except for some young officers who were quite prejudiced, the choice of de Maillé proved generally acceptable.

When de la Haye was informed that Baba Sahib, the previous Moorish general, was dissatisfied and had withdrawn taking 2000 cavalry with him, our General had written to Baba Sahib. De la Haye wished to find out if there was any possibility of winning over Baba Sahib so that he would support our interests.

On 11 December, letters were written to de Lespinay asking him to strive once more to persuade Sher Khan to make every effort to put the frigate, the “Diligente” to sea. If this could be done, the “Diligente” was to sail from Porto Novo to Pondicherry with a cargo of rice. There was little hope that these orders would be implemented successfully.

The whole of 12 December was spent in making an inventory of the papers in the possession of the Commissary, in the sale of his possessions and those of all the other defunct persons including de Rebrey.

On 13 December, de la Haye approached within musket shot distance of the Dutch fort but not a single shot was fired at him. It rained so heavily on 14, 15 and 16 December that the plain was converted into a virtual lake. The heavy rains had dissolved the inner walls on the western side of San Thomé, these being made only of a mixture of mud and brick. Men were set to work to repair this damage.

On 17 December, de la Haye went out to tour the plain. He found it difficult to make much progress as there was still a great deal of water everywhere. He ordered that a bark which had been washed ashore should be repaired so that it could be put out to sea again.

We captured three enemy marauders. Several lascars who were accused of wishing to desert were arrested.
On 18 December, several detachments were sent out of the fort. The men went up to Luz Church from where some of them were sent out with orders to keep themselves in motion. It was hoped that some of the enemy would be drawn out on seeing these men. However, not a single Moor or Dutchman was enticed to leave camp by this stratagem.

They were working very hard to put the walls in a proper state. Despite continuous rainfall, de la Haye toured the plain on 19 and 20 December.

Because of the rains, we could not receive any information about our enemies from Madras. De la Haye decided to make a sortie and capture a few of our adversaries from whom perhaps we might be able to obtain some information. Orders were sent to the troops to keep themselves ready and at two o'clock in the morning of 23 December the men were assembled at the parade grounds. They were divided into detachments and ordered to march. On leaving the city, our men attacked an advance guard stationed in a red house. The enemy retreated, leaving behind only one black who was killed on the spot. Our men failed to catch anyone alive and secure information. Having positioned his troops close to the enemy sentinels, de la Haye advanced with his guards and volunteers until he had reached within 200 feet of the temple in which the Dutch had stationed themselves. It was very tranquil here. There was no noise and not a single person came out. Our men could do nothing more and at dawn they returned to the fort.

A lascar captain and four soldiers who had been marching too far ahead of the troops were arrested and placed in solitary confinement. They were suspected of having intended to go to the Dutch to inform them about our sortie.

On 27 December, the bark which had been mended was put out at sea. Some Dutchmen had come out on a forage but had withdrawn as soon as we had fired a few cannon balls from the fort.

On 28 December, a crew of thirty good sailors were placed on the bark.

We received letters from de Malfosse in which he informed us that some Frenchmen had escaped from the prisons at Chicacole and had made their way to the lodge. The Havildar
of Masulipatam had let de Malfosse know that if our General wished to treat for peace, the Havildar could ensure the success of these negotiations provided he was given a few presents. A letter was sent in reply to de Malfosse on 29 December. A letter was also sent to the Havildar of Masulipatam in which the advantages which would accrue to the King of Golconda if he signed peace with us were described in glowing terms. No one could deny the validity of our arguments, but what was important was that none of the points we had raised was of any interest to the Moors. The focal point of the entire proceedings lay in their desire for money and our refusal to meet this demand. We sent the letters through the three launches which had arrived from Madras. We took this precaution as the Dutch ships had come close to the shore and there was also the possibility of their sending out armed boats to intercept ours. The Dutch, however, took no action. A menial in the service of de la Haye was ordered to take the packet to Deltor. The English, however, refused to allow him to land and the launches returned without having accomplished anything.

On 30 December, the Dutch ships returned and anchored before Triplicane almost within cannon shot distance of the “Breton”. De la Haye sent in additional reinforcements of men, as also food, munition and four cast iron cannons. The crew now numbered 200 men and would be well able to resist any Dutch attack.

On 31 December, all the troops were reviewed. Twenty-five to thirty of the lascars who had disembarked from the “Flamand” at Balasore had managed to filter into Madras by different routes.

January 1674

On 1 January 1674, these men decided to band together and make their way to San Thomé. They met at the selected point at some distance in the interior and set out at night with their arms. On the way, they came across an enemy guard post. They decided on their course of action without any loss of time. Some of them know a few words of French in addition to the phrases which are usually taught to the soldiers. Crying out these words they attacked the enemy. The enemy, thinking them
to be Frenchmen, were panistricken. Their fear lent them wings and all of them fled leaving their arms behind. Our lascars seized these arms which they brought back with them to San Thomé. They arrived at their destination at dawn on 1 January (sic).

Two launches left during the night with letters for Deltor. On the way, two masuris were encountered. One of these evaded us and succeeded in reaching the shore but the second one was boarded by one of our launches. They fired three musket shots from the masuri killing one Frenchman, one lascar and wounding another Frenchman. When our men boarded the masuri, the crew asked for mercy and they were spared. The commanders of the launches felt it would be better to return to San Thomé with their prize rather than proceed to Madras. They reached San Thomé at dawn. The three prisoners were taken to the General. Two of them were German and the other was a Dutchman. They were questioned about conditions in their camp and about their men. They appeared remarkably ignorant on both these points. The two Germans offered to take service with us. Both were, however, kept in detention at Porte Royale. The Dutchman was imprisoned.

DEATH OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL GUESTON AT ISFAHAN

Three launches with packets were sent to Madras during the night of 2 January. On the morning of 3 January these returned with a packet which had been sent from Surat. I have already said that Gueston and his son had left Surat to proceed on an embassy to Persia. We learnt that both of them had died. Gueston arrived safely with his suite at Bandar Abbas. From here, he had left for Isfahan. On the way Gueston and his son had taken ill and both of them died at Shiraz. The other members of the embassy decided to continue their journey to the capital. They went to court but had no idea as to what

When Shah Abbas had captured Ormuz in 1622, he had ordered a new port to be built to which he intended the trade of Ormuz to be diverted. The new port was named Bandar Abbas after the Shah. A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, London, 1928, p. 151.

Upon the death of Gueston and his son, De Jonchères had taken over the leadership of the embassy. R.N., N.A, 9352 (86). According to the
they were supposed to negotiate as they had been unable to find any memorandum among the papers of Gueston which could have provided them with the necessary guidelines. They confined their activities to giving presents to the Persian King and his nobles and in receiving gifts in return, after which they returned to Surat. It is probable that had Gueston survived, this embassy could have secured considerable advantages for the Company but his death robbed it of all fruitfulness, its only result being the large expenditure in which it had involved the Company.

THE SAD END OF THE CAPTAIN AND EIGHT TO TEN SAILORS OF THE "SAINT JEAN DE BAYONNE"

On the same day, we had further news about the captain of the "Saint Jean de Bayonne" who had run his ship ashore at Tranquebar. Without any reflection on his duty and in utter disregard of the orders which had been issued by de la Haye, he had sold several items from the gear which had been salvaged from the ship. He had then come to an understanding with the writer in the King’s service, the botswain and eight to ten of the best sailors after which the group had left, taking the overland route to Goa. The captain, who was doubly culpable having involved others in his own misdeed, was not slow to receive the punishment which he deserved. The journey met with the success which could have been anticipated. On entering Bijapur territory, our men had been stopped at a check-post where they had been asked to pay for right of passage. Upon the refusal of our men to pay, the Bijapuri officials had threatened them with violence. This had inflamed the Gallic blood coursing through the veins of our men and the two parties had come to blows. To their credit, it must be said that our men defended themselves as best as they could. They fired the arms they had brought with them until they had exhausted terms granted by the Shah, the existing rights and privileges of the Company were to be extended by another three years, after which the subject would be open for re-negotiation. Two new privileges were now accorded to the Company. Firstly, the French Company was to be allowed to make wine at Isfahan, and secondly, it was to be allowed to send five Persian horses to France each year. Cuitê, III, pp. 811-13.
all their powder and lead. They killed twenty-five to thirty men and wounded many more. The remaining Bijapuri forces numbering more than 500 men, realizing that now they had nothing to fear, fell upon our men killing them all with the exception of a youth aged seventeen. This young man had been wounded in several places but a Moorish cavalier had saved him, having prevented the others from despatching him. After his recovery, this young man had been allowed to go to the Company counter at Rajapur and it was from him that we had been able to learn about the ill success of the venture.

On 4 January, fifty sailors were disembarked from the “Breton”. All the troops were assembled at the square at ten o’clock at night. A little later, de la Haye left the fort with 500 Frenchmen and 300 lascars. He led them to a large tank about one league outside San Thomé. Our men broke the embankment to allow the water to gush out. This opened a passage which not only improved the path for the express messengers whom we sent to various places, but also made it easier for the local people to bring provisions to the city if they so desired. Our men had not encountered any obstacle in carrying out their task. They stayed here until five o’clock in the morning when they started on their return. The holes in the embankment were plugged in by the enemy on the following day.

The bark which had been put out to sea was leaking badly. They mended it again but still failed to make it sea-worthy.

On 6 January, there was a skirmish between a few of our men and those of the Dutch who had come out of their camp. Although the two sides were not evenly matched—we had only six Frenchmen and thirty lascars while the enemy had more than thirty Dutchmen supported by a few cavalry and a Rajput corps, the latter being the best soldiers in India, we were able to push the enemy straight back inside the temple. It must be acknowledged that our success was also due to the well directed cannonade from the fort. The enemy sustained losses while we had one lascar killed and two others wounded.

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64The Mylapur tank.

65A reinforcement of 600 Rajput soldiers had been sent to the Dutch by the Golconda court. D.R., 22, p. 79.
On 7 January, another revue was held and our General ordered that everything should be prepared for an attack on the Moorish camp.

On the same day, a letter was written to de Lespinay in which he was asked to send out the frigate, the "Diligente" as quickly as possible to San Thomé with a cargo of rice, powder and other munitions. Orders were also sent to the captain of the frigate, and to the officers and such of the crew as remained of the "Saint Jean de Bayonne", directing them to follow the instructions of de Lespinay.
Increasing Food Shortage at San Thome—All who are Considered Unnecessary are asked to Leave

An important meeting was held attended by de la Haye, Baron and all the leading officers. The food scarcity which was beginning to make itself felt was discussed but no resolutions were taken.

On 8 January the entire garrison was drilled. All the men were ordered to assemble with their arms and ammunition in the evening at the parade grounds as an attack was to be launched against the Moors. After the drill, de la Haye mounted on horseback, and, followed by some cavaliers, he advanced into the plain to attempt an appraisal of the enemy disposition. Baron entrusted me with the task of organizing all the men in the Company service into a single corps. When the men were ready to leave, de la Haye called all the officers to a meeting held in his house to ask for their views on the projected attack. There were several who gave their support to the General. Others, who claimed to have a better grasp of the affair, advanced a different point of view. We were risking everything in this enterprise and even if we were successful our victory would cost us too dear. Their argument was that although we
might march on the Moorish camp and capture it, we could not prevent the Moorish cavalry from retreating as we had no control over their avenues of escape. Our success would be a very superficial one as the Dutch would remain in the temple and the Moorish cavalry would return on the following day. Since the proposed action was of supreme significance in which we had either to win or face destruction, Baron did not wish to be excluded from participating in the glory and danger which would be so integral to the entire episode. De la Haye had wished Baron to remain in the fort with forty men. Baron declared that he would oppose the whole idea of the sortie unless he was also included among the men. All these arguments were given very careful consideration. We had received news from various sources that we would be shortly receiving help from France. It was now decided that all those who were considered redundant were to be sent away from the fort. We would even disband some of our lascars. The rations would be reduced by a small quantity, and it was felt that it would then be possible to eke out our stocks for another three months. It was likely that we would obtain reinforcements within this period. It was also possible that during this time we might be presented with a more favourable opportunity to attack the enemy. When this resolution had been taken the men who had assembled at the square were allowed to disperse. We had never seen the members of the garrison in such a determined mood. Each one wanted to do nothing better than plunge into the offensive. However, it was very doubtful if the attack would succeed. While the men had assembled at the square, a soldier had deserted from Bastion de Rebrey.

FALSE NEWS FROM EUROPE

On the morning of 9 January, a catamaran from Madras brought us letters from Surat. One of these contained an extremely convincing account of the capture of Amsterdam and the conquest of the rest of Holland. Such news items are usually the fabrication of men without any settled occupation in Persia. Our men, however, showed an insensate joy at this news. It is not known if de la Haye really believed this news or only
affected to do so, but he appeared as overcome as any of the others. It formed the subject of a letter which he wrote to Pavilioen, the commanding officer of the Dutch troops. He sent the note through the Dutch soldier who had been captured on the masuri the night of 2-3 January. De la Haye stated in his letter that since Holland had been conquered by the French, the Dutch had become the subjects of the King of France. It would, therefore, be improper to detain Dutchmen as prisoners and it was for this reason that we were sending back this man. As for the two Germans, since they had wished to join us we were keeping them with us. The garrison was assembled at the square and de la Haye harangued the men on the enormity of the crime of desertion, and the punishment which awaited those who committed it. He asked them to unite in the service of the King and informed them about the European news which had arrived. The men were also told of the decision which had been taken the previous day and de la Haye stressed that the reinforcements which we had been expecting would reach us soon. By cutting the food allowance a little, we would be able to make the stocks of food in the stores last until the ships had arrived from France. It would have been difficult to have made a more moving appeal than what was now done by our great General. Since de la Haye was always the first to follow whatever he recommended to others, those who strayed from their duty particularly among the officers cannot be sufficiently castigated.

FRANÇOIS MARTIN IS SENT TO PONDICHERRY

De la Haye summoned me to Baron’s residence. After drawing me aside to a place where no one would be able to overhear us, he began to speak about all the events which had taken place. He dwelt at particular length on my refusal to undertake the journey to the Golconda court despite his desire that I should do so. Had I agreed, the peace treaty would undoubtedly have been signed. All the accidents which had befallen us, including the loss of the “Flamand” could be traced to this refusal. I took the liberty of representing to him the perfectly legitimate grounds on which I had based my refusal. De la
Haye then passed on to another subject and dwelt on the conditions prevailing at San Thomé. Under the present circumstances we should either have reinforcements by way of food for the garrison or by way of additional armed forces. If we could obtain the latter we would be able to force the enemy to raise the siege. After this he told me that he had selected me to go to Pondicherry where I was to carry out the orders which he would be giving to me.¹ I replied as humbly as possible that my efforts would prove to the General my readiness to undertake any task. I was willing to sacrifice my blood, and my life if need be, in the service of the King. De la Haye suggested two ways by which I could proceed to Pondicherry. I could either go by sea on the bark which was being mended and which would be ready for departure on the following day, or I could go by land. Placing myself at the head of the lascars who were being retrenched the same evening, I could proceed through Golconda territory to the territory of Bijapur - a journey of two days.² Although I had bound myself to accept whichever route the General recommended, I pointed out the futility of my undertaking a march of two days with a group that could easily be put to flight by twenty horsemen. De la Haye agreed and the passage by sea was chosen for my journey.

At eight o'clock in the evening a group of lascars received their discharge. Only sixty of the best among them were retained. De la Haye suggested that the lascars should keep themselves together in a body during their withdrawal, but they were unwilling to do so. They pointed out they would only be encouraging an attack by the Moorish cavalry if they retreated in this manner. They requested permission to be allowed to conduct themselves in whichever way they considered

¹De Lespinay had written to de la Haye that he was finding it difficult to simultaneously maintain contact with Sher Khan and tend to affairs at Pondicherry. It was for this reason that de la Haye had selected Martin to proceed to Pondicherry. A. Duarte, Les Premières relations entre les Français et les Princes indigènes dans l’Inde au XVIIe siècle (1666-1706), Paris, 1932, p. 72.

²The boundary between Qutbshahi and Adilshahi possessions in this region was constituted by the river Palar. Vide, R. Orme, Historical Fragments, of the Moghal Empire, London, 1905, p. 63. Martin would have to traverse a distance of approximately sixty miles.
India in the 17th Century

best. This was granted to them. They were asked to proceed to Pondicherry where they would be looked after. These men spread themselves out, each one going his own way. Some of them went to the Dutch who took them into their service.

At the same time a proclamation was made by which all valets, blacks, women and any others in French service were to leave the city on pain of death. The major made a house-to-house inspection. It was, indeed, an amazing sight to watch more than 1,200 persons, mostly women, moving away from the city. There was scarcely a soldier or a soldier who had not possessed at least one or two such persons, but now even one dozen of them were not to be seen on the streets.

On 10 January, the Dutch commander Pavilioen, sent Tack, who has received previous mention, to de la Haye to obtain further elucidation with regard to the news about Holland which had been communicated to him the previous day. De la Haye gave this officer the news which he had received but as the source from which we had obtained our information could not be corroborated by any letter from Europe our enemies refused to give it any credence. De la Haye and Baron were busy the whole day on 11 January in writing letters to court.

On 12 January, there was a public proclamation by which all the officers and soldiers in the garrison were forbidden on pain of death to go outside the gates of the city without express orders. On the same day, I received detailed instructions as to what I was to do to procure reinforcements for the city. I was handed some packets for court which I was to send by way of Surat. I was also given letters for the King of Cochin and the Prince who acted as the deputy for the Zamorin. I was expected to despatch these to Flacourt on the Malabar coast. The packet also contained orders for the commanders of the royal ships which were expected to call in at that coast. I was, in addition, carrying letter for the Nayak of Madura, the Duke of Gingee and for Sher Khan. I was to strive to obtain some

5 Flacourt was the chief at the French counter at Tellicherry, Vide supra, p. 323.

4 Since Martin confers the title of Duke on Nasir Muhammad, it is possible that he enjoyed the status of Viceroy of the Coromandel region under the control of Bijapur. The boundaries of the territories under the
reinforcements of soldiers from these princes. I was also to try and set the "Diligente" afloat. If successful, I was to charge this vessel with food and send her to San Thomé. I was to proceed to Tranquebar and conduct a regular enquiry into the conduct of the Captain and the other officers of the "Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne". I was to make a report and reach a settlement with the Governor with regard to the advances which he had made. After inspecting the articles salvaged from the ship, I was to ensure that these were kept in safe storage. De la Haye also included orders which he despatched to the clerk of the treasurer to the navy who had come to Surat with 20,000 livres on board the "Soliel d'Orient". This man was directed to release 70,000 livres when I sent him the necessary intimation. Baron wrote to the merchants at the same counter asking them likewise to release the sum of 60,000 livres, and, above all, to make all haste to send food to the city. After receiving these orders which de la Haye again repeated to me verbally, he came with us when we went to board the bark which was lying in the river. The officers of the "Breton" had been asked to sink in a grapnel on the other side of the mouth of the river so that we could be towed across. This order had not been executed. We had to return to the city as there was no other way in which we could make our exit from the mouth of the river.

On 13 January, we discovered that eight fishermen had control of Bijapur in this area extended from Conimer to the north of Pondicherry to Vellore and Vaniyambadi in the north-west towards the interior. From Vaniyambadi it reached down southwards to Dharmapuri and Valikondapuram. From Valikondapuram it ran eastwards along the river Vellar to Porto Novo. Valikondapuram was the centre of government for Sher Khan Lodi, also in Adilshahi service. Pondicherry was definitely under Sher Khan's control. According to de Lespinay Sher Khan's authority also extended to Porto Novo. Martin, (infra p. 568), however, takes pains to point out that Porto Novo was under Nasir Muhammad. The only explanation which can reconcile these conflicting accounts is that whereas for purposes of direct administration Porto Novo and Pondicherry may have been under Sher Khan, as Sher Khan's overlord, Nasir Muhammad may have taken a special interest in Porto Novo, which, according to the testimony of Martin, (supra p. 489), was a far more commodious port than Pondicherry, making it, therefore, a more prized possession than the latter. Orme, op. cit., p. 62; R.Q.H 1897, pp. 188-9.
disappeared during the night. A little later we learnt that they 
had reached the Dutch. They appeared to have informed the 
Dutch commander about the attempt we had made the previous 
night to send out the bark. The Dutch sent a launch from their 
flagship to one of their other ships. The second ship immedi¬
ately raised anchor and stationed itself near the mouth of the 
river within musket shot distance of the breakers. We realized 
what a grave omission we had made the previous night by 
neglecting to fix the grapnel. It is true that the mistake was 
rectified the following day, but as we would have to pass by 
the Dutch ship which lay at anchor at close range, we had 
little hope of being able to get away unobserved. It was, 
however, decided that we should run this risk. One hundred 
and fifty passengers, men, women and children, the majority 
of whom were being sent away to Pondicherry, were embarked 
on this boat. 3 I was the last to get in, doing so after I had 
taken my leave of de la Haye. Our chances of evading the 
Dutch seemed so minuscule that the General had the goodness 
to say to me in parting that it was better to yield to force rather 
than attempt to resist fate in an insensate manner. As a 
preautionary measure, the packets were placed between two 
lead plaques which were to be submerged in case of attack. 
The defence of the bark was entrusted to a fine skipper and ten 
good sailors. Antoine Cattel, a local Portuguese and a man of 
good sense, was provided to me to serve as my interpreter. 
Our ability to secure a safe passage can only be ascribed to 
the favoures of divine providence. When we were free of the 
breakers, we let out our sails and were helped forward on our 
rout by a mild, fresh wind. We kept ourselves as far as we 
could from the Dutch ship. Despite this I had a clear view 
through the window of two men sitting at table and smoking by

3Martin had also been provided with the services of a native who had 
already attracted the notice of Abbé Carré and de la Haye on account of 
his devotion and ability. This was Thanappa Mudaliar, a merchant of 
Poonamallee, also known by the appelation given him by the French, that 
of Lazare de Motta. After accompanying Martin to Pondicherry in the 
boat, Thanappa Mudaliar proved of great service both to Martin and de 
la Haye journeying several times between the two places. Indian Historical 
Records Commission Proceedings (henceforth I.H.R.C.P), XVII, 1940 
pp. 22-4.
candlelight in their chamber. By the grace of God, we passed by this vessel. We had been informed that there were two Dutch ketches at the Sadras roads. We kept well out at sea to avoid being recognized by these. At dawn, I looked over the inmates of the bark and was greatly surprised to see so many different kinds of persons. Our craft was leaking badly - it now contained more than two feet of water and during the night some of the children had been afraid that the boat had been submerged.

We were finally able to anchor safely at Pondicherry on 14 January at four o'clock in the evening. The wind had strengthened during the day and the sea had become rough. A catamaran came to us and I sent a letter to de Lespinay asking him to send a few masuris or country boats so that we could disembark. From afar I could see that although those country craft were put out to sea, they could not ride over the breakers. I sent the boatswain ashore by another catamaran hoping that he could expedite matters but his presence had no effect. Sieur de Lespinay sent me a letter by catamaran in which he wrote that we would have to wait till the next day before we could hope to disembark. The weather was such that I feared that we would have squalls during the night. Despite the risk, I felt it was my duty to try and save the packets by hazarding a passage ashore by the catamaran which had been sent. I threw myself on these wooden planks which carried me safely to the beach. I went to the lodge where de Lespinay received me as best as he could. I sent the boatswain back in case any accident occurred during the night.

The progress of the masuri which I sent to the bark on 15 January was very slow as the wind remained high. We now decided to run the bark ashore. These orders were transmitted and the bark made for the coast at full sail. It was cast ashore high and dry. Everything was disembarked from it after which it was pulled higher up to ensure its complete safety.

*The building which constituted the French quarters at Pondicherry was a commodious one in which de Lespinay had been living since 4 February 1673. R.H.Q., 1897, p. 192.*
François Martin Goes to Meet Sher Khan After which he Proceeds to Porto Novo and Tranquebar

There were several people who had come with me to Pondicherry and I had been instructed to provide for their food. I had brought 60 pagodas with me to which de Lespinay could only add 20 to 25 louis. This was all we had and it was with these resources that I was expected to implement the plans with which I had been entrusted. I thought that the best expedient would be for me to go and meet Sher Khan. I could then come to an agreement with him as to the amount of money which required to be drawn on Surat for which I had received authorization. In addition, I had been asked to sound the possibility of raising additional troops. I learnt that this gentleman was to be found at Valikondapuram, thirty-five to forty leagues from Pondicherry. I tried to make arrangements for my journey to go and meet Sher Khan. At the same time I informed Véron of my arrival so that he could make preparations, for putting the "Diligente" out to sea.

On 17 January, I set out to meet Sher Khan taking Antoine Cattel with me. The countryside through which we passed was well-cultivated and very beautiful. Rice was to be found in abundance in the low-lying regions where there was water while cotton was grown on the higher ground.

On 19 January, we passed by some ruins. We were told that at one time a large city, spreading over four to five leagues had stood here. To judge from the remains, the city must have been a celebrated one in its time. We were told fabulous stories about a well at the distance of a league which was reputed to contain a large amount of gold. No one had been able to get at the gold which was said to be guarded by demons.

We arrived at Valikondapuram, the seat of the government of Sher Khan, on 21 January at eleven o'clock in the morning. I informed him about our arrival stating that our General had sent us from San Thomé with important communications for him. He gave us an appointment for three o'clock in the afternoon. He received us most cordially when we went to meet him. After reading the letters written to him by de la Haye and Baron, he offered to help us to the best of his ability. He seemed
very annoyed with the Dutch who, he said, had written against him both to the King of Golconda and the monarch of Bijapur. He would always be found willing to take advantage of any opportunity to harm these detractors. After this, he dismissed us asking us to go and rest, putting off further discussions until the following day. He had food from his own table sent to us for our supper.

I spent the entire night writing letters which were to be sent to France, Surat, and the Malabar coast. We went back to the residence of Sher Khan at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of 22 January. We told him about the money available to us at Surat and requested him to provide us with the means to obtain access to these funds. In the meantime, we appealed to him to advance us the sum of 1,000 pagodas. He agreed on both counts after which we went out on a promenade with him. He appeared to have ordered his troops to assemble on a plain close to the place where we had landed. We found 400 badly mounted cavalry, 1,000 infantry and five war elephants here. A mock battle was staged and the troops were drilled in their own fashion. We were then dismissed and Sher Khan had supper served to us.

On 24 January, we had an important meeting with Sher Khan when we had detailed discussions with him on all the items which we had been charged to lay before him. He declared that the exchange rate at Valikondapuram was 5 per cent. After much argument it was agreed that we would pay the customary amount. I then drew up bills of exchange in the names of the clerk of the naval treasury and merchants at our counter payable to Sher Khan in accordance with my instructions. I also asked if he could send our letters to the Malabar coast and Goa through his own express messengers. He agreed and after closing the packets I handed everything to him. I then talked to him about the reinforcements of troops without which we would be unable to force the enemy to raise the siege of San Thome. He agreed, provided we made the resources available to him as he lacked the funds to raise the troops himself. There were,

7In the text it says le commis du trésorier de leur armée. I have, however, used the term found in the text of p. 617.
however, two cavalry captains with 100 to 120 good horsemen who had withdrawn from the service of the Nayak of Madura because of some misunderstanding. Sher Khan pointed out that he would be willing to pay these men until he had obtained the money which was to be paid to him at Surat. The men would then be transferred to us. In this way, we would obtain the reinforcements which we needed. The express messengers were sent out on the same day.

A Brahmin who had known me at Masulipatam, having been sent there by Sher Khan, came to see me. He was quite surprised to find me here. After talking with me for some time he went to find his master to tell him about me. A little later, Sher Khan invited me to have dinner with him. After the meal, we had a long argument on the question of the monthly interest of 3 per cent, this being the usual rate charged in India covering both risk and profit, which Sher Khan wished to charge on the loan of 1,000 pagodas for which I had asked him. He was quite unswayed by all my arguments and we had to agree to his terms as we could not raise money from any other source.

Right through the night, I wrote to de la Haye and Baron telling them of everything I had done to date. I sent the letters to de Lespinay. On the morning of 25 January, I went to take leave of Sher Khan. He asked us to stay for breakfast. As I was about to go, he presented me with a small country horse, and three lengths of cloth. After this, I left for Porto Novo, taking Cattel with me.

On 26 January, we spent the night at a large settlement called Tirumatan, which had been well-known in previous times. The ruined temples and tanks showed how important it must have been once. On 27 January, we halted at Bhuvanagiri, an important centre for the manufacture of various kinds of cloth. Bleached cloth is very good here since a river which passes through this town provides sufficient water for these operations. There is a small fortress here built in the local style. This terri-

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*In the text it is called Trimoulon. This city lies some miles to the north-east of Valikondapuram.

*Referral to in text as Bomigirpatnam.

*The river Vellar.
tory falls within the region governed by Sher Khan. Porto Novo is only three leagues from here. We left Bhuvanagiri at four o’clock in the evening and arrived at Porto Novo at seven o’clock. I found Véron, the captain of the frigate, the “Diligente”, and we discussed the best means of putting the vessel back to sea.

On 28 January, we sent out people to take soundings at the bar. It was reported that even at high tide the water here was only five feet deep. We sent a transmission belt which was needed on the ship and the crew got ready to start the repairs. Véron wanted a certain kind of tackle which was not available in Porto Novo. He told me that I would be able to find it among the salvage of the “Bayonnais” at Tranquebar. I decided to go there, both to get what was required for the “Diligente” and also to carry out my orders.

Events at San Thome’ from 13 to 31 January—Constant Desertions

I left for Tranquebar on 1 February. Before describing how I implemented my orders, I think it is my duty to recapitulate, as I come to the end of each month, the events which took place at San Thomé during the same period. On 4 January, the day after our departure, de la Haye wrote a short note to Pavilioen. He sent back the two German soldiers captured on the masuri and said that Pavilioen could also arrange to take back a wounded corporal in their service. This was the same man who had been captured and brought into the city on the unhappy occasion when de Rebrey had died. De la Haye also asked for permission to send some women and children wishing to go to Madras to the destination of their choice. Pavilioen thanked de la Haye in a letter which he wrote and sent people to bring back the wounded corporal. He allowed free passage to all those who wished to go to Madras, and on the same day all the wounded men were sent out from San Thomé to Madras.

On 15 January, two officers, Sieur Tomassin, a lieutenant in the infantry division, and Sieur Houdry, a lieutenant serving on the royal hooker, the “Giuliot”, deserted in broad daylight. One of the store-keepers at San Thomé had seen them going
away and had informed de la Haye. De la Haye left immediately on horseback commanding some of his guards to follow him. Tomassin, blessed with strong limbs, was striding ahead of his companion. A corporal of the guards, however, caught up with him and asked him to stop. Tomassin knew that he could not hope for any quarter. Aiming his gun at the corporal, he threatened to shoot if the latter made any advance. Tomassin himself continued to move forward taking care to keep the corporal covered all the time. The corporal did not dare to attack and propelling himself forward in this manner, Tomassin was able to cross a small bridge and throw himself amidst a Dutch advance guard. Houdry was arrested and brought to the city. A store-keeper in charge of the powder and other munitions was also put into confinement. He was said to have known about the plans of the two deserters for the past several days and was also accused of being in communication with the enemy. Both men were put into prison. A major was asked to interrogate them and make arrangements for a trial. The sailors were divided into five squads, each squad being headed by a naval officer.

An extraordinary Council meeting was held on 15 January at which the lieutenant and store-keeper were tried. Three voted for the death penalty while the others were in favour of life imprisonment. De la Haye did not vote. The two men were sent back to prison with irons on their feet. A few cannon balls were fired at the cavalry which appeared on the plains. At ten o’clock at night, three cannoniers, a French soldier and three Portuguese soldiers who had joined us deserted to the enemy.

On 17 January de la Haye assembled the garrison at the square. After remonstrating on how important it was for all of us to stand firm if we wished to carry out our obligations towards the King, and having exhorted each man to perform his duty, de la Haye offered to open the gate to all those who wished to leave. Nine Portuguese soldiers or topas asked for permission to withdraw. This was given to them and they left immediately.

The General went on an inspection tour of the plains taking a few detachments with him. A little later, we saw a group of Moorish cavalry emerging from their camp. We immediately
fired a cannon ball from the fort, the pre-arranged signal to denote enemy presence on the field. Our men returned to the fort. A sailor who had kept well to the rear during the return deserted to the enemy.

Wood had become scarce in the fort. On 19 January, boxes were brought in from the village and broken to pieces. On 20 January regulation bread weighing half a pound was distributed. Each soldier received one loaf and was also given a quarter measure of rice and some meat.

On 21 January, de la Haye again addressed the garrison. He pointed out how important it was for each one to remain firm and exhorted them to perform their duty. All these remonstrances had no effect on the men who had already made up their minds to desert. On the night of 21-22 January, three more soldiers deserted. Finding no remedy to check this evil, de la Haye wrote to Pavilioen, the Dutch commander. Our General stated that since Dutch submission to our King was now an established fact, Pavilioen should keep all the men who deserted from us so that he could return them all to us at a later date in conformity with the orders which his superiors would surely be issuing to him soon. Pavilioen should remember that he would be held responsible for these men. A guard was entrusted to take these letters to Pavilioen. Pavilioen sent back our man saying that he did not wish to send back any message to us. On the night of 23 January, de la Haye posted two guards outside the fort to prevent desertion. This precaution was to be taken every night.

A Dutch soldier who claimed to be a corporal in the mounted guards stationed in an advanced outpost, deserted his position and rode into the fort. De la Haye talked to him for two hours, and finding him somewhat ill at ease, placed him under observation in the care of one of his guards. On 24 January, we heard several discharges of cannon and musket fire coming from the Dutch camp, but were unable to find out the reason. The same day, letters arrived from Pondicherry giving news of the arrival of Martin there and of his subsequent departure from Pondicherry to initiate discussions with Sher Khan. De Lespinay let us know that he had received a large packet but had been unable to forward it to us as no runner wished to take the risk
of bringing it to us. If the enemy found them carrying letters for us they would have to forfeit their lives.

On 25 January, a reply was sent to de Lespinay by which he was allowed to open the packet and read all the letters. If he found anything of importance, he was to make extracts in code which were then to be forwarded to San Thomé. The orders with regard to the despatch of the “Diligente” were repeated.

On 28 January, after reviewing the troops, de la Haye went as usual to tour the plain. The Dutch had been performing several naval exercises for the past two days. De la Haye feared that the three Dutch ships might attack the “Breton” which was quite alone. He sent reinforcements of sailors and officers to the “Breton” and ordered de Maisonneuve to always maintain a careful watch.

The soldiers complained that their previous salary had not been paid. The treasurer could do nothing as the coffers were quite empty. When de la Haye was told about the complaints of the soldiers, he asked all of them to assemble at the parade grounds on 30 January. He told the men that although there was a shortage of money now, an additional consignment of funds was expected very soon. When this arrived, the soldiers would receive all their arrears. If, however, they were insistent that their dues should be paid, they should come out openly and say so. The General would melt down his silver vessels to meet their demands. The garrison was satisfied by this offer.

De la Haye took a great deal of trouble to keep the soldiers happy. Although some of the officers owed their promotions to de la Haye, and others who had served a long time in France had been selected and maintained in their present positions as a result of his favour, de la Haye could not carry all his officers with him in his efforts. There was an outbreak of disorder on the “Breton”. On 31 January, the writer came down and complained to de la Haye that he had been treated badly by the crew. The captain was asked to look into the matter and see that justice was done. I will now return to the execution of the orders which had been given to me.
FRANÇOIS MARTIN AT TRANQUEBAR—HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH
THE DANISH GOVERNOR WHO IS SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS THE
DUTCH—IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING PROVISIONS FOR SAN THOME

February 1674

As I have already said I left for Tranquebar on 1 February. We
spent the night at Chidambaram¹¹, or The Four Temples as it is
called by cartographers. This town is a landmark for all vessels
which voyage along the coast. The Four Temples are built in
the form of four high towers which can be seen from for away¹².
Chidambaram is an important centre. They have built a kind
of fort within the precincts of the four temples.

On 2 February, we passed through an area called Shiyali in
which there are some very beautiful temples. Travellers find
this route vexatious because of the number of toll gates where
payments have to be made. We got through all these barriers
as best as we could. At five o’clock in the evening, we came to
Tranquebar. I found the Governor out on a stroll along the
streets. I gave him the letter from de la Haye. He received me
very coldly and said he would speak to me on the following
morning.

I found the lieutenant¹³, the writer for the bottom hold, and
ten sailors all belonging to the “Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne” at
Tranquebar. I informed them about the orders which had been
given to me by de la Haye, and they got ready to carry these
out.

I went twice in the morning to try and meet the Governor. My
second visit was paid at 8 o’clock in the morning when
they told me that this dignitary was still asleep. The third time I
sent someone to find out if the Governor was up or not. The
reply that was sent back was that the Governor was inspecting
some porcelain and would see me only the next day. I was not
to be rebuffed and immediately sent back a message to the effect
that since I was pressed for time I was anxious that an audience
should be granted to me. The Governor finally did agree to see

¹¹Chalembron in the text.
¹²Martin must be referring to the four gopurams of the temple in his
text. Two of these temple gateways rise to a height of 160 feet.
¹³This rank would correspond to that of a captain in the army.
me and asked me to meet him at the fort. I was given a very cavalier reception, and the Governor started the audience by complaining that after seizing a bark loaded with rice belonging to the Danes, de la Haye had refused to make any payment. I was shown the correspondence and some of the terms we had used appeared somewhat sharp. I put up with the ill-humour of the Governor after which I initiated discussions on the points with which I had been entrusted. His initial stand was that we should first repay the money which had been advanced by him before we could be allowed to take away the ship's tackle. I recognized the justice of his claim and asked for a few days' time to satisfy him. I pointed out that the articles which I wished to take away were not very valuable, and even if these were removed, the salvage which would still remain in his hands would be worth three times what was owed to him. He agreed finally and I was allowed to inspect the tackle and put aside whatever we required. The Governor was Emile Jacob. I was told he had earlier served as Captain of the guards to the Danish King. He was an extremely avaricious person. The man who was serving as his second was Jean Heindriex, who had earlier officiated as under-merchant in the Dutch Company. Both these men were bitterly antagonistic towards the French. I identified the latter through the conversation which they held among themselves in Dutch thinking that I would not understand them. The Governor knew a little French and I had conducted my conversation with him in this language.

The Governor asked me to dine with him on 4 February. I took Antoine Cattel with me. The meal was very frugal and the conversation very sharp. We could not do anything on this day as it was Sunday. I asked all the tackle to be brought outside for inspection. Everything was quite well-preserved. After separating what was required for the frigate, the "Diligente", I sent back the rest for storage. I also looked at the debris of the ship itself which had been kept aside. The masts and the cannon were all in good shape. I had a difference with the Governor over the amount of money I had paid to the coolies or labourers.

The fort of Dansborg, in a much renovated condition is still standing and has been converted into a rest house for travellers.
View of Gateway and Fort Dansborg, Tranquebar
– Photographs by R. Varadarajan
Francois Martin at Pondicherry

who had worked on the tackle. I had paid each of them only one quarter of a fanam, a local coin, with which they had appeared to be quite satisfied. According to the accounts which they produced with regard to the advances which had been made, however, the rate per coolie had been computed as one fanam. I requisitioned two masuris for the loading of the tackle required for the "Diligente".

On the same day I received letters from the Frenchmen who had been imprisoned at Negapatam after their boat, a Company hooker, had run aground on the Madura coast. The Governor had questioned them several times about the conditions at San Thomé. They were in great misery and asked for my help.

At midnight, an officer of the garrison informed me that at ten o'clock in the evening the Governor had opened a jib-door and had sent an express messenger with letters for the Governor of Negapatam. I suspected that we had played a large part in the despatch of this messenger.

At ten o'clock on the morning of 6 February, an armed boat which had come in from Negapatam moored at the Tranquebar roads. This made the intentions of the Governor very clear to me. At the same time I received letters from Porto Novo. A small Dutch ship had anchored there to prevent the "Diligente" from sailing out. An armed hooker had also taken up its position in front of Devenapatnam to prevent the passage of any barks, should we decide to send any. It would be futile now to load the tackle and I sent back everything which had been taken out of the stores.

On 7 February, I went to take leave of the Governor. I requested him that since he often had occasion to send ships and other vessels to Porto Novo, he could send the gear which we required on board one of these. He refused point-blank, which provoked me to complain at his attitude. We had a sharp exchange of words during which both of us adopted an equally heated form of speech. He threatened to arrest me but I laughed at him saying he would not dare. A softer note was now introduced and before we separated he asked me to be on guard

^For fanam see Volume II, Appendix.
as the Dutch might try to play some trick on us while we were on our way. I thanked him for this advice and left.

During my stay at Tranquebar, I had made enquiries into the conduct of the captain of the "Saint-Jean-de-Bayonne". Almost all the officers at the garrison condemned his conduct. Not only could he have returned with ease to San Thomé during the two days which he took to sail south but he was held guilty of trying to corrupt all the men he had brought with him. He had tried to incite the remaining members of the crew to desert rather than return to the command of de la Haye.

Tranquebar, situated on the territory of the Nayak of Tanjore, belongs to the King of Denmark. The enceinte of the settlement had been recently made and was flanked by nine bastions. I could not find out the length or assess the regularity of the curtains. There is a small fortress inside the settlement towards the sea. It has four bastions and a moat runs along all the sides except the one facing the sea. The fort is not a formidable one but is sufficiently strong to withstand native attacks. In front of the fort there is a very pleasant square full of shady trees. The city is lively and a sojourn there is a pleasant affair. The garrison consists of fifty to sixty Danes, a few topas being included in this number, and some lascars. The city is peopled by Portuguese, Moors and Hindus who carry on their commercial transactions from here. They have to pay heavy duty and are badly treated by the Governors, the extent of ill-treatment being determined by the rapacity of the Governor concerned. A plain about a quarter of a league in width surrounds the city on the landward side. The terrain here is so flat that not even the smallest mound rises up to break the surface. As a result, the city rises to view from across a considerable distance.

I left Tranquebar on the afternoon of 7 February, taking with me the remaining members of the crew of the "Saint-Jean de-Bayonne". On the way, we almost came to blows with the tollkeepers. On 8 February, when we wished to leave the village in which we had spent the night they wanted us to pay ten pagodas. We prepared to cut our way out by force when the men calmed down. They brought me a present of fruit and were quite happy when I paid them a crown. On 9 February, we arrived
at Porto Novo. Although the frigate, the "Diligente" was ready to sail, we did not put her out to sea for two reasons. The first was that the bar was too shallow to permit her to sail over it, and the second was the presence of the Dutch ship which would certainly try and prevent her exit. I sent Antoine Cattel to the Havildar, or the local Governor, to find out the reason why the Dutch ship had moored itself just in front of the bar. The Havildar sent back the reply that when he had made enquiries, the Dutch captain had stated that it was with the express intention of harassing their enemies that the Dutch ship had assumed its station here.

I wrote to de Lespinay that it was now time to prepare the bark which we had at Pondicherry. I wrote to de la Haye at San Thomé on 10 February reviewing the general situation and describing the obstacles we were facing in trying to implement his orders. From letters which I received from Negapatam, I learnt that Tomassin, who had arrived there in company with another deserter, had publicized the fact that at the time of his departure from San Thomé, we had food sufficient for only two months more and that de la Haye had exhausted all his resources. This news had been conveyed by express messengers to Admiral Rijkloff in Ceylon.  

On 11 February, I received letters from Pondicherry. A Dutch hooker had anchored before the town making it impossible for the bark to set out. We seemed to meet nothing but opposition on all sides. On the night of 13 February, two Englishmen fled from the Dutch ship at Porto Novo. They came to us in a small launch which they had taken from the ship and told us that the Dutch had thirty-eight men on their vessel.

I wrote to de la Haye describing all the difficulties with which we were faced with in our efforts to secure help for him. On 14

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16 Although Admiral Rijkloff was clearly in supreme command over the Indian operations, the role of Pavilioen should not be minimized. It is true that the latter was subordinate to the Admiral, but he was a senior administrator in his own right in the Dutch official hierarchy. In the entry dated 29 January 1672, it is stated that despite the appointment of Pavilioen as ordinary member of the Batavia Council for five years, he was remaining on the Coromandel coast until such a time as a suitable successor could be found. D.R., 20, p. 21.
February, we received letters from him in which he pressed us to put the "Diligente" to sea, and to send him assistance.

I wrote to the Nayak of Madura and also sent him the letter from our General. There was no likelihood of our obtaining any assistance from this quarter but I was carrying out my orders. After this, I left for Pondicherry arriving there on the same night.

De Lespinay, Antoine Cattel and I discussed the problem as to how we could overcome the difficulties which seemed to be hedging us in from all sides. We finally decided to send an envoy to the Duke of Gingee to assess if I would be made welcome by the Duke to treat for assistance to be sent to San Thomé. We decided to send Narasimgham, a Brahmin who hailed from Gingee, and who had served us well under arms at San Thomé. We also decided to raise a body of lascars in accordance with our orders. We sent our men into the interior to raise these levies. On 17 February, Antoine Cattel was sent to Valikondapuram to take to Sher Khan the duplicates of the letters and orders which had been despatched to Surat.

The failure of all our attempts to send provisions to San Thomé made us very unhappy. After reflecting on all the ways in which food could be brought to San Thomé, I struck on an expedient. Many boats came in at Cuddalore to take on cargos of rice which they carried to the south. The basin of the Coleroon posed an obstacle to this coastal navigation as it jutted far out into the sea. In order to navigate this point, the boats normally sailed into Porto Novo from Cuddalore. At Porto Novo, a wind blew out from the land during the night. The boats would take advantage of this wind to sail well out to sea and double the Coleroon in this way. After having

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17 According to Srinivasachari, Nasir Muhammad, the personage referred to by Martin, had been holding charge at Gingee since the time of its fall. The date of the conquest of Gingee by Bijapur is variously given as 1638 (Imperial Gazetteer), 1644 (South Arcot Gazetteer), 1646 (Manual of South Arcot District), 1649 (Srinivasachari), between 1648-1651 (Anderson). J.I.H., XX, pp. 309, 311; C.S. Srinivasachari, History of Gingee and its Rulers, Annamalainagar, 1945 p. 206.

18 Mentioned in the text as Narsingaran.

19 Goudelour in the text.
Francois Martin at Pondicherry

navigated this point, the ships would tack their way back towards the mainland. I thought that if we prepared our plans carefully, it would be easy for us to seize some of these boats at Porto Novo. However, as Porto Novo belonged to the Duke of Gingee, it was possible that the latter would take exception at our action. I wrote to de la Haye describing my project, which seemed to be our only hope now. I also dwelt on all the possible repercussions, adding that we would not undertake any action until we had received the necessary orders.

On 18 February we again received letters from de la Haye. He continued to press us for help but there was no way in which we could send this to him. We sent an immediate reply to him. On 20 February, we heard that the Dutch had sent an envoy to negotiate for our eviction from Pondicherry with the Duke.

On 22 February we heard that the chief of the Dutch counter at Devenapatnam had gone to meet Sher Khan to try and dissuade him from giving assistance to us. We continued to raise levies of lascars. On 24 February de Lespinay went to Porto Novo to see if anything could be done to advance our interests. On the same day Antoine Cattel returned after delivering our letters to Sher Khan Lodi. Sher Khan demonstrated his continued desire to help us. On his way, Cattel had met the chief of the Dutch counter at Devenapatnam who was going to Sher Khan for the purpose which I have already mentioned, and which, indeed, was the only objective of this Dutchman’s visit. Sher Khan remained firm in his resolution not to take any steps until he had some news with regard to the payment of the letters of exchange. Each time a ship hove into sight, the Dutch vessel which had stationed itself before Pondicherry would lift anchor and seek to reconnoitre it. This ship seemed to sail on wings and sped across the water like a bird. It was an incredibly swift ship and had been captured from the English.

De Lespinay returned from Porto Novo without having accomplished anything. The Dutch had won over the Havildar by sending him presents. The Havildar had promised to oppose all our projects.

Cf. supra Chapter Six n. 4.
Events in San Thome' During the Month of February - 
Diminishing Stocks of Funds and Food

I will return to a description of what happened in San Thomé during the month of February. Six sailors and three soldiers of the garrison killed three horses on the night of 1 February. They salted the flesh but were discovered and placed under arrest on the “Breton”. A small flute anchored close to the three Dutch ships at the roads. It had sailed in from the north and delivered something to the Admiral’s boat. On 2 February it set sail towards the south. A little later, one of the three Dutch ships, the smallest one, also took the same route.

On 3 February, letters which had been sent from Surat were delivered to us by way of Madras. These confirmed the complete subjugation of the Low Countries by France. De la Haye sent the printed and handwritten gazettes to the English Governor at Madras to apprise him of this news.

On 4 February, there was a general review of the garrison. The enemy directed a few volleys of their cannon fire at the fort which returned it in kind. On 5 February our General went to reconnoitre the Moorish camp which appeared to be very quiet. The news of the departure of the small Dutch vessel was sent to Pondicherry.

On 6 February all the soldiers were drilled. The two Dutch ships came and anchored to the east of the “Breton”. We heard that two hundred men had been embarked on these ships. This made de la Haye fear that the Dutch intended to attack. The Chevalier de Maisonneuve who was ashore was commanded to return to the “Breton”.

Letters from Golconda and Masulipatam which stated that we would shortly be receiving reinforcements from France were read out publicly at the square. The garrison had been disappointed on so many previous occasions on this score that the men-refused to give the news any credence now. And yet it was essential to find some way of diverting them.

The same day a letter was written to Destremeau asking him to try and negotiate for peace either directly with the King of Golconda, or through the ministers. Destremeau was given
complete freedom of action in the matter. It would be a long
time before we could expect any results from this quarter. In
the evening, three sailors deserted.

The soldiers were again reminded of their obligation to
perform their duty. After this, three baskets of fish which had
been caught were divided among them. With the onset of the
southerly winds there was hope that help from Pondicherry
would be received. A soldier, accused of attempting to steal
from his comrades, was put into prison.

A Portuguese Jesuit priest who had continued to reside at
San Thomé even after our arrival, now asked de la Haye for
permission to go to Madras where he wished to keep Lent.
He was allowed to go the same night by launch.21

On 11 February a Portuguese soldier who had been com¬
plaining about the food was disarmed and imprisoned. The
nine men who had been sent on board the “Breton” for killing
the horses were brought ashore. The men were reprimanded
after which their arms were restored to them.

The country people secretly brought in a consignment of
rice. In spite of the fact that the daily ration of the soldiers
consisted of a half pound of bread, a quarter measure of rice,
and a peg of brandy in the morning, which was further sup¬
plemented by a weekly ration of three pounds of fresh meat and
one pound of lard, the soldiers gathered together in the square
on 13 February and began to loudly complain about their
food. De la Haye tried to point out that this was a perfectly
reasonable quota. He exhorted the men to perform their duty
and appealed to them to show a little forbearance. Several
soldiers cried out that while they had been standing guard at
the bastions, some of their comrades had taken the opportunity
to rifle their belongings. One of these thieves had been caught
and imprisoned but sentence had yet to be passed on him.
De la Haye was obliged to convene the Council and commit
this unfortunate man to trial. He was sentenced to be shot and
this punishment was administered without any further delay.
Although this man was a reprobate, he would perhaps have
escaped such a fate but for the hue and cry raised by the

soldiers. He was the scapegoat who had to be sacrificed in order to appease the soldiers.

Letters continued to be written to Pondicherry asking them to send back the frigate, the "Diligente" and the bark. De la Haye reconnoitred the region outside the fort. On 15 February, letters were received from Golconda. The outlook for the signature of peace appeared very favourable and Destremeau assured us that he would expedite this as far as possible.

Two soldiers got involved in a duel. One was killed on the spot while the second received fatal injuries. On 16 February, a guard found a letter which he handed over to de la Haye. It was not possible to identify the sender. The threat was held out that if the rations given to the garrison were not increased, 127 soldiers would desert before the end of the month. There was also the complaint that the majority of the officers were never to be found bivouacked at night, that they were prepared only to go on three nocturnal rounds, and other matters of a similar nature.

De la Haye, accompanied by a few detachments went out to tour the plain. The Dutch fired thirty cannon balls into the fort. One of these dislodged a small piece of ordinance which we had placed above Porte Royale. A bark which had joined the Dutch ships three days ago, set out at large in the morning on a reconnaissance trip. It returned in the evening and anchored close to the other ships.

On 8 February, a general review of the garrison was held. De la Haye wrote to Deltor on the same day asking the latter to apprise him about conditions in the enemy camp—the sites of their encampments, if the camps were fully protected, the places where they posted guards at night to prevent food supplies from reaching the French, and, in short, everything pertaining to the Moors as this would help de la Haye to formulate his plans. Food and money were in short supply.

On 19 February the soldiers were asked to prepare themselves for an enterprise which was to be undertaken during the night. After the men had been formed into detachments at the square at 8 o'clock in the evening de la Haye left the fort at the head of 300 men. A small river to the south was crossed in two launches which had been kept in readiness there. The
men were kept together for two leagues until they reached a rice field which was ready for harvesting. Some of the men were drawn into battle formation while the others cut the grain and put them in sacks which had been brought. This harvesting operation continued until four o'clock in the morning when the men started the return march to the garrison, carrying with them 160 sacks full of paddy. When they came to the river the men had to wade across as the launches had sunk. They entered the fort at dawn. Until further arrangements could be made the rice was to be guarded by a group of soldiers.

The letters which I had written from Tranquebar and Porto Novo had been received. I had described the attitude of the Danish governor and had also pointed out the obstacles which we had been facing in attempting to implement our orders.

On 20 February, the rice which had been brought in was divided into two parts. One half was distributed among the soldiers and the second half was placed in the stores. Even though they were well aware of all the difficulties, they continued to write to Pondicherry urging the despatch of the bark and that of the “Diligente”.

On 21 and 22 February, de la Haye carried out his excursions accompanied by some horsemen. On 23 February, the two Dutch ships raised anchor and came and moored themselves at about the distance of two cannon shots to the south of the “Breton”.

On 24 February some Moorish cavalry appeared on the plain. They dispersed as soon as a cannon-ball was fired at them. Letters continued to be written to Pondicherry asking that reinforcements should be sent with the utmost expedition. On 26 February, they received my letter in which I had described the impediments which were preventing us from sending provisions to San Thomé. I had also related my plan of seizing the rice laden barks which usually sailed towards the south on leaving their moorings before Porto Novo.

On 27 February they replied to my proposal with regard to the seizure of the the barks loaded with rice. They signified their acceptance in the absence of any other alternative. We had to bear in mind that the Duke of Gingee would be alienated by our appropriation of these boats at the Porto Novo roads.
which belonged to him. The facilities granted to us at Porto Novo were all the more important in view of the fact that our frigate, the “Diligente”, could well be seized in reprisal for our action in commandeering the barks. It was left to us to weigh these considerations, particularly as we would be held fully responsible for all the consequences of our action.

On 28 February, food and water was sent to the “Breton”, from San Thomé. The two Dutch ships set sail tacking from side to side. At the same time, three barks which had sailed in from the south anchored before Madras.

At eight o’clock in the evening, de la Haye sent out three launches to reconnoitre the three barks which had anchored before Madras. If the vessels were found to be loaded with rice, our men were instructed to seize them and bring them to San Thomé. On finding them charged only with wood, the officer who had inspected these barks took no action and returned to San Thomé. A soldier on deserted this day.

FRANÇOIS MARTIN GOES TO GINEE TO ASK THE RULER FOR ARMED ASSISTANCE

March 1674

I will now take up the thread of the events which occurred at Pondicherry during the month of March. On 1 March, the Brahmin, Narasingham, whom I had sent to Gingee returned from there. He said that he had discussed the question of help for San Thomé with the officials of the Duke. The officials had declared that an envoy could be sent to open negotiations on this subject.

We learnt the Dutch were continuing their efforts to persuade Sher Khan to evict us from Pondicherry. They were offering to give him passports for ships which he wished to send to Malacca, Bantam or any other place of his choice even including destinations in the southern sea.22 If he refused their offer,

22This must be a reference to the internal navigation of the Spice Islands, a preserve from which the Dutch jealously excluded all outsiders. In 1615, the Dutch had established themselves at Amboyna and Ternate, important centres of the clove trade. In 1621 they extended their activities
they would try to cut off his vessels and put a stop to all his commercial transactions. Sher Khan refused to accept these offers and continued to resist the Dutch.

On 2 March, de Lespinay went to Porto Novo to see if anything could be done. The Dutch ship lifted anchor, sailed far out to sea and returned on 3 March. We received the letters which de la Haye had written to us with regard to the seizure of the barks at Porto Novo. Since the approval was conditional and as the General had, as usual, refused to make any commitment preferring to keep the door open to either taking the praise or apportioning the blame, I wrote again to him. I pointed out that under the present circumstances, there was no other way of sending help to San Thomé. We had to run risks and I begged the General to explain himself clearly and without any reservations. In the meanwhile, de Lespinay who was going from Pondicherry to Porto Novo, was ordered to take advantage of any opportunity which presented itself without awaiting further orders from San Thomé. De Lespinay returned to Pondicherry on 4 March. He told me that on the night of 2-3 March, he sent out some men on the launch of the "Diligente" to seize a bark which was at the roads. These men performed their task in an extremely clumsy manner. Of course, a possible explanation for their maladroitness could be their aversion to the prospect of returning to San Thomé. The launch had foundered at the bar. They had extricated it with considerable difficulty but had been unable to make any further progress.

While waiting for the responses to the letters which I had written to de la Haye, I decided to go to Gingee and try and see if I could reach any kind of agreement with the Prince. I left with Antoine Cattel and the Brahmin, Narasimingham, at five o'clock in the evening on 5 March. We arrived at Gingee on 7 March and we camped at a temple outside the city. Our Brahmin went to the city to secure permission for us to enter as no stranger is allowed in unless the officials in charge of the

to Banda from where the best nutmegs were obtained. B.N., N.A., 9375 (3). It was the plum of participation in this trade that the Dutch were holding out to Sher Khan on this occasion.
gates allow them to do so. On 8 March, Narasimgham returned with the permission. We came inside the first enclosure and stopped by at a straw covered shed. The shed had no walls and we were in full view of all passers-by.

At dusk we were taken to the home of Siddi Darvez, the minister of the Duke of Gingee. This man belonged to the black African race and had the curly hair which is so common among them. He was, nevertheless, an intelligent man who is well known for the way in which he carried on the administration of his master. After the first civilities, we told him that we had brought a letter for his master from our General. He asked us to give him the letter as he acted as the prince’s intermediary in all affairs. We were reluctant and pointed out that we had been instructed to deliver the letter only into the hands of the Duke. In the end, we had to give in and handed over the letter to the minister. They explained that this constituted a part of the customary court procedure. We then discussed the main purpose of our visit which was to procure help for San Thome. Siddi Darvez replied that his master would certainly come to our help and ensure our success. He next asked on what conditions we were prepared to negotiate. I must admit that even though this question had been foreseen by us, we found it very difficult to come up with an answer. It is true that we had been entrusted with broad instructions and had been made fine promises by de la Haye, but in the ultimate analysis we did not possess the authority to make a commitment of even a sou. And yet it was well-known that the monetary aspect lay at the heart of our affair for neither in India, nor anywhere else, is it possible to conduct negotiations of this nature without money. We tried to parry this question as far as we could and waited to hear what the minister himself would demand. We tried to intimate that it would be advantageous for his master to help us. Our General had promised

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24 Siddi Darvez was the son of Siddi Masaud who was to hold office as wazir in Bijapur from 1678 to 1683. Dr. Modi Memorial Volume, Bombay, 1930, pp. 252, 258-9.
that after the siege had been raised, he would lead his forces to Gingee and help the Duke in achieving whatever conquests the latter desired. The minister, who wanted more substantial assurances, paid no heed to what we were saying. Siddi Darvez demanded the sum of 50,000 pagodas. If we wished to borrow this amount the minister would himself stand surety before creditors in Madras or solvent persons anywhere else whom we wished to approach. In return, he would ensure that the siege was raised and secure for us all the surrounding countryside up to a distance of ten leagues. The only response that we could give to him was that this was too high a price and we could not offer him anything. We spent one hour in these discussions. The minister tried very hard to get us to commit ourselves but we continued to maintain our reserve. He finally gave us leave to withdraw asking us to come back on the following day. He promised to inform the Prince about our arrival.

Antoine Cattel heard that a Portuguese of his acquaintance was to be found in the service of the Duke of Gingee. He called for this man who came to meet us. The information which he gave us was confirmed by a Brahmin who also came to see us subsequently. It seemed that the ruler of Gingee was always in financial difficulties. The revenue which he obtained from his territories was extremely limited and just sufficed to meet the needs of his armed forces which consisted of 2,000 cavalry of a good calibre. We had seen a few of these horsemen and what was being said to us by our informants appeared to be quite true. However, the same men had added, it would be unwise on our part to place any reliance on this prince. A few days previously, the Duke had sent a renegade Portuguese with a suite to procure some money from the English at Madras. The promise which the Duke had held out to the English in return was that they would be given some territory within the dependencies of the province lying two leagues to the south of Pondicherry. The English would be allowed to fortify themselves

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25Manoel de Olivera who had taken the name of Hakim Ismail. Srinivasachari, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
The Duke had instructed the same envoy to attempt to go to San Thomé. The emissary had been provided with letters for de la Haye but his real purpose was to be that of trying to secure some money for the Duke. Some of the things which were being said to us had already come to our knowledge and we resolved to be even more careful. Nasir Muhammad was a brother of Khawass Khan, a minister of Bijapur who was administering the entire kingdom during the minority of the Sultan, who was a child of six or seven years.

On the evening of 9 March we had another long conversation with Siddi Darvez on the subject of sending help to San Thomé. This minister did not resile from the demand which he had made earlier for the sum of 50,000 pagodas. As on the previous day, we refrained from making him any offer on the excuse that the sum demanded by him was completely beyond our means. He was quite insistent that we should make him some offer and finally it came to a point when we could no longer refuse. I promised to pay him 10,000 pagodas although I had no authorization to do this. He laughed at my offer and after some more conversation we retired at ten o’clock at night. Siddi Darvez was now joined by twenty horsemen who were all going with him to a grand feast which was being given by the Prince at the palace. All the cavaliers were Abyssinians, with extremely dark complexions and curly hair. Without exception, they were all well-mounted and wore rich garments. On 10 March, we went again to the residence of Siddi Darvez. Our discussions ranged around the same subject. At last, to extricate myself from this affair, I declared I would make a report of the discussions which had been held to de la Haye and convey to Siddi Darvez the reactions of our General. He

Nasir Muhammad invited the English to establish counters at Porto Novo or its surrounding territory, and at Valudavur. The monetary aspect, on which Martin places so much emphasis, is hinted at by Nasir Muhammad in his statement that he is making this offer to the English despite the considerable incentives held out to him by the French and the Dutch *Ibid.*, pp. 208-9.

*Nasimamet* in the text.

*Caves-kan* in the text. Khawass Khan was regent from 1672 to 1675. Sarkar, *Aur*, IV, p. 158.
was extremely insistent that I should come up with some offer in excess of 10,000 pagodas, but I refused. We then asked if we could pay our respects to the Prince. Siddi Darvez agreed but said that we would have to wait until dusk to do so. He kept his word and at six o’clock in the evening we were taken to the central square of the fortress. We passed through two or three gates and as it was night we could not see very clearly. I was struck, however, by the size of the fort. Everywhere there were small shops embellished with stucco work in which food and other necessities were sold. I was unable, however, to observe our surroundings as closely as I would have desired. We then entered the castle. We had to go through eight or nine doors before we came to the main hall. A big house close by was pointed out to me. It appeared to contain several suites and I was told that all-rooms were made of ebony. We were then taken into another hall which was extremely long, moderately broad and paved with large stones. At one end, there was a covered divan which stretched from one end of the room to another. On it was a bed two feet high from which the Prince gave audience. The Duke entered from one end of the chamber while we advanced from the other. He asked us to come up to the divan and had me placed close to him. I conveyed the salutations which had been sent by our General to which the Duke responded in a similar vein. He then said that our brave exploits at San Thome had been recited to him at length. We conversed thus for a little while. The Prince left the administration entirely in the hands of his minister. The potentate appeared to be between thirty-five and thirty-six years old. He was of dark complexion and had fuzzy hair. He was completely sunk in every kind of voluptuousness. He dismissed us after fifteen minutes presenting us with three

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n8The palace was situated at the base of Rajagiri. Diagou, op. cit., p. 26.

n9Even after taking into consideration the fact that Nasir Muhammad was only a regional Governor, the place accorded to Martin was, indeed, a signal honour when viewed against the customary etiquette of the times.

n10If this statement of Martin is to be accepted, Nasir Muhammad would be too young to have been placed in charge of Gingee at the time of its initial conquest as is stated by Srinivasachari. Vide supra, Chap. VI, n. 17.
pieces of cloth. We returned to our residence at nine o'clock at night.

On 11 March, we went to take leave of Siddi Darvez who showed us every kindness. He told us that he would send us a letter for de la Haye from his master in the evening. On returning to the place where we had pitched our residence I received a letter from de Lespinay. Véron, the captain of the frigate, the “Diligente” had informed de Lespinay that the Government officials at Porto Novo had proscribed all local workmen from taking employment with us and had even made an outright declaration that they would not permit the “Diligente” to set out to sea. The officials had been won over by the Dutch who had given them large presents to contravene us in this way. I sent Antoine Cattel to Siddi Darvez to complain at this injustice. The minister had promised to send us an order for the Havildar, or Governor of Porto Novo, directing this official to cease obstructing us in this manner.

Antoine Cattel was informed by his Portuguese acquaintance at Gingee of a letter which the latter had received from his renegade acquaintance sent as an emissary. The envoy had passed through the Dutch and Moorish camps and was now at Madras. Several Frenchmen were deserting. Pavilioen had offered to take in these men. Some of them had accepted but the majority had preferred to go to Golconda. Each person who had made this choice was given eight pagodas by Pavilioen for the journey. When these deserters arrived at the capital, almost all of them took service with the King. As I have already observed, the men were offered a salary of ten to twelve pagodas per month.

There was a delay in the arrival of the order for the Havildar of Porto Novo. I left on 12 March at eleven o'clock in the

*Khan Muhammad, who had served as wazir at Bijapur between 1648 to 1657 had five sons. The second son was Khawass Khan (wazir between 1672-1675) and the fourth was Nasir Muhammad to whom Martin refers as the Duke of Gingee. Modi Memorial Volume pp. 251-2, 254. It is obvious, therefore, that of the two Adilshahi Governors in Bijapuri Carnatic, Nasir Muhammad at Gingee, and Sher Khan Lodi at Valikon-dapuram, the former could count on stronger support from court than could the latter, at least as long as his brother remained Regent.
morning leaving Antoine Cattel at Gingee to take charge of the order. At seven o’clock in the evening I arrived at Tirouvanicaré where I spent the night in a ruined temple. I reached Pondicherry on 13 March at ten o’clock in the morning. Being alone I had travelled swiftly.

**Description of Gingee**

Gingee, the seat of the ancient kings of the Carnatic, was famous in its time. The exploits of the monarchs are reknowned among the Hindus although many stories are closer to myth than reality. It was an important junction linking all the provincial routes where all kinds of Indian and European merchandise could be obtained. Many rich merchants took up residence here. However, when the city came under Moorish domination, the merchants were forced to leave as a result of the extortionate policies of their new masters. When I visited the city, I found it almost completely deserted. The enceinte which was five to six leagues in circumference enclosed several rocky eminences. The Hindus have a custom of building their fortifications on hills. One can see many such forts in ruins as the Moors have not bothered to maintain them. Three of the hills in Gingee were crowned by fortresses. One of these three hills rises up to a peak and the fort which has been built at its crown is deemed impregnable to all forces except famine. The rocks and woods in the deserted city of Gingee provide refuge for ferocious beasts. Many are the tigers which range within the enclosure of the city. I have seen the skin of one of these animals killed here. It measured eleven feet from head to tail by the folding rule. There are also a prodigious number of monkeys. One of the strangest sights I saw was a deep tank within which there were several crocodiles. There is a local belief that these amphibian animals are enchanted and are not in the least harm-

**Trivicaré** in the text. Tirouvanicaré is situated 28 km. to the northeast of Pondicherry.

*The appearance of this once famous city, now enjoying the status of taluq headquarters, presents an even more desolate appearance to the viewer.*

*This unit of measurement would make the skin 33 feet long.*
ful. I have seen several of the Portuguese in the service of the Prince bathe in this tank without any fear. I noticed particularly one swimmer who continued to sport happily with his companions even when he found two crocodiles on either side of himself. I heard a strange story about the monkeys which I will now repeat since I am on the subject of religion and beliefs. Since there were so many monkeys, I noticed that some of them were captured either by snares or by some other means. If these animals were kept in captivity for a few days and then freed they seemed very afraid of rejoining their jungle companions. We saw several which were torn to pieces when they returned to the herd. According to local people, the animals are treated in this way because they are deemed to have lost caste as a result of this contact with human beings. There are some Brahmins who consider it an act of charity to feed monkeys. They bring gifts of rice and fruit at noon and ring a bell to attract these animals. The monkeys are so used to it that not a single one misses this mid-day treat. In concluding this description of Gingee, I must add that judging from the extant, well-preserved buildings as well as from the ruins, both within and outside the city, it is easy to see that Gingee must have once been considered one of the leading cities of India. The neighbouring villages which constitute the suburbs of the town are large, spreading and populous.

As soon as I arrived at Pondicherry, I wrote to de la Haye telling him about the prospects of sending aid to San Thomé.

Provisions Sent to San Thomé During the Month of March in Boats Taken by Surprise at Porto Novo

On my way to Gingee I had written to Véron asking him to take advantage of any suitable opportunity to strike a blow. There was no reason for us to hesitate any longer as we had received letters from de la Haye indicating the extreme distress to which they had been reduced at San Thomé. We were asked not to allow ourselves to be restrained by any considerations and were urged to send help by any means, whether through violence or amity, etc. I had spoken to the master of a
paros, another kind of country craft, which happened to be available at Porto Novo. The Captain promised that he would load his boat with rice giving out that it was his intention to proceed to Ceylon. During the night he would change his course and attempt to reach San Thomé. The Dutch agents became suspicious and obtained an injunction from the Havildar by which the captain was proscribed from loading anything onto his bark. All paths were now closed to us and we decided to engage in the only course now left open to us - that is to try and seize the barks in accordance with the plans which we had disclosed to de la Haye. I would have liked to have gone to Porto Novo myself to personally direct the operation but I could not take a step without being followed by the spies whom the Dutch had set on me to keep track of even my smallest movements. I feared that by being too wary I might allow opportunities to slip by. I therefore wrote to Véron again asking him not to lose any opportunity to execute the designs upon which we had agreed.

We heard that the Dutch were extremely concerned by some news which they had received from Europe a few days previously. We asked a native who worked as an interpreter at Pondicherry to try and intercept the letters which were sent to the Dutch camp from their counters in the south. This man whom we believed to be faithful, made no difficulties and promised to do as we wished. It was a dirty trick that he perpetrated on us. On 15 March, he brought us a packet which was fastened very securely and stamped with several seals. I called de Lespinay and we retired to examine the packet in private. No one could have been more surprised than we when we opened the packet. It contained nothing but an evenly stacked pile of blank sheets. We realised that we had been tricked. De Lespinay became so furious that he wanted to immediately kill the interpreter who had played this prank on us. I calmed him down by pointing out that not only would any undue publicity open us to ridicule, but it would also provide an opportunity for the Dutch to carry their complaints both to Sher Khan and

*This must have been the French variant of the Purgoos or Pericose, a craft used for the lading and unlading of ships. Indian Economic and Social History Revi (henceforth cited as I.E.S.H.R), p. 157.
to the Duke of Gingee to the effect that we were intercepting Dutch mail on their territories. We would thus be placing ourselves in a vulnerable situation. It was best to pass over the incident in complete silence.

On 16 March, Véron informed us that on the night of the 15/16 March they had seized a paros which had been subsequently sent to San Thomé. The measures we had taken had proved very effective and the whole enterprise had been effected with the greatest of ease. The "Diligente" had foundered on the other side of the river at Porto Novo. The river bank here was completely devoid of any human habitation. At dusk the men who were to participate in the operation were disembarked on this side. At nine o'clock at night they stole out on the launch of the "Diligente" and crossed the bar. It was easy to take the paros which was manned by only one Dutchman and some natives. They made sure of these men and then sailed away. The launch was brought back and placed at its previous moorings, next to the frigate to avoid any semblance of change. The biggest problem would be that of docking safely at San Thomé but we had given some thought to this also. The leader of the expedition had been instructed that while navigating his craft from Porto Novo, on approaching Pondicherry he was to keep his vessel well out at sea, for if the Dutch vessel anchored here caught sight of the boat, our intentions would be immediately revealed. Similar precautions would have to be taken near Sadras where Dutch ketches were usually to be found. The bark could anchor for the night near San Thomé out of sight of the Dutch ships here. Favourable winds had set in by now and at two o'clock at night the paros could set sail, range along the coast and finally cast anchor behind the "Breton". These plans were well-executed.

On the afternoon of the same day, we glimpsed a paros very far out at sea. We assumed it to be the prize which had been made the previous night and trembled at the thought that the Dutch ship might recognize it and give chase. By a singular stroke of luck, the Dutch vessel did not move from its anchorage. We learnt later that the Captain and officers had been feasting until the early hours of the morning and had been asleep when the paros had passed.
I have already described why I was so reluctant to go to Porto Novo. The problem of provisioning San Thomé had, however, become so important that I decided to go there in spite of all the drawbacks. Another reason for this journey was that the officer whom we had asked to be on the look-out for any further opportunities in this field was creating difficulties. This man was known for his integrity and bravery and I hoped that my presence at Porto Novo might help to bring him round. I left for Porto Novo on 18 March, taking with me the men who were to participate in the expedition. I arrived at Porto Novo on 19 March. Although there was a great deal of talk about the paros which had been seized, everything appeared tranquil. The Havildar was still suspicious that it was our intention to put the “Diligente” out to sea. They paid no heed to the orders of the Duke of Gingee which had been brought by Antoine Cattel. It is possible to get anything out of these officers by giving them presents and the Dutch had not been sparing in this respect. These subordinate officials think nothing of eluding instructions issued to them by their superiors.

On 20 March, I wrote to San Thomé informing them that I had come to Porto Novo. We were only waiting for a suitable opportunity to carry out our intentions. I also dwelt at length on various other affairs. On 21 March I sent Antoine Cattel to Tranquebar with letters which I had written to two or three of the richer Portuguese residents there asking them for a loan. However, I realized that this journey would be quite fruitless. Apart from the fact that several Portuguese disliked us as a nation, our presence at San Thomé was also distasteful to them. I was making this attempt only because I had been directed to do so by our General. He would have castigated me if I had not engaged in this effort. I also wrote to our men who were imprisoned at Negapatam. The slave of one of the leading officials there had easy access to our men and my letters were to be delivered through this man.

On 22 March, I received letters from de la Haye. They were experiencing an acute scarcity and could not hope to hold out much longer. The orders to procure help were repeated and we were directed to secure this by any means available whether through money, friendship or force.
A sampan came in and moored itself at the Porto Novo roads at four o’clock in the evening. The tiller ropes were got ready so that we could seize it during the night. Our men went across to the other side of the river. They embarked and set out at eight o’clock in the evening. After crossing the bar, they came up to the sampan. The captain produced a passport signed by de Lespinay certifying that the boat belonged to Sher Khan. Our men returned the same night leaving the sampan as it was, even though it happened to be loaded with rice. I castigated our officer for not having seized it as we could have paid Sher Khan compensation for the loss of his craft. A consideration of greater importance was that one of the members of the crew could have easily disembarked and reported our actions to the officials at Porto Novo. We would then have been lost. Fortunately nothing happened and the sampan sailed southwards.

On 23 March, we learnt that the paros had arrived safely at San Thomé. A big bark and a large boat anchored at the Porto Novo roads at four o’clock in the afternoon. We laid our plans carefully so that the raid would not miscarry. We provided the officer who was to carry out this expedition with a pilot, a man of resolute disposition and I also sent a letter for de la Haye by this means. I warned de la Haye of the importance of ensuring that all the natives on board the prizes were kept in strictest captivity at San Thomé. Should any of them escape they would spread the news, thus preventing us from effecting any further prizes. Our men embarked at nine o’clock in the evening. After one hour, we heard the discharge of two falconets and about ten to twelve muskets. I assumed that our men must have encountered some resistance. At this time, some of the more important merchants had gathered together at the residence of the Havildar. They were surprised but did not take much note of it. A quarter of an hour later the firing was repeated. There was no doubt now that something was afoot. Some of the merchants now began to say that it had been noticed that a few Frenchmen had proceeded to the opposite bank after purchasing some provisions at the market. They were on the point of summoning me from the house where I

“Champanne in the text.”
had stayed behind with a sailor, but after many different views had been aired, they decided to wait till the next morning to clarify the matter. To tell the truth, I was much perturbed. I had decided to put up a stiff resistance preferring death to the prospect of falling into the hands of the Moors. At last, at three o’clock in the morning of 24 March, Véron who had gone to the other side to embark our men returned to the house. He told me that the mission had been successfully accomplished. Both the vessels had been seized without any resistance and our men had returned with the launch. He was just as troubled as myself about the two discharges for which he also could not find any explanation. The next day we learnt that Husain Marcal, one of the most prosperous merchants at Porto Novo had embarked on his galliot for Negapatam. His departure had been marked by one salvo, while a second had been fired when his ship had actually set sail. On the same day I wrote to San Thomé and also sent a letter to de Lespinay with a description of our achievements of the night.

The Dutch complained to Sher Khan that their people 585 were being harassed by us on territory under his control. In order to appease them Sher Khan sent us one of his officers asking us to live in peace and not indulge in any inimical actions against each other on his terrain. Although these complaints were quite unjustified, we promised that we, for our part would not give any further cause for such complaints. However, if we were insulted we would certainly defend ourselves.

On 28 April, Antoine Cattel returned from Tranquebar without having achieved any success. We were aware of the lack of warmth evinced by the Portuguese towards us and had foreseen this outcome. Antoine Cattel brought me a letter from Negapatam which described the grand celebrations which the Dutch had held to mark their joy at the advantages they claimed their country had won over us in Europe. They had lit a bonfire in which they had burnt two effigies, one of our monarch and one of the King of England. There are many instances of the insolence of these people and their sheer lack of respect for

**A5sein Marcal** in the text.

**A small Dutch cargo boat.**
the crowned heads with whom they happen to be at war. Even though there do appear to be a few right thinking persons among them who do not endorse such criminal behaviour which can be attributed to the leadership of the mob which is swayed only by its own passions, the administrators still deserve to be blamed for this state of affairs. It is the duty of the latter to ensure that under all circumstances due respect is paid to the sacred institution of monarchy. The Governor of Negapatam did, indeed, prevent the effigy of our King from being burnt but allowed that of the king of England to be consigned to the flames. A Dutch minister was extremely upset by the consideration thus shown to us. He had the effigy which had been left behind brought before the house where it was burnt.

At ten o'clock at night on 27 March, they came to tell me that a sailor had deserted. It was my guess that he would have probably taken the road to Devanapatnam. I immediately set out on horseback after him as I knew that this man would inform the Dutch about what we had been doing. This would immediately put a stop to all our hopes of achieving any further successes in this field. Despite all the haste which I attempted to make, when I had come to the Cuddalore river I found that the sailor had already crossed it two hours before. He had thrown himself among the Dutch at their counter at Devanapatnam and had apparently divulged our activities to them. I continued along my route and reached Pondicherry in the evening. These are the most important events which took place during the month of March.

**Events at San Thome During the Month of March**

I will now describe the events which had taken place at San Thomé to preserve the continuity of my narrative.

On 1 March, the Dutch ships had raised anchor. After tacking for some time, they came and moored themselves to the north of the fort at the distance of a cannon shot. We opened fire at these vessels and at their small fort bearing a flag. The

"The text throws no light as to whom this house may have belonged, the only words used being "la maison"."
Francois Martin at Pondicherry

Dutch retaliated aiming more than sixty balls at us. On the same day, some pieces of cast iron cannon were sent to the "Breton".

**Seizure of Twenty-Three Bales of Painted Cloth and Two Hundred Sacks of Rice from the Dutch**

On 2 March, a bark appeared, sailing far out at sea from the north. It was making its way towards the Dutch ships. De la Haye believed it would be feasible to try and undertake some action. He sent out three launches commanded by able officers. The bark tried to make for the open sea but could do nothing in the absence of a wind. Our men boarded this bark and brought it to San Thomé in full view of our enemies on land and at sea. There were sixteen men on board carrying twenty three bales of painted cloth to Cuddalore where a ship was being prepared for a voyage to Bantam. The bales were to be loaded on to this ship. Persons were sent to the boat to make a comprehensive inventory. The merchandise was then unloaded. It was put in the stores along with some smaller parcels addressed to various individuals which had also been found. The crew members were disembarked and interrogated, but they did not reveal anything important. They were only poor country sailors who knew little of other affairs. We learnt later that the painted cloth had been purchased at Pulicat for the sum of 14,000 pagodas. It was indeed shameful that the Dutch should have allowed our three launches not only to have captured the bark in their full view but also that they should have permitted our men to have performed this feat within half the range of a cannon-ball.

At eight o'clock in the evening, de la Haye was informed that a sound like that made by the chopping of wood could be heard at musket shot distance from the fort. De la Haye went out at the head of a few detachments but although he remained outside for two hours he was unable to hear or learn anything. He then returned to the fort. It appeared to have been a false alarm.

It was learnt that some rice had been stored and placed under a guard consisting of an infantry and cavalry corps at a village
by the name of Tincery situated at a distance of two leagues from San Thomé. The men were ordered to assemble at the square at dusk. As soon as they had been divided into detachments, they were led out of the fort. It was then eight o’clock at night. It had been arranged that launches were to be brought to the river and our men crossed over in these. They then marched in battle formation until they arrived within musket shot distance of the village. The guards, the volunteers and about 20 men who had been detached from the main body were ordered to attack the cavalry. They were to be supported by the remaining part of the troops who were to march up ready for combat. Our men attacked with vigour. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. Most of the men had been asleep. A good number were put to the sword while the rest took to flight. Our men had brought about 200 empty sacks. When they found themselves masters of the field, fifty sailors were deputed to fill these sacks with rice. After this, our men withdrew taking with them the Brahmin who administered the village fourteen horses which had been captured, and the sacks which had been crammed full of rice. Several times, our guides lost their way during the withdrawal, but each time they managed to correct themselves and our forces returned to the city at four o’clock in the morning. Half the rice was divided among the sailors, the rest being kept in the storehouses. Three soldiers were found missing after the retreat. Some were of the view that the men had lost their way. It was learnt later that they had been captured by the Dutch.

De la Haye wrote a letter to Pondicherry on the same day describing the conditions at San Thomé and stressing the necessity of receiving assistance. On 5 March de la Haye was informed by way of Madras that our foray of 3-4 night had greatly disconcerted the enemy as a result of the losses they had incurred. They had counted twenty horsemen killed, and several wounded among whom were to be counted the commanding officer of their cavalry contingent, and some of their infantry men. In addition, thirty horses were not to be found. If our men could have received even the smallest help by way of rein-

41 This must have been the river Adyar.
forcements, under the present circumstances, the Moors could have been thoroughly subdued.

Letters from Pondicherry reached de la Haye. From these he could visualize conditions there and the numerous impediments which prevented the despatch of help.

Rejoicing of the Dutch

The two Dutch ships edged towards the land and anchored to the north of the “Breton” on 6 March. De la Haye continued to drill the soldiers and talk to them about their duty. He assured them that within a few days reinforcements would reach them and used every device to try and make them stay. When de la Haye learnt that the three soldiers who had been missing since the retreat from Tilocery were under Dutch detention, he wrote to Pavilioen. Just as de la Haye had sent back the three soldiers belonging to the Dutch who had been captured on the chelingue, it was his hope that Pavilioen would reciprocate by restoring our three men to us.

The letter was entrusted to one of the guards. It was assumed that he would be allowed to enter the camp without any difficulty and he was accordingly asked to take due note of the general layout. He was, however, stopped at the first outpost. He had to hand over the letter which was taken to the commander. The commander sent back the reply that the three Frenchmen were in the Moorish camp and he would ensure their return. In the afternoon, the Dutch ships were all bedecked with flags aloft and pennants flying. There were discharges of artillery and musketry fire followed by a fireworks display. De la Haye knew that when Dutch fortunes reached their lowest ebb, it was their custom to make a show of extraordinary jubilation to divert attention. He concluded that the present display also formed a part of this pattern. Our General issued instructions that thirteen of our cannon should fire three discharges at the enemy camp. Our cannon fire was to be interspersed by discharges from our musketry. We learnt later that the Dutch demonstration had been occasioned by the good news they had received from Europe about the disposition of the Empire and Spain which had given them hopes of being able to retrieve their
fortunes. On 7 March letters on the current situation were received from Pondicherry.

A Sortie—Dela Haye Is Injured

For a long time, de la Haye had been seeking an occasion for a decisive encounter with either the Dutch or the Moors. He had not succeeded as both his adversaries had refused to be drawn out. He now made another attempt to entice them into an ambush. He positioned twenty men belonging to the company of cadets at Luz Church dispersing others under cover. After instructing the Governor, de Maillé, to lend support wherever necessary, de la Haye mounted on horseback. Followed by fifteen others who were mounted on the horses which had been taken at Tilocery, he advanced into the plain attacking some foragers who did not have the time to move away. De la Haye penetrated right up to the top of the Moorish camp where he killed the horseman in command of the foragers. He had far too few men with him to be able to sustain his position here for long and withdrew, taking his horsemen with him. The enemy were ashamed that one man had succeeded in penetrating so deep inside their camp. The Moors emerged with 200-300 of their horsemen while the Dutch brought out some of their infantry. De la Haye had withdrawn close to the place where our men had been posted. The enemy who had discovered the presence of our men, knew well what de la Haye had planned. They kept themselves away at a small distance while some of the infantry engaged in a skirmish. De la Haye now advanced a little to see if anything could be done. A distance of fifty feet separated him from the main body of the enemy cavalry which advanced rapidly on him riding at full tilt. Apart from the fact that they were carrying the wrong equipment, the men who should have supported our General were not even too conversant with the art of controlling their horses. The majority had just a thin rope to serve as a rein and...
had been provided with only a sword and a gun.\textsuperscript{43} Many of the horses got out of control and stampeded, with the result that de la Haye found himself quite alone. With one pistol shot he cracked the skull of a Moorish cavalier and parried another who had pointed an assegai\textsuperscript{44} at him. He could not, however, repulse all his adversaries. He killed a third with another pistol shot but not before he himself had been wounded by the lance which his foe had thrust into the upper portion of his right thigh. In the meantime two of our men had come up. They killed the remaining members of the group of five Moorish horsemen who had assailed our General. On noticing that de la Haye was engaged at close quarters, our detachments which were close by advanced while our cannon from the fort kept up a brisk fire. The enemy took no further steps and retired subsequently. An offensive at this point was not considered advisable as our men were quite consternated by the injury inflicted on de la Haye. After his return to San Thomé, de la Haye fainted due to loss of blood. He was taken to his bed where he recovered consciousness. After the wound had been examined by the surgeons, it was declared to be a serious one but the prognosis for recovery was hopeful. While all this had been going on, de la Haye had stressed that he was not to be spared. After the initial dressing had been completed, de la Haye had another letter written to Pondicherry stating that it was worth taking risks in other fields if provisions could be sent to San Thomé. According to letters received from Madras, the enemy lost twenty cavaliers, seventeen lascars and fourteen horses. Much of this damage had been inflicted by our cannonade from the fort. Our only loss was the wound sustained by our General.

On 8 March de la Haye wrote to the Moorish general proposing that the French prisoners should be exchanged for those

\textsuperscript{43}In Europe a cavalier normally wore a helmet and a breast-plate which covered his chest and back. He was armed with a sword and two pistols, both the arquebus and carbine being in use. Castellan, \textit{Histoire de l' Amte}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{44}Tavernier described an assegai thus, \textit{“... a stick of 5 or 6 feet long, tipped with iron at the end, which can be hurled with skill against an enemy.”} \textit{Tavernier}, II, p. 232.
belonging to the Moors who were being held by us in the city. This letter was taken by a guardsman. The latter brought back the answer that the General concerned had no wish to enter into this exchange.

De la Haye selected a captain of the infantry to lead twenty soldiers and a few lascars on a reconnaissance trip. The captain saw a group of Moorish horsemen at a distance on the plain. He got ready to resist them in case the latter should decide to come towards our men. However, the enemy had no desire to get involved in an engagement. Our men then returned to the city.

A letter was written to Pondicherry directing that as much rice as possible should be gathered and kept ready. Several barks appeared far out at sea. The Dutch vessels sailed out to reconnoitre them. The small vessels were brought in and moored in between Triplicane and Madras. Three hundred sailors were embarked on the “Breton”.

Thirty-five soldiers deserted at ten o’clock at night. Some of the officers deserved to be blamed for this as the departure of these men could be traced directly to their unreserved comments. They had been saying openly that de la Haye was quite bent on killing all the men and that it was futile to expect to receive any reinforcements from France.

Despite his injury and continued fever, de la Haye had himself carried to the parade grounds on 9 March. He carried on with his remonstrances to the garrison on the subject of their obligation to endure suffering in service of their King. Once again, he asked them to be patient until the end of the month, assuring them that they would certainly receive reinforcements before the expiry of this period. After this he attended mass following which he was carried into the open. The lascars had become extremely disconcerted fearing that de la Haye had received a fatal injury. It was hoped that they would recover their spirits on seeing the General. De la Haye next engaged in a private conversation with Baron and Chevalier de Maisonneuve. De Maisonneuve was ordered to proceed to the “Breton” and set sail at night. The General was straining every resource to procure food for the garrison. It was intended that the “Breton” should go to Pondicherry and charge the vessel with provisions.
The relatives of the Brahmin who had been captured at the village of Tilcery wrote that it would be impossible to send rice to San Thomé. Their village had been burnt, their possessions had been entirely looted, and all avenues leading to San Thomé had been shut off.

**The Departure of the “Breton” (10 March)**

The “Breton” set sail on 10 March two hours before dawn. The wind blew from a westerly direction while the ship set its course south-south-east, south and then to the east. At dawn it was still on the horizon. The two Dutch ships lifted anchor at nine o’clock. We were later to learn that despite the contrary wind, the “Breton” had tried to advance as far south as possible. The two enemy ships, which were better sailors than her, followed in pursuit. The “Breton” veered round at three o’clock in the afternoon and prepared to give combat. The Dutch ships, which were a musket shot distance away, opened a sharp fire which was returned from the “Breton” with such alacrity that the Dutch were driven out to sea. A westerly wind having sprung up again, our men set out to give chase. The enemy ships put out all their sails and began to move away. Both the Dutch ships were swifter than the “Breton”. They made several tacking movements until they had gained the wind to approach us. De Maisonneuve took in the foresail, the two topsails and all the extra sails and thus awaited the enemy onslaught. The Dutch vessels came closer and opened fire once again. The “Breton” answered in kind and the battle continued until eight o’clock at night. The wind had by now become quite unfavourable for proceeding towards Pondicherry. Following his instructions, the Captain carefully rigged his sails, turning the vessel towards San Thomé. The Dutch followed behind keeping up a constant cannonade. The Dutch ships were quicker and it would have been an easy matter for them to have boarded the “Breton”. Despite their advantage, they were quite content to restrict themselves to firing at us from afar. By nightfall, the “Breton” had moored within the protection of our cannon at the fort while the Dutch anchored at Tripli- cane. The action had cost us three lives. A bullet had ex-
ploded, shattering the leg of one of the ensigns. His limb had to be amputated but the officer showed remarkable fortitude in bearing the pain. Another shot had blown off the hand of one of the sailors. During the last broadside aimed at the Dutch, the discharge from one of the cannons at the top had ignited an eighteen-pounder being charged between two bridges. Six men received burns in the resultant explosion. The gunner who was loading the ball received such severe injuries that he died within the hour. Several cannon-balls had lodged in the masts and some of the rigging had been cut loose. Forty-six cannon balls had hit the body of the ship of which twenty-eight to thirty were wedged into the wood. De Maisonneuve and the other officers had given a brilliant account of themselves during this action. The lack of vigour on the part of the Dutch had received yet another demonstration. Two days later, they wrote to us from Madras that the Dutch had lost sixty men in this engagement. Letters were received from Pondicherry. As there was no prospect of sending food from there, they would take action elsewhere in accordance with the plan which had been intimated previously.

Chevalier de Maisonneuve disembarked on 12 March. De la Haye gave him a reception befitting the valour he had shown. The Chevalier then went to the stores to take out the articles necessary for the repair of the “Breton”. The wounded were brought down and they were ordered to be nursed with great care. De la Haye, whose wound was healing remarkably well, visited the principal officers of the garrison in the evening.

On 13 March the two Dutch ships raised anchor and moored towards the south at the distance of two cannon-balls from the “Breton”. Lieutenant Chancé, a worthy man who was serving on the “Breton” told de la Haye that a sailor had confided to him that thirty-five members of the crew had determined to desert in the long-boat. It was decided that no attempt would be made to identify these men as it was feared that a much larger number might be found implicated. The men had lost all sense of restraint in the past few days and spoke insolently even to their officers. The latter were ordered to treat them gently in the hope that this might induce the men not to desert. Twelve to fifteen members of the crew asked for per-
mission to descend. This was granted and they came down in the evening. There was not one of them who did not desert later.

At night, a letter from Pondicherry was received which described how an attempt to relieve San Thomé had miscarried. The plan to seize a grain boat had gone awry as the launch destined to perform this exploit had floundered at the bar.

Desertions on the Increase

On the night of 13-14 March, five sailors of the “Breton” deserted. When de la Haye heard this he had himself carried to the square again where he exhorted the soldiers to perform their duty and bear up for a little while longer. When someone pointed out that the five men had deserted because of their fear that they would be posted back on the ship, de la Haye gave an undertaking to the remaining men that their stationing on the “Breton” would be a purely voluntary affair. Food and munitions were sent to the “Breton”.

On the night of 14-15 March, ten more sailors deserted. They were the remaining numbers of those who had requested permission to disembark and had been allowed to do so. De la Haye did not know what else he could do. He asked the chaplain of the ship, a good man, to try and persuade the crew to perform their duty. The chaplain spared no effort in carrying out this task. It was these cowardly deserters who made us lose our cause. The information which they supplied to the enemy about the food situation in San Thomé caused a continuation of the blockade. Fifty sailors were disembarked from the “Breton” in the afternoon. They were ordered to assemble at the square along with the other members of the garrison. De la Haye was brought in on a chair. He asked the men to perform their duty and keep faith for the remaining portion of the month. Some natives had given him the information that the enemy had posted a posse of guards at a big temple one league away to intercept the movement of food. If our men would chase away these enemy soldiers, the country people would bring in food in bountiful supply.

Soldiers for this enterprize were detached and placed under
de Maillé. In the orders, de la Haye had laid particular emphasis on the importance of avoiding all misunderstanding and disorder. The soldiers now set out. The advance guard which consisted of an officer and twenty soldiers charged vigorously at the temple. De Maillé supported this drive while another detachment was positioned at a different point with orders to maintain itself in battle formation and fire at the retreating enemy. The men in the last detachment were too hasty. Instead of staying at their position as they had been ordered to do, they entered the temple by a door which was directly opposite to that by which the first group had entered. The temple was empty and each contingent mistook the other to be the enemy and fired. Five soldiers received serious injuries. Had it not been for the prudence of de Maillé who had recognised the error in time, the confusion would have been worse confounded. The men were reassembled. A thorough investigation of the temple was made and it was found to be quite deserted. After this, the men started on their march back to San Thomé, taking the five wounded soldiers with them. They entered the fort at daybreak on 16 March. De la Haye had spent all this time at Porte Royale. He was upset at what had happened. The incident could have been avoided if his orders had been executed properly.

Letters were received from Pondicherry. The present conjunction of circumstances was described. The attempts to send food to San Thomé and the obstacles which were controverting the chances of success were delineated. De la Haye replied on the same day. Ignoring all our difficulties, surrounded as we were with enemies and totally deficient in any financial resources and showing an equal disregard for all the attempts we had made up to now, our General took de Lespinay and myself to task for our failure in sending any help to San Thomé until the present date. In making these strictures, he directed his barbs at myself rather than at de Lespinay. In the same letter, he further asked us to let him know if there was any possibility of our being able to do anything so that he could take the necessary steps.

A large raft was made to transport some cannon which were being brought down from the walls and sent to the "Breton".
The public explanation being offered was that de la Haye was preparing to launch an attack against the Dutch ships, but the truth was that he had decided to embark as many cannons as possible on to the “Breton”. It was his intention to spike the remaining ones at the fort and sail away with the garrison once he had exhausted all the food.

On 17 March, de la Haye mounted on horseback and took a spin outside the fort. This sight gladdened all those who had stayed behind. Such an exercise on the part of de la Haye had become all the more necessary as the Dutch had spread the rumour throughout the countryside that de la Haye had died after his return to the city. The General addressed the garrison which had been assembled at the parade grounds. He took the soldiers and sailors severely to task for disobeying the commands of their superior officers. The latter were ordered to brook no further insubordination and were given permission to put all those who defied orders to the sword. Since the path of gentleness had proved quite ineffectual, de la Haye was trying to find out if harsher methods would yield better results. It had been reported that an envoy from Gingee with letters for de la Haye had arrived at Madras. Letters were written about this to Deltor who was there.

**Provisions are Received from Porto Novo**

At dawn, a paros was perceived close to the shore to the south of San Thomé. It was coming to moor itself before the fort. The Dutch had also seen it and had sent out launches to stop its progress. Fortunately, the wind was favourable and, escorted by the launches of the “Breton” which had been sent to its rescue, the paros came in and anchored between the “Breton” and the shore. The skipper came down and described to de la Haye how this craft had been seized at the Porto Novo roads. It is not possible to describe how happy they were to receive such a large consignment. There was more than 120,000 pounds of white rice, a small quantity of unhusked rice along with some other grains. De la Haye immediately went to the Cathedral. The *Te Deum* was sung to thank God for sending such timely help. After the celebration of the daily mass, officers
were sent to the paros to supervise the unloading of the rice. In order to provide encouragement word of the safe arrival of the bark was thereupon sent to Pondicherry. They were to try and seize some more barks, and think in terms of accumulating stocks of powder, bullets, tinder etc. ... to raise troops. If any of the rajas or poligars, offered help the basis on which such negotiations could be carried on was to be investigated. As to the present circumstances, the enemy would realize that with the arrival of provisions it was unlikely that San Thomé would fall as quickly as they had been anticipating. This might make them decide to press on with the siege in a more active manner. The unloading operations continued on 19 March also. Although every attempt had been made to prevent misappropriation, the General was informed that several sack-loads had been taken away and kept at various places. De la Haye carried on the investigations himself. The sacks were found inside the huts. They were taken out and transferred to the stores. Some of the rice had been left piled in a heap on the ground. The importance of conserving the consignment was so great that De la Haye took to sleeping near this pile. The officers who had been posted here were not sufficiently vigilant. De la Haye began to give each person a daily allowance of one and a half livres.

On 20 March, the village was inspected to find out if any rice had been carried to it. In some of the abandoned huts, more than two thousand sacks were found weighed down as much by rice as by vegetables, and even the personal effects which had been discharged from the paros. De la Haye immediately summoned some of the fisherfolk who served as guides on our launches to find out who had brought the grain here. These men implicated the adjutant who had been sent on board by de la Haye to ensure that no embezzlement should take place. Our General was extremely irritated at this lapse on the part of one of the leading officers in the city. After verifying this accusation, the adjutant was removed from the bark to a prison.

45 This could perhaps be taken to refer to the section in the city where the natives lived, the portion which came to be called Black Town in Anglo-Indian parlance.
on land while the unloading operations continued. By mid-day, all the cargo had been discharged. The sailors were then called together at the square. De la Haye declared that a house-to-house search was to be made, but before this was started he invited each sailor to make a declaration of the amount of rice in his possession so that it could be left undisturbed during the investigation. If they refused, the entire quantity would be confiscated. In the afternoon, the Dutch fired more than 100 cannon-balls at the fort but no one was injured or killed. They were extremely upset at the help we had received.

On 21 March, the rice was brought up from the seashore to the stores. Officers were posted at intervals of twenty feet to ensure that no bags were carried elsewhere. The grain was weighed and was found to be only 91,000 lbs. There were 1,200 pounds of green peas and fifty of the loin cloths which are customarily worn by the native people. This load revealed that a considerable portion had been diverted. We learnt that more than 20,000 pounds had been carried to the "Breton". On the same day, de la Haye publicly promoted the deputy adjutant to the rank of adjutant.

The two Dutch ships anchored close to the shore to the south of the "Breton". On 22 March, the paros was beached. De la Haye now secured the opening of the bales of merchandise found on the bark which had been captured by the two launches of the "Breton". The cloth was distributed among the whole garrison so that the soldiers and the sailors could make themselves new clothes.

On 23 March, new garments for the crew were sent to the "Breton". The entire garrison had been assembled under arms at the square. It was Easter and de la Haye invited all the soldiers to remember their religious duties. They were to offer thanks to God for all His favours and request Him to continue to bless us in this manner.

On 24 March, two pieces of cannon were embarked on the "Breton". The garrison received one instalment of pay. This was all that could be given under the existing circumstances. One of the Dutch ships lifted anchor in the morning and sailed out into the open sea. It returned to its moorings in the evening.
On the night of 25-26 March, two barks, one large and one small, anchored before the fort. Both carried cargos of rice paddy and a small quantity of peas and wheat. The captain descended and explained that both the barks had been seized at the roads of Porto Novo two days ago. He had set sail in accordance with his instructions. The previous evening at dusk, he had caught sight from afar of the two Dutch vessels anchored close to the shore. He had immediately taken in all the sails and dropped anchor. He had waited till midnight and had then come to the roads. He delivered the letters which I had entrusted to him. The garrison was quite overcome with joy at the arrival of these two additional barks. They gathered at the Cathedral to thank God for this help. Enquiries were then made to find out to whom the barks belonged. It was learnt from the people who had been dispossessed of the barks that the boats and their cargos belonged to merchants at Tranquebar. They showed a passport which had been issued to them by the Governor of this place. After all these men had been brought down, one of our clerks on board was asked to keep count of the amount of rice which was unloaded so that due payment could be made to the owners. Officers were sent on board to supervise the unloading of the rice while others were posted ashore to receive the consignments which were then sent to the stores. An example was made of two sailors found filling their pockets with grain. They were immediately clamped into prison as it had already been made quite clear that no attempt was to be made to divert any portion of the grain. At dawn, thirteen cannon-balls were fired at the Dutch camp. The inmates were awakened by the noise and became aware of the two barks which were now with us. This sight, we later learnt, had driven the Dutch mad with rage. Not knowing whom to blame, the Moors began to accuse the Dutch of having colluded with us in allowing the barks to reach us. De la Haye learnt that the enemy intended to storm a redoubt in front of Porte Royale. This post was manned by twenty able soldiers, and although there was no doubt that they would be able to withstand the enemy onslaught further reinforcements were nevertheless sent to this point.

I had sent on the letters which I had received from Porto Novo. From these it became apparent that it would not be
possible to launch the frigate, the “Diligente”. The local officials who had been bought over by the presents given to them by the Dutch, would certainly oppose any efforts we made to secure this end.

The unloading of rice continued on 27 March and letters were written to Pondicherry to intimate the arrival of the barks. We were instructed that while we were not to lose any further opportunities to effect such captures, we were not to overlook other avenues of sending help.

On 28 March, the last load of rice had been taken off the boats and placed in the stores. It came to a total of 730 hundredweights\(^ {46} \). There should have been more but the officers appointed by de la Haye had disobeyed his orders and a large quantity had been misappropriated. We saw about one hundred men leaving the Dutch camp. The group came into the open and then turned towards the south. We learnt that an officer was being sent with instructions for the captains of the two Dutch ships which were still to be found moored to the south of the “Breton”.

The officers began to grumble as they had not received any money. They totally ignored the fact that the treasurer had no funds at all. When de la Haye became aware of this, he assembled them together and told them the exact position. He reminded them that they should be the first to set the example for the men. They could see for themselves, since they shared his table, that the General had no better fare than themselves. However, he later drew out some money and gave it to the treasurer with the order that it was to be distributed according to need.

The country people brought about ten hundred weights of rice and tobacco to the city. This was distributed among the garrison. In the evening, de la Haye went out to tour the countryside accompanied by four horsemen.

On 30 March, letters were received from Pondicherry which described the conditions there. The General wrote to the Governor of Chicacole requesting him to release our men who had been arrested there. He offered to make a full reimbursement of the expenditure incurred by the Governor for the

\(^ {46} \)73 milliers in the text.
upkeep of our men. He sent this letter along with the necessary instructions to Malfosse who was at Masulipatam.

On the morning of 31 March, it was observed that some work was in progress at an advance post maintained by the Dutch. A few cannon-balls fired from the fort dispersed the workers. A body of about 200 Moorish cavalry went across the plain in front of the fort proceeding towards the south. They returned to their camp at noon. The country people brought some provisions to the city.

One of the two Dutch ships moved a little further out at sea to anchor in the east while the second remained at its moorings close to the shore. This had been done to cut us off from any help sent by sea. A letter was sent to Pondicherry asking that Antoine Cattel and the writer, Lazarou, be sent back to San Thomé as their services were required there.

### Events on the Coromandel Coast During the Month of April—Despatch of Victuals from Porto Novo come to a Stop—Pondicherry is Threatened by the Dutch—Sher Khan Advises us to Retreat into Hilly Terrain

I shall now return to the events which took place during the month of April. The Dutch vessel which had anchored before Pondicherry fired several rounds at the aldea on 2 April. We went to the beach to find out what was happening. The vessel which was secured by a spring was very close to the breakers. It turned on us and fired. Some of the bullets came very close to us. We heard that the two barks loaded with rice which we had most recently seized at Porto Novo had arrived at San Thomé. A bark came and anchored close to the Dutch vessel. We were told that the Dutch wished to come ashore and burn our boat which had got grounded. We could not find any indications of this but as a precautionary measure we posted twenty lascars near our bark.

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47 *Vide supra*, n. 5. This must have been Lazare de Motta né Thanappa Mudaliar.

48 A spring is any rope which is used to hold a vessel in a desired position when hauling or swinging in a harbour.
On 3 April, a lascar captain whom we had sent to a poligar returned saying that the native chieftain had offered to take supplies to San Thomé. No help could be secured without money and since we had none, all our attempts met with failure. We informed de la Haye about these difficulties.

We heard on 4 April that the Dutch had sent envoys to Gingee to induce the Duke to attack us at Pondicherry. We were told that an understanding had been reached and that 200 horsemen had encamped two leagues away from the aldea. We placed ourselves on guard. We had at that time 200 lascars whom we had raised. We did not disband these soldiers so that they could be mobilized without any delay. It was our intention to join these troops to those we were procuring from other quarters.

We decided to make an attempt to cut the cable of the Dutch ship at the roads. It was anchored so close to the breakers that we were quite certain that it would get grounded. A hardy sailor plunged into the sea. He made several attempts but was unable to make his way to the cable on account of the currents.

On 7 April, I left to meet Sher Khan. I wished to ask if it would be at all possible for him to send us help prior to the return of the express messengers who had been sent to Surat. When Sher Khan heard of my departure, he wrote to me asking me not to make any further progress as he did not wish to become even more suspect in the eyes of the Dutch. The latter had seized one of Sher Khan's vessels at Galle Point to punish this potentate for tolerating our presence on his territory. I received this letter on 8 April when I was on my way. I returned to Pondicherry on 9 April where I was informed that two sailors had deserted at Porto Novo. There were several Dutchmen at the Devenapatnam counter as they had received reinforcements from Negapatam. Sher Khan became apprehensive as he had a fort here. He sent additional numbers of men and also stationed 200 horses close by to keep a watch on Dutch movements. This strengthened his decision to protect us despite all the threats of our enemy. On 11 April we received letters from him in which he warned us to be on guard since he was not sure what action the Dutch planned to take against us. We learnt that when
Sher Khan had asked the chief of the Dutch counter at Devenapatnam why they had stopped his ship at Galle, the Dutchman had replied that the Admiral would himself provide the answer to this question. However, as long as Sher Khan allowed us to remain on his territories, the enmity of the Dutch would continue.

Ever since we had seized the paros and the barks, they had stopped loading rice at Cuddalore. We could not, therefore, hope to achieve anything in these quarters. Sher Khan suspected that the Dutch wished to attack the fortresses of Devenapatnam and Pondicherry, and he was of the opinion that both attempts would take place simultaneously. A ship belonging to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bijapur army was stopped by the Dutch. The vessel was on its way to Porto Novo from Goa. Sher Khan was lieutenant-general to the Commander-in-Chief.49

On 12 April, we were asked to be watchful about the movements of the cavalry from Gingee. We wrote to the Nayak of Madura, to the French prisoners at Devenapatnam, and to the poligars. After this we sent a letter to San Thome by express messenger delineating our present circumstances.

A ship which arrived from Bantam on 14 April brought us the news that several of the French officers imprisoned at Batavia had escaped. The others were now under close surveillance there. A Dutch squadron of twelve ships was cruising the Sonda Straits. We learnt from another source that the Dutch had set the French sailors at work on their fortifications at Galle Point. Even their slaves had been pressed into this

49Martin gives an account of the civil war in Bijapur in his entry dated December 1675 (vide supra pp. 32-33). Matters may have come to a head during this year but ever since the death of Ali Adil Shah II in November 1672 the stage was being set for the revolution to which Martin refers. Ali Adil Shah II was succeeded by the child king, Sikandar Adil Shah. Court factions had already crystallized along racial lines. Abdul Muhammad Khan, who had been functioning as wazir since January 1661, left court. Khawass Khan, who headed the Abyssinian or Deccani faction at court, became Regent. The Adilshahi army in which Afghan recruits predominated, was headed by Abdul Karim, surnamed Bahlol Khan II. Sarkar, A ur., IV, pp. 157, 159, 161. Sher Khan, a veteran of the Adilshahi campaigns in the Carnatic, was also an Afghan.
Francois Martin at Pondicherry

De Lespinay left for Porto Novo to see if anything could be done. We kept de la Haye informed.

Captain Harnugaran whom we had sent to Gingee returned on 15 April. They were extremely dissatisfied with us there as they had not had any response from us since the time of our visit. It was difficult for us to find an acceptable answer for we had neither been instructed to make the necessary advance, nor did we possess the requisite funds. We were told that three Dutchmen had been sent to Gingee. They had presented the Duke with two horses, some scarlet cloth and various other commodities, the total cost being estimated at 1,000 pagodas. It was said that the Duke was quite well-intentioned towards the Dutch but Siddi Darvez was not in their favour. Chinnapatli Mirza, the General of the Moorish troops at San Thomé also had an envoy at Gingee. We were assured that the Dutch were expecting Admiral Rijkloff to arrive at Negapatam during the following month with fourteen vessels. We had been instructed from San Thomé to send back Antoine Cattel, and the writer, Lazarou. We could find no catamaran to take them and Lazarou did not dare to go by land. Only Cattel was willing to expose himself. Cattel had himself shaved and dressed like a fakir, or a mendicant by choice. He took his departure on 15 April. The Dutch were trying to incite the Duke of Gingee and other petty Princes in the neighbourhood to declare themselves against Sher Khan. They also wrote to the King of Bijapur and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bijapur army complaining at the way in which Sher Khan was treating them. It was at

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From the year 1670 the Dutch tried to bring the external trade of Ceylon under their control by instituting a system of passes for all vessels trading with Ceylon. The Dutch would be particularly anxious to improve their position at Galle, which along with Colombo constituted the centre for the cinnamon trade of Ceylon. Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies 1965, p. 116; Arasaratram op. cit., p. 84.

The name suggests that he may have been a lascar captain.

This detail is of some interest as it shows the kind of contact which may have existed between Qutbshahi and Adilshahi officials at the level of provincial administration.

From this statement it would appear that the Europeans were not yet aware of party alignments at the centre for Bahlol Lodi, the Commander-in-Chief, would be a staunch supporter of Sher Khan Lodi.
this time that the revolution at Tanjore took place. After an open declaration of war, the Nayak of Madura attacked the capital city of the Prince. This ruler, who possessed little skill in warfare and was utterly dependent on his Brahmins, was forced off the throne and killed. The rich state of Tanjore, which was now entirely taken over by the Nayak, formed a very convenient accession for the latter as it was directly contiguous to the borders of his own kingdom. I wrote to San Thome about current conditions at Pondicherry.

The history of Tanjore under Nayak rule had been one of constant wars. The Vijayanagar empire, ruled by Sri Ranga Raya III who had ascended the throne in 1642, had entered into a state of decline. Mysore under Raja Wodeyar had broken away and Madura under Tirumala Nayak was restive. After the year 1636, the Carnatic had been the scene of the military expansion of the two Muslim states of Golconda and Bijapur leading to the occupation of Gingee by Bijapur. Tanjore was reduced to a vassal state while Madura had to pay a yearly tribute. In the year 1653, Sri Ranga lost the little power that had remained to him. Tanjore now became a dependency of Bijapur. Despite the weakness of the position of Tanjore, the hostility between Tanjore and Madura which had been evident under Sri Ranga Raya, continued under the changed circumstances also. In 1659, Tirumala Nayak of Madura died. He was succeeded by Muthu Virappa Nayak. Within six months, Muthu Virappa was also dead and Chokkanatha Nayak was on the throne. In 1661 Chokkanatha invaded Tanjore and forced her to agree to pay tribute to Madura. In 1673 hostilities once again flared up. The reason for this was partly due to the fact that Tanjore had rejected a marriage proposal brought forward by Madura, and partly to the refusal by Tanjore to continue payment of tribute to Madura. Chokkanatha sent his Dalavai, Venkata Krishna, against Tanjore. In the hostilities the King of Tanjore, Vijayaraghavan, was killed. He had reigned between 1633 and 1673. Tanjore was now annexed and Chokkanatha appointed his foster brother, Alagiri Nayak, as Viceroy. After the first year Alagiri began to show increasing signs of independence. A Brahmin named Venkanna who had been the secretary of Vijayaraghavan and who had won the confidence of Alagiri, now determined to use the present circumstances to further his own ends. He encouraged the rift between Alagiri and Chokkanatha. At the same time, he found a descendent of Vijayaraghavan, a child called Chengamaladas, who had been placed in the care of a Chetti merchant at Negapatam. Venkanna took the child with him to the court of the King of Bijapur. He solicited the help of the Sultan to restore the child to the throne held by his forefathers at Tanjore. The Sultan agreed and sent out an army under the command of Ekkoji or Vyankoji. When Ekkoji invaded Tanjore Alagiri appealed in vain for the help of Chokkanatha. Alagiri was defeated near Ayyampet in 1674. Ekkoji placed Chenga-
The Dutch ship hoisted its sails on the morning of 17 April and sailed into the open sea. I had their buoy cut so that they would lose their anchor. The ship returned to its moorings in the evening. When the captain realized what we had done, he fired several cannon-balls at Pondicherry. De Lespinay returned from Porto Novo. Barks laden with rice could not be found here any more.

On 19 April Antoine Cattel returned, having failed to make his way to San Thomé. He had run a great risk and the Dutch would certainly have made a fine example of him had they caught him.

We were informed from Negapatam that they were collecting a large store of provisions there as they were expecting the arrival of Admiral Rijkloff. The Dutch were forcing the merchants of Cuddalore to give promises in writing that they would neither sell anything to the French nor enter into any kind of undertaking with the members of this nation. We had the entire coast against us. On 20 April, a ship could be seen far out at sea. The Dutch fired to make the vessel come in but it continued on its route unperturbed.

On 22 April, we heard that the King of Golconda had sent a present to the Duke of Gingee so that the latter could be

maladas on the throne. Chengamaladas showed his gratification by handing over the revenues of Kumbakonam, Mannarkoil and Papanasam to Ekkoji. The Chetti merchant who had looked after the King was appointed Pradhan and Dalaval. Venkanna was sorely disappointed as he had hoped to hold these offices himself. Venkanna now suggested to Ekkoji that he march to Tanjore from Kumbakonam and seize the throne himself. In early 1675, Ekkoji marched against Tanjore and displaced Chengamaladas. Nayak rule now came to an end and a Maratha dynasty was now installed at Tanjore. V. Vriddhaghirisan, The Nayaks of Tanjore, Madras, 1942, pp. 132, 137, 140-1, 144-5, 148-9, 151, 153, 162-5; B.S. Baliga, Tanjore District Handback, Madras, 1957, pp. 57-8; Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 161-70; J.I.H., XVIII(1), p.6. It is not very clear as to which of these events Martin is alluding in this reference to a revolution at Tanjore. He could, perhaps, be referring to the annexation of Tanjore by Madura in 1673, or to the displacement of Alagiri by Chengamaladas in 1674. In either case, the data given by Martin does not tally exactly with the historical event.
turned away from giving us any assistance. On the same day we received letters from Surat and the Malabar coast. I learnt that towards the early part of January, the "Orient" had set sail for France. It was carrying back the three officers who had deserted from the "Breton" and also several persons belonging to the commercial cadre whose services had become redundant on account of the war. This ship arrives safely at la Rochelle. By a particular stroke of fortune, it was able to slip through the numerous Dutch vessels to be found cruising along the coasts of Normandy, Brittany and Poitou during the summer of 1675. We had no news from Europe about the possibility of reinforcements reaching us from France.

De Flacourt wrote to us from the Malabar coast. He dwelt at length on the affairs of the Dutch and described the goodwill which the Zamorin and several other important personages of the region had evinced towards our nation. Our circumstances, however, did not allow us to profit in any way from this situation. There were several letters for de la Haye and Baron but we were unable to send these on to them. The packets were too bulky and no runner would agree to carry them. We let them know at San Thome about this. We were informed that it was quite certain that we were to be attacked at Pondicherry. We went to see the neighbouring poligar of the woods. It was agreed that at a spot determined by him we were to erect some huts. All our possessions at the house, and in effect this consisted only of munitions, were to be brought and stored inside these shacks.

In view of these relations which were slowly being built up between the Qutbshahi administration and Nasir Muhammad, the stance adopted by the latter at the time of Shivaji's incursion into the Carnatic becomes easier to understand.

There were no Directors at Surat and the ship had been fitted out entirely by Adam and Pilavoine who were managing the affairs of the Surat counter at this time. B.N., N.A., 9352(86).

According to Hobson Jobson, a poligar was a chief occupying tracts which were more or less wild. A variant of this term is to be found in W. Taylor, *Oriental Historical Manuscripts in the Tamil Language II*, p. 165, where there is a reference to a minor feudatory chief called the Palliya carer. This word may have been derived from the Persian *Poolgar* one who holds wealth.
Sher Khan pressed us to retire into the woods. He made this known to us through a cavalry captain whom he maintained at Pondicherry. I was extremely reluctant to move as I feared that once we moved out of the house we would not be able to regain possession of it. The Dutch were expecting the arrival of some of their ships. This had aroused the apprehensions of Sher Khan who was therefore cleverly using this pretext to secure our withdrawal from Pondicherry. We took a firm resolution not to leave unless we were forced to do so. We felt it would be safer however to transfer the munitions to the woods and started to shift these on the same day. We heard that the King of Golconda had made a very expensive gift to the Duke of Gingee. This consisted of an aigrette hanging ear-rings, and a diamond bracelet.

Six catamarans which had come from Devenapatnam went several times to the Dutch ships. We kept ourselves under arms on the night of 23-24 April while the munitions were being carried away to the woods. We received letters from Sher Khan on 24 April. He said that he was not sufficiently strong to protect us against three powers such as the King of Golconda, the Duke of Gingee, and the Dutch. Had we accepted his advice and withdrawn to the woods, he could have ensured that we were not attacked. We had refused to do so and were quite obdurate in our decision to stay. The removal of our munitions to the woods continued, and we informed them at San Thomé about the decision which we had taken.

I went to the woods on 25 April to ensure that the munitions were stored properly. We were warned that twenty horsemen and 500 lascars from Gingee were to attack us during the night. We were suspicious about the veracity of this news which we thought had been fabricated only to secure our withdrawal into the woods. We stuck to our first resolution even though Sher Khan wrote to us again asking us to withdraw. The precaution which we took was to always remain on good guard. We received the same warnings on 26, 27 and 28 April but nothing transpired.

We received letters from de la Haye in which he asked us,

**Spray of gems worn on the head.**
as he usually did, to endeavour to send troops to San Thomé so that he could try to force the raising of the siege. In our present circumstances, bereft of friends and lacking in money, we could scarcely hope to satisfy him. Our replies were dictated by the circumstances in which we found ourselves.

On 29 April we received news of the death of Malfosse whom I had left behind at Masulipatam. This is how the event had taken place.

**SAD DEATH OF MALFOSSE AT MASULIPATAM**

Malfosse had missed several favourable opportunities of sending help to San Thomé. Towards the end of the season he decided to load a bark with rice and other comestibles, and send it on its way to San Thomé after he had placed some Frenchmen on board. The wind which had already started to blow from the south impeded the progress of the boat. After battling against this wind for fifteen to twenty days without making any progress, the pilot, who had been put in command of the bark, returned to Masulipatam. The food was taken off and sent to the lodge. The Dutch, who also had a counter at Masulipatam, came to know about this enterprise. They wrote a highly indignant letter to court, in which they even levelled the accusation that the city administration was in league with our men. They had remonstrated that San Thomé could never be captured if the King permitted his own ports to be used for the outfitting of ships for the relief of the beleaguered city.

The Governor was, in truth, quite innocent but he, nevertheless, received a rude reprimand. He was ordered to seize all Frenchmen in the city and send them on to court. The Governor felt himself bound by his honour to effect this capture. He did not wish to achieve his ends by force knowing that there were eight to ten resolute men at the lodge who would certainly put up a stout defence. He waited for an opportunity to take us by surprise. Despite the secrecy with which the orders had been transmitted, some individuals had become aware of them. Malfosse was warned from several quarters to take care as the Governor was planning to seize him. They had even prevented a Frenchman who had wished to go out of the city gates from
doing so. This train of conduct should have convinced Malfosse of the imprudence of exposing himself outside the lodge. He appeared to have totally ignored all these warnings. A Danish captain called Viltein, invited Malfosse to come and join him at a house half a league outside the city where the captain was entertaining a few friends. Malfosse forgot himself, and mounting alone on horseback he went to join the captain. They had been at table for an hour when the company was informed that the Kotwal or Provost had come downstairs and was asking for Malfosse. When Malfosse went to find out what the Kotwal wanted, he was followed by the entire company which had become somewhat warmed up by all the liquor. The Kotwal stated that he had been ordered to take Malfosse to the Governor. Malfosse showed no reluctance to go and wished to mount his horse. Two of the Kotwal’s men stood in his way while the others wanted to seize him. Malfosse drew out his sword. He was supported by three or four of the Danes who also drew out theirs. Some blows were exchanged but Malfosse was overpowered. He was shown no mercy and the blows given to him by pike, sword and staff made his plight a pitiable one. It was in this condition that he was dragged over a distance of more than a league to the house of the Governor. They continued to maltreat him along the way so that by the time he had reached the Governor’s house his condition was quite critical. He died at midnight. A Portuguese Augustinian friar who stayed at Masulipatam was permitted to visit him and take his last confession. Subsequently, the Governor wished to arrest the friar to find out what had been said to him. It was with difficulty that the priest had been able to extricate himself from this predicament.

While Malfosse was being taken away in this manner, the news was relayed to the lodge where the soldiers belonging to the company of cadets who had escaped from the prisons at Chicacole were to be found. Three of them immediately took their arms and went out in search of Malfosse. They met the Kotwal’s men. They came to blows and in the ensuing passage-at-arms one of them was killed and two were injured. The latter repaired to the lodge. The body of Malfosse was also sent here and the burial took place on the following day. Those who saw the state to which the body had been reduced averred that they
had never seen so much disfigurement. There was not a single
spot in the body which was not free of several wounds and
bruises. The remaining number of Frenchmen made up their
minds as to what they were to do knowing that their fate would
not be any different. Taking everything they could with them,
they got on to a boat at dusk and seized a small ketch which
was to be found at the roads. Raising anchor, they had set sail
for Bengal where they had arrived safely. When the news that the
lodge had been abandoned reached the Havildar, he appropri¬
ted everything which was to be found inside it. Dutch malice
did not stop here and there was a further grievous consequence
to this affair. A gentleman from Champagne called Sieur de
Chamasson was to be found at Masulipatam. He had served
for a long time with the mission at Siam and was being sent
back to France with important memoranda and papers. Not
content with having secured the massacre of our men at the
lodge, the Dutch persuaded the Havildar to arrest this man
and confiscate his papers and other effects. Chamasson was
sent to Golconda where he died in the prison amidst poverty
and misery.

On 30 April, we were again told that the Duke of Gingee’s
men were about to attack us. We had by now completed the
transfer of the munitions to the woods.
Plan of San Thome—Courtesy Archives Nationales, Paris
The Capitulation of San Thome
6 September 1674

April 1674

Events at San Thome During the Month of April—No Significant Occurrences

I will now describe events at San Thome during the month of April. On 1 April, all the soldiers and sailors were reviewed at the square. One of them deserted during the night. The officers were asked to go to the treasurer who was instructed to pay them a part of the money which was their due. The captain of the first company refused to accept any payment unless all his arrears were met. His example was followed by the other officers. The treasurer informed the General who summoned the captain before him. De la Haye remonstrated with the captain pointing out his error, the consequences to which it could lead, and above all the scarcity of money which they were facing. The officer refused to listen to reason and was very rude in his answers. This led to his being sent away under arrest to the "Breton".

On 2 April, the sailors who had been responsible for the seizure of the boats at Porto Novo were brought together at the square. Each was given clothes, fresh linen and ten crowns as an interim reward until conditions changed, enabling de la Haye to recompense them in a better manner. A bark flying their colours stopped before the Dutch camp. It set sail again on 3
April and anchored near the two Dutch ships. Some food was brought into the city by the local people. De la Haye had this sold openly in the bazaar. It was hoped that the better prices which would be obtained in this way would encourage these people to bring in additional supplies.

All the officers were given some money. They received it without murmur knowing that nothing more could be done. De la Haye went out to reconnoitre the plain but found nothing. At dusk, two soldiers deserted. A third, who was suspected of harbouring similar intentions and of having colluded with the other two was placed under arrest.

On 4 April, an officer was arrested and sent to the "Breton" as he had been in intelligence with the captain who had refused to accept the money. A small ship was seen far out at sea. It was sailing from the south towards the north. The two Dutch ships lifted anchor to go and reconnoitre it, but aided by favourable winds and currents the small boat was able to slip past.

At the parade which was held on 5 April two assistant adjutants were appointed. The letter in which I had described the activities at Negapatam, the Dutch celebration and the burning of the effigies of the Kings of England and France, were received by de la Haye. De la Haye replied to me. He also wrote to the Governor of Madras but the latter was not overtly perturbed by this incident. The two officers who had been kept under arrest on the "Breton" were released and they disembarked. De la Haye had a talk with them in private on their bad conduct. De la Haye wrote to Pondicherry asking again for food and munitions. He also asked us to write to all the places and collect as much news as possible.

On 6 April, catamarans arrived from Madras bringing in rice, tobacco and fish. The country people also brought in refreshments. We saw a group of 200 cavalry defiling out of the Moorish camp and proceeding towards the south. Twelve peasants with loads of food arrived on 7 April at San Thomé. They were also allowed to sell their stocks in the bazaar.

Five or six of our men got involved in a skirmish with some foragers. This attracted more than 500 of the cavalry and infantry. When they came within range, several discharges of cannon...
were fired at them killing a few. While our troops were being assembled, the enemy withdrew.

On 8 April the garrison was reviewed. On the same day, letters were received from Pondicherry which described the condition there. The 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 April passed by quite tranquilly. They received news by way of Pondicherry of how the captain of the "Bayonnais" and the members of his suite had perished. On the same day letters were written to Surat. These were dispatched by way of Madras.

Except for a large packet of letters written in Dutch found by some of our men, nothing else of much significance occurred on 15, 16 and 17 April. The letters were translated by a writer in the King’s service who was conversant with this language. I have been unable to get any information as to the contents of these letters.

On 18 April a native who had been a prisoner in the hands of the enemy for three months returned to San Thomé. The explanation which he offered for his return was that he had been fortunate enough to escape. When de la Haye interrogated him as to the conditions prevailing in the Dutch camp, the only answer which was obtained was that the Dutch were preparing a large number of ladders to take the fort by escalade. The General questioned the native so skilfully that it soon became quite evident that he had only been sent to intimidate our garrison by spreading this news. On 19 April, letters were received from Pondicherry which contained some details which had come to their knowledge with regard to the prevailing conditions among our men kept prisoner at Batavia, the disposition of the Dutch at this capital city, and some news of Bantam.

Soon after sundown, we observed 200 lighted torches about half a league inland. These were being carried to the Moorish camp. The setting-off of bombs and the firing of cannon and musketry discharges marked the arrival of these men at the camp. The whole affair appeared somewhat strange and it was believed that the enemy had contrived at it to make us believe that they had received reinforcements.

A small ship was perceived in the moonlight out at sea. The Dutch ships set out to reconnoitre the new arrival. We fired a
cannon-ball to signal a warning in case the ship was ours. The boat continued to sail on its route to the north.

On 21 April, letters describing the local situation were received from Pondicherry. These set forth the firmness with which Sher Khan was resisting the threats and blandishments of the Dutch, the attempts being made by the latter to win over the minor Princes of the region, and the news that Admiral Rijklof was fitting out a strong squadron at Ceylon with the intention of leading it to San Thomé.

On 22 April, there was a general review of the garrison and the soldiers were given a loan. Recourse was taken to this expedient from time to time as it was impossible to give the men their regular pay because of shortage of funds. De la Haye, followed by some horsemen, then went out to scout the plain. News was received from Madras that the Dutch and the Moors were circulating the rumour that they intended to attack and escalate the fort. Even though our people were assured that our enemies were ready with more than 1,000 ladders at their camp, they refused to believe this news. Our adversaries had intended to intimidate our men but everything had been prepared to give them a good reception from our side.

On 23 April, letters were received from Pondicherry to which replies were sent on the same day. We were advised to stay on and to try and maintain friendly relations with the petty Princes of the region and, above all, with Sher Khan. De la Haye went out to reconnoitre as he was wont to do almost every day. The fish caught during this period stood the garrison in good stead. There was an ample supply of fish, failing which lard was handed out to the men. The food served at the table of de la Haye was no different from that given to the rest of the garrison.

At dusk on 24 April, several cannon balls were fired at the Moorish camp. More than 1,000 torches which had been brought in from the interior were taken inside their camp. On 25 April, two small ships sailed in from the south and moored close to the Dutch vessels at the roads. One was Danish and the other was a Dutch vessel. The Moors came out of their camp in a body in the afternoon and remained in battle formation the plain for a long time. The garrison remained on guard in case the enemy decided to engage us in any hostile
activity. On 26 April the small Danish ship set sail. It came close to San Thomé and fired a three-gun salute. We returned this with a one-gun salute. The ship then anchored before Madras prior to continuing on its way to Masulipatam.

The crew of the two barks which we had last seized at Porto Novo were at San Thomé. When these men pointed out that they were Christians residents of Tranquebar, they were restored their liberty and even given permission to return. They had preferred to remain at San Thomé fearing that they would be seized on the way by the Moors. With the arrival of the small Danish ship, de la Haye hoped that he would be able to relieve himself of the task of looking after these people by sending them back on this vessel. He asked his secretary to write to the Captain informing the latter of the General’s willingness to allow the men to go back. The Captain was also requested to impart whatever news he happened to know. At nine o’clock in the evening, a sailor was sent with the letter by catamaran to the Danish vessel. The Captain accepted the letter. When he found that it had been written in French, he asked for it to be translated explaining that he did not know this language. As for news, the item which he furnished was that when he had passed by Pondicherry he had learnt that I had been killed. The catamaran returned. The meaning of the letter was explained in Portuguese. It was decided that the crew members would be sent back by chelingue but their departure was put off until the following night. We had learnt from Madras that our people at Masulipatam had been involved in some difficulties with the local people. Baron wrote to the Havildar of Masulipatam on this subject and sent this letter to the Danish captain through the chelingue. On the night of 27-28 April, the chelingue set out but the Danish ship had already set sail. It returned and the men disembarked. On 27 April, we heard forty-three cannon shots, and three rounds of musketry fire from Madras. Later, we learnt that this had been occasioned by the arrival of a present which had been sent by the King of Golconda to the English Governor.¹ The King had also written asking the

¹The present had been ready since 28 February (O.S.). The English had been advised by their agent at Golconda to receive it with much ceremony. Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 102, 106, 110-11.
Governor not to provide us with any assistance.

On 29 April, we again heard twenty-five cannon shots and three salvos of musketry from Madras. This was also connected with the reception of the present. Letters were received from Pondicherry by which de la Haye was apprised of the decision which had been taken to remove our effects into the woods.

On 30 April, the wind began to blow from the north. De la Haye had been entertaining the idea of embarking on the "Breton", attacking the two Dutch ships and then proceeding to Pondicherry to take in food and munitions. The chances of success appeared so remote that he gave up the idea. The wind became stronger in the evening and began to change direction from north north-east to north-east. Two soldiers deserted at dusk.

May 1674

Events at Pondicherry During the Month of May—All Europeans Declare Themselves Against Us

I will now relate what happened to us in Pondicherry during the month of May. When Véron, captain of the frigate, the "Diligente" who was at Porto Novo, heard from us about our fear that we would be attacked by men sent out from Gingee, he came to Pondicherry with fifteen of his men. Following European alignments all their nationals in India had also declared themselves against us. This included the Portuguese who harassed us even in public. We had asked one of the leading Portuguese residents at Porto Novo if he would allow Antoine Cattel to embark on a ship which he was sending to Madras. This man gave a brusque refusal and when Antoine Cattel gave him my letter he declared that the reason for his refusal was Cattel's association with us.

Strong winds from the north and north north-east accompanied by rain continued to blow on 2 and 3 April. We were worried about the safety of the "Breton". On 4 May we heard that a lascar who had been sent to us with letters from San Thomé had been seized by the Moors who had chopped off his head.
On the same day, we received letters from the Nayak of Madura in which he had declared that we would be welcome if we decided to come to his court to start negotiations. We had no money to buy the presents which are essential prerequisites when Indian potentates are being visited for the first time. Nor had we been authorized to make any payment for the help which we wished to obtain from him. These reasons made us decide to put off the visit to some other occasion and we contented ourselves by sending back a polite reply to the Nayak.

THE LOSS OF THE " BRETON" AND THE TWO DUTCH SHIPS AT SAN THOMÉ

On 6 May, there was a rumour that the "Breton" and the two Dutch ships anchored before San Thomé had been sunk during the tempest. The Dutch vessel which had anchored at our roads since the past few months lifted anchor on 7 May and sailed to the south.

The news of the loss of the "Breton" and that of the two Dutch ships was confirmed. The loss of the "Breton" put to an end any plans we could have visualized for sending help to San Thomé by sea. This boat had functioned as a virtual citadel for us at the roads, sheltering and protecting the smaller boats laden with food which we had sent to San Thomé. Her disappearance meant that we could not send any more small vessels for the Dutch would easily capture these with their launches, and if a bark with a cargo were to be run ashore in such a rough sea, everything would certainly be lost.

We usually sent two reports per week to de la Haye in which we described current affairs. Two Danish merchants were passing through Pondicherry on 9 May. They had been involved in the incident pertaining to the late Malfosse and showed us the scars they had received in trying to defend the latter. The two merchants had been at Pulicat when the tempest had arisen.

The effectiveness of the "Breton" in preserving the French position at San Thomé could be largely traced to the ineffective measures taken by the Dutch. The English pointed out that had the Dutch maintained five or six ships and about ten well-armed boats instead of only two vessels, no help could possibly have reached San Thomé by sea. Ibid., p. 99.
sinking their ship to the bottom of the sea. The news of the loss of the "Breton" had been brought to Pulicat during the night. When it had become known, the Fiscal who happened to be there had come to find them. Shouting at the entrance to their bedroom he had told them that everyone at San Thomé had been quite overwhelmed by the loss of this vessel. The Fiscal had even made the two of them get up and spend the entire night with him in drinking to this good news.

We learnt that the two Dutch ships had also been lost. The larger one had sunk out at sea. The Captain along with twenty-five crew members had managed to escape in the long-boat. All the rest of the men had been drowned. The second ship had been grounded ashore one league to the south of San Thomé but the crew had managed to escape. Later, the cannons, the wreckage and some of the tackle had been salvaged. When I come to my description of the events which took place at San Thomé during the month of May, I will give further details about the loss of the "Breton". Many ships had been lost in this tempest which had extended all around India from the Bay of Bengal to the Red Sea.

On 10 May, we received letters from Surat and the Malabar coast. These were somewhat old, the first being dated 8 November while the rest were dated December. They did not contain anything interesting but we informed de la Haye all the same about the receipt of these letters.

Sher Khan's ship which had been detained at Ceylon for quite a long time was released by the Dutch. It had anchored at Cuddalore. The Dutch were doing this as they wished to win over Sher Khan. Nothing very much happened during the days which followed. Reports reached us from various sources that the Duke of Gingee was going to send his troops to drive us out of Pondicherry and make us prisoner. Sher Khan continued to write advising us to retire into the woods. We refused to do so as we were quite convinced that once we had left the aldea

*The Dutch computed their losses at 140 men but Langhorn felt that the number should have been closer to 200. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
we would not be allowed to return. On 22 May, we heard that the Dutch were getting ready at Negapatam to receive Admiral Rijkloff who was expected to arrive there with his squadron.

HOW LACK OF MONEY CAUSED THE FALL OF SAN THOME—DEATH OF THE DIRECTOR CARON

On 20 May, we received news that two Danish ships had arrived. The new governor of Tranquebar was sailing on one of these. Antoine Cattel had been stationed at the court of Sher Khan since the past three weeks. He had been instructed to keep us informed if he came to know of any decisions taken which would affect us adversely. He returned to Pondicherry on 24 May. He told us that the express messenger sent by Sher Khan to Surat had returned. Cattel had brought with him the letters which had been written to us by the merchants of the counters which had been brought back by Sher Khan’s messenger. I was extremely surprised to read in my letter that despite the authorization of Baron, the merchants were refusing to honour the bill of exchange I had drawn on them for the sum of 60,000 livres. They ascribed their inability to give satisfaction to the fact that there were no funds in the treasury. As for the sum of 75,000 livres which had also been drawn by me on the clerk of the treasurer of the navy who had come to Surat on the “Orient” with 200,000 livres from the royal treasury, I was told that this gentleman had left for Bijapur. He was carrying a part of the money in cash with him. He was taking letters of exchange for the remainder of the sum conveying the capital to Golconda with all possible precautions. We were completely crushed by this news. It meant that we could no longer hope to send help to San Thomé as we would not have the money. What disturbed us even more was our fear that Sher Khan would now lose heart about maintaining us on

“Apart from the fact that Pondicherry could be used by the French as a base from which help could be sent to San Thomé, Martin was also reluctant to leave this place as he felt that if for any reason, the French garrison was forced to leave San Thomé, it could always find refuge at Pondicherry. Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 121.

“Adam and Pilavoiné, ibid., loc. cit."
his territory. Moreover, his annoyance at the non-payment of the bills of exchange would be all the greater as he had sent them on at the first instance to his master, the nawab, or Commander-in-Chief of the army of Bijapur. The latter had expedited two horsemen to Surat to receive the two lots of money. The Commander-in-Chief had written, taking Sher Khan severely to task for having involved him in such a fruitless enterprise. In the midst of such bad luck all we could do was to be patient.

We opened the letters which were addressed to de la Haye and Baron. These did not contain anything that was different from what had been written to me with regard to payment of the two letters of exchange. There was also some news of the departure of a squadron from France but this did not appear to be at all certain. The same letters also informed us that the "Jules" on which the Director Caron had embarked, had got wrecked at the entrance to the river at Lisbon which it had been trying to enter. Caron, the Captain of the ship and several members of the crew had perished but the others had managed to save themselves.\(^6\)

The grounds on which the merchants at Surat had refused to honour the letter of exchange for 60,000 livres—namely, that they did not have sufficient funds in the treasury—simply cannot be accepted. At that time the Company enjoyed reasonably good credit and our merchants could have secured the money had they tried. They had not taken the trouble as they were quite convinced that we would not lack any resources once the secretary of the naval treasury had arrived at these coasts. The conduct of the latter was extremely irregular. He had informed de la Haye of his arrival at Surat and had stated that he would remain there until de la Haye sent him instructions as to how he was to forward the money entrusted to his care. It would seem that he should not have left this place until he had received these notifications. Of course, it is also true that despite the condition to which they had been reduced, for the next two months no decision was taken at San Thomé as to how the money was to be transmitted to them. The secretary committed

\(^6\) Vide supra p. 392.
one more error. He had taken his departure from Surat in the month of February. Instead of proceeding directly to Pondicherry with all speed, he had taken his own time to do so. He had initially made for Bijapur and had then tried a number of other routes stopping at each place along the way, so much so, that for a period of six months nothing about his whereabouts was known. All these lapses on both sides were to ultimately lead to the loss of San Thomé. Sher Khan had only been waiting to receive this sum of money to despatch the troops headed by his son to force the raising of the siege of San Thomé. We were to have accompanied this force. As a result of the abortive outcome of the affair, he had disbanded the cavalry which he had been maintaining for this purpose since the past three months. We made an extract of the more important news items from our letters and sent this on to de la Haye and Baron.

We also wrote to Sher Khan begging him not to blame our General for the non-payment of the bills of exchange. The fault could be squarely attributed to subordinate officials who were refusing to carry out orders issued to them by their superiors. Moreover, the secretary who was carrying the money from the royal exchequer had left for these parts and we were expecting him to arrive any day. Sher Khan replied that the only reason why he was discomfited by the whole unfortunate episode was because it would give grounds for his master, the Commander-in-Chief at Bijapur, to assume that Sher Khan’s judgement was not to be trusted, which could not but prove detrimental to his interests. He was even more sorry about the fact that he was now deprived of an opportunity to give us the help which had been requested of him by our General. He would always protect us but it would be well if for the time being we agreed to withdraw to the woods. He had heard that we were working on the repair of the bark which we had with us at Pondicherry, intending later to take the risk of sending her with a cargo to San Thomé. Sher Khan appealed to us to relinquish this plan as the Dutch had threatened to break with him completely if he permitted us to set the bark out to sea. We again sent Antoine Chevreuil took his departure from Surat on 9 February. Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 119.
Cattel to Sker Khan to confirm what we had written to him. Cattel returned on 28 May. Sher Khan had reiterated his friendly feelings towards us but had warned us to give up all thought of despatching the bark.

We wrote to Surat and the Malabar coast sending these letters by way of Goa. We received letter written by the King of Cochin to de la Haye. This Prince invited de la Haye to come and join him and declared that he had troops in readiness for the attack of San Thomé.

Nothing very much happened at Pondicherry during the remaining part of the month. We continued to keep de la Haye informed about current developments.

SAN THOME' DURING THE MONTH OF MAY—FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE LOSS OF THE "BRETON"

I will now take up the events which had taken place at San Thomé during the same month. On 1 May, the wind was blowing very forcefully. The two Dutch ships raised anchor. The flagship made for the open sea while the other one sailed along the coast towards the south. Within a short time both were lost to view. The wind increased in turbulence and it was possible to see that the top mast and yards of the "Breton" had been brought down. At eleven o'clock it was noticed that the main mast was broken. The bowsprit and the foremast collapsed soon after. The gale strengthened and was now accompanied by rain. Visibility was reduced and the "Breton" was soon lost to sight. De la Haye knew that the ship could not ride the tempest much longer. He tried to send a catamaran to the vessel with a letter to the officers directing them to run the ship aground to save the crew, but it was impossible for the catamaran to reach the ship. The country sailors tried several times but were thrown back to the shore on their slender wooden craft. The sea was so turgid that it struck terror into even the

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*Dutch records confirm the damage inflicted by this storm. *D.R.*, 22, p. 255. The storm was said to have cost the Dutch a total of eight ships. However, both the English and François Martin cite the loss of only two ships. *B.N., N.A.*, 9375(8); Fawcett, *E.F.*, II. p. 109.*
most intrepid hearts. The waves swept right up to the base of the city walls. De la Haye was on the beach when the news was brought to him that the "Breton" had been cast ashore at a distance of a quarter league from the river. He went to the spot accompanied by some sailors and country folk to try and help those among the crew who had been able to reach the shore.

It was a sad sight to watch how the grounded ship was disintegrating piece by piece. Several of the crew who had managed to save themselves were found. Others who had been drained of all their energy were rescued. Of the 120 members on board, sixty four had escaped. Sieur de la Picaudière, the lieutenant commander of the ship, was found in a half-moribund condition. He was carried back and fortunately revived. Many good men were lost among whom could be counted the second lieutenant Sieur de Chancé, a man of merit who had a good record of service. Several others perished including some of the officers who had been sent to the ship under arrest. All the dead bodies which were found were buried by the sea-shore and in the evening, de la Haye returned with the group to the city. The beach continued to be inspected and on 2 May, this was done two hours before dawn, the dead men being buried as before. Among the corpses thrown up by the sea were those of a few Dutchmen belonging to the ship which had foundered in the open sea. These were interred in the same manner as ours had been. After this, a high mass was held at the Cathedral and prayers were offered for the repose of the dead. The gale continued to rage right through the night. The wind proved so variable that it veered right round the compass, being accompanied by heavy downpours. In the morning, the wind began to fall and the weather cleared. Some of the debris of the "Breton" was found deposited close to San Thomé and this was now salvaged. The shipwrecked sailors were provided with clothing.

On 4 May, de la Haye inspected the beach to a distance of three quarters of a league to the south. The corpses of three of our men and five of the Dutch were found and given burial. Fifty to sixty Dutch soldiers supported by a squadron of Moorish cavalry proceeded to the south. They appeared to be
going to the spot where one of their ships had been grounded. De la Haye advanced towards the Moorish camp at the head of some troops. After raising an alarm, he retreated with his men. They brought ashore such of the fragments of the "Breton" as could be found.

At dawn, a group of sailors were sent to the spot where the "Breton" had been grounded so that more of the debris could be collected. These men were supported by a corps of soldiers. While they were at work, a careful watch was maintained from the city to prevent any sudden attack on them by the enemy.

There was a general review of the garrison. De la Haye bade each person to perform his duty. A letter addressed to a corporal of the guard which had been found on the road was brought to de la Haye. The letter had in fact been written to the General and was full of subversive sentiments. The only thing which de la Haye could do was to threaten to hang those found to be writing such nonsense.

The same day reports were received that some more dead bodies had been washed ashore at Madras. One of these was identified as that of Chevalier de Maisonneuve. It was known at Madras that the Chevalier had served as the Captain of the "Breton". When this news had been conveyed to the English Governor, he had the body brought and buried with full military honours to the sound of cannon fire. The body of the chaplin was also found. This was taken away by the Capuchin priests. Deltor who was at Madras, went along the length of the beach and had all the corpses which were found buried irrespective of whether they were of Dutch or French origin. De la Haye believed that the reason why the English Governor had given such an honourable burial to the body taken to be that of the Chevalier de Maisonneuve was because the Governor had wished to make use of this occasion to project the claim that he hold us in high regard despite his entertainment of Dutchmen at his table each day.  

Langhorn's relations with the Dutch were not as close as was imagined by the French. Despite the earlier agreement between Rijkloff and Langhorn there were numerous instances of the Dutch harassment of the English. 

Vide Fawcett, E.F., II, pp. 103-17; also infra, n. 15.
be at San Thomé when the storm had arisen, wrote a polite letter of thanks to the English Governor.

APPEALS FOR HELP ARE SENT TO PONDICHERRY—
SKIRMISHES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS BEFORE SAN THOME'—
DESERTIONS CONTINUE

Letters were received from Pondicherry on the situation which was brewing there. De la Haye replied on the same day. We were asked to despatch the "Diligente" and the bark loaded with rice to San Thomé as the Dutch vessels were no longer there. De la Haye was, however, unaware of the difficulties which made it impossible for us to despatch either one of these two ships. The Havildar of Porto Novo continued in his refusal to allow the least degree of movement to the frigate which remained at its moorings. At the same time Sher Khan had instructed his officials at Pondicherry not to allow us to set the bark out to sea.

On 7 May, de la Haye ordered the carpenters to put a bark on the beach into a proper condition. He then sent some people to bring in the wreckage of the "Breton", and while this was being done, he posted 100 men commanded by able officers in the woods on the opposite bank of the river to support these men at work and prevent any attempt made to cut them off.

At ten o'clock in the morning 300-400 Moorish cavalry accompanied by 200 infantry came out of their camp and marched towards the south. It was believed that they would attack our men. The garrison was ordered to assemble at the square and march out whenever this became necessary. The enemy stopped near Luz Church where several palm trees were cut down. Our cannon from the city could reach out to this distance and twelve to fifteen well-aimed volleys were fired at them. This caused the enemy to retreat. A small ship had sailed in from the south and had dropped anchor out at large. It was the same vessel which had been at Pondicherry. On 9 May, one soldier deserted.

On 10 May, a Dutch ship sailed in from the north and anchored in their roads. The following day, it lifted anchor and moored to the south of San Thomé out of the reach of our
cannon. On 13 May, the small ship which was carrying the debris of the Dutch vessel which had foundered to the south of San Thomé, came and anchored to the north of the city. During the night three soldiers deserted from Fort Sans Peur. On 14 May, twenty more soldiers deserted. Three of our horsemen entered into a fray with enemy foragers. After killing three of the latter, they had pushed forward raising an alarm until they had reached the enemy camp. They had then returned. Every day de la Haye went out to reconnoitre the plain accompanied by some horsemen. On 16 May, the Moors numbering 100 horse and 300-400 infantry came out of their camp and repulsed the men who had been sent out to cut grass for the horses and other animals inside the fort. These men were very hard pressed until they had reached within musket shot distance of the fort. De la Haye had marched out with some troops to lend them support. The skirmish lasted for a long time while the cannon from the fort kept up a brisk fire. After losing several men the enemy was forced to retreat. Our men also returned to the fort. Three of our men were wounded in this action.

On 17 May, letters were received from Pondicherry on the conditions there. Replies were sent on the same day. The order to try every possible means to send help to San Thomé was repeated and we were enjoined to seek out the Nayak of Madura and try and gain his support. Apart from the fact that the Nayak was not powerful enough to provide us help on the scale desired by us, de la Haye had still to learn how impossible it was to win the support of the minor Princes without holding out the inducement of monetary gain. The only person in whom we could place any hope was Sher Khan, but even in his case it was necessary to raise the means to enable him to provide us with the levies.

On 19 May, de la Haye again exhorted the soldiers and sailors assembled at the square to remain faithful to the King. He assured them that the reinforcements by which the fort would be saved would be reaching them soon. Letters from Pondicherry were again received. In the replies which were sent, the requests for assistance which had been made in all the previous letters, were again repeated. And yet our condition at
Pondicherry did not permit us to satisfy them any better than before. De la Haye, feeling this to be a necessary exercise, went out on a reconnaissance trip to assess if any enterprise could be undertaken against the enemy. In the meanwhile the desertion among our men continued. On 21 May, three soldiers deserted at seven o'clock in the evening.

The feast of the Holy Eucharist was celebrated with great solemnity on 24 May. On 26 May, letters were received from Pondicherry. De la Haye replied in his usual vein ordering that every effort was to be made to send help speedily. He added that it had been heard that the Capuchin fathers at Madras were to go with Deltor to Pondicherry. He warned us not to divulge any information to the priests nor allow ourselves to be guided by their advice.

At four o'clock in the afternoon on 28 May, a servant of de la Haye deserted to the enemy. During the night six more followed suit. Among these, three had earlier crossed over to us from the Dutch. On 29 May, the garrison was assembled at the square. De la Haye again exhorted each one to do his duty, assuring the men that help was at hand. He tried by every means to put a stop to this leaning towards desertion.

On 30 May, two Dutch ships anchored before the city. The officers in the garrison frequently quarrelled among themselves. De la Haye often found it very difficult to reconcile them and encountered the same difficulty in trying to reactivate those who repeatedly slackened in their duty. It was not that there was any paucity of brave men at the fort, but many were young and carried on conversations before the men without sufficient forethought. It was to this practice that the desertions could be largely attributed.

June 1674

PONDICHERRY IN THE MONTH OF JUNE—FRANÇOIS MARTIN VISITS SHER KHAN

I will now return to the events which befell us at Pondicherry during the month of June. I decided to go and meet Sher Khan and try and secure his agreement to our lading the bark which we had with us at Pondicherry with food and sending it on to
San Thomé. It was clear that even if we succeeded in persuading Sher Khan, it was unlikely that we would be able to actually make use of such an opportunity. We had no reason to believe that the outcome of the voyage would be successful, in view of which we would only be exposing our men to unnecessary risk in deciding to despatch them on the vessel. At the same time, we were convinced that we should leave no stone unturned to send help to San Thomé, not holding ourselves responsible for what transpired subsequent to our efforts. I knew that Sher Khan did not welcome our visits. Such intercourse was distasteful to the Dutch with whom Sher Khan had to keep on good terms. We had to bear this in mind in conducting our relations with this noble which made me write asking him if he felt it would be appropriate on my part to meet him while I was on my way to Porto Novo. He replied saying that I would be welcome to do so. I left on the night of 3 June, arriving on the following day at Cuddalore where Sher Khan happened to be at the time. I do not know if the whole episode had been contrived or not, but right through the morning which I spent in waiting on him I found that he was always to be found surrounded by a large number of people which precluded any possibility of my being able to discuss subjects of a confidential nature with him. The manner adopted by Sher Khan was also quite distant. I concluded that even if I persisted in staying, I would be unable to achieve anything and hence decided to withdraw. Prior to taking my leave, I told Sher Khan I was on my way to Porto Novo and would have the honour of seeing him again during my return trip. His only response was to say succinctly that I could do so. A Brahmin who served us, later told me in confidence that pressure from many different sources was being brought to bear on Sher Khan to make him give us up. Sher Khan was weighing all these considerations very carefully so that he could make up his mind. The journey to Porto Novo had only been a pretext and I arrived there at six o’clock in the morning of 5 June. No sooner had I come when I was met by a man sent by the Governor to inform me that it was his master’s wish that I should withdraw. I replied that while I had no desire to prolong my stay I would not leave until I had finished my business. The Havildar repea-
ted his order and I sent back the same reply. However, I thought it better not to be too obdurate about extending my stay, fearing that the official might take recourse to violence. They had lost all sense of restraint in their dealings with us and there were only two places where our presence was tolerated, at Porto Novo and at Pondicherry. I left at five o'clock in the evening. The bar was completely dry at Porto Novo. I learnt that Admiral Rijkloff was expected at Negapatam.

I arrived at six o'clock in the morning at Cuddalore. I went to the residence of Sher Khan to ask for a private audience which he granted to me. I set out immediately accompanied by Antoine Cattel who was to act as interpreter. I began by trying to explain the basic reasons which had led the Surat merchants to refuse to accept the bills of exchange issued by us. I followed this up by pointing out that when the clerk of the treasurer of the marine, whose presence we were expecting any day, finally arrived, Sher Khan would know that we were telling him the truth. Although Sher Khan had pretended to accept my statements, my arguments had not really convinced him. I then asked for permission to embark our craft at Pondicherry. His reply was that he could not allow us to do so for this would certainly draw out the Dutch against him, in which case the former would undoubtedly seize the two ships which Sher Khan had out at sea in accordance with their threats. Moreover, his master, the Commander-in-Chief at Bijapur, had written to him in very strong terms not only for the refuge which was being accorded to us at Pondicherry but even more so on account of the illusory grounds on which Sher Khan had engaged the Commander-in-Chief into sending cavaliers to Surat to obtain payment of the bills of exchange. The threat had even been held out to Sher Khan that he would be deprived of his government. Under these circumstances, we should be grateful that our position at Pondicherry was receiving support. Sher Khan added further that he had still to ask the Dutch for two passports, one for a vessel belonging to the Commander-in-Chief which the latter wished to send to Malacca and the other for one of this own ships. The Dutch would be certain to refuse if we made the slightest attempt to put our bark out to sea. Sher Khan asked us to consider the matter as closed and advised us
not to make any further attempts to despatch this vessel. I took up this point with vigour arguing that it was an injustice on his part to prevent us from deploying something that was rightfully ours to the best use we considered and that we might well make him feel the consequences of his action at a later date. He was shocked by the terms I had used and retorted forcibly. We ended, however, on a more conciliatory note but could obtain no concession with regard to the bark. Sher Khan acknowledged how painful such a decision was for him but declared that he would be lost before his master if he accorded us permission. I withdrew, being unable to secure anything more.

After leaving Sher Khan, I received letters from Porto Novo which informed me that Admiral Rijkloff had arrived at Negapatam with thirteen ships. I thereupon left for Pondicherry where I arrived at nine o’clock at night. De Lespinay told me that it would now be very difficult to find messengers to send to San Thomé. Eight days ago, the Moors had seized and beheaded two of these men who had been despatched by us. We did not allow this to deter us and asked for some to be searched out. One of the lascars came forward. We wrote letters to de la Haye and Baron which we sent through this man.

On 8 June, we were informed that two paros were being charged at Cuddalore with a cargo of rice for Ceylon. We immediately sent some sailors to Porto Novo and wrote to the captain of the “Diligente” asking him to lose no occasion to capture the paros if the opportunity occurred. This would again lead to an action from which we could not draw any benefit, but our orders being what they were, we did not allow ourselves to be deflected by any such considerations.

A Brahmin whom I had left posted near Sher Khan informed me that within five days he would bring us permission to embark our craft. We had the perspicuity to comprehend that Sher Khan was awaiting the arrival of the Dutch vessels on the coast before granting us permission, knowing full well that it would then be quite useless to us. Even if we were able to load the craft, it would be impossible for it to secure a successful passage to San Thomé.
On 9 June, we received letters written by de la Haye in reply to ours in which we had informed him that the bills of exchange which we had drawn on Surat had been returned without payment. This had upset him and he was extremely annoyed with the clerk, Chevreuil. Five Dutch ships put in at the Devenapatnam roads on 10 June. Their merchandise was unloaded and there was a loud noise of cannon fire. We informed de la Haye about the arrival of these ships.

The French are Threatened by the Dutch and by the Raja of Gingee

On 11 June, we learnt that the commander of the Dutch ships at Devenapatnam had been to see Sher Khan and had asked for his permission to attack us at Pondicherry. Upon receiving a refusal, the Admiral had threatened quite openly that he would disembark at Pondicherry and expel us from there. Sher Khan took offence at these threats and replied in a similar vein. He was willing to concede complete freedom of action on the high seas but he would not tolerate any hostile action emanating from either one of the two parties on territory which belonged to him. We had also approached Sher Khan for permission to chase the Dutch out of their counter at Devenapatnam, but just as he had refused us permission then, he would do the same now in order to keep the scales evenly balanced between the two nations. The commanding officer of the five vessels had to withdraw having received little satisfaction.

Four Dutch ships appeared on the horizon. They were sailing along the coast and were coming in from the south. As the Dutch declaration of their intention to set some men ashore had been intimated to us, we joined the fifteen Frenchmen with us to a group of about 400 lascars, posting these men along the shores to prevent the disembarkation of our enemies. When the Dutch ships neared the river mouth they hove to rest. Several launches now proceeded to the flagship. We believed that the long-boats had been sent to fetch the requirements for their disembarkation and we were well-prepared to receive them. The

10Rajah in the text.
launches returned to the ships which now reduced their sails and came as close as possible to the coast. We were waiting for them but no sooner had they reached a position running parallel to ours then they hoisted their sails and made for the open sea, proceeding towards the north.

We received letters from de la Haye and Baron in which we were asked to send messengers back to the Surat counter. The merchants there had been strictly enjoined honour the bill of exchange amounting to 40,000 rupees. We sent Antoine Cattel to Sher Khan with the necessary instructions so that the runners could be despatched.

On 12 June, we learnt that Gingee forces comprising fifty horsemen and 300 infantry were on their way to attack us. Even the point up to which they had advanced was marked out for us. We moved beyond the aldea to a distance of two muskets shots to reconnoitre this position. We saw the enemy. They emerged from a grove of palm trees and advanced to attack us. We felt that it was not for us to advance and seek out our adversaries, particularly as they had not made any open declaration against us, but at the same time we should be prepared to fight them off if they decided to attack us on home territory. We retired inside the settlement and posted our men along the roads which led to our mansion. The troops advanced towards us to a distance of 400 feet giving us every reason to anticipate an attack. Just when we thought hostilities were about to commence, the commanding officer sent a message of civility assuring us that his intentions were not inimical in the least. After this, he turned to follow a route across the plains. We learnt later that he had been sent to attack a poligar who had retired into the woods at a distance of two hours from Pondicherry. The commander performed this duty losing several men in the exploit but succeeding in capturing the poligar who was brought prisoner to Gingee. On 13 June, we were warned to maintain guard as the men from Gingee wished to harm us.

On 14 June, we sent Sher Khan a bill of exchange for the

11 The earlier order for the sum of Rs. 60,000 had been addressed to Chevreuil. The present one was sent directly to Adam and Pilavoine. Kaeppelin, op. cit., p. 122.
sum of Rs. 20,000 drawn on a merchant at Golconda to whom Chevreuil had handed over a portion of the money which had been entrusted to his care. On 16 June, we again sent express messengers to Surat. The runners were carrying duplicate copies of our letters to ensure that the bills of exchange which we were drawing out for a second time, would receive due payment.

We heard that a paros and a sampan were being charged with rice at Cuddalore. These vessels were then to be sent to Ceylon. Under the prevailing circumstances, it seemed unlikely that we would be able to draw any advantage from this situation. Sieur Cloche arrived at Pondicherry. He had come from France in the service of the Company and had embarked on the squadron at Surat. At the time of the departure of de la Haye from Trincomallee, he had been left behind as treasurer there. After the fall of Trincomallee, he had gone with the other officers to Batavia. After a considerable period spent in imprisonment he had succeeded in escaping and had made his way to Surat. There he had found Chevreuil who was on the point of taking his departure for these parts. He had accompanied Chevreuil to Bijapur from where he had been sent to us to inform us of the arrival of Chevreuil at this capital. In the letter which Chevreuil wrote to us he noted that he was awaiting the orders of de la Haye. It had taken Cloche twenty-seven days to come to us from Bijapur. A Dutchman had recognized him while he was on his way at Gingee. The former had tried very hard to secure his arrest but had failed. We informed de la Haye immediately about the arrival of Cloche. We also wrote to the Captain of the frigate, the "Diligente" about the vessels which were being laded with rice at Cuddalore but this was quite a futile step.

Antoine Cattel returned from Sher Khan. The latter was about to send troops for our protection at Pondicherry. We sent express messengers to San Thomé with duplicate copies of the letters which we had written the most recently. Within a short time we learnt that two lascars who had been bringing us letters from de la Haye had been seized by the Moors who had cut off their heads. On 21 June, 100 horse and 200 in-
fantry belonging to Sher Khan arrived at Pondicherry. They encamped outside the city.

From letters which we received from Gingee on 22 June, we learnt that the Capuchin priests at Madras accompanied by Deltor, a Protestant officer, and two soldiers had arrived there. The three latter had escaped from Batavia to Bantam. An English ship on which they had embarked at Bantam had brought them to Bombay, and from Bombay they had proceeded to Madras on board a Portuguese vessel. They asked us to provide them with the means to come to Pondicherry from Gingee. We sent them twenty lascars and also three horses which we had with us for their use.

We received letters from Negapatam. Admiral Rijkloff was still there. It was noted that he was waiting for some ships to come in from Ceylon. After these had arrived he intended to add them to the vessels he already had with him at Nagapatam and then lead the entire fleet to San Thome. The Frenchmen belonging to the Company hooker who had been brought prisoner to Negapatam were being pressed to participate in this expedition.

We learnt that when the Admiral had landed, he had been met by the Governor of the place who had been awaiting him on the sea shore with some soldiers drawn up in the form of guards. After looking at them closely, the Admiral had recognized the latter to be Frenchmen. He had berated the Governor for utilizing the services of such men who, he had vehemently declared, deserved not only to be chased out of India but whose very traces needed to be obliterated.

On 23 June, a Dutch flotilla passed by Pondicherry sailing towards the north. We were beginning to run out of money and sent Antoine Cattel to Sher Khan to ask for an advance. He

\[1^{12}\] Duarte, *op. cit.*, p. 76, places the number of infantry at 100.

\[1^{13}\] Bantam retained its independence until 1684. After this date, the Dutch began to increasingly extend their control over the affairs of this state from their base at Batavia, the name which had been conferred by the Dutch in 1621 on the town previously known as Djakarta. Vlekke, *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 211; Picard, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

\[1^{14}\] Langhorn was under the mistaken notion that Martin was himself present at Gingee at this time. Fawcett, *E.F. II*, p. 110.
returned on 26 June saying that Sher Khan had promised to advance us 100 crowns.

On 27 June, we heard that fifty Dutch soldiers and 100 topas had been landed at Sadras, fifteen leagues to the north of Pondicherry. These men supported by 200 lascars were to be sent to harass us. We had our agents everywhere to keep us informed of any action planned against us.

THE ENGLISH GOVERNOR EXPELS ALL FRENCHMEN FROM MADRAS

After levelling down several houses close to the fort, Rijkloff had raised new fortifications at this site. On 29 June, the Capuchin priests, the Reverend Fathers Ephraim and Zenon along with Deltor, Sieur Villedor, the Protestant officer, and two other Frenchmen arrived at Pondicherry. Deltor reported that the Moors had threatened not to allow anything to be brought into Madras unless the Governor agreed to expel all Frenchmen from the city. After having deferred this action several times, the Governor had finally informed Deltor that the latter would have to withdraw. Deltor had protested, marshalling every possible argument, basing his reasoning on the fact that the two countries in Europe were linked to each other by ties of friendship. The Governor would be dealing a blow at public confidence by expelling them in this manner. Moreover, since Deltor had been sent by our General he could not leave until he was ordered to do so by his superior. All these arguments proved of no avail. Deltor and the Capuchin priests had to leave for the same reasons. The only concession

10Langhorn had no desire to expel the two Capuchin fathers, and had even remonstrated that the two gentlemen were more than seventy years of age. His hands were, however, forced by the Dutch who wished to use this as a tool to embroil the English with the French. The Dutch had persuaded Chinnapalli Mirza that Langhorn’s tolerance of the presence of the French friars along with some other Frenchmen at Madras indicated his support for the French at San Thomé. Chinnapalli Mirza prevented the entry of provisions into Madras and threatened to attack the city unless Langhorn expelled the French inmates. Langhorn did not wish to hazard a war with Golconda on this issue and gave in despite his reservations. Ibid., pp. 106, 107.
which they were able to obtain was that they were provided with passports both by the Moors and the Dutch by which they were allowed to travel through Golconda territory free of any impediment. This was a very unworthy action on the part of the English Governor at Madras. His injustice was all the greater as the Dutch drew a considerable quantity of supplies for their camp from Madras and each day several Dutchmen could be found in the city. In contrast to this, his behaviour towards us showed that he had thrown all sense of constraint to the winds. Since the past four or five months we had not been allowed to bring anything from Madras. The English had even opposed Deltor’s attempt to send twelve to fifteen pounds of butter in the hollow of a bamboo pole to San Thomé. It would be difficult to exaggerate the harshness shown to us by the members of the Madras Council ever since the arrival of the Dutch.

An Englishman who was passing through Pondicherry had declared to us that significant changes had occurred in Europe, the Dutch having reconquered a portion of the territories which had been lost by them earlier. We did not know what to believe as we had not received any news from Europe.

Towards the end of June, Sher Khan informed us that the reply to the duplicate copies of the first set of letters which we had written to Surat had arrived. We sent Antoine Cattel to fetch our packets.

**Events at San Thomé During the Month of June—The Impossibility of Securing Any Reinforcements**

I will now return to events at San Thomé during the month of June. A rumour swept through the garrison that Sieur Fertier, who had earlier served as chaplain on board one of the ships

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16 These castigations were somewhat unfair. Langhorn had tried to secure the passage of these Frenchmen to San Thomé but had failed. He had then obtained passports to enable the group to travel through the territories of Bijapur, and had sent them in palanquins to Gingee having provided them with coolies and a contingent of fifty peons. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

17 Fawcett confirms that no provisions were sent to San Thomé from Madras since the month of February 1674. *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 103.
of the squadron and who was now officiating as the vicar of San Thomé, was contemplating flight along with the treasurer. On hearing the rumour, the two men came to de la Haye to clear themselves. These rumours were spread by malicious men who, in order to save themselves, would have liked the entire garrison to desert.

On 5 June, de la Haye had the garrison assembled, at the square and spoke to the officers and men about the opinions which they were privately circulating among themselves as to the critical conditions within the fort. He told the officers that if any among them wished to assume the mantle of leadership, and believed that he was better equipped to do so than the General, de la Haye would willingly give up his position and take service with a halberd under the new commander. He urged the soldiers that it was their duty to see the expedition through to the end and tried by every means to instil a sense of duty into the men. He was, however, dealing with hardened souls who wished to avoid all suffering and whose only aim was that of seeking refuge in flight. Letters were again received from Pondicherry which mentioned the expedition of the bills of exchange at Surat. De la Haye and Baron were cut to the quick by this lapse. They could also foresee that the loss of San Thomé could well be caused by a retrograde step such as this. They laid all the blame on the clerk of the treasurer of the navy, and, in truth, the untoward circumstances in which we now found ourselves could be largely attributed to the departure of this official from Surat without orders. They immediately replied to our letters. We were asked to impress

18Chevreuil had been directed to hand over the money personally to de la Haye from whom he would have to get the receipt in the proper form. After his arrival in India, the King’s emissary had chosen to stay at Suvali rather than shift to Surat. Had he been better acquainted with Indian banking practices he would have known that the transmission of this sum of money to de la Haye through the existing channels open to the business community would not have constituted any problem. Chevreuil refused to make any enquiries and remained in Suvali from September 1673 to February 1674 as though he were expecting de la Haye to leave San Thomé and journey personally to Suvali to take the money. It would have been a simple matter for the two French merchants at the Surat counter, Adam and Pilavoine, to have arranged for the transmission of this sum,
on Sher Khan how much this outcome had upset de la Haye and that our General could not be held accountable for it in any way. We were also asked to request Sher Khan on behalf of the General to send his men to Golconda as it was believed that the clerk had made his way there. Sher Khan’s men could ask the clerk to hand over the money which the latter had brought with him. Sher Khan would then realize that we had not engaged him in a completely fruitless enterprise. These letters were sent forthwith by express messengers.

On 4 June, de la Haye came out being accompanied by a few of the detachments from the garrison. He went across the plain until he had reached quite close to the Moorish camp. He stayed there for four hours ready for battle but as none of the enemy came out he withdrew. The Moors are very afraid of engaging in direct conflict with us. On the night of 4-5 June, a Portuguese soldier appointed to sentry duty deserted.

On 6 June, three gallows could be discerned on the plain. The bodies of three men had been left hanging on them. These men had been among the six who had deserted on the night of 28-29 May. They had earlier served the Dutch from whom they had defected to us. They had resisted stubbornly when they had first been placed under arrest, killing an officer and three soldiers during the struggle.

On 7 June, letters were received from Pondicherry. Local affairs were reported, but greater emphasis was placed on the impossibility of sending any help. De la Haye accompanied by some horsemen scouted the plain on 8 June. The Dutch raised a new battery on the sea-shore on this day.

On 9 June, they fired at three Dutch launches which were sailing along the shore. These launches had been sent to keep but Chevreuil had maintained a strict distance from them. When Abbé Carré had arrived at Surat on 28 December 1673, he had remonstrated to Chevreuil that if the latter wished to hand over the money to de la Haye in person, it was imperative to journey to the Carnatic. After his long procrastination, when Chevreuil ultimately did arrive at a decision, the timing could not have been worse chosen as far as French fortunes at San Thomé were concerned Carré, III, pp. 763, 771-73, 775-77; Kaeppelin, op. cit., pp. 112-18.

19 Vide supra p. 624.
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a watch and intercept all catamarans going into or proceeding out from San Thomé. Letters which had been written four days ago were received from Madras. These stated that the Moors were threatening not to allow anything to enter the city unless all Frenchmen were handed over to them.

On the night of 9-10 June, three of the Portuguese deserted. De la Haye again exhorted the garrison not to flag in the performance of its duty. The vicar also delivered a sermon on this subject which was attended by some of the soldiers. All these remonstrances bore little fruit.

Our men went out on patrol on 10 and 11 June to repulse an advance corps of the enemy which was preventing the runners from entering the city. On 13 June four vessels were sighted at sea. The two Dutch ships moored before San Thomé sailed out to reconnoitre these, but returned to take up a position quite close to the city on finding that the former were also Dutch. De la Haye subjected these vessels to a heavy cannonade from the batteries facing the sea. The Dutch must have experienced some discomfit from our firing as they lifted anchor and moored further out at sea.

The Dutch Summon us to give up San Thomé—De la Haye is Determined to Resist—Desertions Continue

For several days, it had been raining continuously. Our men were very poorly clothed and each one was now provided with a jerkin made from the cloth which had been brought in from France. After carrying out his usual scrutiny, de la Haye went to the seashore. The carpenters were making a bark here and de la Haye had come to urge them to hasten on with the work. A little later a trumpeteer arrived. He had been sent by the Dutch commander to summon the French to surrender the fort. He was sent back with the assurance that the response would be communicated to his commander. As soon as it became apparent that the trumpeteer had returned to the camp, four cannon balls were fired from the fort. The enemy understood the message and reposted with the same number of cannon balls. The trumpeteer spoke very good French. He told
the major who was escorting him out of the fort that he was sorry to say so, but he felt that we would not be able to hold out much longer. Whereas the Dutch were expecting their Admiral to come to them with a strong squadron they were well aware that we could not expect any reinforcements. Indeed, it is not possible to take some of the leading officers at the garrison sufficiently to task. Despite all their bravery, they had contributed a great deal towards breaking the spirit of the soldiers and sailors by pointing out that it was very improbable that reinforcements would be received from Europe.

On 14 June, a company of sailors was sent out to cut wood and bring it to the city as it was in short supply. Three of the Dutch ships lifted anchor on 15 June and sailed towards the north. The rains continued. They doled out some wine among the members of the garrison and, in short, no attempt was spared to encourage the soldiers to show some fortitude. We heard that the Capuchin friars had been forced to leave Madras along with Deltor and the other French residents.

At sunrise on 16 June, we were informed that out of the body of twelve sailors who had been stationed at Fort Sans Peur, nine had deserted. De la Haye had immediately set out on horseback to try and catch some of these men. The attempt was quite fruitless as the men had already reached the Dutch. After his return to the fort, de la Haye continued his exhortations to the remaining number of men but they were in no mood to listen to him. Twenty-five men under the command of a good officer were now placed at the same fort. It was also decided that from now onwards, a group of mounted guards would be sent outside the city each night to keep watch for deserters. De la Haye had formed quite a good opinion of those who were in the service of the Company at San Thomé. He distributed these men at night among the bastions from which the largest number of desertions took place ordering them to keep watch.

On 19 June, de la Haye had the garrison assembled at the square and addressed them for a full half an hour. His words were such that had the men been at all amenable to reason or possessed the slightest love of honour they could not but have
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been moved by him. As it was, they were quite deaf to his exhortations.

On the same day a small Dutch hooker sailed in from the south and moored before their camp. At nightfall, two guardsmen were sent out on patrol duty on horseback and an officer with twenty men was sent to fort Sans Peur for the same purpose. It is not possible to give sufficient praise to the company of guards. Those men who were all gentlemen or deserved to be so, always remained steadfast to their duty and were never discouraged no matter how much suffering they had to put up with. One can, indeed, say that among all the members of the garrison, their performance was the best. At eleven o’clock at night, the enemy advanced to Luz Church. From here, a contingent came up within 100 feet of the fort. After firing one musketry discharge, it retired.

On the morning of 19 June, de la Haye went out to reconnoitre as usual. When he returned, which was at ten o’clock, he was informed that four soldiers had deserted from Bastion Saint Louis. He set out on horseback to try and catch some of these wretches, but the men had already reached the enemy camp. Upon his return, he found the garrison waiting under arms. De la Haye continued his exhortations following which he said to them that all those who wished to leave could do so quite openly as he would not be found placing any hindrances in their way. Under the present circumstances this was the maximum that de la Haye could do, but as I have already pointed out the men were completely impervious to all appeals. In the evening detachments, were sent out to keep watch.

On 21 June, fresh bread and lard were distributed among the sailors. These men were reasonably well-fed and each had in addition a weekly allowance of fifteen sous. They had, of course, no way to spend this money as not a single item was coming in from outside. In the morning, the Dutch ship had raised anchor and in moving out into the open sea, it had come quite close to the city. A few cannon-balls were fired at it from the fort and from the way in which the vessel was being navigated, it was possible to gauge that the firing had left its mark.

On 22 June, a letter which had been found outside was
brought to de la Haye. It had been sent from the Dutch camp
and was replete with promises held out to all those who would
agree to desert. A large Dutch ship which had dropped anchor
the previous evening now set sail towards the north. It was
reported that some of the sailors were dissatisfied with the
bread given to them. According to the offer held out to them
at the parade grounds on 23 June, they were to be allowed to
opt for either bread or rice according to their choice. The men
who had lost all sense of restraint did not even bother to
answer, and yet it was necessary to put up with their insolence.
At dusk, the feast of Saint Joan was celebrated. There was a
discharge from all the cannon facing the enemy, while the men
outside the city also fired their muskets several times. Bonfires
were lit and rockets were sent up into the air.

On 24 June, the garrison was reviewed. We heard the sound
of cannon being fired at sea. A little later a hooker appeared.
It was recognized as being the boat which had been com-
manded by Captain Chantrelle which the Dutch had seized at
Ceylon. All the Dutch ships at the roads were decked out.
White flags had been hoisted above their own. There was great
jubilation within their camp. They fired fifty to sixty cannon-
balls and three rounds of musketry. Their ships responded, firing
all their guns. Fertier, the vicar of San Thome, preached an
extremely moving sermon and called on each man to perform
his duty. He declared that the enemy were indulging in all
these manifestations only because they wished to keep their
men amused and also hoped to intimidate us thereby.

A ship had taken advantage of the darkness of the night to
come and anchor close to the fort. A few shots fired from the
fort on 25 June were sufficient to force it out to the open sea.
They put out a bark at sea and then beached it near fort Sans
Peur. In the evening, three enemy launches appeared close to the
breakers but the men appeared apprehensive about disembarka-
tion. De la Haye went there and forced them to withdraw.

De la Haye was able to cover much more than he usually
did when he went out to reconnoitre on 26 June. A Dutch
vessel came within half cannon shot range of the fort. The
maltreatment to which she exposed herself forced her to put out
to sea. The boat which had come in on the 24 June set sail
towards the north. At ten o’clock at night, four sailors deserted. On 27 June, information was received that some of the sailors had planned to desert while high mass was being celebrated on the following Sunday. The culprits, seven in number, were summoned and placed under arrest. Each was interrogated separately. Their answers revealed that the information given about them had been correct. Four of the most culpable among them were imprisoned, while the remaining there were detained. Of the twelve sailors stationed at Fort Sans Peur nine had deserted on 16 June. The remaining three also now deserted. They crossed the river which was close by in a small boat which they had there. When de la Haye was informed about this, he mounted on horseback and taking some cavaliers with him, he crossed the river but was unable to encounter anyone. He rode until he had left the city one league behind him. He came upon a Moorish outpost which he attacked. After this de la Haye returned to the city. All attempts at preventing desertion were now given up.

On 28 June, de la Haye again asked those who wished to leave the city to come out openly. This had little effect for at dusk two soldiers and the valets of two officers slipped away. Two Dutch flutes sailed in from the north and anchored near the other ships. On the morning of 29 June, de la Haye was informed that during the night, a number of lighted torches had been seen from Fort Sans Peur between Luz Church and San Thomé. A deserter by the name of Guillaume Marie had came right up to the base of Fort Sans Peur with bread, a bottle of arrack, tobacco and a sealed letter which he had left there. He had tried to entice the men to desert by holding out the promises made by the Dutch. The men at Fort Sans Peur said that it had been a very dark night and they had not shot the miserable renegade because they were unable to see him. The letter was opened and read out. It repeated the promises that had been made verbally by the deserter.

**De la Haye Still Hopeful of Receiving Help from Sher Khan**

When de la Haye had returned as usual from his inspection on 30 June, he received letters from Pondicherry. By these he
was informed of the arrival of Cloche at Pondicherry and of the news brought about by the latter about Chevreuil. Chevreuil was stated to be at Bijapur where he was awaiting orders authorizing him to draw on the sum which he had forwarded to Golconda. They were asking for interest at the rate of 5½ per cent at the latter place to make payment at Bijapur. De la Haye also learnt that packets from court had arrived at Surat. Father Ambrose, the Capuchin friar, had taken delivery of the letters. He had then handed them over to Father Timothy. Father Timothy was a Franciscan friar who had served as chaplain on board one of the ships in the squadron of de la Haye. He had deserted his post and had made his way to Surat. He was now on his route to Goa with the packets intending to proceed from there to Madras. De la Haye replied to our letters advising us to negotiate with Sher Khan as to the terms on which we could draw on our funds available at Golconda. Our most important assignment was, however, to try and induce Sher Khan to advance the credit which would enable us to obtain the reinforcements which were so essential. The General had noted that in view of our position and the desertions which were taking place at the garrison, even 500 horse and 2,000 infantry would suffice. As soon as it became known that these men were on the march, de la Haye would come to join them with a corps of Frenchmen. The urgency of receiving help in view of the plight to which they had been reduced was repeated several times.

During the night several lighted torches could be seen on the small bridge between the city and the Dutch camp. A deserter then came very close to the fort and fired a shot with his musket. The bullet hit the sentry box at Bastion le Soliel. The sentry returned the fire and the wretch fell back and rejoined the other members of his group. The two horsemen on patrol for the night joined together and attacked this band. They forced the latter to withdraw to the other side of the bridge by aiming a few musket and pistol shots at them. Our two guards had wished to advance

Father Timothy had served as chaplain on the "Breton". Carré, who draws a somewhat unflattering picture of Father Ambrose, was extremely critical of the choice which was made by the Capuchin priest at Surat as in his opinion Chevreuil should have been asked to deliver the packets. Carré, III, p. 785.
further but had to stop and withdraw as a result of a discharge of several shots fired at them by a group of the enemy which had been posted in reserve on the other side.

July 1674

**Pondicherry During the Month of July—All Attempts to Secure Help from Sher Khan are Fruitless**

I will now describe the events which took place in Pondicherry during the month of July. An express messenger we had sent to San Thomé came back to us on 20 June. He returned all the letters saying he had been unable to reach his destination as all paths leading to it had been closed. Antoine Cattel whom we had sent to Sher Khan towards the end of June returned on 2 July. He brought the packets which Sher Khan had received from Surat. These contained the replies to the letter we had written in duplicate with regard to the payment of the bills of exchange. The letters did not contain anything noteworthy and merely confirmed that Chevreuil had left Surat. It was also noted that because of lack of funds, the two merchants whom we had there had been unable to meet the bill which I had drawn upon them on the orders of Baran.

The tempest of 1 May had been widespread in this part of India. Several ships and smaller vessels had been sunk off the coast of Malabar, while the ships sailing to Persia were forced to return to Surat even though they had sailed within view of Muscat.

Upon hearing that the Nayak of Madura had invaded his territory with an army, Sher Khan had left Cuddalore. He ordered the cavalry commander whom he kept at Pondicherry to come and join him. This officer left on the morning of 3 July. We wrote to San Thomé about the letters we had received from Surat.

A Brahmin was sent to us by Raghunath Teva, son of Raghunath Setupati who at one time had been in command

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11 *Ramoudounaïque* in the text.
12 *Tripachtssenapanaique* in the text.
over the Carnatic\textsuperscript{23}. The former had sent a message that if we supplied him with the money, he would raise a force of 4,000 lascars and some cavalry and secure the raising of the siege at San Thomé with these troops. Our shortage of funds precluded any negotiations, and if we had possessed the money, it would

\textsuperscript{23}The decline of the Vijayanagar empire in the Carnatic had made itself felt in several different ways. It had facilitated the expansion of the empires of the Qutb Shah and the Adil Shah in this region. Krishna Deva Raya had established three centres of subordinate governments at Gingee, Madura and Tanjore. The Governors called Nayaks soon established themselves as independent rulers. During the Muslim invasions, Gingee, Madura and Tanjore were brought under the dominion Bijapur. Gingee was directly annexed while Madura and Tanjore enjoyed a subordinate status. The authority of Bijapur over Madura and Tanjore does not appear to have been very strong for Martin seems to have been quite ignorant of the fact that the independence of these two entities was circumscribed in any way.

In the absence of any strong centralized authority, the minor potentates in the Carnatic were in a continual state of friction. Martin’s statements are of interest for the light they throw on the confused state of political alignments during this period.

A brief recapitulation of events at Ramnad, Madura and Tanjore is necessary both for understanding the background to the history of the period, as also for grasping the identity of the persons mentioned by Martin in his text.

In 1635, Kuttan Setupati, the ruler of Ramnad died. He was succeeded by his son Sadaika Teva II, also known as Dalavay Setupati. Dalavay Setupati’s position was contested by his younger brother, popularly called Tambi, who appealed for the help of Tirumala Kayak of Madura. With the help of Tirumala Nayak, Tambi was successful, Dalavay Setupati being taken prisoner in 1637.

Tambi’s authority was now questioned by two new contestants—Raghunath Teva and Narayan Teva—both nephews of Dalavay Setupati. Tambi again appealed to Tirumala Nayak but the latter felt that Tambi’s position was too precarious to warrant help. The ruler of Madura preferred to restore the liberty of Sadaika Teva II, a prisoner since the late war and set him on the throne of the Maravas. The Dalavay was successful in controlling his subjects but was assassinated in 1645 by Tambi. Tirumala Nayak now divided the country into three parts ruled by Raghunath Teva, his brother Tanakka Teva and Tambi respectively. Upon the deaths of Tanakka and Tambi, Raghunath Teva unified the entire country under his rule. The overlordship of Tirumala Nayak over Ramnad was undisputed and Raghunath Setupati became one of his staunchest supporters. As a result of services rendered to his overlord, Tirumala gave
have been preferable to negotiate with Sher Khan rather than with these Indian nobles.

We wrote to San Thomé on 6 July. The express messenger returned on 7 July confessing that he had not dared to undertake the journey. We sent another messenger on the same day. Our Brahmin left to join Sher Khan. We were short of money and our man was going to ask Sher Khan again for a loan. A Dutch ship sailed along the coast and then proceeded towards the north.

On 8 July we wrote letters to our counters along the Malabar coast giving him the title of Tirumala Setupati. The name Tripachissenapanaique given to him by Martin is probably a corruption of this title. Tirumala Setupati died in 1674 and was succeeded by his nephew Raja Surya. The part played by Raja Surya in the internal affairs of another feudatory of Madura, Tanjore, which had recently been brought under the thraldom of Madura, cost Raja Surya his throne.

Chokkanatha Nayak of Madura had installed his foster brother Alagiri as Governor of Tanjore. A scion of the late ruling dynasty in Tanjore, Chengmaladas was conspiring to win back his throne. Raja Surya was suspected of supporting Chengmaladas and was thrown into prison by Chokkanatha Nayak. Raja Surya's reign lasted only for six months. After a brief interregnum, an illegitimate son of the late Setupati was installed. He was also named Raghunath Teva but was more popularly known as Kilavan.

There is some discrepancy with regard to the date of the accession of Kilavan and the testimony of Martin is useful in this context. Nelson makes two contradictory statements—that Kilavan reigned for twenty-five years, *op. cit.*, p. 244, and that he reigned for thirty-six years, *op. cit.*, p. 206. According to Aiyar, *op. cit.*, p. 225, Kilavan ruled for thirty-six years from 1674 to 1710. Martin corroborates the fact that in 1674 a son and not a nephew of Tirumala Setupati was at the helm. If Tirumala Setupati died in January 1674 and Raja Surya's reign lasted for six months, either Kilavan must have acquired power very recently or the date of the death of Tirumala Setupati would have to be pushed back by a few months and taken to have occurred towards the close of 1673.

**Doubtless, it was Martin's intention here to distinguish between Sher Khan who represented the superior authority of the Adil Shah, and the petty local potentate whose power could not be compared in any way to that of Bijapur.**
coast. We also sent, letters to Shivaji Raja. The messengers whom we had sent to Tranquebar and Negapatam to gather news returned as they had been unable to cross the river Cole-roon. The Madura troops had expanded all over this region and were also ravaging the territory of Sher Khan. On 10 July, we received a bill for 100 crowns from Sher Khan. He lent us as little as possible as he had been having doubts about our creditworthiness ever since the messengers had returned from Surat.

A big catamaran sailed past Pondicherry towards the north on 10 July. This was followed by another on 11 July. We came to know later that these boats were bringing orders sent by Rijkloff to the commander of the Dutch forces before San Thomé. A French soldier who had been kept prisoner at Negapatam succeeded in escaping to Tranquebar. We received letters which he had written to us from there. He informed us that Rijkloff was waiting for some ships to come in from Ceylon after which he would sail to San Thomé. On 12 July, we wrote to San Thomé and also sent express messengers to Tranquebar. On 14 July, some Dutch vessels stopped at the Devenapatnam roads and took on a large quantity of refreshments.

On 17 July, we received a message from the Captain of the "Diligente". He said he had been told that there was a plan to set fire to his ship. We could find no evidence in support of this contention and the "Diligente" in its present condition was quite incapable of arousing the least apprehension. I sent two men to Madura. I was making a last attempt with the Nayak. I wrote asking him to send us some soldiers belonging to the region. It was extremely unlikely that he would listen to us, but I did not wish to leave any avenue unexplored.

Baron had been in secret correspondence with Shivaji since January 1672 and claimed that Shivaji had at the time been very amiably inclined towards the French Company. B.N., N.A., 9352 (43).

Tranquebar and Negapatam both lay within the territories of the Nayak of Tanjore. The hostilities referred to by Martin relate to the war between Vijayaraghava of Tanjore and Chokkanatha of Madura. Vide Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 163-65. Aiyar, ibid., loc. cit., dates the war to 1673. Martin infers that hostilities started in 1674, thus corroborating the data given by Nelson, op. cit., p. 191.
The Dutch ships set sail from the roads at Devenapatnam on 17 July. They sailed south up to Porto Novo, when they reversed their direction and sailed to the north. They passed by Pondicherry between eleven o'clock and midnight. We wrote to San Thomé on 22 July. On 23 July, Sher Khan warned us to be on our guard. All the petty Princes were up in arms, each trying to expand at the cost of the other. There was a state of complete confusion. Sometimes, two or three of them would come together to forge an alliance only to break it the very next day if it suited them to do so.

On 28 July, we received letters from Sieur Boureau, the chief of the Company counter at Rajapur. He told us that many ships, including the one on which the Franciscan friar, Father Timothy, had embarked at Goa, had been sunk off the Malabar coast during the tempest of 1 May. Father Timothy had been bringing the letters addressed to de la Haye from court which had been entrusted to him by Father Ambrose. It was said that when this ship had foundered to the south of Goa, all the men including Father Timothy had managed to escape from the vessel. However, Father Timothy had returned to the ship to retrieve the packet and this attempt had cost him his life. We also received letters from the chief of our counter at Bantam. Several Frenchmen who had escaped from the prisons in Batavia had come to Bantam. Our Chief was greatly embarrassed by the quarrels which frequently broke out among our men. In a duel which had ensued from one of these, a gentleman who had served as captain of the guards to de la Haye had been killed by a Captain of a hooker.

On 28 July, we sent express messengers to Surat, the Malabar coast and the Bijapur court. On 29 July, two more Dutch ships passed by Pondicherry sailing towards the south. On 30 July, we wrote to San Thomé.

San Thomé during the month of July—Subterfuges Practiced to Prevent and Instigate Desertion.

I will now describe events at San Thomé during the month of July. On 1 July, letters from Pondicherry were received. The attempts made by the Dutch to obtain the permission of Sher
Khan to secure our eviction from Pondicherry were described as also an account of other affairs. An express messenger who had been despatched to Pondicherry the previous day returned saying that he had been unable to make any progress as all the paths had been sealed. He declared, however, that he would hazard the passage during the night. A note was added to the letters which had already been written indicating that our letters from Pondicherry had been received. They continued to ask for help and enjoined us to ask Sher Khan to send the 500 horsemen and 2,000 lascars about which they had already written to us. We heard from Madras that several wounded men had been brought to Pulicat but it was not known from where they had come.

De la Haye continued to go out on patrol. Desertions were now taking place in broad daylight and to prevent this, de la Haye posted a contingent of the best lascars with four cadets outside the fort. On 2 July, the Dutch hooker tacked very close to the fort but the cannon fire directed at it from here forced it into the open sea. On 4 July, a cadet called Lapresle, acting on the orders of de la Haye, went to the Dutch camp on pretence of being a deserter. He was to try and find out what was happening in the camp and entice some of our deserters to come close to the fort on the pretext of undertaking some enterprise. An attempt would be made to seize these men of whom an example would be made.

On 5 July, a party of the Moors who had posted themselves near Luz Church were repulsed. Two sailors deserted from Fort d’Orgeret a little before dawn on 6 July. Lapresle, who had reached the Dutch camp, managed to draw Guillaume Marie into a scheme to come and seize the horse belonging to d’Orgeret, the commanding officer of the fort of the same name. Guillaume Marie was a very well-known deserter. He had come close to the walls on several occasions at night and had tried to entice our men into emulating his example. Lapresle marched at the head followed by Guillaume Marie and twenty enemy lascars. According to the plan, at fifty feet from the fort, Lapresle was to detach himself and ride forward. If he found any difficulty in taking the horse he was to cry out and the others would come to his support. Everything was done accord-
ing to the plan and our men were also appropriately stationed. Lapresle cried out but the others being prudent, feared an ambush and began to withdraw. Our men gave chase but since the others had a lead and made very good use of their legs, they were able to reach the Dutch camp. Lapresle then entered the fort. He described the bad treatment given to deserters by the Dutch. This had no effect on the ill-intentioned men.

By letters which were received from Pondicherry on 7 July, it was learnt that the Capuchin friars of Madras, Deltor and the other Frenchmen had arrived there. Other items of news were also mentioned. Replies were sent on the same day. The essentials remained the same as in the previous correspondence. We were to try and secure help by any means possible. And yet, the chances of success in this field remained very small in the absence of money. One of the four cadets posted outside the fort to check desertion, himself went over to the enemy on the night of 7-8 July.

The three Dutch ships at the roads were joined by another which dropped anchor close to them on 9 July. Only the guards who went on their rounds outside were now left to keep a watch over deserters. In the past eight days, the rate of desertion had somewhat decreased. The Dutch sent in a young boy of ten into the fort. He was ostensibly to seek employment with us at San Thomé but in reality he was to keep track of everything that happened. He was interrogated and was ingenuous enough to reveal his plans. He was led close to the Dutch camp, given a sound thrashing and then allowed to go.

De la Haye continued to go out and reconnoitre. On 14 July letters were again written to Pondicherry on the usual subject of procuring help. On 15 July, letters from Pondicherry were received. These described the responses which had been obtained from Surat to the duplicate letter which had been sent there with regard to the payment of the bills of exchange. Sher Khan had been greatly upset by the rejection of these bills. This had made this noble disband the troops which he had been maintaining since the past several months for the relief of San Thomé. Although this news brought fresh disappointment to de la Haye, he ordered the firing of a cannon ball from Bastion Dauphin as though it were some kind of signal. He did this to divert the
men as he used every means to foster the hope among them that reinforcements were expected.

Two guardsmen who had spent the night outside the fort saw two grass cutters at work in the morning. They gave chase and were imprudent enough to follow their victims across to the other side of the small bridge separating the Dutch position from ours. They found themselves drawn into an ambush and the enemy charged. The horse of one of the guards was wounded on the neck by a musket ball and the rider received a bullet injury on his knee. Both men then returned to the fort.

Eight barks escorted by a small Dutch ship sailed in from the north and anchored before their camp. The ship set sail again a little later and continued on its route to the south. One of the barks in the roads had tacked sufficiently close to us to be within the range of our batteries. We opened fire and forced the bark to withdraw to the open sea. Some wood was cut and brought inside the fort on 17 July as we were running short of this.

ARRIVAL OF A PORTION OF THE DUTCH SQUADRON

On the morning of 21 July, eight enemy launches were seen moored close to the breakers. A few well-aimed cannon shots forced them to withdraw. In the afternoon, twelve Dutch ships put in. One of these ships was sporting the Admiral's colours surmounted by a pennant. Two others were flying those of the Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral. The Dutch flagship at the roads accorded the newly arrived vessel a thirty-three gun salute the other three following suit in accordance with their rank. Some cartridge bags on board one of these ships caught fire and the flames soon spread right up to the top of the ship. But for the prompt help given, this vessel would have been lost. They also fired a salute with all their guns from the Dutch fort at Triplicane. A fifteen-gun salute was fired from the ship belonging to the Admiral leading this squadron of twelve vessels, following which his flag was lowered. This made our people assume that Admiral Rijkloff was not present with the fleet.

Some of the enemy soldiers came at the night to the south of the fort and fired a few musket shots. They lit a large fire near
a church belonging to the Jesuits outside the city. The Admiral’s ship hoisted the flag of Council on 22 July. The officers of the other ships all went by launch to the Admiral’s boat and then returned to their own ships. The flotilla then anchored in a semi-circle before San Thomé out of the reach of our cannon. De la Haye found it very difficult to revive the spirits of our men which had sunk to a very low point as a result of food scarcity and the presence of the enemy.

A sailor deserted by way of the bastion of Porte Royale on 23 July. It was felt that another sailor on duty as sentry at a position which was very close by had done nothing to prevent this incident. The rope by which the first sailor had descended had got broken. It was believed that had this not happened the second sailor would also have deserted. The latter was imprisoned so that further information could be obtained from him. Another sailor was apprehended by his companions in the same action. This man had already advanced a considerable distance towards the enemy when he was seized. Upon interrogation he revealed that he had decided to go over to the enemy because two sailors whose intention to desert he had exposed had threatened him. He had intended to kill one of the two sailors, his major enemy, and then throw himself among the Dutch. He was imprisoned pending further investigations. De la Haye was then informed that several of the senior officers had also decided to desert. I later came to know that this included fifteen of the leading officers who were to have been followed by an equivalent number of sailors. They had planned to lower themselves from one of the bastion walls during the night. They had intended to seize a boat by the seashore close to Fort Sans Peur, put out to sea and sail away towards the north. Such an enterprise would entail many difficulties. Despite this, I was told that after a discussion it was decided that it was worth engaging in this action. However, these men changed their minds. The only one who was singled out for attention was the treasurer of the navy who was kept under observation. De la Haye now removed from the residence of the treasurer all the possessions of the defunct officers which had been lodged there. The most valuable among these items was the silver table service of the late de Turel who had served as leader of the squadron.
On 24 July, they looked into the affair of the deserters. De la Haye continued to exhort the garrison to keep patience. On 25 July, all the Dutch ships hoisted their colours. Launches were then sent out from the Admiral’s boat. With the arrival of these launches before Triplicane, a volley was fired by the entire battery there. It was assumed that the commander of the squadron was coming ashore.

There was a sitting of the courtmartial on 26 July to try the sailor who had been caught while deserting on 23 July. The case was presented by the adjutant and since the accused had been caught in the act, he was condemned to be shot. The sentence was executed. The priest who had attended on the criminal during his last moments, used the opportunity later to exhort the garrison to patience.

Letters were received from Pondicherry which described how impossible it was to procure any help. The only person from whom any succour could be expected was Sher Khan, but this nobleman would do nothing without money. Moreover, Sher Khan was also preoccupied by the war with Madura, the Nayak having invaded his territories. The General was also informed about other affairs. De la Haye replied to these letters immediately and continued to ask for help. He took us to task for not having won over the Nayak of Madura as it was believed that we could have obtained some help from him. In truth, among all the Hindu rulers, none was as little capable of helping us as he. Moreover, we were still lacking in money which was the most essential requisite if we wished to achieve any success.

The express messenger who was being sent with the letters to Pondicherry could only leave on the evening of 27 July. Two more Dutch ships anchored at the roads on 28 July. Sixteen of their ships were of a relatively large size and there was one small hooker.

Some of the officers who had been placed under arrest were released on 29 July. The Dutch lit several bonfires in their camp and fired numerous volleys. These were answered from the ships in a resounding manner.

On 30 July, two more Dutch ships sailed up from the south and anchored amidst the squadron. Once more, the flag of Council was hoisted. All the officers attended the meeting follo-
wing which the Vice-Admiral and the Rear-Admiral hoisted a blue flag. One of the ships tacked into the open and then returned to anchor close to the other ship.

On 31 July, letters were received from Pondicherry describing the unhappy turn events had taken there. De la Haye replied on the same day, virtually duplicating all that he had earlier written with regard to the necessity for obtaining help.

August 1674

PONDICHERY DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST—NO POSSIBILITY OF RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM ANY OF THE LOCAL PRINCES

I will now return to events in Pondicherry during the month of August. On 1 August, we received letters from de la Haye in which he described the scarcity at San Thomé and reiterated the necessity of sending help. We were helpless but wrote nevertheless to the Captain of the frigate, the “Diligente” asking him if there was any possibility of procuring barks. De Lespinay and myself were determined to take advantage of the first opportunity which presented itself. Deltor left for Porto Novo to borrow some money carrying some letters of recommendation from a merchant at Madras with him. We had received a point-blank refusal from Sher Khan who had not yet got over the rejection of the bills of exchange.

On 2 August, we again received letters from San Thomé on the necessity of sending help. On 3 August, we replied saying it was impossible for us to undertake any action. We had a long discussion with the descendant of one of the ancient ruling dynasties of the Carnatic. He proposed a scheme by which

Sriranga III, the last King of the Vijayanagar dynasty ascended the throne in 1642. His position became increasingly untenable. Mysore and Madura broke away from the Empire at a time when Bijapur and Golconda began their incursions into the south. By 1653, Sriranga was a virtual fugitive and had even appealed to the Mughal Emperor, Shah Jahan for help. After 1665, Sriranga III accepted the protection of Sivappa Nayak at Ikkeri by whom he was given the districts of Velur, Hassan and Sakkareppattana. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar is of the opinion that after the year 1675, Sriranga III ceased to be a factor of any importance in the politics of the region. It is possible that the protagonist mentioned by Martin may have been Sriranga III. Vide S. Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 21, 24, 133-34, n. The English records, however, contain a letter dated 16
reinforcements could be brought to San Thomé but money would be required for the raising of the levies.

On 4 August, we received letters from Flacourt who was on the Malabar coast. He had forwarded our letters to the King of Cochin and to the senior Prince at Calicut. These noblemen wanted de la Haye to cross over to their coasts promising to take to arms against the Dutch if he did so. The fact that we had hoped to use these princes to advance our interests showed how little we knew them at this time. Later, we became only too aware that their sole aim had been to use us to advance their own interests. We had put ourselves to considerable expenditure on their account without having even been able to secure the least degree of assistance from them.

These letters also confirmed the news of the death of the Franciscan friar, Father Timothy, and that of the loss of the packets from court. Ever since the Arabs of Muscat had reconquered the fort of Muscat from the King of Portugal, they had been at a state of war with the Portuguese. They had descended near Bassein and had looted the entire coastal area here. All the subjects of the Portuguese King were attacked.28

On 5 August, the man related to the ancient line of Kings in the Carnatic came to meet us again. He asked us for the means to raise 1000 Rajputs29 soldiers renowned for their valour among the Hindus of these quarters. He would arm these men with pikes and gather together 3000-4000 musketeers. He promised to secure the raising of the siege of San Thomé with these troops. He offered to hand over his wife and children to us in December 1672 in which it is stated that Sriranga III, having died recently, has been succeeded by a nephew. E.R.S. p. 232. Srinivasachari states that on the death of Sriranga III, which took place either in 1674 or 1675, he was succeeded by a member of his family called Kodandarama J.I.H., 1931, p. 100.

28Muscat had been retaken by the Arabs in January 1650. Martin does not appear to have been aware of the part played by the English in these Arab-Portuguese hostilities. The cession of Bombay to the English in 1665 had not pleased the Portuguese at Goa and the relations between the two powers were not very good. The Portuguese complained at the encouragement given by the English to the Arabs in their depredations. Danvers, op. cit., II, pp. 298, 346, 361.

29Rajas in the text.
hostage. Even if we had been inclined to accept this proposal, we would not have been able to do so since we could not advance the funds necessary for raising the levies.

On 8 August, Deltor returned from Porto Novo. He brought us 500 pagodas. We sent express messengers to San Thomé informing them about the unfortunate state of our affairs.

**THE MISSION OF DUPLESSIS IN BENGAL—CONCESSIONS GRANTED BY THE VICEROY**

On 9 August, we received letters from Sieur Duplessis, a gentleman from Brittany, who had taken up residence in Bengal. He informed us that he had visited Dacca, the seat of the court of Shaista Khan, the Mughal Viceroy of this extensive territory. Duplessis had presented a letter signed by the Governor of Balasore, and leading local merchants with regard to the seizure by the Dutch of the royal French ship the "Flamand" from its anchorage at the Balasore roads. The officials had guaranteed the safety of the ship basing their assurances on the agreement which had been arrived at with the Dutch. According to the terms of the firman by which the Dutch had been allowed to establish their counters within the kingdom they had agreed not to attack any vessels moored at the ports even if these happened to be enemy ships. Shaista Khan had pledged that he would force the Dutch to give back our ship. Duplessis also obtained firmans or licences by which the Company was to be allowed to establish counters in the cities of commercial importance within his kingdom. If this affair had been followed up, the Dutch would have had to pay dearly for their seizure of the "Flamand", but nothing was done and when it was decided to take action, the opportune moment had passed.

We heard that a Danish ship had brought out a new Governor for Tranquebar. On 10 August we wrote him a letter of courtesy asking for the latest news of Europe. We received letters from de la Haye. He continued to ask for help. We sent an agent to Cuddalore to explore the possibility of undertaking an enterprise.

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*Chastecam in the text. Shaista Khan was the Governor of Bengal between 1664-1677 and again from 1680-1683.

*Malik Qasim. Vide Bowry, op. cit., p. 52.
against the barks which take on loads of rice here. We did this despite our knowledge that even if we succeeded in capturing these barks, it would be impossible to send them to San Thomé. We received letters from San Thomé which described the sad straits to which they had been reduced.

Our envoy returned from Cuddalore with the news that three barks fully laden with rice were due to leave within three days. We tried to persuade the sailors at Pondicherry to make an attempt on these barks offering to place ourselves at their head. We could not get even a single one of them to agree. Indeed, having run the risk, we would be unable to draw any advantage from it. All the same, we wrote to the captain of the “Diligente” asking him if his men were possessed of greater resolution than ours at Pondicherry.

On 13 August, Chevreuil, the clerk of the treasurer of the navy, arrived at Pondicherry. We described the critical condition of San Thomé and the urgency of sending immediate help there. I then asked him for the payment of the bill of exchange which I had been authorized to draw on him. We protested when he refused but he justified himself saying that according to the orders which he had received from court, he was to be personally responsible for making disbursements from the sum with which he had been charged.

The men we had sent to the Nayak of Madura returned. Instead of offering us help, it was the Nayak who was now asking us to assist him with some ships. If we provided him with this help, he declared that he would chase away the Dutch from Nagapattam. It was for this purpose that the Nayak had extended us all civilities.

On 14 August, we informed de la Haye of the arrival of Chevreuil at Pondicherry, of his refusal to pay the bill of exchange, and of our protests at this action. We also notified the General about the return of our envoys from Madura and of the unlikelihood of our being able to obtain any help from that quarter.

**THE FRENCH AT PORTO NOVO ARE THREATENED WITH EXPULSION**

The Captain of the “Diligente” wrote advising me that a perso-
nal visit by me would be opportune as I could then persuade the men to undertake some project if the opportunity presented itself.

On 15 August, I left for Porto Novo. Just as I was about to mount my horse, two Augustinian friars who had been on the same ship as the Franciscan friar, Father Timothy, arrived. They confirmed that Father Timothy had initially saved himself from the shipwreck and had even managed to reach the shore. On remembering the packet which he had left behind, he had turned back and had been drowned in trying to get back to the ship.

During the four days which I spent at Porto Novo, two barks laden with rice for Ceylon put in at the roads. I proposed to the sailors that with myself and Veron, the Captain of the “Diligente” at their head, we should take action but made it quite clear to them that their participation would be quite voluntary. Not one of them would agree and all of them loudly rejected my scheme. As my presence was not serving any purpose, I returned to Pondicherry where I arrived on 20 August. On the same day six Dutch ships passed by sailing towards the north.

The Captain of the “Diligente” informed us that the Governor of Porto Novo wished to make him leave his lodgings. The Dutch were refusing to grant a passport to a ship belonging to the Commander-in-Chief of Bijapur which the Governor was preparing for despatch to Atjeh unless all Frenchmen were chased out of Porto Novo. I replied to the Captain and also wrote to the Havildar.

We wrote to San Thomé on 21 August. Ten Dutch ships passed by Pondicherry on 22 August sailing towards the south. On 23 August, we wrote to Surat and Rajapur. On 24 August, we heard that the Nayak of Madura had sent a man to Sher Khan to find out who we were. Sher Khan had described us as men belonging to a powerful and warlike nation who had been holding out against the enemy for two years at San Thomé. Anyone extending help to us could count on winning glory and acquiring some advantage. The Nayak, however, took no further steps as he was at the time engaged in hostilities against Ekkoji,²²
a local Hindu prince who, having attacked Tanjore, the capital of the province of this name, was to conquer it after a few months. On 26 August, the Captain of the “Diligente” informed us that he had been forced to leave his quarters and was now lodged in a ramshackle hut belonging to a topas. Everything was against us at Porto Novo.

The Dutch were refusing to grant passports to any of the merchants at Porto Novo for the ships they wished to put out to sea unless all French residents were evicted from the city. It was for this reason, we were told, that the Governor was quite insistent that all Frenchmen should leave. After a great deal of argument, the Captain of the “Diligente” had been obliged to run his launch aground. The Governor had also posted a corps of guards at the sand bar to check all boats which were proceeding outwards.

On 30 August, a Brahmin in our service came to inform us that the money-changer at Golconda to whom Chevreuil had entrusted a portion of the King’s money, had refused to cash our bill of exchange until the original bills drawn on him from Surat in the possession of Chevreuil had been handed over to him. We seemed to meet with nothing but bad luck on all sides. On 31 August three Dutch ships appeared sailing towards the south.

SAN THOME’ IN AUGUST—SITUATION IS DESPERATE—REDUCTION OF RATIONS

I will now describe events in San Thomé during the month of August. On 2 August, eleven ships flying full colours set out

**San Thome’ in August—Situation is Desperate—Reduction of Rations**

I will now describe events in San Thomé during the month of August. On 2 August, eleven ships flying full colours set out
from San Thomé roads proceeding towards the south. The wind was contrary and after tacking several times in the open, they returned in the evening and anchored within sight. On 3 August two more enemy ships joined the eleven which had set out the previous day. These ships now sailed in convoy leaving behind four vessels at San Thomé.

De la Haye wrote to Pondicherry asking for the immediate despatch of help as they could not hold out any longer. Any risk was worth taking if a bark loaded with rice could be sent. At San Thomé also, they would willingly risk everything if only they received even slight reinforcements of troops and if a body of lascars could be despatched to them.

On 4 August, men were sent out to cut down wood which was becoming scarce at the garrison. As our men were withdrawing, fifty enemy horsemen and about 200 of their foot appeared. De la Haye gathered together some men to form a corps and advanced towards them. The skirmish lasted through a part of the day. The enemy received some reinforcements from their camp and skirted the fort a little too closely. They soon had reason to regret this action as the cannon which was aimed at them from the fort carried away some of their number. Our men returned to the city at dusk. We had only one Portuguese who received an injury on his hand but the Moors had lost some of their men. De la Haye continued to go out on his scouting missions to find out if it was possible to deal any blows to the enemy. On 5 August, he reached within musket shot distance of the Moorish camp. No one came out. Letters from Pondicherry describing the current situation were received.

A Dutch ship came and moored close to the vessel belonging to the officer in command of the four ships which had remained at the roads. In the evening, the thirteen enemy ships which had left on 2 and 3 August hove into sight and anchored in the open sea. They had been unable to proceed south because of the contrary winds.

On 6 August, letters were again received from Pondicherry. These described their difficulties and declared that in view of all their troubles it appeared unlikely that they would be able to send any help. De la Haye was not deterred and replied on the same day repeating his order that we were to take any risk
provided we could send some assistance, for they were at their last extremity at San Thomé.

We could still see the Dutch ships tacking in their attempts to sail towards the south. When it was learnt, that the Governor of Madras had received letters from Europe, de la Haye wrote asking that he should also be informed about the news.

On 7 August, the Dutch repeated their manoeuvres and then anchored as before. It was now the season when ships from Europe normally arrived. It looked as though the Dutch were intending to keep this position until the ships from Europe, both English and French, had come in.

Munitions were distributed to the garrison and the men were ordered to get ready and assemble at the square. This was for the participation in a sortie on which de la Haye decided to engage at dusk. A heavy downpour of rain made him postpone this project. The Dutch ships continued the same manoeuvres.

On 9 August, the Dutch vessels which were sailing southwards were lost to view. Only four of their vessels now remained before the fort. On 10 August, de la Haye scouted the countryside taking a detachment of sailors with him. All the stocks of food had dwindled and the rice ration was reduced by a quarter. Three horses which had strayed away from the Moorish camp were caught and killed by some of our men at Fort Blanc. They salted the meat and kept it away for provisions.

On 11 August, some workmen sent out by the Dutch to cut grass were forced to retreat by the cannon which was fired at them from the fort. At ten o’clock at night, the enemy fired seven balls at the city.

THE DESERTION OF THE ADJUTANT DANVAL

De la Haye had decided to attack the Moorish camp and had set aside 12 August as the date when this action was to take place. In the morning the adjutant, Danval, was ordered to get the men ready and distribute munitions. What happened now took everyone completely by surprise. While some of the men were attending high mass, the news was brought that Danval, Lecouvreur and a cadet named Libertas had deserted and had already crossed the small bridge separating the city from the
Dutch. De la Haye was quite astonished by the news and could scarcely believe it. He left the church and from the walls he could see the three deserters inside the enemy camp. No incident at San Thomé had been as unexpected as this one. Danval, a soldier of fortune had been promoted adjutant by de la Haye. The General had looked on Lecouvreur, a young man of good family, with as much affection as he would his own son. He had gone out of his way to teach the young man mathematics and everything else which could make the latter a better engineer, this being the capacity in which he was employed at San Thomé. He had all the keys and could do what he wanted with them. No person could have been better treated than he and at the same time no one could have possessed a deeper knowledge of our affairs. Libertas, a cadet, was always to be found in the company of Lecouvreur. The subversion of these two men was attributed to the influence of Danval. Fear must also have played a part. They believed that de la Haye’s plan of a sortie was a counsel of despair and did not wish to play any part in it. The entire garrison was consternated by this desertion and de la Haye did not feel that it was now expedient to engage in the sortie.

De la Haye went out, nevertheless, to reconnoitre in the afternoon. He placed himself at the head of his guards and a few volunteers, and to reassure the garrison, he went up close to the enemy camp. None of the latter emerged and our men returned to the fort. The General was secretly informed that if he marched out to encounter the enemy, some of the soldiers and sailors would desert. Even though the senior officers were openly talking of quitting, de la Haye could not let them know that they were under suspicion. Letters were received from Pondicherry. These described the difficult circumstances there and the impossibility of procuring any help without financial resources.

**Subterfuge Practiced by de la Haye to Raise the Morale of the Soldiers**

A Dutch ketch sailed in from the south and anchored to the windward of the fort close to the shore. Three men from the
India in the 17th Century

bastion at Porte Royale and three others from Fort Sans Peur deserted. When de la Haye was informed that it was their fear that they would be made to attack the enemy that was causing the men to desert, he made three rounds of the walls during the same night and did everything possible to reassure the men on guard. A rumour was circulating that there was only enough food for four days. De la Haye promised that on the following day he would allow the men to see that there were sufficient stocks for three months.

On 13 August, the stores were opened and four soldiers from each company were allowed to enter. They saw a huge mound of rice and barrels full of corn and biscuits. It seemed as though there were enough stocks to last for more than three months. it was however, all a subterfuge. There was nothing but sand below the rice. They had resorted to this trick to try and make the men get over their fear that they were all going to starve to death. The garrison was then assembled at the square and the men who had made the inspection related what they had seen. De la Haye continued to exhort the men to keep patience still, assuring them that reinforcements could not but reach them in time. He then discoursed to them about the route he had intended to take and the methods he had determined to follow by which success would have been assured. However, as he had communicated these plans to the adjutant Danval, he had to give them up as they would certainly have been revealed to the enemy.

Express messengers were sent to Pondicherry with duplicates of the letters which had been written the most recently in which the straits to which the city had been reduced were described. On 16 August, they reconnoitred close to the Moorish camp. It was learnt that the enemy, fearing a sortie, was on guard. A Dutch vessel which had come in from the south anchored before the city. One of the ships which were there lifted anchor and moored two leagues further out to sea.

On 17 August, de la Haye accompanied by his guards and a detachment of sailors rode more than a league into the countryside. De la Haye wished to use this foray to prove to the men that we were still feared by the enemy, for had the latter
possessed even the least resolution it would have been very easy for them to have cut us off.

It was noted that since the past four days, the enemy had been coming quite openly to Luz Church. This appeared to provide the opportunity for arranging an ambush. Sieur de la Sauvagère (elsewhere la Sauvagère) an officer of merit who was guarding the outskirts under d'Orgeret, was selected to take charge of this operation. He posted himself with fifteen men at a point where he would not be seen, and when thirty Dutch lascars came here as they usually did, he opened fire with such accuracy that five of the enemy were killed, seven were injured and the rest took to flight. De la Haye had taken up his position close by with his guards and the volunteers. He now advanced and joined la Sauvagère but since none of the enemy appeared again the contingent returned to San Thomé. A Dutch ship which had sailed in from the south came and moored itself close to the others. One of the officers suggested that he should go and burn one of the Dutch ships, but his plan appeared somewhat vague and no further attention was paid to it.

One of the men whom we had sent to Madras succeeded in returning to San Thomé by catamaran. He informed the General that a Danish ship which had arrived at Tranquebar had brought out a packet for our General from court. De la Haye would receive it within two or three days. De la Haye took this opportunity to explain to the garrison that the packet contained news of the help which was being despatched to us. The officers, soldiers and sailors did not derive the least satisfaction from this news. They were now murmuring quite openly and the rations were diminishing in quantity each day.

On the night of 20-21 August, the enemy came up to Luz Church from where they opened up a musketry fire which they kept up till the morning when they withdrew. A Danish bark anchored close to the Dutch ships and then set sail towards the north. De la Haye came out leading a force consisting of his guards, ten of the cadets and twenty sailors. He joined d'Orgeret who had been ordered to await the arrival of the General along with twenty able men. They advanced into the plain with these small numbers and attacked two of the enemy advance guards. Those who came forward to give battle were
killed while the others took to flight. The arms of twelve to fifteen of the enemy were brought back to the parade grounds. The enemy kept themselves under cover in their camp and at night a great noise of trumpets and drums could be heard emanating from the Moorish camp.

On 22 August, de la Haye described to the garrison the ease with which the enemy could be defeated. He managed to win the acceptance of the men to the enterprise he had in mind and ordered each one to keep himself ready to take advantage of the first opportunity.

Another Dutch vessel arrived on 23 August and anchored close to the others. Brandy was distributed among the officers and the men. At night a soldier belonging to the company of cadets deserted. Two express messengers arrived from Madras on 24 August but they did not bring any letters from Pondicherry. Both men were questioned and one of them contradicted himself. This made him suspect and he was thrown into prison. Three Portuguese soldiers deserted during the night. On 25 August, the feast of St. Louis was celebrated. In the evening, the Dutch fired twenty-one round shots at us with their cannon. On the night of 26-27 August, letters were received from Pondicherry. These gave the news of the arrival of Sieur Chevreuil and of his unwillingness to hand over the letters of credit which he had with him. Chevreuil claimed that his reluctance stemmed from the orders which he had received from court according to which he was expected to maintain a detailed account of all disbursements made from this sum. He wrote all this to the General also. The remaining letters described the impossibility of procuring help without financial resources. However, every attempt would be made to seize some barks if any could be found proceeding out of Caddalore. As for myself and de Lespinay, both of us would go to Porto Novo to try and enthuse the men into taking action. Two men serving under d'Orgeret had deserted.

On 27 August, letters were written to Pondicherry describing the dire circumstances to which they had been reduced. They could not wait any longer. The enemy were the feeblest in the world and it would not require a large force to make them withdraw. Five hundred horses would be sufficient and we were
asked to try and obtain this number from the Nayak of Madura. During the intervening period, we were to try and send a boat to San Thomé. The terms used in the letter wore an eloquent testimony to the desperate situation which they were facing. A strong letter was also written to Chevreuil castigating him for the difficulties he was placing in the way of the implementation of the orders which I had received from the General. De la Haye threatened to hold him responsible for any damage caused to the affairs of the King as a result of his recalcitrance. In order to obviate any further difficulties which could be created by the clerk, de la Haye sent me a commission appointing me naval Commissary. It would be in this capacity that I would furnish receipts to Chevreuil for the sums advanced by him.

**The Sortie of 27-28 August — Increasing Wave of Desertions**

It was difficult to send those letters out from San Thomé as the enemy had closed all the routes. De la Haye determined to open up a passage as it was important that the letters should reach us. He left the fort at night at the head of his guards, some volunteers, thirty soldiers and fifty sailors. After joining a detachment which was outside the fort he advanced into the plain. The first encounter took place with a group of 500 men who had been stationed by the enemy along the river. Our men were recognized and the enemy took up a defensive position behind a major entrenchment which had been raised by them. This extended from the embankment of a large tank right up to their camp and the entire work was interspersed with redoubts at musket shot distance of each other.

De la Haye attacked from the left side of the river where a guard of infantry and cavalry had been posted. At the first discharge which was made at almost point-blank range by our men, a large number of the enemy was laid low while an even larger number had to be carried away. Even as our men surmounted the entrenchment and engaged the enemy at close quarters, our adversary fell back on a second group of soldiers at the distance of a musket shot. These men had been posi-
tioned here to support the first division. With undiminished vigour, our men forced the entire group to retreat to a third outpost fortified by a strong redoubt. The enemy rallied here and stood their ground. Our men halted briefly to reform and then, with the officers at their head they advanced forcefully. For a little while the Moors, among whom several Dutchmen were to be found, managed to resist but as our men continued to advance with unabated vigour and began to mingle with them, they finally ceded ground. Our men pursued them for half a league along the entrenchments during this attack. Only the enemy camp now remained and our men had almost decided to attack it. However, in view of the paucity of our number, the late hour of the night, and the fact that the Dutch could attack and take the fort in the absence of our men, de la Haye decided to return to the city. They were back under the cannon of the fort at dawn. As they were returning, many torches could be seen in the Moorish camp from which they were sending out their cavalry to reinforce their positions but it was now too late. The enemy had sustained heavy losses in the recent action. Our men made two of the enemy prisoners and captured two of their horses. We had only one man killed and our express messenger had been able to slip through amidst all the confusion. The officers who had commanded the detachment had excelled themselves and deserved the highest praise. Among others, the infantry captains Sieurs d'Estreville and de Rochambaut, and d'Orgeret and la Sauvagère, who were commanding the outskirts deserve special mention.

On 28 August, de la Haye addressed the garrison at the square. He pointed out how easy it would be to beat the enemy since their best soldiers had been put into a state of disarray by only one company of our men. Reinforcements would take a few more days to reach us but if the men were content with rations of half a pound of rice to go with their meat the food would last out till then. Not a single man responded, a sure sign that the proposal did not meet with their satisfaction. Two carpenters who had been at work on a boat deserted in broad daylight. At night, fifteen others, roadmen, soldiers and sailors followed suit.

On 29 August, ten country people came loaded with rice and tobacco. This was distributed among the soldiers and
sailors. De la Haye asked the latter to wait for another eight
days promising that after this they would be allowed to do
whatever they wished. He also proposed to lead an attack
against the Moorish camp and guaranteed to the men that they
would succeed. He gave them the whole day to discuss his
plans among themselves. Letters of an old date were received
from Pondicherry.

At eight o'clock, the garrison was again assembled at the
square. De la Haye asked the men if they had decided in favour
of an attack on the enemy camp. The enterprise could not but
succeed if the men performed as well as they had been doing
up to now. He asked those who were straying from the path of
duty to reflect on their actions and pin their faith on him for
he would lead them on the path to glory. All the men agreed
to the enterprise. They were given a good draught of brandy
and this was followed by prayers. The doors were about to be
opened to allow the men to go when news was brought that an
adjutant of the cadets had deserted with eight soldiers from the
redoubt between the bastions Dauphin and Soleil. These men
had forced the sentinel to accompany them and if order was not
quickly restored all the men in the bastion would also leave.
This news led to utter disorder and consternation. Several blus¬
tered their way to the walls and leaping down from them made
their way to the enemy camp. Many more were about to follow
this example. This caused de la Haye and the other important
officers to take up their positions along the walls to prevent
further desertions. They spent the entire night in performing
this duty and in going round on patrol as all thought of the
sortie had been given up. At several places, rope ladders and
coils of rope which the men had intended to use to make their
escape were still to be found. In the morning, eighteen men
were discovered to have deserted.

The 30 August passed by uneventfully as measures to prevent
desertion were vigilantly pursued.

THE DECISION TO CAPITULATE IS TAKEN

Conditions being so critical, de la Haye convened all the officers
to a meeting and presented the situation to them. All his efforts
to procure reinforcements through the agency of Martin had been negated by the pusillanimity of Chevreuil who had refused to hand over the money in his keeping. Hence even though our friends were holding troops ready for us, we could not take advantage of these as we could not pay for them. Martin had gone to Porto Novo to try and seize some barks loaded with rice but the success of this venture could not be counted upon. There was only sufficient food for eight days if each man in the garrison were given half a pound per day. The low morale of the garrison and the dangers ahead had also to be borne in mind. De la Haye requested the officers to express their views. It was unanimously decided that negotiations should be started with the Dutch as it was impossible to hold out any longer. It should be noted that throughout the two years that San Thomé had held out against the enemy without receiving any assistance from France, de la Haye and the officers had fulfilled their duties extremely well. A letter was written to Pavilioen, the Dutch commander at Triplicane, asking him to send a reliable person through whom we could open communications. It was felt that the letter should be delivered in secrecy so that the Moors would have no knowledge of the treaty. We wished to avoid discussions with these people who had shown their inability to keep their word. Sieur Thibaudeau, a surgeon in the Company service, was entrusted with the letter. He left the fort and on approaching the Dutch camp he was greeted by six Frenchmen who had quit two days ago who mistook him to be a deserter. He did not disabuse them of their illusion and asked to speak to the commander. He was led to the latter who received him well. He was sent back with the promise that a letter would be written to the General on the following day. Right through the night, the city was patrolled and rounds were taken to prevent desertion. All that remained now were two barrels of old biscuits, ten to twelve cows and a small quantity of butter and rice sufficient for six days.

De la Haye went out to reconnoitre on 31 August and had wine and butter distributed to the entire garrison on his return. At two o’clock in the afternoon, an envoy from the Dutch camp brought the reply to the letter which the General had written the previous day to the Dutch commander. De la Haye
replied immediately asking that an officer with a knowledge of French should be sent that very day so that de la Haye could confer with him in secret. At four o’clock in the evening, Tacq, an infantry captain who spoke French extremely well, came to the city. Two cavaliers greeted him at the outskirts of the city and conducted him to the Jesuit priory to which place de la Haye also found his way. After talks lasting half an hour, Tacq returned to the Dutch camp being escorted up to the outer limits by the two horsemen.

September 1674

PONDICHERY DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER—FINAL ATTEMPTS TO SECURE HELP FROM SHER KHAN AND LAST EFFORTS MADE IN THE DIRECTION OF PORTO NOVO

I will now return to events at Pondicherry during the month of September. On 1 September, we wrote to Sher Khan about the rejection of the bill of exchange which we had drawn on Golconda. On 2 September Chevreuil had left with Antoine Cattel to meet Sher Khan at Valikondapuram to negotiate the terms for the entire sum which had been entrusted to the clerk. We had finally got Chevreuil to agree to this after several protests but it was all too late now.

The Captain of the “Diligente” informed us that when he had sent one of his men to inspect the bar, the guards who had been posted here by the Governor of Porto Novo had arrested this person suspecting him of some design. The Captain had also suggested that one of us should come to Porto Novo to meet him and investigate the possibility of making an attempt on the paros and sampans which were to set out from Cuddalore loaded with rice. De Lespinay and I discussed that matter and we decided that de Lespinay should go to Porto Novo even though the chances of success were very small. I would have preferred to have gone myself but the Dutch kept a very careful watch on all my movements. The above mentioned de Lespinay was not as suspect and after sending an express messenger to San Thomé, he left on 3 September. I later received letters from Sher Khan in which he asked me to come and meet him without delay. I left at four o’clock in the evening.
On 5 September, I caught up with Chevreuil and Antoine Cattel and on 7 September, we arrived at Valikondapuram. We were able to meet Sher Khan on the same day and hand over all the documents which were required to enable him to obtain possession of the money which was lying at Golconda.

On 8 September, Sher Khan told us that he had received information that our General had sent an envoy to the Dutch camp to start negotiations with them. The Dutch were still refusing to grant him passports for his ships and as a result he had been forced to offload a ship which had been ready to sail to Bengal from Cuddalore.

On 9 September, we had a wide-ranging discussion with Sher Khan. He promised that he would provide us with a large body of cavalry as soon as he had obtained access to the money. We knew it would then be too late but could do nothing and had to put ourselves entirely in his hands. We heard that some English ships had arrived at Madras bringing news that the English had concluded peace with the Dutch but there was no reference to us.

On 9 September, the arrival of two Dutch ships was confirmed. We asked Sher Khan for permission to set our bark at Pondicherry out to sea. He gave us a point blank refusal. We argued with him pointing out how prejudicial this would be to our interests, but could obtain no concession.

I received letters from de Lespinay who had returned to Pondicherry finding it impossible to undertake any exploit at Porto Novo. He confirmed the news of the arrival of the two Dutch ships and of the conclusion of peace between them (the English) and the Dutch. Eleven Dutch ships which had anchored at the Devenapatnam roads set sail for Ceylon. Fifteen barks which had been loaded with rice for Ceylon took advantage of

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*It was at this time that the Zamorin, knowing Sher Khan’s friendly disposition towards the French, sent envoys to Sher Khan with proposals for the French. The Zamorin would provide de la Haye with 300,000 men to chase the Dutch out of Cochin and the entire coastline. The Frenchmen present informed de la Haye but the latter was not in a position to follow up the offer. B.N., N.A., 9352 (100).

*In February 1674, the English Parliament had forced Charles II to relinquish the French alliance.*
the departure of these ships. We had concluded our business with Sher Khan. Our letters to Golconda, the Malabar coast, Surat and France had been written and despatched by express messengers, and we now took leave of Sher Khan to return to Pondicherry.

A Dissertation on Toads and Ants

I cannot prevent myself from reporting what we saw on the morning of 12 September while we were on our way. There are many different species of ants in India and among these is one of a fairly large size which sprouts wings late in autumn. This is considered a delicacy by the local people. They take the hind part of these insects, much in the same way as we take those of frogs in France, and grill these lightly in a pan, placed on fire. This dish is then consumed with much ceremony. We had often noticed straw torches set alight in the countryside at night. We learnt that these insects which were attracted to fire would fall to the ground having singed their wings. The natives would then collect them. The feature which really surprised us, and which, perhaps, will be disbelieved is that several toads attracted by the same light, would also feed on these ants. Some would eat so many that their stomachs would become greatly distended by the quantity consumed. The women would catch these toads slit their stomachs and take out the ants which were to be found whole inside. These would be cooked along with the others and be eaten indiscriminately. It is difficult to believe this but I have seen all this with my own eyes. True, the Indian toads, which the natives catch with their bare hands, are not as venomous as those in Europe but they are as repulsive in appearance. I would like to point out that it is not necessity which forces the natives to have recourse to this diet as the countryside is quite bounteous.

We reached Pondicherry on 13 September and received confirmation that a treaty had been signed for the rendition of San Thomé. This news received further confirmation in the days which followed.
News of the Capitulation of San Thome is received on 17 September

On 17 September, two lascar captains brought us letters from de la Haye. We were informed that as conditions at San Thome were in such a critical state, de la Haye had been forced to convene a meeting of the officers at the garrison to discuss the situation. There was a unanimous decision that negotiations should be started. If we had any important communication to make with regard to the despatch of help or any other matter, we were to write immediately. The Director, Baron, also wrote to me. I was to send de Lespinay, Deltor, Villedor and all the other Frenchmen at Pondicherry, particularly Chevreuil, to San Thome by the transport to be provided, by the Dutch. We were staggered by the news of the loss of San Thome. It is true that we had been expecting such an outcome knowing that it would be impossible to hold out against so many enemies for such a long time in the absence of any reinforcements from Europe, but this did not serve to lessen the blow in any way.

The men who had been recalled got ready for their departure and waited for the transport which was to be sent by the Dutch. I vacated all our quarters on 19 September. We were asked by the chief of the Dutch counter at Devenapatnam to be ready to embark on the transport which he would be sending to us.

On seeing three Dutch ships sailing from the south towards the north, we concluded these to be the transport about which they had written to us. Chevreuil expected stringent action to be taken against him knowing that de la Haye was extremely incensed against him. He felt that he would be charged with having caused the loss of San Thome. He ran away, semi-nude as he was, in the midst of all the confusion as the others were waiting to embark. We were so intent on following the Dutch ships which were continuing their route towards the north that we had no thoughts to spare for him. Finally, on noting his absence we asked for him, sending out natives to get information about him. They brought back the news that Chevreuil had withdrawn to Villianur, an aldea about two leagues away.

**Villenour in the text.**
from us. Since this place lay within the jurisdiction of Gingee, we could not bring Chevreuil away by force. I sent some men to try and persuade him to come back but he categorically refused to do so and we had perforce to leave things as they were.

On 20 September a bark with one Dutchman on board arrived from Devenapatnam. Some of our men embarked on it. The sea was extremely rough and Deltor and Cloche who were the last to leave, were unable to board the vessel as it had already set sail. They had to wait until 20 September when they embarked on a chelingue with four sailors on board sent by the Dutch. I stayed behind with six men.

Chevreuil returned on 23 September. Since I was not authorized to use any force against him, I contented myself with informing Baron about his return. Sher Khan wrote me a letter in which he described how sorry he had felt to hear of the fall of San Thomé. He assured us that there would be no break in his friendly feelings towards us. I received letters from him again on 28 September in which he repeated the same sentiments. He was only being politic as he did not wish to get on the wrong side of either the Dutch or ourselves. Despite this, he could have extended us more efficacious help than in fact he had done.

SAN THOME’ IN SEPTEMBER—THE TERMS OF THE CAPITULATION

During the last days of the month, many conflicting reports about San Thomé reached me. I shall take up a description of the events which took place there during the month of September in order to complete my narration of this affair.

Tacq who had conferred with de la Heye on 31 August, returned to the fort on 1 September at ten o’clock in the morning. The two men conferred together for two hours after which they had dinner. Two men were then picked out to go to the Dutch camp as hostages. The Dutch were also to send two, of whom Tacq was counted as one. Our men were directed to proceed to Fort d’Orgeret and wait there until the second Dutch hostage had been seen proceeding from the Dutch camp towards the city. Passports were reciprocally exchanged. In the evening Martin Pit, who was in charge of the provisioning of the Dutch camp entered the fort and the two officers from our side went to the Dutch camp on 2 September.
The whole of 3 September was taken up in the framing of the articles of rendition. In the evening, Pit took the draft to the Dutch camp and returned on 4 September. Some of the articles were amended and the draft had to be sent back again. There was now food for only one day. The Dutch were to furnish two ships on which the garrison was to return to France. When the vessels which had been offered were inspected, one was found to be completely unfit for the voyage. This vessel was rejected and its replacement by the Dutch flagship was demanded to which the Dutch agreed. The garrison had to be content with a quarter of a biscuit per person which was all that the men received by way of food.

On 5 September there was a general agreement as to the terms of the treaty. Two copies were made of the articles, one in French and the other in Dutch. On 6 September, de la Haye assembled all the officers and had the treaty read out to them. He then asked for their reactions. Taking into consideration the situation in which they were placed, all of them found the articles very advantageous. The convention was then signed. De la Haye at San Thomé and Pavilioen at Triplicane both gave solemn promises to uphold the treaty. Our hostages returned from the enemy camp and were replaced by two other officers. Tacq stayed on at San Thomé along with Martin Pit, making his way to the Dutch camp whenever this was necessary. In accordance with the terms of the treaty which I am herewith appending, the Dutch sent 1200 pounds of rice and three cows to the garrison for its subsistence. Provisions for our General were sent separately by Pavilioen.

**Articles for the Rendition of the City of San Thomé**

**Handed over to the Dutch on 6 September 1674**

1. The city is to be surrendered within fifteen days with all the cannon and munitions of war intact.

*The fortifications which were to be handed over by de la Haye to Pavilioen were to be in the same condition as at the time of the conquest of San Thomé by the French. D.R., 22, p. 300.*
2. Our men were to be allowed to take their baggage and emerge from the fort fully armed carrying lighted matches at their end of the procession.\[38\] They were to be permitted to beat their drums and carry their colours. Two six-pounder cannon were to be taken at the head of the train. Marching in this way our men were to embark on the ships.

3. The Dutch were to furnish two ships capable of undertaking the voyage to France. These ships were to be equipped with food sufficient for eight months and thirty pieces of iron cannon along with the necessary munitions.\[39\] The two cannon and their munitions were not to be included in this number.

4. The Dutch Company shall provide the two ships in a sound state duly stocked with food on condition that payment is made for the said food and that the two ships are returned to the above mentioned Company.\[40\]

5. The two ships shall set out from San Thomé within fifteen days without making any halts on territories inhabited by the Dutch, i.e., territories under Dutch control with particular reference to Mauritius\[41\] and elsewhere.\[42\]

6. In return for the passport which was to be granted to us by the Dutch and for their undertaking not to impede us in any way during our voyage between this place and France, we would reciprocate with regard to their vessels and their possessions.

7. All hostilities shall cease from the day of the signature of this treaty with the article included therein.\[43\] We are not to

\[38\]The French were to be allowed to take their horses also. ibid., p. 301.

\[39\]This was to include ten large guns of ten balls and ten of eight balls, ten of a smaller calibre of eight balls, 18,000 of good gunpowder and 3,000 bullets. Ibid., loc. cit.

\[40\]These adjustments were to be effected in Europe. Ibid., pp. 301-32.

\[41\]In 1558, the Dutch took this island away from the Portuguese who had discovered it in 1505. They named it “Mauritius” in honour of the Stadtholder, Maurice of Nassau. It was abandoned by them in 1710. Between 1715-1767 agents of the French East India Company held it and the name was changed to “Ile de France”.

\[42\]The ships should either steer clear of Madagascar or sail through the straits (i.e., Mozambique channel). They were not to stop at any harbour on the Cape but were permitted to make one stop at St. Helena, Ascension or any other sparsely inhabited island provided that the harbour was not a Dutch possession. D.R., 22, p. 302.

\[43\]This included the cessation of all inimical moves against the Moors also. Ibid., loc. cit.
proceed beyond the city to the distance of one and a half musket shots; nor may the Dutch and the Moors cross these limits to approach any closer to the city.  

8. From the day of the signature of the treaty, supplies shall be sent each day to San Thomé consisting of one and a half pounds of rice per person for 800 men, three cows and fifteen kids.

9. The clauses of the treaty are to have validity for a period of two months. If within this time, reinforcements, large or small, are received from France, no help, may be extended from the garrison nor may it participate in any of the operations by sea or land. Neither may any food sent to the garrison by sea or land during the same period be accepted.

10. All the inhabitants of the city including the Portuguese and the others are to be allowed to withdraw wherever they please within fifteen days.

11. On the day of the signature of the treaty, both sides are to release all their prisoners.

12. If the Director-General Baron so desires, he will be allowed to embark for Surat on a Dutch ship on which he will be accorded every honour. Should he prefer to travel overland with his entourage, he will be provided with a passport by the Dutch and the Moors.

13. From the day of the signature of the treaty until the day of the departure of the French, each side will retain two men.

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44 The boundaries laid down for the French were as follows: on one side they were not to proceed beyond Luz Church, along the waterfront, the limit was placed at musket shot distance of Fort d'Orgeret while towards the south they were not to cross the river Adyar. Ibid., loc. cit.

45 The Dutch appeared to have computed the cost at the rate of 1½ rixdollars per person which came to a total of 1,200 rixdollars for 800 men. Ibid., p. 303.

46 The Dutch were also not to extend any help from land. Hostilities were to be strictly confined to the engagement between the two squadrons. In case of a French victory the treaty would no longer be held valid. Ibid., loc. cit.

47 The Moors were also included in this agreement. Ibid., loc. cit.

48 Baron was to be allowed to take his equipage, weapons and baggage with him. If he chooses to go to Surat by sea he would have to wait for the commencement of the next season. Ibid., loc. cit.
furnished in hostage by the other. When the French troops shall
march out of San Thomé to embark, two men are to be sent by
the Dutch to take delivery of the keys of the city from its com-
mandant.

14. If the Dutch so desire they can send us in convoy but this
shall not in any way restrict our right to sail directly to France.
Nor are the Dutch to be allowed to embark any of their men
on the two ships without the consent of the French.

15. Both sides are to observe the articles of the present treaty
in good faith and with good intentions free of fraud or duplicity
despite the existence of autographical errors and any other
ambiguities.

Executed at San Thomé on this day, 6 September 1674.49

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAPITULATION

On 7 September, two English ships appeared from the south.
When they approached the Dutch ships, they fired a salute which
was returned. The ships then sailed past close to the city firing
another salute of nine cannon balls. This salute was returned
from the fort shot by shot. The vessels then anchored before
Madras from where it was learnt that the King of England had
been forced by his subjects to forsake his close alliance with
our great King and sign a peace treaty with the Dutch. We also
learnt that the Emperor, Spain and, indeed, almost the whole
of Europe had declared themselves against us. It was in this

49A sixteenth article is to be found in the Dutch text. De la Haye,
Baron, de Maillé and the other important officers at San Thomé promise
to keep, execute and maintain exactly and in good faith the treaty and the
articles of the document which they have signed and sealed, while on the
other side Pavilioen and the gentlemen of the Council of the United Pro-
vinces will also keep faith in the same way. This treaty with sixteen
articles has been made and signed both at San Thomé and Triplicane on
6 September 1674. The signatories to the treaty on the French side were
Des Cartes, De Herville, Jullien Rackenbeau, De Raignaux, Chaute Aupers
Thiverno, La Junquere, De Maineuillers, De Maillé, Chevalier de
Maison Neuf, Baron, La Haye, De Lorin, Secretary. (The original spellings
have been retained for both the French and Dutch names). On the Dutch
side were A. Pavilioen, Barent Clebout, Marten Pit, Willem Hartsincq,
Jean Roelants, Herbert de Jaquer, François Tack, N. Ruysar, Secretary.
Ibid., pp. 304-305.
way that the war which was to bring so much glory to our King commenced. Our monarch had demonstrated to our enemies what France could achieve fighting single-handed under the leadership of an able and well-loved Prince.

On 8 September, another Dutch ship sailed in from the south and anchored along with the other boats. Martin Pit who had been to Madras sought out de la Haye and confirmed the news of the cessation of hostilities between themselves and the English.

On 9 September, two French officers were sent to inspect the provisions of food placed on board the two Dutch ships supplied for the passage to return to France. Two competent boatswains were also sent to equip the vessels with the requisite tackle and secure the necessary replacements.

On 10 September, de la Haye wrote to Pavilioen, the Dutch commander, pointing out that according to one of the clauses of the treaty all prisoners made by the two parties were to be set at liberty. He requested Pavilioen to secure the release of all those held by the Moors at Chicacole. Apart from the legal justification of this claim, de la Haye also pointed out that it would be a work of charity inasmuch as the renunciation of their faith by Christians who might seek the method of adopting the faith of their captors as a way to escape from their misery, could be averted by such action. Our General further prayed that any news from Europe should be shared with him. Pavilioen promised to do what he could to secure the release of the prisoners, and as for the news of Europe we would have to go to the English for this. Letters were received from Pondicherry but they were of an old date.

On 10 September, de la Haye sent one of the Company merchants to the English ships to greet the Captains and request to be informed about the news of Europe. It was very difficult to believe that His Brittanic Majesty could have broken the alliance which had bound the two monarchs so closely together and these gentlemen were begged to describe the conditions which had existed at the time of their departure from England. The English confirmed the news which they had proclaimed on their arrival. Two of our officers deserted during the night. One of them was the adjutant who had been sent under arrest
to the "Breton" for his part in the embezzlement of the rice from the two boats which had been sent from Porto Novo. He had managed to escape when the "Breton" had been wrecked and in his hour of need he had vowed that he would become a monk if he survived his ordeal. He had subsequently fulfilled his promise having joined a Portuguese house of the recollect order^50 and I heard that he later acquired much esteem. The second officer was a young man who had nothing to look forward to at home and believed that he could advance his fortunes better in India than in France.

On 11 September, letters were written to Pondicherry describing how the conditions to which they had been reduced had forced them to negotiate with the Dutch and agree to the handing over of the city on the 22 of the month. If they had any news of peace or there was any prospect of their sending help from Pondicherry soon, they were to send on this information without any delay. Martin was asked to make haste to send back all Frenchmen from Pondicherry, particularly Chevreuil, on the transport to be provided by the Dutch.

All the lascar officers and men at San Thomé were dismissed on 12 September. Two of the captains were ordered to go to Pondicherry with copies of the letters written on the previous day. On 13 September, letters were received from Pondicherry describing the impossibility of despatching any help. Chevalier de Maisonneuve received a commission to proceed to the "Rammekin" as Captain and prepare the ship for the voyage. Sieur de Manvilliers was sent in a similar capacity to the "Welze". All the church ornaments which had been found in the San Thomé Chathedral were sent to Madras on 15 September.

On 16 September, a letter was written to Pavilioen on the lack of diligence in evidence in the outfitting of the ships with all the requisites for the voyage. The men would have to wait till this was done before they could load their personal effects.

^50 An offshoot of an Observantine branch of the Franciscan Order founded in Spain in 1500.

^51 The two ships are referred to in the Dutch records as the "Rammekene" and the "Thuys de Velsen" respectively. D.R., 23, p.7.
Martin Pit brought us back the reply on the same day by which we were promised every satisfaction.

The Moors were extremely annoyed with the Dutch who were now enjoying all the credit for the capitulation without having called on them for their participation. They devised a plot being determined to get their own back on the Dutch. The confided in some individuals who revealed their plans to a Frenchman at Madras. The latter wrote to de la Haye who replied immediately but there were no further developments to this affair.

The personal effects of the men began to be loaded onto the ships on 17 September. On 18 September, the treasurer and the store keeper were sent to the Dutch camp to draw up the exact account of everything that had been supplied by the Dutch.

On 19 September, de la Haye was told that a present and a letter sent to him by the King of Golconda had reached the Moorish camp. It was said that the King was offering our General considerable inducements to enter Golconda service. De la Haye responded very coldly to this offer and ignored both the present and the latter.

San Thome was handed over to the Dutch on 23 September. De la Haye then embarked on the "Welze" which he had chosen for his passage back to France. Baron accompanied him to the ship and after bidding the last farewells, the Director proceeded to Madras. He had secured permission from the Governor to withdraw to this place with all his men while awaiting an opportunity to return to Surat.

On 24 September, the two ships "Welze" and "Rammekin" arrived at the city. De la Haye has played too important a role

The acute sensitivity to national differences appear to have been born from the forces of patriotic self-consciousness generated by British rule in India. This feeling appears to have been totally absent during the period under review. The Mughals reached well out of their own ethnic groups to enrol Hindus, Rajputs and Marathas as imperial mansabdars to facilitate the expansion and consolidation of their empire. The Deccani sultanates were even more liberal in this respect. Vide Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, London, 1966, pp. 22-37; *Deccan History Congress*, 1st Session, pp. 309-312. In view of the maritime weakness of all the Indian states, the services of de la Haye could be of inestimable value provided he could be persuaded to take office. For the text of this letter vide Duarte, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
in my narrative for me not to follow his career to its close. His end befitted one who had rendered such signal services to his King and country during his lifetime.

DE LA HAYE RETURNS TO FRANCE—HIS DEATH

I will not say anything about the voyage and indeed there was nothing noteworthy about it. On 19 November, the two ships anchored at the island of Mascareigne or Bourbon. The ships stopped here for a few days to take in water, wood and refreshments. De la Haye took this opportunity to go ashore. He removed the person whom he had installed as Governor when he had been at Fort Dauphin as the violent behaviour of this official had alienated everybody. D'Orgeret, an officer of singular merit who had never failed de la Haye at San Thomé, was now appointed to this office while the Protestant Sieur Florimond, a lieutenant who had also distinguished himself was appointed Deputy-Governor. Fifteen to twenty Frenchmen belonging to both the ships who wished to stay behind were allowed to do so. After promising to send help to them during the following year, de la Haye set sail on 2 December.

On 8 December, the two ships moored at the entrance to the bay at Fort Dauphin. Some men were sent ashore to find out how things were. They brought back the news that Champmargou, the Governor had died. His successor, Sieur de la Bretèche along with the remaining settlers had abandoned the fort and the settlement and had embarked on the “Barbet” to return to France. The natives had then come and set everything aflame. This was all the information that our men were able to gather after talking to the natives who had been in the service of the late Champmargou. I will describe the truth of the matter prior to the conclusion of my narrative.

Finding that he could do nothing here, de la Haye lifted anchor and continued on his way. On 26 January 1675, he ancho-

De la Haye had put in at Fort Dauphin, Madagascar on 23 November 1670 while leading the squadron to the east. During the six weeks which he spent here, he had reorganised the administration of Bourbon. Kaep panglin, op. cit., pp. 50-1.
India in the 17th Century

red at the roads at the island of Saint Helena. The officials sent to procure food and water found that the inhabitants were in a state of panic as they feared that our men would attack them. The leading merchant came on board to request de la Haye to allow only ten men to disembark to procure their requirements. These men were to be unarmed and were not even to carry swords. He showed some orders to de la Haye which were quite explicit on this point. De la Haye humoured them. The officers stayed on board and only the sailors were sent ashore. It took four days to replenish the water and the wood and the ships set out again on the 31 January.

They continued on their route. The winds were variable and at times proved contrary. Many members of the crew were laid low by scurvy and dropsy. So many lives were claimed by these diseases that there were barely enough men to navigate the vessel. The ship leaked so badly that every one had to take their turn at the pumps and de la Haye also took his along with the others. After an extremely arduous voyage during which at least half the crew died, the “Welze” arrived at Port Louis in the month of May. The “Rammekin”, commanded by the Chevalier de Maisonneuve, had separated during the voyage and it put in at La Rochelle. This vessel had also suffered in the same way as the first. De la Haye who had survived all the tribulations of the voyage took seriously ill on disembarkation. His condition became critical. It was at this time that the orders from court were received. All the men who had returned were paid and they were recompensed for the expenses incurred by them at Port Louis.

In order to recover, de la Haye went to Paris from where he proceeded to Flanders at the head of the officers who had returned with him from India. Here he was granted an audience with

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4 "This island was discovered on 21 May 1502 by the Portuguese explorer Joao de Nova and given the name of St. Helena. It was developed as a port of call for ships travelling to the east but by 1603 the Portuguese had lost interest in the island. The island was occupied by the Dutch between 1645-1651. The British then appropriated the island which was given over to the English East India Company. The Dutch recaptured the island on 1 January 1673 but were evicted on 5 May of the same year. Since this date St. Helena remained in British possession."
the King who was returning from one of the campaigns which have covered our monarch with so much glory. De la Haye was received very kindly when he paid his respects. Our General had then presented the officers who had followed him who were also very well regarded. Each was allowed to enter the service of his choice. Some accordingly entered the army while others were absorbed into the navy. In the following year, de la Haye took service with the rank of Lieutenant-General and was appointed to the command of Thionville. He acquitted well all the responsibilities of the important positions to which he was appointed. In the year... he was wounded by a musket shot after having defeated a confederate convoy which was on its way to join Prince Charles of Lorraine. He succumbed to this injury within two or three days. Thus did this noble man die in action. He had risen by his own ability and his meritorious actions. Had his life been spared, he would undoubtedly have been elevated to still more exalted positions by the King in reward for his actions.

I have now described the outcome of the squadron sent by the King to India. Surely, we could have expected a more favourable outcome had we known to make better use of all the advantages we had enjoyed.
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*Note*: The appendage of letter ‘n’ to the pagination statement at various places below refer to the explanatory and footnotes at the respective pages. Pagination in the index refers to page numbers printed at the head of each page in the present volume.

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